Somnath Iyer, J.- This is an unusual application, presented by a husband, for a direction of the nature of a habeas corpus under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that his wife should be set at liberty. The allegation of the petitioner is that she is illegally and improperly detained by her father in Mysore. The accusations made by the petitioner against his father-in-law is that on 14th November, 1966, he came with a reinforcement of hooligans to the petitioner’s house in Bangalore and forcibly removed his daughter from the roof of the petitioner after having manhandled the members of the petitioner’s family and who, according to the allegation of the petitioner, were subjected to violent treatment. The petitioner says that in respect of the happenings on 14th November, 1966, in his own house, he presented a complaint to the police authorities on the very same day and that his complaint was registered. When this application came up for admission on 21st November, 1966, we admitted it and issued a direction to the petitioner’s father-in-law, who is the respondent before us, to produce the petitioner’s wife on 23rd November, 1966. The respondent and his daughter both appeared before us on that date, when both the respondent and the petitioner’s wife produced affidavits, in the course of which they denied the allegation that the petitioner’s wife was improperly or illegally detained by the respondent. The assertion made in those two affidavits is that the petitioner’s wife went to her father’s house by her own volition and as a free agent and that she did so in consequence of the cruelty to which she was subjected by the petitioner and his parents during her stay with her husband. She alluded, in the course of her affidavit, to the affidavit which was presented by her on 19th November, 1966, before the concerned police authorities. In paragraph 4 of her affidavit, she stated: “I say that my parents never compelled me or induced me to go and stay with them. On 14th November, 1966 at my own free will I went to Mysore with my parents. My liberty is not curtailed. I am not kept in detention by anybody illegally or by force. In paragraph 4 of her affidavit, she stated: “I say that my parents never compelled me or induced me to go and stay with them. On 14th November, 1966 at my own free will I went to Mysore with my parents. My liberty is not curtailed. I am not kept in detention by anybody illegally or by force. When I expressed my desire to go with my parents my father-in-law and his people offered obstruction and created commotion.” Paragraph 5 reads thus: “For the reasons, I have sworn to on 19th November, 1966, before the City Magistrate I was afraid to stay in my father-in-law’s house at Bangalore. Even now I am not willing to go there or live with my husband separately for some time to come.” In paragraph 6, she stated that after her marriage in February, 1966, she was subjected to torture during a period of 8 or 9 months in her husband’s house and that her life became miserable. She next stated that she apprehended danger to her life and that was the reason why she was reluctant to go back to her husband. In the course of his own affidavit, the respondent also made similar allegations and submitted that his daughter came to his house as a free agent and that she was quite at liberty to do what she liked and to go away if she wanted, and that it was not true to state that there was any improper or illegal detention. The petitioner, in the course of his two affidavits, maintain that the wife is detained in opposition to her will. The wife appeared before us on at least three occasions, and, we are able to observe that she has sufficient intelligence and comprehension. In a case like this, where the wife who has attained majority disclaims detention and refuses to return to the husband, there can be no occasion for liberation from detention, if there be no reason to believe that the apparent distaste for the company of the husband disguises the desire which the wife is not free to express. But the matter becomes complicated when it appears that the wife says what is put into her mouth by someone who is so able to dominate her will that she has suppressed the truth. But the matter becomes complicated when it appears that the wife says what is put into her mouth by someone who is so able to dominate her will that she has suppressed the truth. If there is sufficient reason to think that swayed by fear, intimidation or compulsion, the wife who feels deterred from speaking the truth, has levelled accusations against her husband, succumbing to the domination of another without having the courage or the power to resist the imposition, the ground for a direction of the nature of a habeas corpus would have been adequately established. The wife’s seeming reluctance to return to her husband, is, in that situation, a mask which when penetrated would display an emotion generated by an apprehension of peril likely to be encountered if she disowned the story she was asked to narrate or evinced eagerness to go back to the matrimonial home. A wife in that predicament, is, it is clear, in detention which is both illegal and improper and it would be our duty to liberate her. But, we are unable to deduce on the materials before us that the wife is the victim of any such domination or duress. The wife is a major and so should be presumed to have acquired the power of independent judgment. A serious accusation of forcible detention of a person who has attained the age of majority against a parent, should have the support of evidence which clearly proves the charge. We cannot in these proceedings investigate the truth of the accusation of cruelty and violence attributed to the husband. Nor are we concerned with the ethics or propriety of the wife’s conduct even if her revulsion for the company of her husband is impelled by intransigence, and, antecedent fondness for the husband cannot have then any relevance. In her affidavits, the wife completely exonerates her father of the charge that he removed her from the petitioner’s house against her will or impeded her return to her husband at any time. That accusation is also repudiated by her father. On the contrary, the wife asserts that she longed to visit her parents, but, that the petitioner’s father made a scene when her father came to Bangalore to take her to Mysore. She says she is just now quite unwilling to join her husband. That accusation is also repudiated by her father. On the contrary, the wife asserts that she longed to visit her parents, but, that the petitioner’s father made a scene when her father came to Bangalore to take her to Mysore. She says she is just now quite unwilling to join her husband. We have no reason to think that these statements by the wife do not reflect her true wishes or that they are inspired by any one who could by force or by the exertion of pressure, deflect her from truth. We think that the wife’s preference for the parental home is her own, and, that the union of the two spouses which does not appear imminent, is principally dependent on her own inclinations, guided in some measure, by legitimate parental advice. It is not within our power, when deciding an application under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to restore to a husband a wife who, not being a minor, has decided not to go back to him. So long as the reluctance to so go back to him is her own, and, is not the product of any external compulsion to which a timid wife surrenders her own free will, there is no element of restraint and so no detention. We are satisfied, on the materials before us, that the allegation that the petitioner’s wife is illegally or improperly detained by the respondent, is not established. So we dismiss this application. S.V.S. ----- Application dismissed.