Judgment.- Criminal Appeal No. 263 of 1964 is by accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and Criminal Appeals Nos. 261 and 262 of 1964 are by accused Nos. 4 and 5 in Sessions Cases Nos. 40 and 41 of 1963 on the file of the II Additional Sessions Judge, Bangalore, and the Additional Sessions Judge, Civil Station, Bangalore. They were tried for the offences of criminal conspiracy defined in section 120-A and punishable under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, and also separately for certain specific offences said to have been committed by them pursuant to the said conspiracy. The broad features of the case sought to be proved against them by the prosecution were that there had been a conspiracy with the object of cutting and removing illegally sandalwood trees from State Forests belonging under the law exclusively to the State Government, transporting them illegally, partly by road and partly by rail, to Bombay City and suburbs under false permits and false papers relating to transport by rail and selling them at Bombay or its suburbs. According to the case ultimately presented to the Court at the trial, the activities of this conspiracy had been going on for a period of at least two years, throughout which period the authorities, particularly officials and officers of the Forest Department, appearing to have been wholly ignorant of it. Indeed, but for a very fortuitous circumstance, these nefarious activities would have gone undetected. Sometime early in January, 1958, the Conservator of Forests K. Kadambi, examined as P.W. 1 in the case, received a pseudonymous telegram from Bombay informing him that 40 bags of sandalwood consigned by rail had arrived at Victoria Railway Terminus at Bombay, that the same remained undelivered or unclaimed by any person claiming to be consignee thereof and that should he consider the matter as one of importance and deserving investigation, he may look into it. Immediately on receipt of the telegram, P.W. 1 gave special instructions to two of his subordinates. He instructed P.W. 66 S.P. Uppin, the then Assistant Conservator of Forests, to proceed to Bombay. He also instructed P.W. 4 K.M. Subbaiah, District Forest Officer to proceed to Rajanukunte Railway Station, from which the telegram had stated that the consignment had emnated, for investigation. He instructed P.W. 66 S.P. Uppin, the then Assistant Conservator of Forests, to proceed to Bombay. He also instructed P.W. 4 K.M. Subbaiah, District Forest Officer to proceed to Rajanukunte Railway Station, from which the telegram had stated that the consignment had emnated, for investigation. The latter contacted the Station Master at Rajanukunte and collected some information about two consignments of 20 bags each of sandalwood booked and transported from the Station on. 31st December, 1957. The former (Uppin) found on arrival at Victoria Terminus at Bombay that the 40 bags referred to in the telegram received by the Conservator of Forests had just been delivered. Another fortuitous circumstances of a servant of a merchant called Govardhandass Tokersey being present on the Railway Platform at that time enabled him to trace the sandalwood consigned to the godown of the said Tokersey. At his instance the Police at Bombay seized the sandalwood in question under a mahazar Exhibit P-180 and later transported it to Bangalore. The Officers of the Forest Department lodged information with the Police at Stations empowered to investigate it. The facts disclosed by the investigation at the earliest stage were that about 50 bags of sandalwood had been transported by rail under four consignments from a station called Hirehalli and about 150 bags transported by rail under eight different consignments from a station called Rajanukunte. Both these Railway Stations are within the limits of the erstwhile State of Mysore and continue to be within the limits of the present State of Mysore. Apparently on account of the fact that Hirehalli is within one jurisdiction and Rajanukunte in another, two different first information reports and two final reports or charge-sheets came to be filed before two different Magistrates, one in respect of the consignments from Hirehalli and the other in respect of the consignments from Rajanukunte Station. In both, however, the accused were the same and there was a general charge of conspiracy in identical terms. Later both the chargeshetts were transferred to a single Magistrate the Special Magistrate at Bangalore. After holding an enquiry in that regard, he made two orders of commitment pursuant to which two sessions cases came to be registered on the file of the Court of Sessions, Civil Station, as Nos. 40 and 41 of 1963. Later both the chargeshetts were transferred to a single Magistrate the Special Magistrate at Bangalore. After holding an enquiry in that regard, he made two orders of commitment pursuant to which two sessions cases came to be registered on the file of the Court of Sessions, Civil Station, as Nos. 40 and 41 of 1963. It appears that a request was made before the Magistrate to consolidate these two cases and treat them as a single case. For reasons more of convenience than of law, the Magistrate did not see his way to grant the request. But the Sessions Judge, after examining the papers and hearing the accused and the Counsel, came to the conclusion that both from the point of view of the prosecution as well as from the point of view of the accused, the proper thing would be to consolidate these cases. He made an order to that effect on 1st April, 1964, pursuant to which a single trial was held and convictions recorded as in a single joint trial. Though the Judge held a single trial, he retained on record all the charges framed in both the cases. Charges 1 to 8 relate to the case arising out of the consignments made from Hirehalli Railway Station; charges 9 to 13 relate to the case arising out of the consignments from Rajanukunte Railway Station. Charges 1 and 9 are identical in terms, and though they have been retained as two different charges on record, the Judge has dealt with them as a single charge of conspiracy. The other charges for specific offences against different individual accused are described as for offences said to have been committed pursuant to the conspiracy mentioned in charges 1 and 9. Except in the case of the 3rd accused agains whom there is a specific charge of theft of sandalwood trees from a State forest called Narasimhadevara Betta and another specific charge for contravention of Rule 8 framed under the Mysore Forest Act relating to transport of sandalwood, all other charges are for forgery of such documents as railway forwarding notes and permits for transport of sandalwood and using as geuine such forged documents. Against the 5th accused K.V. Pathy, there was no allegation of any overt act amounting to an offence or any charge separately in respect of any specific offences framed against him. Against the 5th accused K.V. Pathy, there was no allegation of any overt act amounting to an offence or any charge separately in respect of any specific offences framed against him. Against the 4th accused Shanthaveera Aradhya, there was a charge of having forged certain documents. After a long trial involving an examination of 123 witnesses and a large lumber of documents, the Sessions Judge arrived at the following conclusions: He convicted all the five accused under charges 1 and 9 treated as one of conspiracy punishable under section 120-B read with sections 379 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and Rule 8 of the Control of the Transit of Sandalwood Rules framed under the Mysore Forest Act, and sentenced each of them to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000 with a default sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment. He acquitted the 4th accused of the offence of forgery under charge No. 13 for lack of evidence. He convicted the 1st accused on six counts, three of them of having forged forwarding notes in respect of the consignments sent from Hirehalli Station on 6th September, 1956, 27th August, 1957 and 2nd September, 1957, and three for using the said three forged documents as genuine-and imposed on him in respect of each count a sentence of five years’ rigorous imprisonment. He convicted the 2nd accused on two counts, viz., for forging the fonwarding note in respect of the consignment from Hirehalli Station on 4th October, 1957, and using the same as genuine, and sentenced him in respect of each of those counts to Undergo five years’ rigorous imprisonment. He convicted the 3rd accused on three counts for theft of sandalwood trees from the forest at Narasimhadevara Betta, for illegally transporting them in contravention of Rule 8 of the Control of the Transit of the Sandalwood Rules and for using as genuine the forwarding note and the sandalwood transit permit in respect of the consignments sent from Rajanukunte Railway Station on 31st December, 1957, and sentenced him respectively to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment, to pay a fine of Rs. 200 and to undergo five years rigorous imprisonment. He directed all the sentences of imprisonment to run concurrently. He acquitted accused 1, 2 and 3 of offences under other charges. 200 and to undergo five years rigorous imprisonment. He directed all the sentences of imprisonment to run concurrently. He acquitted accused 1, 2 and 3 of offences under other charges. The general features of the case for the prosecution should now be set out in some detail. According to the prosecution all specific offences set out in the various charges framed at the trial were offences committed pursuant to a conspiracy. The conspirators according to the prosecution were six in number viz. (1) Y. Krishnaiah Setty, (2) B.N. Rama Rao, (3) C.M. Munivenkataramaiah, (4) R.B. Shanthaveera Aradya, (5) K.V. Pathi and (6) N.V. Govinda Rao. Out of these, the first five are the accused-appellants; the sixth N.V. Govinda Rao was named as accused in both the charge-sheets as well as at the Sessions trial but shown as absconding. The object of the conspiracy, as set out in the charge itself, was to remove and transport sandalwood with a view to cause wrongful gain to the accused and wrongful loss to the State by illegally removing the same from the Mysore Forest area, by illegally transporting the same by rail to Bombay under cover of forged permits and forged forwarding notes calculated to decieve the railway authorities and by dishonestly selling the sandalwood so transported within Bombay. The conspiracy is said to have been hatched, for the first time, sometime in the year 1955 in Bangalore. Although the general suggestion was that the sandalwood illegally cut from different State forests in Mysore State was transported sometimes by bullock carts and sometimes by lorry and ultimately by rail to Bombay, in the case as presented to the trial Court, only twelve specific cases of transport by rail were sought to be established by evidence. Details thereof are the following: (1) Consignments from Hirehalli Railway Station. Date. Rly. Receipt Number. Exhibit No. of RR. & Forwarding Note. Name of Consignor. Name of Consignee. 6- 9-1956 00975/6 P-41, P-42 Kumar & Co. Self. 4-10-1956 00975/7 P-13, P-43 Kumar & Co. Self. 27-8-1957 00975/9 P-44, P-45 Kumar & Co. Self. 2- 9-1957 00975/10 P-46, P-47 Kumar & Co. Self. The first two consignments were to Budlapur in Bombay and the other two to Dadar in Bombay. In the papers relating to the last of the consignments, the address of Kumar & Company is given as 364, Avenue Road, Bangalore-2. (2) Consignments from Rajanukunte Railway Station. Self. 2- 9-1957 00975/10 P-46, P-47 Kumar & Co. Self. The first two consignments were to Budlapur in Bombay and the other two to Dadar in Bombay. In the papers relating to the last of the consignments, the address of Kumar & Company is given as 364, Avenue Road, Bangalore-2. (2) Consignments from Rajanukunte Railway Station. Date. Rly. Receipt Number. Exhibit No. of RR. & Forwarding Note. Name of Consignor. Name of Consignee. 17- 1-1957 00948/5 P-20, P-21 Y.K. Sharma M. Krishnoji Rao. 6- 2-1957 00948/6 P-22, P-23 Y.K. Sharma Murthy Rao. 6- 2-1957 00948/7 P-24, P-25 Y.K. Sharma Murthy Rao. 6- 2-1957 00948/8 P-26, P-27 B.K. Sharma Murthy Rao. 9-10-1957 00948/9 P-28, P-29 Bangalore Trading Co. Abdul Khasin. 31-12-1957 00948/10 P-16, P-32 K. Anantha Rao Self. 31-12-1957 00948/11 P-17, P-33 K. Anantha Rao Self. The first was consigned to Dadar, the next four to Byculla and the last two to Victoria Terminus, Bombay. It is the case of the prosecution that the four consignments from Hirehalli were sent by accused Nos. 1 and 2 and that either or both of them by some means got the District Traffic Superintendent of the Railway to Bangalore City to send telegraphic instructions to the Station Master at Hirehalli to give all facilities for the expeditious despatch of the goods covered by them. They also adduced evidence to show that the forwarding notice in respect of two of the consignments were actually signed by the 1st accused in the presence of the Station Master P.W. 15 Mohammad Nazir Hussam and one of the forwarding notes was similarly signed in the presence of the said Station Master by the 2nd accused. They have tried to prove that Kumar and Company was a false name-assumed by the first two accused and that they were never trading in that name. It is similarly the case of the prosecution that the eight consignments from Rajanukunte Railway Station were all despatched by the 3rd accused Munivenkataramaiah under various false names, such as Y.K. Sharma, B.K. Sharma, Bangalore Trading Company and K. Anantha Rao. The case of the prosecution as against the 4th accused was for forgery of some of these documents but that case they could not prove. In regard to these documents and consignments, the principal evidence against the 3rd accused is that of the Station Master of Rajanukunte, viz., Sheriff, examined as P.W. 11. The case of the prosecution as against the 4th accused was for forgery of some of these documents but that case they could not prove. In regard to these documents and consignments, the principal evidence against the 3rd accused is that of the Station Master of Rajanukunte, viz., Sheriff, examined as P.W. 11. Out of the direct evidence let in by the prosecution in this case, the bulk of the evidence relates to the last two consignments from Rajanukunte of 31st December, 1957. Besides the Station Master as P.W. 11, they have examined the Assistant Station Master Donddanna Shetty as P.W. 12, two porters or pointsmen Revoki as P.W. 13 and Narsoji as P.W. 14 and a Guard of the train which carried the consignments called Sreenivasa Iyer as P.W. 17. They have also examined a number of witnesses to speak to the events relating to the arrival of these consignments at Bombay and their seizure by the police, viz., P.W. 84 Lagvankar and P.W. 85 Balakrishna Narayan Railway clerks at Victoria Terminus P.W. 82 Shankar Raghunath Mainkar and P.W. 83 Narayan Babu Vane, servants of Govardhandas Tokersey and five Police Officers, P.W. 77 V. R. R. Inamdar, P.W. 86 Sete, P.W. 106 Abdul Sattar Qureshi, P.W. 99 Shindhe and P.W. 109 Jethwani. There is also P.W. 66 Uppin Assistant Conservator of Forests. They have also adduced other evidence to show that the permits demonstrably used in connection with the transport of sandalwood by rail as appears from the endorsements on the railway receipts themselves and from the oral evidence of the railway staff as well as one permit marked Exhibit P-4 actually seized from one of the witnesses at Bombay and produced at the trial were all not genuine but forged or false documents. Part of the evidence is that of the District Forest Officer, P.W. 4, and the other part of an officer of the Government Press, viz., Mallaraj Urs examined as P.W. 32. Apart from these instances of transport in respect of which there is not only ora1 but also documentary evidence, another set of witnesses examined for the prosecution speak to the alleged case of theft by the 3rd accused by cutting some sandalwood trees from the State forest at Narasimhadevara Betta. Apart from these instances of transport in respect of which there is not only ora1 but also documentary evidence, another set of witnesses examined for the prosecution speak to the alleged case of theft by the 3rd accused by cutting some sandalwood trees from the State forest at Narasimhadevara Betta. From what is stated above, it will be noticed that what may be described as the central or basic objective facts round which the prosecution case has been built are the cutting of trees in Narasimhadevara Betta and the twelve consignments by rail - four from Hirehalli and eight from Rajanukunte. I have also pointed out that the direct evidence implicates the first two accused in regard to the consignments from Hirehalli and the 3rd accused in regard to the cutting of trees in Narasimhadevara Betta and the consignments from Rajanukunte Railway Station. For the rest, the evidence is circumstantial evidence said to go in support of the case of conspiracy by the six persons named above. Apart from such facts as the normal residence of the five accused persons and their movements or presence in Bombay at or about the times some of the consignments were received at one of the stations in Bombay, the evidence on which strong reliance has been placed on behalf of the" prosecution consists of documents in the shape of letters, notes, blank sheets, account books, etc., seized rom the possession of the 1st accused Krishnaiah Shetty, 2nd accused Rama Rao and the 4th accused Shanthaveera Aradhya. That being the general nature of the evidence and the use sought to be made by the prosecution of the said evidence in support of their case of conspiracy, one of the matters to be examined at the very outset would be the manner in which it is permissible to make use of the evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the conspiracy and the principles of the law of evidence governing or controlling the use of the material for the said purpose. Before examining that point bearing or. the merits of the case, it is convenient first to dispose of one technical objection raised on behalf of the appellants relating to alleged impropriety or illegality of the procedure adopted by the Sessions Judge in consolidating the two cases and trying them together as a single case. Before examining that point bearing or. the merits of the case, it is convenient first to dispose of one technical objection raised on behalf of the appellants relating to alleged impropriety or illegality of the procedure adopted by the Sessions Judge in consolidating the two cases and trying them together as a single case. I have already stated that the request to consolidate the cases had been made by the prosecution even before the Committing Magistrate. I have also stated that before proceeding to hold a single trial, the Sessions Judge had heard the accused and made a detailed order giving reasons for consolidating the cases and holding a single trial. The general line of reasoning adopted by the Judge for taking such a course is that the principal basis of the prosecution case is a conspiracy and that the canspiracy set up in respect of the cases relating to the consignments from Hirehalli is same as and not different from the conspiracy set up in respect of the cases relating to the consignments from Rajanukunte. In other words, the case of the prosecution is that the six persons named above had entered into a single conspiracy and that all the twelve consignments were sent pursuant to that conspiracy. In that view, the learned Judge thought that, far from causing prejudice to the accused, it would indeed be to their advantage to hold a single trial. The learned Judge has cited some rulings in support of the view taken by him. Nevertheless, the arguments strongly pressed before me against the legality or propriety of the procedure adopted by the trial Judge is that some prejudice to the accused was inevitable in the circumstances because the impression created on the mind of the Judge by the evidence relating to one set of transactions is likely to cause bias on the part of the Judge in respect of the other set of transactions, the two sets of transactions being covered by different charges resulting in two orders of commitment and two differently numbered Sessions Cases. Obviously, the argument is advanced in view of the provisions of section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The argument recognises the necessity of making out and demonstrating before the appellate Court that actual prejudice has resulted to the accused before the appellate Court can be asked to interfere with the convictions. Obviously, the argument is advanced in view of the provisions of section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The argument recognises the necessity of making out and demonstrating before the appellate Court that actual prejudice has resulted to the accused before the appellate Court can be asked to interfere with the convictions. I may at once state that prejudice necessary for the purpose of section 537 is certainly not the prejudice traceable to what the argument calls bias on the part of the Judge. I am also clearly of the opinion that the impression formed on an examination of the evidence which is relevant for consideration of the cases before him can never be described as bias. The evidence adduced at the trial being the only material on which a Court can come to a conclusion, to say that a consideration of the evidence and formulation of an opinion on the basis of that evidence constitutes bias is to state an impossibility. To come to a conclusion on the material lawfully availa ale to the Judge is to discharge the duty which the law places upon him. The discharge of that duty can never be described as constituting or resulting in bias. Bias in the case of judicial trials can arise only by such considerations as personal interest, personal predilections or extraneous influence or consideration of material not lawfully available as evidence to base a finding. I also agree with the trial Judge that having regard to the fact that the background of the cases was a single conspiracy and all the specific offences were described as having been committed pursuant to that conspiracy, a single trial was not only not prejudicial but actually advantageous to the accused. The only legal argument which was possible of statement was whether there having been two orders of commitment it could be said to be regular or irregular to have proceeded to hold a single trial pursuant thereto. Any discussion of principles on this point is unnecessary in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court reported in Banwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh1. Any discussion of principles on this point is unnecessary in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court reported in Banwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh1. In the case, three different cases against the same accused arising out of three different incidents, though apparently connected by a certain sequence indicating that all of them might have been parts of the same transaction, resulted in three orders of commitment and the Sessions Judge retained the three cases as three separate trials but recorded common evidence-only in one trial for use in all the trials. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that there was a certain irregularity in the procedure adopted by the Sessions-Judge because it did not appear to be warranted by any of the provision; of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Upon facts their Lordships held that the accused had not suffered any prejudice by the adoption of that irregular procedure by the“Sessions Judge in that case. On the question of law, this is what their Lordships state: ”It is clear that if separate commitments had been made of such distinct offences, which did not come within the exception to section 233, they could not be tried at one trial by consolidating those three cases. But this does not mean that if there had been separate commitments of persons who could be tried together at one trial, or of the same person for offences which could be tried together at one trial, the accused could not be tried at one trial.....The committal order just gives the Sessions Court cognisance over the trial of the persons committed. The committal order does not bind the Sessions Judge to try those persons alone at one trial who have been committed by the particular committal order. The question of the trial of the various committed persons does not depend on the number of committal orders, but on the provisions of sections 233 to 239 of the Code. If one trial can be justified under those provisions and there is no prejudice to the accused, the Sessions Judge can certainly consolidate the committal orders in those cases and try the accused at one trial.“ These observations apply with complete appropriateness to the position obtaining in these cases. I see therefore neither any illegality in the procedure adopted by the trial Judge nor any prejudice resulting therefrom to the accused. I see therefore neither any illegality in the procedure adopted by the trial Judge nor any prejudice resulting therefrom to the accused. To avoid repetition, I may also refer to one undoubted proposition of law in this case. The subject-matter of the conspiracy as well as of the subsidiary offences flowing therefrom was sandalwood grown in State forests in the erstwhile State of Mysore. Under the Mysore Forest Act, the”right to sandalwood, wherever it may grow, vests exclusively in the State Government. There are also Rules framed under the Act including the Rules for controlling the transit of sandalwood referred to in the charges. It is not disputed before me that the learned Judge has discussed the legal provisions at some length in his order and that the correct position in law is that in the erstwhile State of Mysore, sandalwood trees belonged exclusively to the State. There were as a matter of fact several forests in which certain areas were exclusively devoted to the growing of sandalwood. It is not disputed that even in respect of sandalwood trees grown in private land or within the compound of a private owner, the right to them vests in the State and that specific rules were in force binding the owner of the land in respect of the dealings with sandalwood trees growing in his own land. The transport or transit of the cut sandalwood logs from place to place was also controlled by a system of permits. No one without such a permit could lawfully transport sandalwood. I may now take up the proposition of law regarding the availability of various pieces of evidence in proof of the charge of conspiracy and the mode of their assessment. As I have already stated, apart from the direct evidence relating to the twelve cases of consignments by rail and the alleged falsity of some of the documents relevant thereto such as railway forwarding notes and sandalwood permits, the bulk of the evidence is circumstantial evidence. I should now state that there is also a confessional statement said to have been made by the 2nd accused Rama Rao before the Assistant Commissioner of Doddaballapur functioning as an Executive Magistrate, marked Exhibit P-306. I should now state that there is also a confessional statement said to have been made by the 2nd accused Rama Rao before the Assistant Commissioner of Doddaballapur functioning as an Executive Magistrate, marked Exhibit P-306. There has not been any argument before me nor is there any doubt that so far as each individual accused is concerned, any act or statement on his part which is admissible under any one of sections of the Evidence Act is clearly available against him to prove that he has committed the offence with which he has been charged. The question arises only in regard to the attempt by the prosecution to make use of the conduct or statements of one accused against the other or others for proving the conspiracy. There is, as I shall presently point out, some difference on this matter or some distinction in the application of the principles to the confessional statement of the 2nd accused and in their application to other items of evidence. The principal section of the Evidence Act which is directly in question, is section 10 which lays down a special rule of evidence in regard to proof of a conspiracy. That section reads: “Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons n reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it.” Two matters, in relation to which the evidence of the type mentioned in the section is made admissible, are- (1) Whether any conspiracy as alleged exists or not, and (2) Whether and if so, which of the accused or which of the persons named as conspiractors is or is not a member thereof. The main part of the section permits the use of anything said, done or written by anyone of the persons as against others for the proof of both or either of the points mentioned above, subject to the stated condition that whatever is said, done or written has reference to the common intention of the conspirators. But before any such thing said, done or written can be admitted under section 10, there must first be a reasonable ground to believe that any two or more of the persons named as conspirators have conspired together to commit an offence or a wrong by entertaining a common intention to do so. Although the exact effect of this section had been the subject of discussion in many cases most of which dealt with special difficulties arising in the matter of application of the provisions of the section to special or peculiar circums tances of the case, the three cases which may be regarded as leading cases and as stating exhaustively the principles are: Mirza Akbar v. Emperor1 Sardul Singh v. State of Bombay2 and Bhagwan Swamp v. State of Maharashtra3. In the first of the cases cited above, Lord Wright stated both the principles of Common Law in England and the provisions of section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, and expressed the view that the position under both is more or less the same, if not identical. In the first of the cases cited above, Lord Wright stated both the principles of Common Law in England and the provisions of section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, and expressed the view that the position under both is more or less the same, if not identical. After referring to some of the leading cases in England, his Lordship formulated the principles developed by those cases as follows: “Where the evidence is admissible it is in their Lordships’ judgment on the principle that the thing done written or spoken, was something done in carrying out the conspiracy and was receivable as a step in the proof of the conspiracy * * * * * The words writter or spoken may be a declaration accompanying an act and indicating the quality of the act as being an act in the course of the conspiracy; or the words written or spoken may in themselves be acts done in the course of the conspiracy.” Having so formulated the principle, his Lordship proceeded to deal with section 10 as follows: “This being the principle, their Lordships think the words of section 10 must be construed in accordance with it and are not capable of being widely construed so as to include a statement made by one conspirator in the absence of the other with reference to past acts done in the actual course of carrying out the conspiracy, after it has been completed. The common intention is in the past. In their Lordships’ judgment, the words”common intention“signify a common intention existing at the time when the thing was said, done or written by the one of them. Things said, done or written while the conspiracy was on foot are relevant as evidence of the common intention, once reasonable ground has been shown to believe in its existence. But it would be a very different matter to hold that any narrative or statement or confession made to a third party after the common intention or conspiracy was no longer operating and had ceased to exist is admissible against the other party. There is then no common intention of the conspirators to which the statement can have reference. In their Lordships’ judgment section 10 embodies this principle.” Before referring to the other cases, I wish to emphasise the last few sentences in the above extract. There is then no common intention of the conspirators to which the statement can have reference. In their Lordships’ judgment section 10 embodies this principle.” Before referring to the other cases, I wish to emphasise the last few sentences in the above extract. As I have already pointed out, the condition precedent to the admissibility of acts or words of one person against the other is that such acts or words have reference to the common intention. The probative value of these acts and words in the eyes of a Court is the assurance or guarantee of the truth which known and observed human conduct stamps these acts with; the said evaluation of human conduct is the very basis of the rule. The common intention survives or subsists so long as the conspiracy subsists. Once the conspiracy comes to an end either because its object has already been achieved or for any other reason, the bond or the vinculum that would exist between one member and another member of the conspiracy and between the conspiracy as a whole and each one of those members ceases to exist. It has also been stated in some of the cases that section 10 of the Evidence Act imports into Criminal law the Civil law idea of agency. Criminal conspiracy being regarded as a partnership with an illegal object, just as during the subsistence of the partnership and in relation to the business of the partnership each partner is regarded by law as the agent of every other partner so as to bind the others by his acts and deeds in relation to the business, acts and deeds of one conspirator are available for use against others only in so far as he acts as a conspirator in relation to the common intention of all the conspirators for the purpose of carrying out the conspiracy. As Lord Wright points out, it is receivable in evidence because it is a step in the proof of the conspiracy. One of the instances in respect of which the principles stated in this Privy Council case have been commonly used and applied is a statement or confession made by an accused person after arrest. As Lord Wright points out, it is receivable in evidence because it is a step in the proof of the conspiracy. One of the instances in respect of which the principles stated in this Privy Council case have been commonly used and applied is a statement or confession made by an accused person after arrest. Several decisions of the India a High Courts applying these principles have held that a statement or confession made by an accused person after arrest in a conspiracy case can never be brought within the purview of section 10. That the clear effect of the Privy Council decision is to place such a statement or confession made by an accused person after arrest beyond the scope of section 10 is also the view expressed by Jagannadhas, J. in the second of the cases cited above, viz., Sardul Singh v. State of Bombay.1 His Lordship says: “In Mirza Akbar v. Emperor2, itself the question at issue was about the admissibility on the charge of conspiracy, of a statement made by one of the conspirators before a Magistrate after arrest. That was held to be not admissible. ***** In civil cases it is well settled that a principal is bound by the acts of his agent if the latter has an express or implied authority from the former and the acts are within the scope of his authority. Therefore acts of an agent are admissible in evidence as against the principal. An analogous principle is recognised in criminal matters in so far as it can be brought in under section 10 of the Evidence Act. It is recognised on well established authority that the principle underlying the reception of evidence under section 10 of the Evidence Act of the statements, acts and writings of one co-conspirator as against the other is on the theory of agency. It is recognised on well established authority that the principle underlying the reception of evidence under section 10 of the Evidence Act of the statements, acts and writings of one co-conspirator as against the other is on the theory of agency. * * * * * Now both the English rule as recognised in Regina v. Blake3, as well as the rule in section 10 of the Evidence Act, confine that principle of agency in criminal matters to the acts of the co-conspirator within the period during which it can be said that the acts were “in reference to their common intention”that is to say, as held by the Privy Council in Mirza Akbar v. Emperor2, “things said, done or written, while the conspiracy was on foot” and “in carrying out the conspiracy”.” In the third of the cases, viz., Bhagwan Swarup v. State of Maharashtra4, Subba Rao, J. analysed the provisions of section 10 as follows: “(1) There shall be a prima facie evidence affording a reasonable ground for a Court to believe that two or more persons are members of a conspiracy; (2) if the said condition is fulfilled, anything said, done or written by any one of them in reference to their common intention will be evidence against the other; (3) anything said, done or written by him should have been said, done on written by him after the intention was formed by any one of them; (4) it would also be relevant for the said purpose against another who entered the conspiracy Whether it was said done or written before he entered the conspiracy or after he left it; and (5) it can only be used against a co-conspirator and not in his favour.” As I read the points set out in this analysis, I do not see any departure from the principles stated either by Lord Wright in Mirza Akbar v. Emperor2 or by Jagannadhadas J., in Sardul Singh v. State of Bombay1. But some argument was sought to be advanced on the basis of Point No. 4. But some argument was sought to be advanced on the basis of Point No. 4. It is pointed out that the point of time of occurrence of either the deed or act or word sought to be admitted under section 10 may be ‘either before a person enters the conspiracy or after he leaves it.‘It is therefore argued that a statement made by a conspirator even after he had left the conspiracy is available as evidence against his quandom co-conspirators. It appears to me that that is not the correct view to take. The conspirator referred to as either entering a conspiracy or leaving it is not the conspirator whose act or deed is sought to be admitted in evidence but a conspirator against whom such evidence is sought to be given. Hence the act or deed or statement of a conspirator sought to be admitted in evidence against his co-conspirator must be something said, done or written by a conspirator when he continues to be a conspirator and still retains the character of a conspirator and must have relation to the common intention of the conspiracy which is the binding force not only between the conspirators inter se but also between them and the conspiracy. This result has a direct effect on the value to be attached to the confessional statement of the 2nd accused as against the other accused for the purpose of either proving the existence of conspiracy or showing which of them was a member of the conspiracy. In my opinion, the principles discussed above make the confessional statement wholly unavailable for the purpose of section 10 of the Evidence Act. It can of course be used, to the extent permissible, under section 30 of the Evidence Act. It appears to me that is also how the learned trial Judge himself proceeded to make use of it. In my opinion, the principles discussed above make the confessional statement wholly unavailable for the purpose of section 10 of the Evidence Act. It can of course be used, to the extent permissible, under section 30 of the Evidence Act. It appears to me that is also how the learned trial Judge himself proceeded to make use of it. Although his discussion in the earlier part of his judgment makes it doubtful whether he was invoking section 10 or section 30 of the Evidence Act for the purpose of making use of the confessional statement, the following sentence in paragraph 123 of his judgment viz: “In this case, I am using this confessional statement to find out, if this lends assurance to the circumstantial evidence already on record and not for the purpose of basing a conviction either of the second accused or the other accused, on it,” makes it clear that he was making use of the confessional statement only under section 30 of the Evidence Act and not under section 10. That, in my opinion, is the correct view to take. As to the availability of the other pieces of evidence under section 10, the essential condition is, firstly, whether it can be said that there is reasonatle ground to believe that any two or more of the accused in this case have entered into a conspiracy and secondly, whether those pieces of evidence may be said to be either something said, done or written, in reference to the common intention of the conspiracy. As it is not possible at this preliminary stage, without examining the evidence, to express an opinion either on the one or the other of the two points mentioned above, I think the most convenient thing would be to first examine the evidence in detail and collect what may be regarded as facts established by evidence and then proceed to assess the value of those facts to the prosecution cither for the purpose of proving the conspiracy or the membership thereof under section 10 or for any other purpose. There is no direct evidence relating to the alleged conspiracy. According to the case of the prosecution it was first hatched in a room bearing No. 15, of a building called “Oleti Buildings”, New Door No. 438 (Old Door No. 369), Visveswarapuram where the second accused Ramarao was running some business. There is no direct evidence relating to the alleged conspiracy. According to the case of the prosecution it was first hatched in a room bearing No. 15, of a building called “Oleti Buildings”, New Door No. 438 (Old Door No. 369), Visveswarapuram where the second accused Ramarao was running some business. One Hanumantharao, watchman of the building, was examined as P.W. 44, to speak to Ramarao’s occupation of the said room and also to the salient details or features of the conspiracy such as the meeting of the several accused persons on different occasions in this room. But the said witness after stating that Ramarao was occupying that room for the purpose of his business in scrap iron and cotton waste did not answer further questions he was expected to answer in a particular way. He was treated as hostile and the Prosecutor permitted to cross-examine him. But the only cross-examination was in the nature of putting to him certain previous statements said to have been made by him in the course of the investigation. He having denied having made such statements and the Investigating Officer one Ramabhadraiah who had recorded those statements having died some time before the trial, the entire cross-examination is ineffective and of no value to the prosecution. The learned trial Judge also states that two other witnesses P.W. 75 Rajanna who was a clerk for some time under the fourth accused and P.W. 98 Ramachandar, a cousin of the second accused, were expected to speak to the details of the conspiracy. There is however no basis for this observation except the short particulars given in the charge-sheet against these witnesses. The learned Judge further states that on account of the relationship or association that these witnesses had with one or the other of the accused, it was natural for them to decline to speak to matters which are adverse to the interests of their erstwhile master or relation or associate. I do not think however any inference can or should properly be drawn from these circumstances. The result is that the prosecution has not been able to lead any direct evidence relating to the alleged conspiracy. I do not think however any inference can or should properly be drawn from these circumstances. The result is that the prosecution has not been able to lead any direct evidence relating to the alleged conspiracy. The entire evidence therefore on that topic is purely circumstantial evidence in examining which not merely the normal rule of caution applied by Courts while assessing circumstantial evidence but also the restrictions stated in section 10 of the Evidence Act will have to be borne in mind. I shall first relate facts in regard to which there is satisfactory evidence or evidence against which much criticism or any effective criticism is not possible. Among the accused, No. 1 Krishnaswamy, No. 2 Ramarao, No. 5 K.V. Pathy were at the relevant period ordinary residents of the City of Bangalore. 3rd accused Munivenkataramaiah is a resident of Chickballapur carrying on some business in a locality called Kandavarpet. The prosecution say that he had relatives in Bangalore whom he used to visit or that he also otherwise had opportunities to visit Bangalore. 4th accused Shantaveera Aradhya is a resident of Chintamani carrying on business in Agarabatties. In regard to this accused also it is the case of the prosecution that he had business connections which used to bring him frequently to Bangalore. There is satisfactory evidence on this question of the residence of the accused persons. The first accused Krishnaswamy resides at a house bearing Door No. 351/3, Burugal Mutt Road, Visveswarapuram. Besides the evidence of P.W. 24 Ratnam Setty there is the admission of the first accused himself that he was residing it the said building during the years 1954 to 1958. The 2nd accused Ramarao resides at No. 10, Dattatreya Road, Basavanagudi and had a business place in Room No. 15, Oleti Buildings already referrd to. His residence at Dattatreya Road is spoken to by a neighbour of his, P.W. 34 Venkatappa and another P.W. 39 Gopal, the original owner of the house and P.W. 57 Kulkarni, the vendee from P.W. 39. The second accused himself in the course of his examination under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has admitted this fact. Regarding his occupation of Room No. 15 of Oleti Buildings, there is considerable body of evidence. The watchman of the building Hanumantharao, P.W. 44, already referred to speaks to this fact. The second accused himself in the course of his examination under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has admitted this fact. Regarding his occupation of Room No. 15 of Oleti Buildings, there is considerable body of evidence. The watchman of the building Hanumantharao, P.W. 44, already referred to speaks to this fact. P.W. 25 Narayana Setty, a clerk of Oleti Aswathanarayanaiah & Sons, the owner of the building, also speaks to this fact. There are then two other occupants of the building, a hotel-keeper, Narasimha Holla, examined as P.W. 43 and a Principal of Mysore School of Commerce which was being run at Room Nos. 13 and 14 of the same building P.W. 40 Venugopal. The accused Ramararo also admitted this fact in his examination under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The third accused Munivenkataramaiah is admittedly a resident of Chickballapur. The prosecution has examined- two witnesses namely, P.W. 18. Thimmarayappa and P.W. 19 Narayanaswamy to speak to his visits to the residence of the latter at G-30, Cottonpet, Bangalore-2. The deposition in cheif-examination of these two witnesses supports this view of the case. But in cross-examination some interestedness has been attributed. The prosecution relies upon another piece of evidence to support their case in this regard. I shall have occasion to refer at a later stage to the evidence of a hotel-keeper in Bombay P.W. 78 Joshi. While speaking generally to the third accused having come to his hotel as a ledger, he says that on a certain occasion the third accused gave his address as G-30, Cottonpet, Bangalore. There is also an entry of that address in a register maintained in the hotel. The original register is Exhibit P-178. Exhibit P-179 is the relevant sheet removed from that register. The particular entry is marked Exhibit P-179(a). Some argument has been addressed regarding the acceptability of this entry as reliable but those arguments are directed towards another topic to which I shall have occasion to refer at a later stage. There is as matters stand no effective cross-examination of the oral evidence of the hotel-keeper P.W. 78. Hence, whatever may be the value of this fact to the case of the prosecution we may take it that the third accused might have had some reasons to visit Bangalore at least occasionally The fourth accused is an Agarabatti merchant of Chintamani. There is as matters stand no effective cross-examination of the oral evidence of the hotel-keeper P.W. 78. Hence, whatever may be the value of this fact to the case of the prosecution we may take it that the third accused might have had some reasons to visit Bangalore at least occasionally The fourth accused is an Agarabatti merchant of Chintamani. The evidence of his clerk P.W. 75 Rajanna shows that he had business interests in Bangalore also. There was an Agarabatti factory of his in Malleswaram. He also was interested either as proprietor or otherwise in a Printing Press called “The Sankar Power Printing Press”‘in Mamool Pet, Bangalore. The fifth accused KV. Pathy is said to have been residing at a house bearing No. 590, Sajjanarao Road, Visveswarapuram, Bangalore. The direct evidence on this matter is that of the investigating Police officer Shamanna P.W. 123. He supports his evidence not merely on his personal observation but also on some letters said to have been addressed to the 5th accused at the said address. In the course of his examination under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he admits the fact of his having resided at the address given above, while denying the statement of P.W. 123 that he was absent on certain occasions when P.W. 123 is said to have gone to the locality. The next topic about which there is some satisfactory evidence is the business connections which some of the accused had with merchants dealing with sandals wor d in Bombay. The principal evidence in this matter is of three witnesses-P.W. 100 Nathulal Kashiram Trivedi, P.W. 88 K.N. Prabhu and P.W. 81 Govardandas Tokersey. P.W. 100 Nathulal Kashiram Trivedi was working in a firm called Sorbaji Nowroji Co., who deal in sandal wood. He speaks to the first accused having dealings with that firm. He states that the first accused Krishnaswamy had sold sandal wood to his firm on several occasions under the name Ramachandra. His. oral evidence is supported by the entries in some of the books of accounts of the firm as well as some bills produced by him. That Ramachandra trading with them was no other than the first accused is clear from the opening sentence in the deposition of this witness reading “I see the accused before Court. I know A-1. His. oral evidence is supported by the entries in some of the books of accounts of the firm as well as some bills produced by him. That Ramachandra trading with them was no other than the first accused is clear from the opening sentence in the deposition of this witness reading “I see the accused before Court. I know A-1. He was coming to that shop asking us to purchase sandal wood.” P.W. 88 K.N. Prabhu refers to three of the accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4, having sold sandal wood to his firm called “Bharat Products” of which he was one of the partners. He also knew the first accused by the name Ramachandra Rao; but the other two accused he knew by their proper names, the second accused as Ramarao and the fourth accused as Aradhya. All these three, according to the witness, were coming to him to ascertain the rate of sandal wood and also for Agarabatties. He refers to his having purchased on one occasion from the second accused sandal wood worth Rs. 3,697 transported by railway. In regard to the fourth accused, he says that he had purchased baloon powder for Rs. 134 against an order placed by him with the second accused. There is also reference to a purchase of sandal wood and chips by him from Ramachandra Rao meaning the first accused on behalf of a concern called "Hindustan Agencies, Hindupur". The cross-examination on behalf of the first accused elicited that Ramachandra Rao’s signature does not appear on the invoice produced by this witness. The cross-examination on behalf of the 4th accused elicited from the witness the information that he had known the fourth accused from 1956, that he trades in Agarabatties and that he was coming to Bombay with Agarabatties. P.W. 81 Goverdandass Tokersey refers to the first, second and the fourth accused having had dealings with him in respect of sandal wood. So far as the 2nd accused is concerned, there is, besides the oral evidence of this witness, documentary evidence in the shape of entries in his books of account as well as a receipt signed by him. P.W. 81 Goverdandass Tokersey refers to the first, second and the fourth accused having had dealings with him in respect of sandal wood. So far as the 2nd accused is concerned, there is, besides the oral evidence of this witness, documentary evidence in the shape of entries in his books of account as well as a receipt signed by him. Regarding the first accused the only evidence of the witness is that he came to him to ascertain the rate of sandal wood some time between 28th and 31st of December, 1957 when the winess was putting up at States Hotel in Bangalore. The first accused had visited him in connection with some proposed sale of sandal wood. In cross-examination on behalf of the first accused, however, he admitted that he saw the first accused for the first time in Bangalore and that neither at that time nor at any other time had he made any actual purchase of sanadal wood from him. Earlier, however, he had stated that he had seen the first accused in Bombay in about June, 1957. However that be, the ultimate effect of the evidence so far as the first accused is concerned is that he had made some attempts to sell sandal wood to the witness and that apparently with a view to establish some future contacts he had asked for rates he was willing to offer. In fact, the reason for the first accused to go and see the witness in Bombay in June, 1957 was for ascertainment of rates. Regarding the fourth accused the evidence of this witness is that he had purchased from him some sandal wood powder some time after an auction of sandal wood at Dharwar which both the witness and the fourth accused had attended. It has been elicited from him in the course of the cross-examination on behalf of the 4th accused that at the time the said accused sold sandal-dust to him, he had given him a permit for it. The cross-examination on behalf of the first accused in the first instance elicited only what I have stated above. In further cross-examination on his behalf however some more information was brought on record. The witness said ‘‘ I did not enquire A-1 for his name. He himself gave his name as Ramachandra rao alias Krishnaswamy. The cross-examination on behalf of the first accused in the first instance elicited only what I have stated above. In further cross-examination on his behalf however some more information was brought on record. The witness said ‘‘ I did not enquire A-1 for his name. He himself gave his name as Ramachandra rao alias Krishnaswamy. A-1 gave only his name as Ramachandra Rao when he came to the hotel." The next topic is the accused persons residing temporarily in certain hotel in Bombay. Four persons working in four hotels have been examined for the prosecution, P.W. 103 P. Lakshminarayana Rao, P.W. 79 Krishnaraya Baliga, P.W. 87 P.B. Bhatt and P.W. 78 Ramji Nathulal Joshi. P. Lakshminarayana Rao, P.W. 103, is a proprietor of New Vasantha Ashram Hotel at No. 232, Carnac Road, Bombay. He knows all the accused and. states that all of them had some time or the other put up as lodgers in his hotel. He gives particulars with reference to a ledger maintained by him Exhibit P-257 covering a period of two years from 1st April, 1955 to 31st March, 1957. 1st accused, Krishnaswamy for example had stayed with him from 21st June, 1957 to 13th July, 1957. The 3rd accused, Munivenkataramaiah had stayed with him from 13th March, 1957 to 20th March, 1957. The 4th accused Aradhya had stayed from 10th January, 1957 to 6th February, 1957 and also from 8th April, 1957 to 11th April, 1957. He also states that the 5th accused K.V. Pathy had lodged and boarded in his hotel and refers to a bill in that connection. The dates are not available in his evidence. Another occasion when the 3rd accused had stayed at his hotel was for seven days in May, 1958. He also refers to the second accused coming to his hotel and taking meals along with the third accused Munivenkataramaiah and the first accused Krishnaswamy. From the context it would appear that this was perhaps when the third accused was in his hotel in May, 1958. But it is not possible to state so with any definiteness. P.W. 79 Krishnaraya Baliga who is the manager of a hotel called “Welcome Hotel”speaks to the second accused Ramarao having stayed in his hotel on one occasion from 15th November, 1957 to 15th December, 1957. But it is not possible to state so with any definiteness. P.W. 79 Krishnaraya Baliga who is the manager of a hotel called “Welcome Hotel”speaks to the second accused Ramarao having stayed in his hotel on one occasion from 15th November, 1957 to 15th December, 1957. He was occupying Room No. 10 from 15th November, 1957 to 24th November, 1957 and then Room No. 21 till 15th December, 1957; ultimately he left the hotel without paying the bill. He also knows and recognises the first accused and stated that he was coming to his hotel to speak to the second accused. I do not see anything effective in the cross-examination of this witness. P.W. 87 P.N. Bhatt is the manager of a hotel called Arya Nivas Hotel at Bombay. In this hotel also the second accused had stayed between 9th January. 1958 and nth January, 1958 occupying Room No. 38. The first accused had also stayed in his hotel from 18th February, 1958 to 28th February, 1958. Here again the cross-examination is not effective. P.W. 78 Ramji Nathulal Joshi who is the manager of Rameswar Hindu Lodge at Bombay speaks to the third accused having stayed in his hotel from 7th January, 1958 till 12th January, 1958 giving his name as C.M. Venkataramaiah and address as Cottonpet, G-30, Bangalore-2. According to this witness, Room No. 19 occupied by the third accused on that occasion was also occupied by two other lodgers, Ratilal Parikh and Narmada Shankar Nayak; the latter is examined as P.W. 80. He states that he stayed in Room No. 19 of Rameswar Hindu Ledge some time in January, 1958 and that the third accused was one of the persons occupying the same room at that time. This witness is a permanent boarder of that hotel and refers to the other occupant Ratilal also as a permanent boarder and to the third accused who occupied the third bed as a temporary boarder. He identified the third accused in Court and also stated that 8 or 10 months after January, 1958, he had identified him at Princess Street Police Station at Bombay. Whether and if so what value this proved residence of the several accused in those hotels in Bombay may have from the point of view of the prosecution I shall examine at a later stage. Whether and if so what value this proved residence of the several accused in those hotels in Bombay may have from the point of view of the prosecution I shall examine at a later stage. By far the most important and perhaps most satisfactory evidence adduced by the prosecution relates to the booking of sandal wood from the two railway stations Hirehalli and Rajamukunte. I have already given details and particulars, of these booking at an earlier stage of this judgment. The principal witness speaking to the bookings from Hirehali is P.W.15 Mohamad Nasir Hussain who was the Station Master at that statior from 1954 to 1957. P.W. 16 Padmarajiah was the Assistant Station Master during the relevant period. The evidence of P.W. 16 is to the effect that he was he Assistant Station Master from 1956-57 and that some time during his period of service as such Assistant Station Master at Hirehalli, the first accused came to his place, introduced himself as a person belonging to the same village as that of the witness in Madhugiri taluk, later made frequent visits to speak to the witness’s mother and ultimately told him that he was a merchant dealing in sandal wood for export and that he wanted to book some sandal wood from Hirehalli. The witness told dim that the actual booking is done only by or under the orders of the Station Master and later introduced the first accused to the Station Master as a person hailing from the witness’s native village. He also speaks to the second accused coming to the Station Master in the company of the first accused. The witness however did not attend 10 the actual bookings and could not therefore speak to any details thereof. Those details are spoken to by the Station Master P.W. 15. He states that his Assistant Station Master Padmarajaiah introduced the first accused and that both the first and the second accused later saw him in connection with the proposedbookings of sandal wood. The witness states that the first accused gave his name as Krishnaswamy alias Krishnaiah Setty. He questioned both the accused about their business and other relevant particulars. Both of them told him that they were sandalwood merchants and that they were trading in partnership in the name of “Kumar & Co.”. The witness states that the first accused gave his name as Krishnaswamy alias Krishnaiah Setty. He questioned both the accused about their business and other relevant particulars. Both of them told him that they were sandalwood merchants and that they were trading in partnership in the name of “Kumar & Co.”. The first accused further told him that he was a Congressman with great influence and knew all the Ministers and all the public leaders. The witness described him as wearing pucca Congress uniform. He further deposes that he received 3 or 4 telegraphic communications from the District Traffic Superintendent of Railways, Bangalore, asking him to give ail facilities in the matter of booking sandal wood from Hirehalli railway station. He then gives the following details of the bookings. On 6th September, 1956, the first of the bookings took place under the way bill No. 00975/6 marked Exhibit P-41. Exhibit P-42 is the relevant forwarding note. The consignor was Kumar & Co., the consignee, self. That contained the signature of one P. Sitaramaiah on behalf of the consignor Kumar & Co. That forwarding note was filled up in a printed form before presentation. The next consignment of 4th October, 1956 was under the way bill No. 00975/7 marked Exhibit P-13; the corresponding forwarding note Exhibit P-42 was actually prepared and signed by the 2nd accused in the presence of the witness. Here again the consignor is Kumar & Co., the consignee, self. The witness referred specifically to the signature put to the note by the 2nd accused, separately marked Exhibit P-43(a). The next two consignments of 27th August, 1957 and 2nd September, 1957 under way bill Nos. 00975/9 and 00975/10 were both booked by the first accused. Exhibits P-44 and P-46 and the way bills, Exhibits P-45 and P-47 are the relevant forwarding notes. These notes were signed on behalf of the consignor by the first accused, in the presence of the witness. The signatures are identified by him in Court as those put to the document by the first accused in his presence and were separately marked Exhibits P-45(a) and P-47(a). I should add that there is in the last of the forwarding notes the address of the consignor as Kumar & Co., No. 364, Avenue Road, Bangalore-2. The signatures are identified by him in Court as those put to the document by the first accused in his presence and were separately marked Exhibits P-45(a) and P-47(a). I should add that there is in the last of the forwarding notes the address of the consignor as Kumar & Co., No. 364, Avenue Road, Bangalore-2. Before referring to other evidence relating to the events or the transactions at Hirehalli, I might briefly refer to the evidence relating to the delivery of the consignments at the destination. I have already stated that two of the consignments were consigned to Budlapur and two to Dadar. P.W. 93 Kameswara Rao was the Station Master at Budlapur at the relevant period. He and another official at the Budlapur station Gilbert Vincent, P.W. 97, speak to the receipt of the consignments at Budlapur and delivery thereof to some body claiming to be representing the consignee. P.W. 92 Balakrishna Hanumanth Kalgonkar was the Head Parcel Clerk at Dadar from 1958 to 1963. He speaks to the delivery of consignments under way bill No. 00975/9 and No. 00975/10. In addition P.W. 94 N.A. Naidu who was then the Assistant Parcel Clerk speaks to the delivery of the consignment under way bill No. 0097/59 and P.W. 95 W.C. Godbole speaks to the delivery of the consignment covered by the way bill No. 00975/10. There is neither any effective cross-examination nor any reason to disbelieve any of these witnesses at the Bombay ail-way stations. Going back to the position at Hirehalli, one fact on which strong reliance has been placed on behalf of the prosecution is that Kumar & Co., is a false name assumed and used by the first two accused for the purpose of booking four consignments of sandal wood mentioned. I have already stated that in one of the forwarding notes or one of the papers relating to the consignments the 1st accused had given the address of Kumar & Co., as No. 364, Avenue Road, Bangalore. I have already stated that in one of the forwarding notes or one of the papers relating to the consignments the 1st accused had given the address of Kumar & Co., as No. 364, Avenue Road, Bangalore. The prosecution has examined three witnesses to speak to facts which go to show that the first two accused were not really trading and could not have been trading during the relevant period in sandal wood under the name and style of Kumar & Co., P.W. 67 K. Pillanna states that he was running a stationery, cutlery and fancy goods shop under the name and style of Kumar & Co., at No. 470, Avenue Road, during the years 1942 to 1945. P.W. 21 D.C. Chennappa states that he was running a similar business under the name and style of Kumar & Co., at the same address No. 470, Avenue Road, which he closed down about 12 years before he gave evidence, that is till about 1952. He also states “even as it existed we started the other shop” meaning apparently they took over the then existing business run under the name and style of Kumar & Co., P.W. 22 Paramasivaiah states that his shop called Amutha Kesari Depot is located at No. 364. Avenue Road, Bangalore. He says that it was his ancestral business and that it was running even during the life time of his father and that the said shop had never been used for running any business under the name and style Kumar & Co. These witnesses have been believed by the trial Court and nothing has been said before me nor do I see any reason not to accept their evidence. One other fact which has been elicited from P.Ws. 67 and 21 is that the first accused was running some sort of a business in a neighbouring shop and that the fourth accused was occasionally visiting him. The Station Master P.W. 15 has also deposed to the additional fact that along with every one of the forwarding notes, a document purporting to be a permit from the District Forest Officer authorising transport of sandal wood had been produced to him. We do not have those original papers so produced as permits produced in this case. But there is no reason to disbelieve the Station Master when he says that such permits were produced before him. We do not have those original papers so produced as permits produced in this case. But there is no reason to disbelieve the Station Master when he says that such permits were produced before him. The legal position is that sandal wood could not have been transported without a valid permit issued by the appropriate authority authorising transport. There is also the evidence of the District Forest Officer Subbaiah as P.W. 4 to that effect that during that period to the best of his recollection no permit had been issued to any private individual but only a a few permits to recognised Government agents. From what is stated above the clear facts that emerge are that accused 1 and 2 representing themselves to be partners in buisness running under the name and style of Kumar & Co., dealing in sandal wood had on this false pretence got four consignments of sandal wood despatched from Hirehalli railway station upon permits for transit produced before him the authenticity of which is open to serious doubt in view of the definite and clear evidence of P.W. 4. That the permits which these accused persons would have used at that time could not possibly have been genuine permits receives strength on the fact that they had used false name Kumar & Co. for getting the goods consigned. The evidence also shows that both the accused must have devoted some thought to the mode adopted by them. We find in the first instance that the first accused recollecting his old acquaintance with P.W. 16 Padmarajaiah was visiting the mother of Padmarajaiah and then ultimately got himself introduced to the Station Master P.W. 15 Mohamad Nasir Hussain as a person hailing from the native village of his Assistant Station Master. He also gave the evidence that the first accused had managed to get certain telegraphic communications issued to the Station Master at Hirehalli by the District Traffic Superintendent at Bangalore and posed himself as a very influential Congressman, claiming acquaintance or friendship with the Ministers and public leaders. He also gave the evidence that the first accused had managed to get certain telegraphic communications issued to the Station Master at Hirehalli by the District Traffic Superintendent at Bangalore and posed himself as a very influential Congressman, claiming acquaintance or friendship with the Ministers and public leaders. Excepting in the case of the first of the forwarding notes purporting to be signed by one P. Sitaramaiah the clear evidence of the Station Master, not to any extent whittled down by cross-examination, is that the signature to one of the notes was affixed by the 2nd accused himself and to two others by the first accused himself in the presence of the Station Master. I have no doubt in my mind that all these facts are clearly established by the evidence and I cannot say that the trial Judge committed any error in placing reliance on this part of the evidence. The consignments from Rajanukunte, as I have already stated, were eight in number and were sent on four different dates-one on 17th January, 1957, three on 6th February, 1957, one on 8th October, 1957 and two on 31st December, 1957. I have already given the details and particulars of these consignments in an earlier portion of this judgment. In this case also the principal and important witness is the Station Master Sheriff examined as P.W. 11. There are other witnesses speaking principally to the last of the bookings to whose evidence I shall make a reference later. It is first necessary to refer to the details of the evidence given by Station Master P.W. 11. He knows the 3rd accused by name Anantha Rao. In his chief examination it may be stated that there is some infirmity in not obtaining from him specific, distinct and clear answers, identifying Anantha Rao whom he knew with the 3rd accused before Court; but fortunately for the prosecution that infirmity has been completely rectified by the following answers obtained from him in the course of cross-examination: "It is not correct to say that the name of A-3 is Munivenkataramaiah and that I know it Even to-day I do not know that his name is Munivenkataramaiah. I came to know A-3 for the first time when he brought the earliest consignment for booking." 1 see no reason to accept the argument that there has not been any clear dentification by the Station Master to the effect that the 3rd accused Munivenkatara maiah before Court was the same as and no other than Anantha Rao who had come to him for booking consignment. He speaks to the 3rd accused coming to Mm on every one of the four dates mentioned above to book consignments of sanda wood and speaks to the details, the numbers and other particulars of every one of the railway way bills and forwarding notes. The only fact which he does not speak to is his having seen any body preparing forwarding notes, but that the forwarding notes as well as the permits for transit of sandal wood were produced to him by the 3rd accused admits of no doubt. There has been some cross-examinat ion by the 3rd accused, to discredit his evidence by eliciting from him that in the fowarding note Exhibit P-29, he had attested a left thumb mark of one Abdul Khasim without taking sufficient care. The answers are: "I have attested the L.T.M. in Exhibit P-29 permit. The L.T.M. is in the name of Abdul Khasim. He put the thumb impression in my presence. I prepared Exhibit P-29 for Abdul Khasim." This evidence shows that some body calling himself Abdul Khasim did affix the thumb impression in the presence of the witness. The only lack of care exhibited by the Station Master would be that he did not satisfy himself that the person affixing a thumb mark for Abdul Khasim was no other than Abdul Khasim. But there is his evidence that in all occasions the 3rd accused had come for booking the consignment. It would perhaps have been better for the prosecution to clarify the position in re-examination. They have not done so. However, I am not impressed by the argument that this lack of caution on the part of the Station Master is sufficient to discard his entire evidence as unreliable. Nothing has been elicited either by way of interestedness or otherwise to show why the Station Master should depose falsely against the 3rd accused. I shall refer to the details of the booking of 31st December, 1957 at a slightly later stage. Nothing has been elicited either by way of interestedness or otherwise to show why the Station Master should depose falsely against the 3rd accused. I shall refer to the details of the booking of 31st December, 1957 at a slightly later stage. It is necessary at this stage to mention one other fact elicited from this witness, by the trial Court itself at the end of the examination by all parties. The witness stated: "Before I was a Station Master, I was an Asst. Station Master. I have worked at Dodkurugod and Rajanukunte in the metre guage on Guntakal Section. I have also worked in the Bangalore Kolar Light Railway. I had not booked any sandal wood in those places. I have not booked sandal wood for any one else at Rajanukunte. I belong to the old State of Mysore. I knew that sandalwood was a State monopoly. I know that a permit was also necessary. There is no special permit for the transport’of sandal wood as I know. Shimoga, Chitaldrug, Tumkur and Kolar are the areas where sandal wood grows in plenty." Rajanukunte is in the Bangalore District. It did not strike me as odd that people should come to Rajanukunte to look sandal wood." The Judge permitted all Counsel including the Public Prosecutor to cross-examine the witness further; but nobody cross-examined the witness. We may-therefore take it that during his entire period as Station Master at Rajanukunte in 1956 and 1957, this witness had booked sandal wood only for or at the instance of the 3rd accused. That his oral evidence is true is clear from the fact that the eight way bills from 17th January, 1957 to 31st December, 1957 are successive serial numbers from 00948/5 to 00948/11. On this evidence which I find no reason to disbelieve or discard one thing that becomes clear is that the 3rd accused it was that booked sandal wood on eight occasions. If so the next fact which flows directly from it is that for every one of these bookings he had used a false permit and a false name; three of then were in the name of Y.K. Sharma as consignor, one in the name of B.K. Sharma and another in the name of Bangalore Trading Company and the last two in the name of Anantha Rao. None of these was either the name or the trade-name of the 3rd accused. I shall refer later to the evidence of a lawyer called Seshagiri Rao examined as P.W. 52 in another connection but at this stage I may mention that according to the evidence of the lawyer-Bangalore Trading Company was a name under which his wife was carrying on some business in oils and greases. It also appears that another name was used by the 3rd accused, namely, National Trading Company-There is only the evidence of two or three police officers including the investigating officer. They could not trace any concern of that name in any part of Bangalore. However there is no gainsaying the fact that the third accused has used false names while booking consignments. Regarding the delivery of the consignments at Bombay, there is the evidence of P.Ws. 90, 91, 92 and 94, Station Masters or Clerks working at the relevant period at Byculla, Dadar etc., to which the earlier consignments had been sent. There is no necessity to refer to the details of that evidence because they speak to obvious facts and facts which are not sought to be contradicted that goods sent from Rajanukunte were in the usual course delivered at the railway station of destination in Bombay State. I might also refer to one portion of the evidence of K.N. Prabhu, P.W. 88. It will be remembered that the consingee under three consignments of 6th February, 1957 was one Murthy Rao. Prabhu speaks to his seeing some person calling himself Murthy Rao at Byculla executing some indemnity bond for the purpose of obtaining delivery. By itself it would have meant little but the following was elicited in the course of cross-examination on behalf of the 3rd accused: “There is no person by name Murthy Rao in the photographs exhibits P-112 to P-115. The Murthy Rao that signed the bond at the railway station is not before Court amongst the accused.” The apparent purpose of the cross-examination was to show that delivery was not taken by the third accused at Byculla of consignment sent in the name of Murthy Rao. But that the consignments were made under a false name Y.K. Sharma, B. K. Sharma, etc., is clear from the evidence relating to the bookings themselves at Rajanukunte railway station to which I have already referred. But that the consignments were made under a false name Y.K. Sharma, B. K. Sharma, etc., is clear from the evidence relating to the bookings themselves at Rajanukunte railway station to which I have already referred. I now take up for detailed examination the evidence relating to the last booking of 31st December, 1957, the goods booked under which consignment ultimately happened to be seized and occasioned the investigation resulting in the prosecution P.W. 11 Station Master Sheriff states that 40 bags of sandal wood were brought and that these were sent in two consignments of 20 bags each. He also states that when he asked for a permit, the 3rd accused produced a permit. This permit was later seized from one of the clerks of Goverdhandass Tokersey and has been produced in Court and marked Exhibit P-14. The Station Master Sheriff states that the 3rd accused came to the station at about noon on the 31st December, 1957 for the purpose of booking these consignments. He of course does not know or does not remember whether any body else had accompanied him. He also states that the 3rd accused wanted to book the sandal wood for one National Trading Company. He permitted the booking and sent him over to the Assistant Station Master for completing the formalities and details of the booking. After the formalities and details were completed, the Station Mastet says that the consignments were despatchthe same day by the Guntakal Mail being Train No. 223. Two other witnesses Revoji and Narasoji who were working as pointsmen at the Rajanukunte railway station have also been examined to show that the bags were marked appropriately according to the Code or practice adopted by the Railway and loaded into the Train No. 223. Both of them speak to their having put the 40 bags on all in two consignments. The second among them, namely, Narsoji, marked the bags, with letters “RNN BB VT” - “RNN” standing for Rajanukunte and “BBVT” for Bombay Victoria Terminus. P.W. 17 Srinivasa Iyer was the Under Guard of that Train No. 223 on that day. He states that he actually saw the 40 bats being loaded into the break-van of the train with the railway marks. He himself apparently had to attend to the matter because according to schedule the train stops at the station only for two minutes. P.W. 17 Srinivasa Iyer was the Under Guard of that Train No. 223 on that day. He states that he actually saw the 40 bats being loaded into the break-van of the train with the railway marks. He himself apparently had to attend to the matter because according to schedule the train stops at the station only for two minutes. Whatever may be stated about the evidence of the pointsman in other respects, so far as the loading of 40 bags covered by these two consignments with the marks RNN BB VT into the Train No. 223 is concerned, there can be no doubt because both the Station Master P.W. 11 Sheriff as well as the Under Guard Srinivasa Iyer, P.W. 17 speak to these facts. The evidence of the former as I have already stated is worthy of acceptance. The evidence of the latter I do not find any reason to discard. The only cross-examination was directed to test his memory or to cast doubt on his being able to clearly recollect the details he was deposing to. But the witness states that he recollects the thing because that was the only occasion when he loaded so large a quantity of goods in the Mail Train at Rajanukunte, and also because he had made a note thereof in what he calls a journal maintained by him. The journal is not produced and it has also been elicited that even before the Investigating Officer he did not produce the said journal, but he merely looked into it to refresh his memory. Even a part from the journal or other record, I do not think that it can be said that an event of loading as many as 40 bags of sandal wood in an out of the way railway station like Rajanukunte, where the train stops for only a couple of minutes, is an event which a person like the Under Guard P.W. 17 Srinivasa Iyer may not be in a position to remember or recollect. The fact therefore that two consignments consisting of 20 bags each of sandalwood were booked by the 3rd accused on 31st December, 1957 at Rajankunte railway station and that they were actually put into the train the same night for despatch may be taken as satisfactorily proved. The fact therefore that two consignments consisting of 20 bags each of sandalwood were booked by the 3rd accused on 31st December, 1957 at Rajankunte railway station and that they were actually put into the train the same night for despatch may be taken as satisfactorily proved. At the other end, the Victoria Terminus at Bombay, we have three witnesses speaking to the delivery-P.W. 85 B.N. Opasini who was then the Head Delivery Clerk at Bombay V.T. and two other witnesses P.W. 84 Laga Vankar and P.W. 107 Hyder Ali. These are the railway officials who handle the delivery. The effect of their evidence is that after checking the details, the parcels were delivered to one Dasarathlal Gandhi, a servant of Govardandass Tokersey. The Head Delivery Clerk P.W. 85 states that he knew the said Gandhi personally. It is not unlikely because there is the other evidence of’Govardhandass Tokersey himself that he has fairly large dealings in sandal wood and also the evidence of another witness Mayinkar, his accountant, to the effect that he, Mayinkar and Gandhi used to attend to purchases, taking delivery of sandal wood etc., on behalf of their master Govardandass. Although the pseudonymous telegram received by P.W. 1 Kadambi gave him to understand that the consignments were awaiting delivery or were not claimed for some suspicious reasons, when P.W. 66 Uppin actually arrived in Bombay on the morning of the 13th, the delivery had already been effected. It would appear that delivery was made some time on the nth January. The parcels, according to the evidence of Mayinkar, were removed by hand carts to a godown belonging to his master Govardandass. Uppin, after making enquiries with the railway staff dealing with del, very of parcels, was taken to Goverdhandass’s place by one of his servants who happened to be on the platform. At the business place of Goverdandass, he met not only Gandhi men tioned above, but also his accountant Mayinkar, P.W. 82. Gandhi was dead by the time this case came on for trial. We have it however from the evidence of Mayinkar and also from another witness called Narayana Babu Vane P.W. 83, another servant of Govardandass, who had accompanied Gandhi to the railway station, that Gandhi it was who took delivery and had the things removed to the godown of their master Govardandass. We have it however from the evidence of Mayinkar and also from another witness called Narayana Babu Vane P.W. 83, another servant of Govardandass, who had accompanied Gandhi to the railway station, that Gandhi it was who took delivery and had the things removed to the godown of their master Govardandass. The further evidence of Mayinkar is that because the sandalwood sent was not quite good or in good condition, he and his co-employees had got the sandalwood removed from the bags and arranged for their being cleaned and washed. Discovering from Mayinkar that the sandalwood concerned had been actually taken delivery of, Uppin contacted the police at Bombay. P.W. 106 Quareshi of the Pydhoni Police Station deputed his subordinate Jethwani to proceed to the godown along with Uppin. Jethwani is examined as P.W. 109, and when he and Uppin arrived at the godown it was found that the sandalwood had been partly washed, some of it put into bags and some remaining to be put into bags, 10 bags contained the washed or cleaned sandalwood and 12 others, the rest of the sandalwood 40 bags in which it had been originally packed for railway transport had been separated and folded and bundled into two bundles of 20 bags each. Having gone to the place, Jethwani prepared a mahazar. The original mahazar is produced as Exhibit P-108 and it speaks to his having prepared the same at the godown of Tokersey on the 13th January, 1958. The mahazar itself shows that its preparation concluded at about 1-30 p.m. Uppin is one of the attestors of the mahazar. Another line pursued by Uppin was to trace Anantha Rao, the consignor of these goods. Mayinkar told him that he was to his knowledge, residing in the hotel called Rameshwar Hindu Lodge run by P.W. 78 Joshi, and took Uppin with him to that hotel. He asked for Anantha Rao. But P.W. 78 did not know anybody by that name in the hotel. Mayinkar then described him as a tall, well-built Madrassi in a lungi, and recognising the man from the description. He asked for Anantha Rao. But P.W. 78 did not know anybody by that name in the hotel. Mayinkar then described him as a tall, well-built Madrassi in a lungi, and recognising the man from the description. P.W. 78 took him to Room No. 19 and pointed out accused 3 who had entered the lodge under the name G.M. Ramaiah, vide Exhibit 179-A. Mayinkar also, as I have already stated, produced to the police in the presence of Uppin, the permit later produced as Exhibit P-4 and the other railway papers relating to the consignment. Both the mahazar prepared by Jethwani P.W. 109 as well as his oral evidence In Court shows that when the mahazar was prepared the sandalwood billets had some letters stamped on them included within small circles. One set of letters were FAD, the other SS. Prima facie, there is little reason not to accept the general effect of this evidence, namely, that the 40 bags of sandalwood taken delivery of by Gandhi for Govardandass Tokersey, were taken to the godown of Tokersey and that those sandalwood-billets were the very billets described in the mahazar Exhibit P-180 and lates seized by the police, and that at or about the time they came to be delivered accused 3 was in Bombay and had been actually contacted by the servants of Goverdandass Tokersey. But considerable argument has been addressed to discredit this evidence or at any rate, to cast doubts on its complete acceptability. One of the strongest points sought to be made is that the oral evidence of Mayinkar as well as a statement of Uppin said to have been recorded by a policeman at Bombay would go to show that Uppin first addressed himself to the identification of Anantha Rao, the alleged consignor, and that he came back again late in the evening at about 5 o’clock on the 13th of January which would go to show that all was not well with this mahazar Exhibit P-180 which records that it was completed at 1-30 in the afternoon of 13th and also shows that Uppin had attested it. I am clearly of the opinion that the statement said to have been recorded by the police though marked as Exhibit P-265 in this case, is no evidence it all. I am clearly of the opinion that the statement said to have been recorded by the police though marked as Exhibit P-265 in this case, is no evidence it all. Although it may not be a statement affected by sections 161 and 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on which point it is unnecessary to express any opinion, it would be a previous statement of a living person who was examined as a witness. If the accused wanted to contradict or discredit the evidence of Uppin, it was up to them to have confronted him with that previous statement by complying with the provisions of section 145 of the Evidence Act. They have not cone so.. There is, however, the oral evidence of Mayinkar to the effect that he and Uppin returned from Rameshwar Hindu Lodge about 5 o’clock in the evening. Although this evidence taken along with the narration of events by Uppin in the curse of his chief-examination, does seem to suggest some confusion in the matter of sequence of events which took place after his arrival in Bombay. I am not satisfied that sufficient material has been placed on record not to accept as true the recorded facts that the mahazar Exhibit P-180 was completed at 1-30 P.M. and that Uppin as attestor must have been present at the time. If there was indeed some definite material on the basis of which the acceptability of these recorded facts could have been rendered doubtful, it was, in my opinion, necessary to have confronted both Uppin as well as Jethwani with this circumstance and obtained their explanation, before a Court could be asked to condemn their evidence as unacceptable. 1 am therefore not persuaded that any suspicion attaches either to the mahazar Exhibit P-180 or to the circumstances in which it came to be prepared. The identity of the articles covered by the mahazar with the articles despatched in the 40 bags by train has also been questioned in the course of the argument. The argument is supported not on the basis of any interestedness or mala fiats attributed either to the police officer, Jethwani or to the Forest Officer Uppin, but from certain other circumstances elicited from Tokersey or from Mayinkar in the course of cross-examination. The argument is supported not on the basis of any interestedness or mala fiats attributed either to the police officer, Jethwani or to the Forest Officer Uppin, but from certain other circumstances elicited from Tokersey or from Mayinkar in the course of cross-examination. At one stage in the course of cross-examination Mayinkar answered that the sandalwood received in the godown of his master Govardandass would get mixed up with the sandalwood already in it, but very shortly thereafter he made it clear that until the sandalwood received is cleaned and paid for it would be kept separate and not mixed up. The general answer elicited from Govardandass Tokersey is that he deals in large quantities of sandalwood and that at any given time there will be plenty of sandalwood in his godown. These answers, in my opinion, are of little assistance to the accused on this matter. Mayinkar himself has said that until the wood is cleaned and paid for, it will not be mixed up with the rest of the sandalwood. Jethwani and Uppin who went there found it separately kept, and even the process of cleaning incomplete Quite close to them were placed the 40 bags in which it had been packed for railway transport folded and bundled up into two bundles. They also saw on these bags the marks RNN by BBVT. I do not think therefore that there is any reason to disagree with the opinion of the trial Judge that the sandalwood despatched from Rajanukunte in 40 bags, is the same as the sandalwood in respect of which Jethwani prepared the mahazar Exhibit P-180. There is some point regarding the question whether the sandalwood put into the train in Rajanukunte is the same as the sandalwood said to have been cut by accused 3 by engaging coolies from the State Forest in Narasimhadevarabetta and whether the sandalwood covered by the mahazar Exhibit P-180 is the same as the sandalwood produced in Court and marked M.O. 1. These question I will consider when I come to examine the question of theft. These question I will consider when I come to examine the question of theft. At this stage, therefore, I should record that the evidence so far discussed clearly establishes the following facts: (1) That accused 3 consigned 40 bags of sandalwood from Rajanukunte railway station on 31st December, 1957; (2) That the forwarding note contained the signature reading K. Anantha Rao; (3) That the said identical 40 bags of sandalwood were received by a servant of Govardandass Tokersey at V. T. Station at Bombay; and (4) That the said sandalwood was seized by the police in Bombay at theinstance of Uppin after preparing a manager Exhibit P-180. Two other matters should now be discussed: (1) Whether Anantha Rao shown as the consignor is the same as accused 3 Munivenkatramaiah? and (2) Whether the permit Exhibit P-4 is a genuine one? On the first point, there can be little doubt. I have already discussed on detail the evidence of the Station Master Sheriff P.W. 11 to the effect that accused 3identified in Court was always known to him as Anantha Rao who had come to Rajanukunte railway station en several occasions for broking sandalwood. Having regard to the fact that the only booking of sandalwood done by Sheriff was at Rajanukunte and the only person for whom he booked sandalwood was accused 3, there is little reason not to accept his evidence that accused 3 whom he saw in Court was Anantha Rao who had come for booking sandalwood. But some doubt has been cast on this evidence or some caution sought to be administered before accepting his evidence because of the suspicion attaching to the evidence of the Assistant Station master Doddannasetty P.W. 12 and the evidence of the pointsmen Revoji, P.W. 13 and Narasoji, P.W. 14. The special feature of the evidence of Doddannasetty on which reliance is placed on behalf of accused 3 is that while speaking to the factum of the consignments having been booked from Rajanukunte station on 31st December, 1957, he was not in a position to state anything more than that one person calling himself Anantha Rao came and booked those consignments. He did not see that Anantha Rao in the Court, much less among the accused persons. He did not see that Anantha Rao in the Court, much less among the accused persons. This evidence is in direct opposition to the evidence of the Station Master, P.W. 11, who while stating that the knew the consignor by the name Anantha Rao clearly identified him with accused 3 Munivenkataramaiah before the Court. Now both these witnesses had been asked in the course of the investigation to identify accused 3 at identification parades conducted by Magistrate. The Station Master P.W. 11 admitted having been asked to attend the identification conducted by Magistrate Mr. Ganesh P.W. 101. But Doddannasetty P.W. 12 while admitting that he was asked to attend an identification parade by another Magistrate Mr. Kotrabasavaiah P.W. 64, staled that he had not identified and could not identify accused 3 at the parade. Had it been a mere matter of choosing between the oral statement on oath of one witness against the other, it would have at least furnished a basis for an argument that there is some reasonable doubt about the identify of the accused of which the benefit should be given to him. But the matter does not stand merely on the oral evidence of two witnesses. We have on record the evidence of Mr. Kotrabasaviah, the Magistrate who had conducted the parade at which Doddanna setty was asked to identify the person who had booked the consignments from Rajanukunte on 31st December, 1957. He states: “I asked Doddannasetty to identify Munivenkataramaiah, the accused. He straight went to that. Munivenkataramaiah and identified him. Doddannasetty identified Munivenkataramaiah as the perron who booked 40 bags of sandalwood Doddannasetty signed the identification parade proceedings at Exhibit P-143-A. Doddannasetty identified accused 3 twice on that day.” This would have been a complete answer to the argument on behalf of accused 3 but for the fact that the name Munivenkataramiah is used by the witness in the course of his deposition; a more accurate statement would be that either the Counsel who put the question or the Court which recorded the answer used the name Munivenkataramaiah without using the name Anantha Rao which was the proper name to use at that stage. It would have been difficult for the prosecution to fully get over the effect of the argument but for the fact that in the extract given above, the Magistrate has said that Doddannasetty had identified Munivenkataramiah as the person who booked 40 bags of sandalwood. I therefore cannot disagree with the trial Judge when he says that in the face of the clear evidence of the Magistrate Mr Kotrabasaviah that Doddannasetty had actually identified accused 3 on two occasions at the identification parade it is not possible to accept the evidence of Doddannasetty to the effect that he had never identified accused 3 at the identification parade. I therefore think that there is nothing in the evidence of Doddannasetty to cast my doubts on the evidence of Sheriff P.W.11. There is not much in the evidence of the pointsmen Revoji and Narasoji. Both of them appear to have attended the identification parade conducted by the magistrate Mr. Ganesh, P.W. 101. Both of them state in Court that the gentleman who booked the consignments at Rajanukunte on 31st December, 1957 was accused 3 before the Court. But there is something in the evidence of Narasoji on this question of identification which makes me hesitate to place much reliance on it. He has stated twice over in his evidence that at one of the parades he had actually identified accused 5, who, according to the Magistrate, was nowhere in the parade. But the value of this weakness in the evidence of Narasoji is not so much to accused 3 as to-accused 5. Dealing now with the case of accused 3, I do not think that the over-enthusiasm exhibited by Narasoji in this matter is reason enough not to accept as fully reliable the evidence of the Station Master Sheriff. 1 have discussed these matters at some length because one of the arguments strongly, and, in my opinion, rightly, pressed on behalf of accused 3 is that ultimately so far as the happenings in Rajanukunte railway station are concerned, the case against him rests on the sole testimony of the Station Master, P.W. 11 Sheriff, the rest of the evidence being either in favour of the accused or not fully and clearly in favour of the prosecution. For all the reasons discussed by me above I think that his evidence is worthy of acceptance, and the trial Judge cannot be said to have committed any error in relying on it and acting on it. At this stage itself, I may state that the evidence of Mayinkar P.W. 82 as wellas that of the hotel-keeper Joshi, P.W. 78 and his boarder Narmada Shankar Naik, which I have already discussed goes to show that accused 3 was in Bombay at the time the consignment was taken delivery of at V.T. and was known to Govardandass’s employees by the name Anantha Rao and known to the hotel-keeper Joshi, P.W. 78 by the name C.M. Muniramaiah. The evidence already discussed shows that Muniramaiah who stayed in the hotel and Anantha Rao who contacted Mayinkar and other servants of Govardandass and C.M. Munivenkataramaiah, accused 3 before the Court, are one and the same. Exhibit P-4 is the permit produced by Mayinkar as the one handed over to him by accused 3, calling himself by the name Anantha Rao, as the one covering the consignment of 40 bags in question. The case of the prosecution is that this is not a genuine permit. It is in a certain printed form resembling that of permits ordinarily or normally issued by the Forest Department and purports to besigned by the District Forest Officer, Bangalore, whose name so far as it can be read out in the signature is “H.V. Subba” and the rest is not clearly loadable. Apparently and in the absence of any explanatory circumstances, one is led to believe that this signature is of P.W. 4 Subbiah who was a District Forest Officer of the region where Narasimhadevarabetta is located. In his evidence, on looking at Exhibit P-4, he states that: “In 1956 the District Forest Officer, Kolar, has not issued any permit for sandalwood for export. I see the permit Exhibit P-4. This permit has not been issued from the District Forest Office, Bangalore. I read the signature which is now marked Exhibit P-4A. It reads as ‘H.V. Subba’ and something more. It is not my signature. I sign as”K.N. Subbayya“. My initials are not there. The rubber stamp impression in Exhibit P-4 is not that of the rubber stamp that was in use in Bangalore District Forest Office.” P.W. 32 Mallaraj Urs is the Joint Director of the Government Press, Bangalore. It reads as ‘H.V. Subba’ and something more. It is not my signature. I sign as”K.N. Subbayya“. My initials are not there. The rubber stamp impression in Exhibit P-4 is not that of the rubber stamp that was in use in Bangalore District Forest Office.” P.W. 32 Mallaraj Urs is the Joint Director of the Government Press, Bangalore. Speaking with reference to Exhibit P-4, he narrates several differences between the genuine forms printed at the Government Press and Exhibit P-4. The trial Judge has made a detailed note of them and accepted his evidence. It is not necessary to repeat the technical details deposed to by Mallaraj Urs. There is no difficulty in accepting his evidence not only because of its intrinsic value but also because there is no cross-examination on behalf of accused 1, 3, 4 and 5 and very ineffective cross-examination in a couple of sentences on behalf of accused 2. I really cannot understand why any accused other than accused 3 and 4 should have thought of cross-examining him because the case is directed pointedly against accused 3 with a charge of forgery against accused 4. Accused 4 need not have cross-examined him because forgery, if any, has to be proved. The fact that Exhibit P-4 is not genuine does not carry the case very far as against accused 4. It was accused 3 who actually used the paper before the Station Master whose interest it was to cross-examine him. He has not done so. The value of the evidence consists in its own intrinsic merit and the technical knowledge and personal knowledge about the numbering of the work orders etc. of Mallaraj Urs, P.W. 32. Agreeing therefore with the trial Judge, I hold that Exhibit P-4 was not a genuine permits. The next topic in respect of which there is direct oral evidence is the a legation that accused 3 unlawfully cut some sandalwood trees from the State forest in Narasimhadevarabetta. There are 5 witnesses speaking to this matter: P.W. 6 Ram Dass, P.W. 7 Malliga, P.W. 8 Venkatarayappa, P.W. 9 Venkatarayya and P.W. 10 Malluriga. These were all engaged, according to their evidence, by accused 3 Munivenkataramaiah at wages nearly three times the normal level of wages to cut certain trees pointed out by him and a companion of his called Channappa. These were all engaged, according to their evidence, by accused 3 Munivenkataramaiah at wages nearly three times the normal level of wages to cut certain trees pointed out by him and a companion of his called Channappa. On one point, they are all unanimous, namely, that it was accused 3 who engaged them promissing to pay them wages at the rate of Rs. 3 per day and it was accused 3 who actually paid them the wages. They are also unanimous in their statement that the sandalwood trees felled by them were later cut into billets and tied into 40 bags supplied by accused 3 and removed about midnight on a particular day by a lorry. If their evidence can be accepted, the clear legal effect would be that accused 3 has committed theft of sandalwood. Sandalwood, as I have stated, is the exclusive property of the State Government under the Mysore Forest Act. There can also be no doubt as a matter of law, the State Government is in effective possession of the State forests where the trees alleged to have been cut were growing. The moment the tree is cut and felled, it becomes movable property still belonging to the Government and in the possession of the Government, and the very act of cutting and felling can rightly be regarded as moving sufficient for the purpose of the offence of theft under the Indian Penal Code. We have of course, the further evidence in this case that they were actually moved and transported by a lorry from the place where the tress had been cut. Several criticisms were made against their evidence both before the trial Court and before me. The trial Court after a consideration of all those criticisms, found the evidence sufficiently reliable. The question is whether that opinion of the trial Court can be said to be erroneous. There are some discrepancies in their evidence in the matter of certain details. For example, although all of them seem to be clear that the locality from which they cut the trees was behind a temple called Eradimmammana temple, they do not seem to be quite clear about the exact distance of the area with reference to the temple itself. One of them says it is about half a mile, another, about 11 miles. One of them says it is about half a mile, another, about 11 miles. One of them says that the billets were hid under a bush near about the place where the cutting took place. Another says that the billets were removed to read side to facilitate loading into a lorry. Yet another says that the packing in bags took place within temple premises. None of them is able to give the number of the lorry by which those bags were transported, nor gives the name or even the religion of the driver except that one of them says that he had a beard. These discrepancies by themselves may not, as the trial Judge says, be given so much importance as to totally discredit their evidence in regard to the basic or the central fact of their having been engaged by accused 3 for cutting sandalwood trees and their having acutally done so. After all that is the central fact that the prosecution was called upon to prove in this case. If in that regard there could be no doubt, the smaller discrepancies about the details may not be of much value especially if one remembers that six long years had elapsed before these witnesses were examined by the trial Court since the date of the cutting. Even here, although most of them say about six years before they gave evidence, one of them gives more than six years before then, the cutting took place. But the broad and general attack made against the veracity of these witnesses is that their statements were not recorded with sufficient promptitude by the investigating police but that at a subsequent stage in the investigation steps were taken to get those statements recorded before a Magistrate under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It has also been stated that these witnesses belong to a class which may be expected to be moved by monetary or other material consideration to depose one way or the other without much compunction or hesitation. Another argument addressed against them is that they have shown great readiness to say that the sandalwood produced before the Court as a material object is identical with the sandalwood cut by them in Narasimhadevarabetta, some of then even without looking at it or even before any bag was brought from the property room to Court hall for purposes of identification. There is no gainsaying the fact that they have exhibited over-enthusiasm in the matter of identifying the goods. I say so because experienced officers of the Forest Department themselves who gave evidence have frankly stated that by merely looking at a piece of wood they cannot say that it is identical with some other wood of the same variety unless of course there are certain clear identifying marks or distinguishing features which might have created a fairly long lasting Impression on the mind of a person who had looked at them. But the circumstance that their statements were got recorded under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not a circumstance on the basis of which one could say that they were either reliable or unreliable witnesses. If the suggestion is that that step was taken by the investigating police on account of the unreliability of these witnesses or the apprehension that they might be got over by the accused, that suggestion itself is destructive of the general attack made against them. It would imply that the prosecution thought that at the stage of the investigation they were speakingthe truth, but that there was a clear possibility of their being tampered with. I do not, think, therefore, that it is at all to the advantage of the accused’s case to press this suggestion. If, on the other hand, the suggestion is that it was the attempt of the prosecution to bind them to a certain story by getting them to make a statement on oath before a Magistrate under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, then something more than the mere fact of the statements having been so recorded is necessary. The accused must go further and prove or at least place on record circumstances which would probabilise the fact that some sort of pressure was exerted on them by the police before the statements were got recorded. On that point, we have neither evidence nor any other circumstance brought on record by cross-examination of either these witnesses or other witnesses. Apart from these considerations, there are what may be called broad probabilities on which reliance can be placed without much hesitation. Accused 3 has been shown to indulge or to have indulged in getting sandalwood transported by railway without proper permits and by giving false names. Apart from these considerations, there are what may be called broad probabilities on which reliance can be placed without much hesitation. Accused 3 has been shown to indulge or to have indulged in getting sandalwood transported by railway without proper permits and by giving false names. As the subject-matter of the offence is sandalwood which is exclusive property of the Government and which cannot be moved without the possession of a valid transit permit, the steps taken by accused 3 do suggest a clear inference that the sandalwood dealt with by him was not acquired by him by any legitimate means, necessitating his taking steps to cover his wrongful acts. There being quite reliable evidence relating to the bookings which I have already discussed at some length, the probability of his having engaged persons of the type of P.Ws. 6 to 10 for the purpose of cutting trees gets greatly enhanced. Considering these probabilities, the trial Judge who has seen the witnesses in the box both under chief-examination as well as under cross-examination, has felt no hesitation in accepting their evidence as to the basic or the central fact of their having cut the trees at the instance of accused 3 in the manner spoken to by them. I do not feel justified in disagreeing with that view. I therefore agree wih the trial Judge and hold that the prosecution has proved that accused 3 had engaged P.Ws. 6 to 10 to cut sandalwood trees from a portion of the State Forest in Narasimhadevarabetta. Two other items of evidence placed on record by the prosecution are the seizure of certain papers and account books from accused 1, 2 and 4 and the confessional statement of accused 2. I will take up the latter for consideration first The confession was recorded by the Assistant Commissioner, Doddaballapur on 30th October. 1958. Accused 2 had been arrested, according to the police, on the 12th October. After some days of police custody for purposes of investigation he was remanded to judicial custody and lodged in the Central Jail at Bangalore, on 27th October, 1958. On the following day, the Investigating Officer P.W.123, appears to have made and application to the Assistant Commissioner of Doddaballapur who is also an Executive Magistrate, to record the confession of accused 2. He posted the case to the 30th of that month. On the following day, the Investigating Officer P.W.123, appears to have made and application to the Assistant Commissioner of Doddaballapur who is also an Executive Magistrate, to record the confession of accused 2. He posted the case to the 30th of that month. The record made by the Magistrate shows that the recording of the confession started at 12-10 p.m. on 30th October, 1958. It was completed at 3-15 p.m. The former, I infer by reading the text written at the top of the first page, the latter I infer from he fact that at the end of the text of the certificate the Magistrate after signing his name and putting the date has also entered the time as 3-15 p.m. The first or the preliminary portion shows that he put certain questions to the accused and ascertained from him that he was aware of the fact that he was a Magistrate, that he was in the Court hall of the Magistrate, that he has not been offered any inducement or administered any threats or warnings, that he was aware that he was going to make a confession which may be used against him as evidence and that nevertheless he was desirous of stating the true facts as he knew them. The confession was retracted by him before the Committing Magistrate himself Exhibit P-316 is the record of his answers before the Magistrate to the questions put to him. Question No. 8 was whether he wished to say anything about the confession which was read out to him in full by the Magistrate. His answer was ‘as he police compelled me, I made a confession statement before the Magistrate Eighteen days thereafter I gave an application to the District Magistrate, Bangalore and withdrew it He did not, however, produce or cause to be produced a copy of the application alleged to have been made by him to the District Magistrate or the original lying with the District Magistrate. At the Sessions trial when Chandrasekahar, P.W. 37, the Superintendent of the Central Jail, was in the box a paper purporting to be the copy of the application to the District Magistrate was produced and marked as Exhibit D-8. Chandrasekhar’s answers in that regard were: “I see Exhibit D-8. I do not remember if accused 2 presented this application to me for being sent to the District Magistrage. Chandrasekhar’s answers in that regard were: “I see Exhibit D-8. I do not remember if accused 2 presented this application to me for being sent to the District Magistrage. I do not remember now if the original of Exhibit D-8 was sent to the District Magistrate without seeing the application.” The said Exhibit D-8 is written in pencil. It appears to have been originally intended to be addressed to the Minister in charge of Law and Order which was later struck out and the name of the District Magistrate written The text it the top of the first page is that it is a copy. On the second page below the text, there is a writing in ink to the effect that the original had been sent to the District Magistrate through the Superintendent. On the first page at the top on the right hand side there is a faint rubber stamp which appears to be that of the office of the Superintendent of the Central Jail, Bangalore. The learned Sessions Judge states in his judgment that he permitted this to be marked as an exhibit only for the purpose of ascertaining the circumstances in which accused 2 came to retract this piece of paper. I doubt very much whether this piece of paper was at all admissible or has been properly brought on record. Accused 2 himself makes no mention of it in his statement under section 342 although specific questions are put to him in regard to the confession. The answers given by Chandrasekhar are not in any sense answers which can be regarded as tending to prove or probabilise at least the truth of the fact that Exhibit D-8 was a copy of an application the original whereof had been forwarded through Chandrasekhar’s office to the District Magistrate. It is also not clear how accused 2 who was an under-trial prisoner in the jail could have had or retained this piece of paper in his possession. If as I expect his possessions would have been left in the custody of the authorities of the jail and handed back to him when he was released from jail, I should have expected the relevant books of the jail to be produced in proof of the authenticity of the application and the fact of accused 2 having sent such an application. I also attach much importance to the fact that when for the first time before the Committing Magistrate accused 2 made a retraction and also referred to his having made an application to the District Magistrate he did not produce this paper before the Magistrate. I feel therefore considerable hesitation in placing: any reliance on this piece of paper. But I do accept the position that before the Committing Magistrate accused 2 did retract from the confession. On the question whether the confession was voluntary or not, great emphasis in the argument was placed on the fact that when Magistrates, both Judicial and Executive, were available in Bangalore City where accused 2 was lodged, the investigating police thought it fit to take him to the Assistant Commissioner of Doddaballapur to have his confession recorded. It is also pointed out that the fact that P.W. 123 made an application to the said Assistant Commissioner on the 28th, one day after accused 2 was placed in judicial custody in the Central Jail, might suggest that though the custody was formally judicial, the investigation officer might have had opportunities to contact the accused. The inference or suggestion of the possible opportunities for contact by P.W. 123 must, in my opinion, be regarded as mere suggestion. He was not asked any question about this when he was in the box. It is not fair, therefore, to construct any argument on that basis. But the fact that the investigating police did not take advantage of the presence of the several Judicial Magistrates in Bangalore City for the purpose of recording the confession but took accused 2 to the Assistant Commissioner of Doddaballapur is a matter which I think should have been explained. The explanation offered is that the office or the Court hall of the said Magistrate is also situated in Bangalore. As the law empowers Executive Magistrates also to. record confessions and the Judicial Magistrates who may have jurisdiction as trial Magistrates or Committing Magistrates may decline to record confessions for fear of having to transfer the case to some other file, the explanation given may be accepted. As the law empowers Executive Magistrates also to. record confessions and the Judicial Magistrates who may have jurisdiction as trial Magistrates or Committing Magistrates may decline to record confessions for fear of having to transfer the case to some other file, the explanation given may be accepted. Another circumstance strongly relied upon is that although the Magistrate put several questions to satisfy himself that accused 2 was proposing to make a confession freely and without being under the influence of the investigating police, the omission on the part of the Magistrate to give him some time for reflection is an infirmity or a source of weakness or a circumstance which should caution the trial Court before accepting the confession as a fully free one. Although the matter may depend upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, the desirability of giving some time for reflection to an accused before making a confession is now regarded as one of the important elements. See particularly the case in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab1 where their Lordships stated that though any hard and fast rule may not be laid down, one may ordinarily regard 24 hours as a necessary period. That the said rule is not inflexible is clear from a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court reported Ram Prakash v. State of Punjab2, where the Magistrate had given only one hour to the accused for reflection. The legal position as I see it is that though the length of the time granted for reflection or its sufficiency may depend upon the peculiar circumstances of each case, it is always desirable that the Magistrate should give some time to the accused for reflection before recording his confession and the trial Courts would feel less hesitant to act upon confessions if a Magistrate had given some reasonable time for reflection to the accused. Regarding the truth of the statement, it is necessary briefly to state what it contains. It is a fairly long statement in Kannada giving various facts in detail. It starts by saying that when accused 2 was carrying on business in Room No. 15 of Oleti Buildings in Visveswarapuram he had a clerk called Balan of Madras working under him and that it was this clerk Balan who introduced to him the rest of the accused. It starts by saying that when accused 2 was carrying on business in Room No. 15 of Oleti Buildings in Visveswarapuram he had a clerk called Balan of Madras working under him and that it was this clerk Balan who introduced to him the rest of the accused. Some time after that introduction with the five accused in this case as well as Govinda Rao, the absconding accused, the accused discussed the question of the illegal transport and sale of sandalwood. The general distribution of the work between the conspirators, according to the confession, was that accused K. V. Pathy and the absconding accused Govinda Rao should have the general direction of the conspiracy, that accused 1 and 2 should attend to the major details of the working of it and accused 3 and 4 should find and supply sandalwood for transport. He then gives various details almost all of which relate to the bookings at Hirehalli and Rajanukunte railway stations. The bulk of the details also relate to the last booking of 31st December, 1957, including the cutting of trees from Narasimhadevarabetta and the accused going by taxi, lorry and other transports to the railway station and other places. Finally when the sandalwood was seized at Bombay at the instance of Uppin, all the accused got scared, stopped further activities and started taking steps to prevent detection. Among the steps so taken was burning of letters and papers relating to these nefarious activities in the possession of either accused 2 or accused 1. One thing that strikes me on reading the confession is that the 2nd accused has stated hardly anything more than what the police already knew. The clearest and most specific statement of details made by him relates to the bookings in the two railway stations in respect of which the prosecution has a fairly well-documented case. The burning of papers, etc., even if true, appears to have been a halfhearted attempt because a good number of documents was secured from the 2nd accused himself although majority of them or the most important among them from the point of view of the prosecution were seized from the possession of the 4th accused. The burning of papers, etc., even if true, appears to have been a halfhearted attempt because a good number of documents was secured from the 2nd accused himself although majority of them or the most important among them from the point of view of the prosecution were seized from the possession of the 4th accused. It is not beyond the pale of probability that the 2nd accused who on all accounts was a fairly educated man, could read and write English and must be regarded as a very intelligent man with worldly experience, would have made a pretence of making a confession knowing full well that what could be discovered had already been discovered by the police. The only additional or special information given by him is the meeting of the five accused persons and Govinda Rao sometime in 1955 in Room No. 15 of Oleti Building. If one is to accept the tenor of the confession, it would appear that Until Balan introduced these various accused to him, the 2nd accused knew nothing of them or had no dealings or contacts with them. One might as well ask whether a conspiracy of so vast consequences as this world have been so easily entered into by the 2nd accused with five other persons with whom he had hardly any contact until Balan introduced them to him. We do not know where Balan is. There is only one sentence in the evidence of P.W. 123 to the effect that he made enquiries about Balan but could not trace him. It may be stated that there were, among the documents seized from accused 2, some letters from K.V. Pathy addressed to this Balan. From all points of view, the presence of Balan would have been of great assistance to the Court for assessing the value of the confessional statement of the 2nd accused regarding the genesis and initial stages of the conspiracy. However, as I have already stated, the legal position is that the confessional statement is not available to the prosecution as against the other accused under section 10 of the Evidence Act. However, as I have already stated, the legal position is that the confessional statement is not available to the prosecution as against the other accused under section 10 of the Evidence Act. The trial Judge himself made it clear in paragraph 123 of his judgment that he was not going to rely upon the confession either as against the other accused or even for convicting the 2nd accused himself but look upon it merely as a piece of evidence lending some assurance to the inferenc:s available on other circumstances in the case. If I am not far mistaken, it appears to- me that even the learned Judge had considerable hesitation in making use of the confession or detailed statements therein. I do not think therefore that the confessional statement is of much assistance to the case of the prosecution. Before examining the evidence furnished by the papers seized from accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4, I think it will be more convenient now to examine the material already discussed from the point of view of their availability as pieces of evidence Under section 10 of the Evidence Act for the purpose of proving either the conspiracy or membership of one or more of the accused of the conspiracy. The first circumstance, which must exist before any use can be made of any material under section 10 of the Evidence Act, is that there must be reasonable ground for believing that two or more persons have entered into a conspiracy. "The question whether the acts, deeds or statements are related to common intention or have reference to common intention arises next for consideration. Now, whatever else may or may not be said to have been established, one thing on which or in respect of which there can be no doubt is the booking of consignments at the two railway stations. So far as the evidence examined by me goes, only one person-3rd accused-has been clearly shown to have been concerned in the bookings at Rajanukunte. But there were two persons, the first two accused, actively concerned with the bookings at Hirehalli. The evidence of the Station Master P.W. 15 leaves no room for doubt that at every stage the two accused were together. But there were two persons, the first two accused, actively concerned with the bookings at Hirehalli. The evidence of the Station Master P.W. 15 leaves no room for doubt that at every stage the two accused were together. I have already pointed out that the evidence of the Station Master read along with his assistant Padmarajaiah’s does suggest that both the accused must have devoted some thought to the steps that they were going to take. I have shown how the 1st accused started by striking up an acquaintance with Padmarajaiah and how thereafter both the 1st and the 2nd accused saw the Station Master P.W. 15 Nazir Hussain and impressed upon him that they were highly influential persons carrying on trade in the name and style "Kumar & Company", all the details of which statement were false. Further, this transport through rail had gone on for a period of over one year at Hirehalli itself. From January, 1957 and throughout the said year 1957 the bookings were in Rajanukunte, with which the 3rd accused is shown to have been directly concerned. So much information had come on record by the time the first sixteen witnesses had been examined. The question is whether these facts brought on record by evidence, found to be reliable both by the trial Court and myself, are not sufficient to raise reasonable ground for believing that at least the first two accused had entered into a conspiracy to steal Government sandalwood, to transport it under false permits and names and sell it at Bombay. The answer, in my opinion, can only be in the affirmative. The nature of the steps taken, the continued association of the two accused at every stage and the magnitude of the adventure and its continuance for nearly one year even at Hirehalli are all, in my opinion, sufficient to raise the suggestion that at least these two accused had entered into such a conspiracy. Hence the preliminary basis for Utilising the material under section 10 has been established. On the material so far discussed, it is not possible straightaway to connect the bookings at Hirehalli with the bookings at Rajanukunte. It would appear prima facie that these were independent adventures, one indulged by the first two accused and the other by the 3rd accused. Something more is necessary to connect the two. On the material so far discussed, it is not possible straightaway to connect the bookings at Hirehalli with the bookings at Rajanukunte. It would appear prima facie that these were independent adventures, one indulged by the first two accused and the other by the 3rd accused. Something more is necessary to connect the two. The only thing that now strikes the eye is the similarity in the methods adopted in the two cases, viz., giving false names as consignors, producing false or non-genuine permits, etc. That by itself need not indubitably lead to the conclusion that the two accused working at Hirehalli and one accused at Rajanukunte were really working as members of the same conspiracy, although their object and methods were similar. There is, for example, the evidence of officers of the Forest Department including the District Forest Officer directly dealing with the locality, that there has been extensive stealing of sandalwood from Government Forests which they have not been able to stop and in regard to which they have not been able to trace any culprits. Although the situation appears to be by no means complimentary of the department which is expected to be in charge of the security and interest of public property in State Forests, it does suggest that there may be or might have been more persons indulging in these nefarious activities than the accused themselves. But this very possibility of there being other persons indulging in the stealing of sandalwood from State Forests makes it impossible for me to hold that the 1st and the 2nd accused on the one hand and the 3rd accused on the other must necessarily be regarded as having been members of the same conspiracy. The fact that most of them were residing in Bangalore at close proximity with each other and others had opportunities to come to Bangalore either for business-reasons or for private reasons is also by itself not sufficient to think that all of them shared any single common intention in regard to these consignments. The fact that most of them were residing in Bangalore at close proximity with each other and others had opportunities to come to Bangalore either for business-reasons or for private reasons is also by itself not sufficient to think that all of them shared any single common intention in regard to these consignments. Likewise the fact that some of the accused have been shown to have had what appear to be not inconsequential dealings with sandalwood merchants in Bombay and had been known to be residing in various hotels in Bombay at or about the time these nefarious activities were going on may not by itself be sufficient to charge then with the same conspiracy. After all, the evidence is circumstantial, and if it is capable of an explanation consistent with the innocence of any one of the accused, it is not open in administering criminal justice to draw a conclusion in favour of guilt. The confession, as I have already stated, is not available for use in this case. The only link therefore, which could put these apparently different circumstances into a single picture and suggest a conspiracy of which all these five accused persons and the absconding Govindarao were members, must be found in the papers seized from accused 1, 2 and 4 and the inferences that can be reasonably drawn therefrom on the strength of other acceptable evidence relating to it or bearing on it. It is not without significance therefore that the argument in support of the charge of conspiracy has commenced with an analysis of some of the facts appearing from these documents. The papers seized from the house of the 1st accused on 14th October, 1958. under the mahazar Exhibit P-131 are only six in number. Out of these, four are an Air ticket, some blank paper and a couple of letters from the Forest Department officials to the 1st accused. They are hardly of any use and no emphasis has been placed upon them. The papers of importance are the last two, viz., a letter-head of the 3rd accused containing what appear to be four signatures in English of the 3rd accused and a blank cover also having the name and address of the 3rd accused printed on it. What use can be made by the prosecution of these I shall consider after enumerating the papers seized from the other two accused. What use can be made by the prosecution of these I shall consider after enumerating the papers seized from the other two accused. The papers seized from the 2nd accused are Exhibits P-91 to P-100, out of which Exhibits P-93, P-94, P-95, P-96, P-98, P-99 and-P-100 purport to be letters written by the 5th accused to Balan, the alleged clerk of the 2nd accused. Exhibit P-97 purports to be a letter from Govinda Rao to the 2nd accused. Exhibits P-91 and P-92 are account books. The writing in these account books is spoken to by the 2nd accused’s nephew Ramachandra examined as P.W. 98. The importance of the books is that they contain some entries of payments or receipts to or from K.V. Pathy the 5th accused. From the possession of the 4th accused, about 36 papers were seized; most of them or many of them are letters, post-cords, etc., The most important among them from the point of view of the prosecution and sought to be made use of by them are the following: (1) Exhibits P-121 and P-122 blank letter-heads of the Bangalore Trading Company run by P.W. 52 Seshagiri Rao’s wife; (2) some small note-books containing accounts of various items of expenditure, etc., marked later Exhibits P-145 to P-150 and (3) two sheets Exhibits 171 and 171(a), of some sort of account writing, one of them being the letter-head of the 2nd accused and the other letter-head of a concern or trade with which we are not concerned in this case and about which we hear nothing in the evidence. Among the letters, one or two letters purporting to be those of Govinda Rao have also been relied on. All these seizures were made by the Investigating Police Officer P.W. 123 in the presence of one or two Mahazardars. The general criticism against this procedure is that it would have been better, if not proper, for the police to have taken a search warrant from the jurisdictional Magistrate rather than proceed on the basis that the accused volunteered to produce them. Another criticism is that in spite of the obvious fact that respectable persons could have been requisitioned from the neighbourhood to act as Mahazardars the police chose persons like flower vendors bus drivers, etc., for the said purpose. Another criticism is that in spite of the obvious fact that respectable persons could have been requisitioned from the neighbourhood to act as Mahazardars the police chose persons like flower vendors bus drivers, etc., for the said purpose. Much of the value of the letters depends upon identifying the writing therein as those of one or the other of the accused. Tor this purpose, the investigating police took some exemplar writings from the 2nd and the 4th accused. This also was done not before a Court or a Magistrate but in the presence of private persons under a mahazar. The respectability of these Mahazardars or the credibility of their evidence has been attacked seriously on behalf of the accused. Another argument is that at the time of seizure no precautions were taken to get the initials of the Mahazardars on the documents, although it has been pointed out by the Prosecutor that all the documents were produced on the very day of seizure before the nearest Magistrate and his initials taken andseparate property forms were filled with the Magistrate and his orders obtained for retaining the documents for the purpose of investigation. The Investigating Officer himself as P.W. 123 has not deposed to these important facts in the course of his evidence at the Sessions trials. There is, in my opinion, considerable force in the arguments advanced on behalf of the accused. They do not, of course, question the honesty or bona fides of the investigation or attribute any particular bias, animus or mala fides to the Investigating Police Officer P.W. 123. The Counsel on their behalf, however, say and, in my opinion they are entitled to say, that the omission to observe the safeguards specially prescribed by the law in matters of this nature like searches and seizures of documents, etc., is a circumstance which detracts considerably or at any rate, to some extent, from the value which the Court may be prepared to attach to it otherwise. The next aspect of this matter is as to the proof of writing. There are not on record, nor was Investigating Police able to secure exemplar writings of either Govinda Rao or the 5th accused K.V. Pathy. The 5th accused has refused to give an exemplar writing to the Court; of Govinda Rao there is nothing. The next aspect of this matter is as to the proof of writing. There are not on record, nor was Investigating Police able to secure exemplar writings of either Govinda Rao or the 5th accused K.V. Pathy. The 5th accused has refused to give an exemplar writing to the Court; of Govinda Rao there is nothing. The Handwriting Expert P.W. 122 Seetharaman, while speaking to various matters, with some confidence was clearly hesitant when he came to speak to the writing purporting to be that of the 5th accused K.V. Pathy in the several letters seized from the possession of the 2nd accused. He stated that he could not speak with any certainty about the similarity of that writing with other writings of the 5th accused which may be regarded as admitted writings of his. It would follow therefore that so far as letters purporting to be those emanating from Govinda Rao and the 5th accused K.V. Pathy are concerned, there is no proof that they contain respectively their own writing. The Public Prosecutor has however, cited an observation in Jhabwala v. Emperor1, That was also a case of conspiracy, and one of the facts relied upon by the prosecution was that the accused conspirators were carrying on some correspondence with persons residing out of India. One of those persons was M. N. Roy. With regard to that the Court made the following observations: “In order to establish that the accused ware in correspondence with an individual going by the name of M.N. Roy in Berlin it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to establish that any of the letters were innfact written by any particular M.N. Roy. It is enough to show that some person living in Berlin was in conspiracy with the accused and correspondence was passing between them” But that is not the limit of the object of the prosecution in this case. It is not their case that the accused before the Court were carrying on some correspondence with a person going by the name of Govinda Rao or that the letters purported to be emanating from K.V. Pathy are not the letters of K.V. Pathy the 5th accused before Court. It is not their case that the accused before the Court were carrying on some correspondence with a person going by the name of Govinda Rao or that the letters purported to be emanating from K.V. Pathy are not the letters of K.V. Pathy the 5th accused before Court. They do assert that the letters purporting to be those of Govinda Rao are in the writing of Govinda Rao and those purporting to be of K.V. Pathy are in the writing of K.V. Pathy, the 5th accused. Without proof of that further fact which is the essence of their case, the observation in the Allahabad judgment mentioned above does not advance the position. The failure to prove the writing of Govinda Rao removes from consideration two letters marked Exhibits P-172 and P-296 on which considerable reliance was placed. Those letters contain some references to some type of business in Bombay in which apparently the writer Govinda Rao and the addressee the 4th accused were interested and also to the despatch by telegraphic transfer of a sum of Rs. 2,000 by Govinda Rao from Bombay to the 4th accused in Chintamani. The importance of this reference to a T. T. was sought to be enhanced by an entry in the account book Exhibit P-148 marked separately Exhibit P-148 (v) which, if proved, would go to show that Rs. 2,000 were received from Govinda Rao and certain snail sum paid out of it to the 3rd accused. The writing of entry Exhibit P-148(v), though denied by the 4th accused to be his, is said to be of the 4th accused himself by his clerk Rajanna, P.W. 75. But whatever may be the value of this entry which I shall consider along with other entries, the connection between that entry and the alleged letters of Govinda Rao Exhibits P-172 and P-296 cannot be regarded as having been established in the absence of proof of Govinda Rao’s writing. Before going into consideration of other entries, I should refer to three letters among the papers seized from the 4th accused, viz., Exhibit P-156 dated 25th July, 1956 from the 2nd accused to the 4th accused, Exhibit P-152 dated 9th March, 1957 and Exhibit P-151 dated 17th May, 1957 from P.W. 75 Rajanna to the 4th accused. Before going into consideration of other entries, I should refer to three letters among the papers seized from the 4th accused, viz., Exhibit P-156 dated 25th July, 1956 from the 2nd accused to the 4th accused, Exhibit P-152 dated 9th March, 1957 and Exhibit P-151 dated 17th May, 1957 from P.W. 75 Rajanna to the 4th accused. In Exhibit P-156 the 2nd accused tells the 4th accused that one month had elapsed since their previous meeting, that he sent for him near the press but he was not available, that C. M. M. also did not come, that though he promised to come on a Tuesday or Wednesday, two Wednesdays had passed without his turning up and insisting upon some early meeting between them. The argument is that the language employed in the letter suggests something clandestine to be the real topic of correspondence which the writer was not prepared to put down in clear terns. In Exhibits P-152 and P-151, the clerk Rajanna writes to his master (4th accused) about his going to a District Forest Officer and waiting for him and also a Forest Ranger and about the loading of some material. The reference to District Forest Officer and Ranger and loading of material, it is suggested, is indicative of something clandestine going on. But in his evidence an answer has been elicited from P.W. 75 Rajanna that while he was serving Aradhya the 4th accused he used to send him often to the District Forest Officer at Hassan and that he had also gone once or twice to Hassan to take delivery of sandal chips. Though there is no specific reference to the letters Exhibits P-152 and P-151, the argument on behalf of the 4th accused is that the letters are capable of an innocent explanation and need not necessarily be regarded as being suggestive of anything clandestine. To some extent, there is no clear answer on behalf of the prosecution. However, the Public Prosecutor states that at any rate it shows that P.W. 75 and therefore his master the 4th accused were quite familier with the details of working of the Forest Department or the transport of timber, etc. The argument that the letters appear to be suspicious is of course not without force. However, the Public Prosecutor states that at any rate it shows that P.W. 75 and therefore his master the 4th accused were quite familier with the details of working of the Forest Department or the transport of timber, etc. The argument that the letters appear to be suspicious is of course not without force. But the question is whether the mere suspicion is sufficient to tip the scales for the purpose of section 10 of the Evidence Act. It may be, as the 4th accused points out, the business or the transaction referred to in the letter Exhibit P-156 was perfectly honest or bona fide transaction, or should it at all be regarded as nefarious or clandestine, it might well be something quite unconnected with the conspiracy which is the subject of the prosecution case. If more inferences than one are possible and some of them are consistent with the innocence of the accused, the proper thing to do would be to draw the inference which is consistent with innocence and not suggestive of his guilt. Apart from particular entries, two or three in number, in Exhibit P-148 which would show that some expenditure, small though it be, was incurred by the 4th accused for a journey to Rajanukunte, the burden of the argument rests upon the fact that in this as well as another account book, abbreviations such as Y.K., B.N.R., C.M.M., R.B.S., and K.V.P., are found frequently used in the accounts suggesting that they were respectively abbreviations of the full names of accused Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. As to the entries relating to expenses for going to Rajanukunte, the suggestion in the course of answers by the 4th accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is that these expenses were incurred by P. W. 75 Rajanna with the permission of the 4th accused for going to a village close to Rajanukunte for fixing marriage alliance of a near relative of Rajanna himself. How far it is true is more than anybody could say. But all that I need say is that even if the 4th accused himself might have gone to Rajanujkunte on 2 or 3 occasions, it need not necessarily suggest any connection with the nefarious activities undoubtedly carried on by the 3rd accused at that railway station unless other material is placed on record to establish the connection. But all that I need say is that even if the 4th accused himself might have gone to Rajanujkunte on 2 or 3 occasions, it need not necessarily suggest any connection with the nefarious activities undoubtedly carried on by the 3rd accused at that railway station unless other material is placed on record to establish the connection. As to the abbreviations, the argument is that it proceeds entirely upon a speculative inference rather than on evidence. The suggestion is made by P.W. 123 in the course of his evidence. The same suggestion could have been made even without evidence by a Counsel at the Bar if a clear background of some continuous business relationship, whether honest or dishonest, has been established between these various parties. The learned Judge thinks that it is reasonable to accept the suggestion made by the Investigation Officer that these initials refer to the five accused before the Court. It may be one of the reasonable inferences; but I cannot say that it is the only reasonable inference possible. The reference to accused 1, 2and 3. in the accounts of the 4th accused may be regarded as possible or true only if otherwise some connection between the 4th accused and the said other three accused. is established. For establishing that connection we have very little on record. So far as his presence at either Hirehalli or Rajanukunte railway station is concerned, there is no evidence. P.W. 14 Narsoji is the only witness who speaks specifically to his presence at Rajanukunte railway platform at the time the consignment of 31st December, 1957 was booked. The said Narsoji, as I have already stated, has contradicted himself in his evidence regarding the identification parade held by the Amildar-Magistrate. He states that he actually identified the 5th accused whereas in fact the 5th accused was not at all in the parade. There is then the evidence of Goverdhandass that he was in the States Hotel between 28th December, 1957 to 31st December, 1957 and that the 4th accused Aradhya accompanied by the 1st accused Krishnaswamy had come to him to discuss the rates with him. The other connection can only be in the nature of an inference from the evidence of Bombay hotel-keepers. The other connection can only be in the nature of an inference from the evidence of Bombay hotel-keepers. He was present, as I have already stated, in Bombay in January, 1958 as spoken to by P.W. 87 Bhatt of Arya Nivas Hotel and also had business connections with the same sandalwood merchants with whom the other first two accused also had dealing. Before I try to answer this question one way or the other, it is necessary to examine the argument in regard to Exhibits P-171 and 171(a) on which the Sessions Judge appears to have placed considerable importance in his judgment. The importance of Exhibits P-171 and P-171(a) to the case of the prosecution lies in two circumstances. According to the evidence of P.W. 98 Ramachandra Exhibit P-171 is in the writing of the 2nd accused Rama Rao and according to the evidence of Rajanna P.W. 75, Exhibit P-171(a) is in the writing of the 4th accused. Secondly, the account statement or figures stated in the two pieces of paper are capable of an interpretation that both of them deal with the same topic or the same transaction. In addition, there are in Exhibit P-171(a) certain amounts stated against initials CMM, BNR, RBS and YK. On the basis of these features of these two pieces of paper, the theory sought to be constructed on behalf of the prosecution is that they make out or suggest certain nefarious association between the second accused and the fourth accused. There was the further suggestion that the nefarious activities to which these papers belonged or referred was one in which the first and the third accused were also interested. On the basis of these, it is sought to be made out that if there is one circumstance which would render highly probable the prosecution case of conspiracy of which all the five accused are alleged to be members it is this. The learned trial Judge appears to have accepted almost in entirety the theory suggested by the prosecution on the basis of these documents. It is therefore-necessary to scrutinize the line of reasoning and the acceptability from the point of view of the Evidence Act as well as the Criminal Law of these several steps in the process of reasoning. To begin with, the learned Judge accepts the truth or reliability of the evidence of P.Ws. It is therefore-necessary to scrutinize the line of reasoning and the acceptability from the point of view of the Evidence Act as well as the Criminal Law of these several steps in the process of reasoning. To begin with, the learned Judge accepts the truth or reliability of the evidence of P.Ws. 75 and 98 about the identity of the writings. So far as the accused themselves are concerned, they have denied that the documents contained their writings. The 4th accused also states that Exhibit P-171(a) was written by him under pressure of the Investigating Officer, P.W. 123 who, according to him, holding certain documents or papers with him, dictated the contents of Exhibit P-171(a). The suggestion so made by the 4th accused, involving a serious imputation against the bona fides of the investigation conducted by P.W. 123 and also an attack against his own honesty, cannot, in my opinion, be readily accepted for the simple reason that apart from the principles of the Law of Evidence, even considerations of fairness require that he should have been given an opportunity to explain his conduct if indeed what the 4th accused later stated under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is true. I therefore keep it out of consideration. The evidence of P.Ws. 75 and 98 proceeds on the footing that they are acquainted with the writing of accused 4 and 2 respectively. There is some basis for treating them as competent witnesses in this behalf. P.W. 75 Rajanna was a clerk working under the 4th accused and could be expected to be acquainted with his writing. P.W. 98 Ramachandra is the nephew of the 2nd accused and he has also stated that he had been working for his uncle for sometime so that he may be said to be acquainted with the writing of his uncle the 2nd accused. So far as P.W. 75 Rajanna is concerned, there are two statements in his evidence which have considerable bearing on the value of his evidence from the point of view of the extent to which a Court of Law may place reliance on it and act upon it to find the accused guilty. In paragraph 26 in the course of cross-examination he has stated: “The only accounts maintained by accused 4 were those now before Court. In paragraph 26 in the course of cross-examination he has stated: “The only accounts maintained by accused 4 were those now before Court. I was lot present when any of the transactions noted in the accounts as in the handwriting of accused 4 were done.” The other statement occurs at the end of his cross-examination on behalf of the accused 4 and 5. It is in the shape of a question and an answer. The question was: “Did the I.O. ask you to depose that the books that would be shown to you are in the writing of A-4?” His answer was a single word ‘Yes’. There is no re-examination by the Public Prosecutor of the witness in respect of either of these matters. The first extract taken from paragraph 26 of his evidence suggests, in my opinion, a serious infirmity in his evidence. The books of account produced in this case as those maintained by the 4th accused are Exhibits P-145 to P-150 seized from the possession of the 4th accused in the course of investigation. They are small note books of the size of an ordinary palm, written in a manner which would do no credit to any person professing to write accounts relating to a business. The 4th accused, according to the evidence, is a person who is carrying on regular business in Agarbathis and also what is called “Balloon Powder”. He is also said to have some dealing in white. chips of sandalwood. The prosecution itself has lead evidence that he has got an Agarbathi factory at Malleswaram and that he is also interested in a printing press called “Shankara Power Printing Press,” Mamoolpet, Bangalore. To say therefore that the only account books that this accused maintained are the small books produced in the case is a statement which I find it very difficult to accept. Whether the witness meant that these are the only books that he (the witness) maintained is more than I can say. To say therefore that the only account books that this accused maintained are the small books produced in the case is a statement which I find it very difficult to accept. Whether the witness meant that these are the only books that he (the witness) maintained is more than I can say. That the witness was one in whom the 4th accused had reposed some confidence is apparent from the fact that not only does the witness himself say that his master the 4th accused used to send him on occasions to the District Forest Officer at Hassan on business but the prosecution itself has produced and relied upon certain letters written by him to his master referring clearly to some business of the 4th accused which he was trying to put through in the office of the District Forest Officer. This acquaintance of the witness with the general business of the 4th accused which has no connection with the alleged conspiracy in this case should make one hesitate to accept his evidence when he says with all his knowledge and information that the small books, Exhibits P-145 to 150 are the only account books maintained by the 4th accused. Secondly, assuming that one may accept his evidence that some of the entries in these books as well asthe writing in Exhibit P-171(a) are in the writing of the 4th accused, his admission that he was not present at and cannot therefore speak to the transactions to which the entries spoken to by him relate does not advance the case of the prosecution. It cannot succeed by merely proving that these writings are in the hand of the 4th accused. To succeed it should go farther and prove by other evidence that they have a distinct and direct relationship with the various activities undertaken or indulged in by the alleged conspirators. His last answer, if true, is destructive of the value of his entire evidence. Earlier he had stated that at no time during investigation had the police showed him these documents. What exactly he meant by this answer is difficult to guess or imagine. I am not quite willing to read that answer as imputing actual dishonesty to the Investigating Officer for the reasons already stated by me in connection with the statement made under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. What exactly he meant by this answer is difficult to guess or imagine. I am not quite willing to read that answer as imputing actual dishonesty to the Investigating Officer for the reasons already stated by me in connection with the statement made under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But the readiness with which he made a one-word answer to this question shows at any rate that the witness was willing to answer questions without fully understanding their import. That attitude of mind while giving evidence is a source of great danger because should a Court lose sight of that attitude and take the evidence at its face value, it might well come to conclusions which are far from the truth. P.W. 98’s evidence is devoted to the most part to the entries in the books of accounts marked Exhibits P-91 and P-92. Those books are of value from the point of view of the prosecution only because they contain some entries of payments and receipts made to and from the 5th accused. So far as he is concerned, P.W. 98 has stated in clear terms that he does not know him nor has he seen him. As to Exhibit P-171, there is only his bald statement that it is in the wilting of the 2nd accused. But probably his answer has little more value that the answers of P.W. 75 Rajanna for the reason that Exhibit P-171 is on the letter head of the second accused. Even assuming that these two papers are in the respective writings of the second and fourth accused, all value attached to them will disappear unless it is satisfactorily made out that the two papers really constituted one paper or related to one and the same transaction. The relative Mahazar Exhibit P-144 no doubt says that they were near each other at the time they were seized. P.W. 123, the Investigating Officer who recorded that Mahazar at the time of the seizure has not stated in his evidence anything on the basis of which a firm inference of these two papers being closely connected ones can be drawn. All that he says is: “I also found Exhibit P-171 an account written in the letter head of B.M. Rama Rao &Company. All that he says is: “I also found Exhibit P-171 an account written in the letter head of B.M. Rama Rao &Company. ExhibitP-171(a) is a sheet of paper in the letter head of Abrac products.” Indeed, if these two documents had been placed in juxtaposition at the time of the seizure to support even the slightest suggestion of the vast inference now sought to be built upon it, I find it difficult to think how an experienced Investigating Officer would not have noticed the importance of this juxtaposition and taken such steps as joining them together putting a note on them and getting the signatures of the mahazardars immediately instead of leaving matters as they are and not even clarify them in the course of his oral evidence. On the material as it stands, I am unable to accept the suggestion that the two papers must inevitably be regarded as relating to one and the same transaction. The further weakness in the theory developed at the Bar and practically accepted by the learned trial Judge consists in the fact that apart from placing these papers before Court, the prosecution has not been able to lead any other independent evidence of a type which can be readily relied upon to make out that the mere totals or the possibility of tallying the totals of the one sheet with the totals on the other can be regarded as a basis, much less a firm basis, for an inference, especially when the inference suggested is perhaps the most important circumstance furnishing the reason for linking together pieces of evidence which would otherwise appear to be unrelated to one another. That disposes of most of the matters relied upon in support of the case against the fourth accused. The case developed against the 3rd accused on the basis of the papers seized in the course of investigation depends upon two circumstances. The first is that two blank letter heads of the Bangalore Trading Company were found in the possession of the 4th accused. Among the papers seized from the possession of the first accused there were two-one a letter head of the third accused on which there are what appear to be four signatures in English of C.M.M. Ramaiah and the other is a blank envelope on the face of which is printed the name and address of the third accused. Among the papers seized from the possession of the first accused there were two-one a letter head of the third accused on which there are what appear to be four signatures in English of C.M.M. Ramaiah and the other is a blank envelope on the face of which is printed the name and address of the third accused. The oral evidence regarding the letter heads of Bangalore Trading Company is that of the Lawyer Mr. Seshagiri Rao examined as P.W. 52. He says that his wife was running a business in that name. He further states that the two letter heads seized from the fourth accused were the letter heads which were being used by his wife’s firm in the year 1956 and prior to it and that at the time he gave evidence i.e., in 1964 his wife was using letter heads of a larger size. He further states that the fourth accused was a client of his in a long-standing civil matter. It may be remembered that one of the false names used by the third accused while booking sandalwood from Rajanukunte railway station was the Bangalore Trading Company. These two circumstances are sought to be linked together with a view to make out that there must be some sort of relationship or association between the fourth and the third accused and that the said relationship has reference to the bookings and through them the alleged common intention of conspiracy. The inference has been characterised by the learned Counsel for the fourth accused as an inference not possible of acceptance except on exercise of strong imagination. Though the "argument is put in rather emphatic terms, I think there is substance in it. We can accept the fact that the 4th accused was a long-standing client of Mr. Seshagiri Rao. In normal circumstances, there may be nothing surprising in the husband on occasions making use of the letter heads of his wife or vice versa. The possibility of the 4th accused getting hold of some of the loose paper on the table of his Lawyer, including his letter head, is not a possibility which can be totally ruled out. Such a possibility is quite consistent with even mere absent-mindedness. The possibility of the 4th accused getting hold of some of the loose paper on the table of his Lawyer, including his letter head, is not a possibility which can be totally ruled out. Such a possibility is quite consistent with even mere absent-mindedness. As to the third accused making use of the name Bangalore Trading Company, It is not far different from the first two accused making use of the name of Kumar & -Company which did not belong to them. There is also no evidence of the third accused having made use of any letter heads of Bangalore Trading Company at the time of booking goods under false names. As to the signatures C.M.M. Ramaiah found on the 3rd accused’s letter heads an possession of the 1st accused, the only evidence in the case is the emphatic opinion of the Handwriting Expert P.W. 122 that it is in the writing of or is similar to the writing of the 3rd accused. The opinion was sought to be supported by the further opinion that the signature reading C.M. Ramaiah in Exhibit P-179(a), an entry in the register maintained by Joshi, P.W. 78 in respect of Sree Rameswar Hindu Lodge, Bombay, is also in the writing of or similar to the writing of the third accused. He refused to accept the suggestion that even to the naked eye there are differences between the signatures found on the letter head and the signature found at Exhibit P-179(a). There is then another Exhibit (Exhibit P-155) which is a money order acknowledgment signed by the 3rd accused. In that signature only the initials ‘C’ and ‘M’ are in English but the name Munivenkataramaiah is written in Kannada script. I have looked into the signatures in original. I do not think that anybody would require the assistance of an expert to say that there are distinct differences between the signatures found on the letter head and the signature at Exhibit P-179(a). Even the spelling of that name is different; the way of writing the letter ‘C’ is obviously different. I find it difficult to accept the opinion of the expert and reject the evidence of my eyes. Even the spelling of that name is different; the way of writing the letter ‘C’ is obviously different. I find it difficult to accept the opinion of the expert and reject the evidence of my eyes. The signature on the acknowledgment Exhibit P-155 may or may not be of much assistance to the case of the 3rd accused, because in view of the nefarious activities he was engaging in, there is no reason why he should not adopt different modes of signing his name on different occasions. But the greatest weakness of the prosecution case on this point is that the inference now sought to be drawn was not put to the 3rd accused while he was examined under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The overall position emerging from the examinations of the documents seized from the several accused is the following: (1) So far as the 5th accused is concerned, there is hardly anything on the basis of which any inference can be drawn against him. The letters purporting to have been written by him to Balan cannot definitely be said to be his letters, because there is no proof of his handwriting and the prosecution has not been able to secure Balan to given evidence. Further P.W. 98 who speaks to the entries in the account books Exhibits P-91 and P-92 has stated that he does not know the 5th accused. Even after the most searching investigation, the prosecution has not been able toprove any overt acts by him. (2) As against accused 3 and 4, the documents seized raise considerable suspicion; the suggestions made by the prosecution are not wholly impossible suggestions; but the prosecution fails because it has not been able to secure the necessary evidence to connect the documents with the accused and connect both of them with the common intention of the alleged conspiracy. (3) Regarding accused 1 and 2, for the reasons already discussed by me in detail, there can be no doubt that they were active members of a conspiracy. The result therefore, so far as the charge of conspiracy is concerned, is that the 5th accused will have to be acquitted for lack of evidence, and accused 3 and 4 will have to be acquitted by giving them the benefit of doubt, but there is no way of acquitting accused 1 and 2. The result therefore, so far as the charge of conspiracy is concerned, is that the 5th accused will have to be acquitted for lack of evidence, and accused 3 and 4 will have to be acquitted by giving them the benefit of doubt, but there is no way of acquitting accused 1 and 2. But a serious argument has been advanced in support of the suggestion that on the findings as recorded by me it is legally impossible to record a conviction against accused 1 and 2 on the charge of conspiracy. It is sought to be supported by the principles stated in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty and others1, and Chandiram and others v. Emperor2. The case considered by Calcutta High Court was one in which as many as 46 persons were arraigned as accused and charged with widespread conspiracy, to overthrow the Government. The conspiracy, according to the charge, was carried out in several different places of Bengal in several different ways and in support of the charge several criminal cases, some pending and some which had concluded in. the conviction of the accused, were relied upon. One of the features of the case as stated by the learned Chief Justice who wrote the judgment in that case was that the prosecution attempted to make out their case of conspiracy as alleged by showing that different groups of conspirators were working in different places in Bengal. Against this background of facts and after a detailed examination of the evidence their Lordships expressed themselves on the point of law as follows, at pages 601 and 602 of the report: “The accused have been described by the prosecution, and conveniently described, as filling into groups. But it is not open to us to find more conspiracies than one, for there is the highest authority that it is a legal impossibility when several persons are charged with the same conspiracy that some should be found guilty of one conspiracy and some of another. This proposition was accepted by Counsel for the prosecution as one by which the Court must be governed. This proposition was accepted by Counsel for the prosecution as one by which the Court must be governed. It is thus only open to us to find one conspiracy, and for the prosecution to succeed against any one of the accused, they must establish by proper and sufficient proof that he is a member of that conspiracy.” That principle was cited and applied in the case reported in Chandiram and others v. Emperor1. In that case, the old practice of framing charges in conspiracy cases appears to have been adopted, in which used to be framed consolidated single charge of conspiracy, in which the several overt acts said to have relation to the conspiracy were set out. These overt acts or some of them in themselves constituted independent offences. Dealing with considerations arising from such a charge framed in that case, the Court observed as follows towards the end of the judgment: “If, however, it is proved that there was no conspiracy but merely an unrelated series of crimes, unrelated, that is, by any common end, then none of the alleged conspirators would be guilty of the offence charged. In that case either the isolated offences would be such that if proved they could form the basis of a conviction in accordance with section 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in which case the guilty persons could be so convicted. Or on the other hand, the isolated offences might be of a kind which could not be so dealt with in which case the acquittal of the offence of conspiracy would be no bar to further proceedings on the true charge.” With these observations, their Lordships remanded the case to the Sessions Court to examine the applicability or otherwise of section 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the facts of the case. Now, the argument on the basis of these two decisions is that before a conviction can be entered on a charge of conspiracy, such conviction must be on what is emphatically described as ‘charge as laid’. ‘Charge as laid’, according to the argument, takes in not merely the description of the common intention mentioned but also the membership of the conspiracy alleged in the charge. ‘Charge as laid’, according to the argument, takes in not merely the description of the common intention mentioned but also the membership of the conspiracy alleged in the charge. If, therefore, three or four offences are described as related to the common intention of the conspiracy, any lack of evidence in respect of such relationship of any one of them would make conviction legally impossible. Likewise, if ten persons are described as having been the members of the conspiracy, any lack of evidence against any one of them on that question will make the acquittal of others also inevitable. It appears to me that the argument so sought to be developed is not sustainable. Their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court, in spite of the fact that they found that there were several infirmities in the case and actually condemned the suggestion of the prosecution that several separate groups constituted themselves into one vast conspiracy and in spite of the fact that they found it necessary to acquit as many as forty accused, did nevertheless enter conviction against six of the accused. That conviction proceeded on the finding that those six persons were members of a conspiracy and their unlawful association did constitute criminal conspiracy punishable under the Penal Code. The Sind decision, especially the concluding portion of judgment extracted above, places beyond doubt that even a failure to prove the charge of conspiracy is not in itself or in all cases sufficient reason not to find any one or more of the accused guilty of other specific offences with which they or some of them are separately charged. The Sind case, it will be remembered, did not contain separate charges for separate distinct offences. What constituted separate offences described as unrelated offences were overt acts enumerated in support of the main charge of conspiracy. Any further discussion on principle is unnecessary in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Swamirathnam v. State of Madras1, where their Lordships have pointed out that the essence of a conspiracy is its unlawful object and not the question whether and if so, which or how many of the accused are members thereof. Any further discussion on principle is unnecessary in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Swamirathnam v. State of Madras1, where their Lordships have pointed out that the essence of a conspiracy is its unlawful object and not the question whether and if so, which or how many of the accused are members thereof. They state: “Where the charge, as framed, discloses one single conspiracy, although spread over several years, there is only one object of the conspiracy, and that is to cheat members of the public, the fact that in the course of years others joined the conspiracy or that several incidents of cheating took place in pursuance of the conspiracy does not change the conspiracy and does not split up a single conspiracy into several conspiracies.” I may also mention that another decision of the Supreme Court already discussed by me in Bhagwan Swarup v. State of Maharastra2indicates that membership of a conspiracy may be a fluctuating factor. Hence, I am clearly of the opinion that the mere fact that the prosecution has failed to prove that accused Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were members of the conspiracy as alleged by them does not make it necessary or inevitable to hold that accused Nos. 1 and 2 who on the evidence I have held have clearly been guilty of criminal conspiracy, should be given the benefit of an acquittal. The object of the conspiracy of which. I hold the first two accused were members is the same as the object originally stated in the charge, namely, unlawful cutting or stealing of Government sandalwood and transporting the same under false documents to Bombay for sale. The only other point of law on this part of the case is as to the need, if any, of previous sanction by the State Government for initiating proceedings in respect of criminal conspiracy. It does not call for much discussion. There has not been before me any doubt expressed or argued about the trial Judge’s opinion that the only provision of law of relevance is sub-section (2) of section 196-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It does not call for much discussion. There has not been before me any doubt expressed or argued about the trial Judge’s opinion that the only provision of law of relevance is sub-section (2) of section 196-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nor has any valid reason been made out to disagree with the further opinion of the trial Judge that as the charge stands, the dominant object of the conspiracy was to commit theft of sandalwood,-a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding two years. I therefore accept and confirm his finding that this is not a case where previous sanction was necessary. This concludes the discussion on the charge of conspiracy. I now proceed to examine the correctness of the convictions entered against the first three accused in respect of individual offences. Except in the case of the 3rd accused who has been additionally convicted of theft and contravention of rule 8 of the Rules for the Control of the Transit of Sandalwood, the common feature of the rest of the convictions is forgery of forwarding notes and permits and using those forged documents as genuine. Except Exhibit P-4 which is a forged permit, rest of the documents in respect of which these convictions have been entered are forwarding notes in connection with the railway consignments. In all the convictions entered against them the learned trial Judge has proceeded on the basis that both these documents, forwarding notes as well as the permits are valuable securities within the meaning of section 30 of the Indian Penal Code and that therefore the offences committed were those punishable under section 467 or section 471 read with section 467 of the Indian Penal Code. I will therefore first examine the argument whether either or both of these documents may be regarded as valuable securities within the meaning of section 30 of the Indian Penal Code. A forwarding note is merely a request by the consignor to the railway authorities to receive the goods and forward them to the destination intended by the consignor. The necessity of executing such a request is traceable to section 72-A of the Indian Railways Act. The form thereof and the particulars to be entered therein are prescribed by rule 22 relating to Goods Traffic. The necessity of executing such a request is traceable to section 72-A of the Indian Railways Act. The form thereof and the particulars to be entered therein are prescribed by rule 22 relating to Goods Traffic. Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code reads: “The words ‘valuable security’ denote a document which is, or purports to be, a document whereby any legal right is created, extended, transferred, restricted, extinguished or released, or whereby any person acknowledges that he lies under legal liability, or has not a certain legal right.” The creation, extinction or other type of control in respect of a legal right is the essence of the definition; unless therefore some right is either created or extinguished or controlled by a document, the document cannot be a valuable security. Now, the forwarding note creates no rights, extinguishes no rights, nor does it control or affect any right. It is only a request to the railway authorities to enter into a contract of carriage. The Public Prosecutor has argued that by executing the note the consignor acquires the right to get the goods moved or transported by the railway. I find it difficult to accept that suggestion. The rights, if any, or liabilities, if any are created and controlled by the contract of carriage which is entered into subsequent to the request conveyed by the forwarding note. I am therefore of the opinion that forwarding notes cannot be regarded as valuable securities within the meaning of section 30 of the Indian Penal Code. Hence, the offence of forgery committed in respect of them would only be the normal offence of forgery punishable under section 465 of the Penal Code and not the aggravated offence of forgery, punishable under section 467 of the Penal Code. But, the position with regard to the sandalwood permit is different. Under the law as in force in the State of Mysore, sandalwood trees are the exclusive property of the Government and they cannot be moved or transported from one place to another except under and in accordance with transit permit issued under the rules called the Control of Transit of Sandalwood Rules. Under the law as in force in the State of Mysore, sandalwood trees are the exclusive property of the Government and they cannot be moved or transported from one place to another except under and in accordance with transit permit issued under the rules called the Control of Transit of Sandalwood Rules. Hence they may be regarded as either conferring on a person holding the permit the right to move sandalwood from one place to another or if he is a person who has lawfully acquired the ownership in respect of the sandalwood as controlling his normal right as owner to possess and transport it. In either event, the document would be a document which affects legal rights and therefore a valuable security within the meaning of section 30 of the Penal Code. A similar view was taken in regard to timber transit passes-by the Calcutta High Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Bengal v. Daulatram Mudi1. I hold therefore that so far as the permit Exhibit P-4 is concerned the offence of forgery if proved would be an offence punishable under section 467 of the Indian Penal Code and the offence of using that document as genuine, if proved, would be an offence punishable under section 471 read with section 467 of that Code. That being the legal position,and most of the evidence directly bearing on the alleged commission of this offence has already been examined by me at length, what remains for me to state is only the conclusion. In regard to the four forwarding notes used in connection with the bookings at Hirehally railway station, the position is this. One of them Exhibit P-42 dated 6th September, 1956 containing the signature reading P. Seetharamaiah, was, according to the evidence, completed before it was brought to the Station Master P.W. 15 Mohammad Nasir Hussain. He has not seen anybody affixing that signature. Therefore, the conviction for the primary offence of forgery in respect of that note against the first accused cannot stand. But, his conviction for the said offence in respect of Exhibit P-45 dated 27th August, 1957 and Exhibit P-47 dated 2nd September, 1957 is correct, but must be related to section 465 and not section 467 of the Indian Penal Code. But, his conviction for the said offence in respect of Exhibit P-45 dated 27th August, 1957 and Exhibit P-47 dated 2nd September, 1957 is correct, but must be related to section 465 and not section 467 of the Indian Penal Code. Similar is the position in the case of the conviction entered against the second accused for forgery of the forwarding note Exhibit P-43 dated 4th October, 1956, the conviction should have been under section 465 and not section 467 of the Indian Penal Code. In regard to the use of these documents as genuine, the conviction of the first accused in respect of the three forwarding notes Exhibits P-42, P-45 end P-47 must be altered into one for an offence punishable under section 171 read with section 465 of the Penal Code. Likewise, the conviction of the second accused for using as genuine Exhibit P-43 must be altered into a conviction for an offence punishable under section 471 read with section 465 of the Penal Code. Because the learned Judge took the view that these accused were guilty of aggravated offence in relation to valuable security, he awarded to them a sentence of 5 years’ rigorous imprisonment but the maximum sentence under section 465 of the Indian Penal Code is only 2 years’ rigorous imprisonment. The circumstances of this case and the magnitude of the nefarious activities undertaken by the accused make it necessary to impose the maximum sentence provided under section 465, Indian Penal Code. The sentence will have to be reduced from 5 years to 2 years. Now coming to the conviction of the 3rd accused under charge XI(d), it is a combined charge both for forgery of the relative forwarding note of 31st December, 1957 as well as for forgery of the transit permit Exhibit P-4. The learnt d Judge has deals with the two as amounting to one offence punishable under section 471 read with section 467 and imposed a single sentence of five years’ rigorous imprisonment. Actually it is made up of two offences, one for using a false forwarding note as genuine punishable under section 471 read with section 465 of the Indian Penal Code and the other for using as genuine the forged permit Exhibit P-4 as offence punishable under section 471 read with section 467 of the Penal Code. He has imposed consolidated sentence of 5 years in respect of both. He has imposed consolidated sentence of 5 years in respect of both. I leave it unaltered because the charge includes the aggravated offence of using as genuine a forged valuable security. I should have stated earlier that there was an argument before me that the execution of a false forwarding note cannot be described as either dishonest or fraudulent because the person who so executes or uses false note gets no advantage whatever. The railway authorities do not show him any concession in respect of freight nor does he get any other advantage according to the argument. I think, a complete answer to this argument is found in a ruling of the Supreme Court reported in Dr. Vimla v. The Delhi Administration1, where it has been pointed out that dishonesty and fraudulent motive are two alternative items of mens rea and that so far as the word ‘fraudulent’ is concerned, it involves or suggests either non-economic advantage or a non-economic disadvantage or loss and that it is enough if any one of them exists to constitute the offence. Hence in the case of a forged forwarding note or the using of a false forwarding note as genuine, it is enough to show that the forger or the user of it had acquired some advantage not necessarily economic, whether or not the other party suffers any disadvantage or loss. The clearest advantage acquired by the accused in this case by using this false document is the advantage of moving the sandalwood not legitimately acquired by them under a false name and avoiding detection. There remains only the case in relation to the conviction of the third accused for theft and contravention of rule 8 of the Control of the Transit of Sandalwood Rules, Mysore. I have already held that the acceptance of the oral evidence of P.Ws. 6 to 10 is itself sufficient to make out the offence of theft. But the argument very strongly pressed on behalf of the 3rd accused was that as the charge stands, he was charged with the offence of theft of some sandalwood from Narasimhadevarabetta, which identical sandalwood was, according to the charge, transported by rail from Rajanukunte to Bombay Victoria Terminus and is identical with the sandalwood seized in the godown of Govardhandass Tokersey later produced in Court. The question of identity falls into three parts: First, the identity of the sandalwood cut from Narasimhadevarabetta with the wood put into the train at Rajanukunte; second, the identity of the goods transported with the goods seized at Bombay; and third, the identity of the goods seized at Bombay with the goods actually produced before the Court. The second point in identity I have already considered and expressed my opinion that what was seized was the same as what had been transported. The identity of the goods seized with the identity of the goods produced in Court has been the subject of long argument both before the Sessions Judge as well as before me. But in my opinion, the bulk of the argument is unnecessary. It relates to the identity of the bags. It will be remembered that the goods transported were packed in 40 gunny bags and at the time the goods came to be seized by the police in Bombay these 40 bags had been emptied and kept separately bundled into two bundles each containing 20 and the sandalwood taken out put into two sets of bags, ten and twenty. The original 40 bags bore the railway marking RNN BB VT 22 bags seized in Bombay were marked by Jethwani by writing figures 1 to 22. The railway markings were in red ink; Jethwani’s markings were in green ink. The 40 bags originally used were single bags; 22 bags found are described as double bags. There has been considerable confusion and contradiction in or between the observations by one witness and another. The position has been made worse by P.Ws. 8 to 10 who have purported to make the identification even without looking at the wood. It appears to me that the entire evidence as to bags is wholly irrelevant and is of no assistance whatever to the Court in deciding upon the identity of the wood. The real question with which this Court is concerned is identity of the sandalwood. and so far as that is concerned, there is, in my opinion, reliable and acceptable evidence to hold that the sandalwood seized in the godown of Govardhandass Tokersey in Bombay is identical with and not different from the one actually produced in Court. The evidence of Jethwani corroborated by the observation recorded in the Mahazar Exhibit P-180 is that the billets contained the markings F.A.D. and SS. The evidence of Jethwani corroborated by the observation recorded in the Mahazar Exhibit P-180 is that the billets contained the markings F.A.D. and SS. included within small circles. These marks were found on the billets produced before Court. Evidence was let in to show that these were not the narks used either by the Mysore State or by the Andhra State. The examination of the Andhra Officers became necessary because the letters F.A.D are also found in the Forest Department stamps of Ananthapur District of Andhra State. These officers have deposed that the seal of the Ananthapur Forest Department is quite different in important particulars, viz., that the letter ‘A’ is much smaller than the letter used in the markings on the billets in Court, that the letters ‘F’ and ‘D’ are on either side of the letter ‘A‘and that under the letter ‘A’ there is an arrow pointing upwards. The markings found on the billets are therefore clearly faked markings. The existence of the same faked markings both on the billets seized at Bombay and on the billets produced in Court is, in my opinion, sufficient evidence to support the inference that the two goods are identical. Had they been official marks there was a possible argument that those official marks could also be found in goods not produced before Court, or that goods in Court may have been legitimately acquired There is, however, the argument that there is no evidence as to the person by whom or the place and time at which those stamp marks were put on the billets. It is true that there is no such evidence. But, it is also true that there is evidence to show that after the goods were received in Goavardhandass Tokersey godown they remained separate without being mixed with the rest of the goods until Jethwani came and prepared a mahazar and got them seized. It has been argued that there has been sufficient time lag between the receipt of the goods in Goverdhandass Tokersey’s godown and their seizure by the police making it possible for Tokersey or some servant of his to put those stamps. It has been argued that there has been sufficient time lag between the receipt of the goods in Goverdhandass Tokersey’s godown and their seizure by the police making it possible for Tokersey or some servant of his to put those stamps. But the answer to that is hat there was no control of sandalwood in Bombay City as there was in Mysore State at that time and that therefore there can be no motive for persons in Bombay to proceed to affix markings on this sandalwood. Because the possibility of Tokersey’s people affixing marks is itself remote and the possibility of anybody opening the packets during the railway transit is highly improbable, if not impossible, in the circumstances, the probability of somebody having affixed them before putting them into the train is very high. The party who got those goods transported by rail was, as I have already held, no other than the 3rd accused. He was a person who was interested in using false documents. The probability therefore of himself having done it is very high and the learned trial Judge’s opinion that he or somebody on his behalf and in his interest must have put these marks appears to me to be correct As to the identity of the sandalwood cut in Narasimhadevarabetta with the sandalwood put into the train at Rajanukunte, we have no material except the examination of probabilities suggested by evidence accepted by the trial Court as well as by me. According to the woodcutter witnesses P.Ws. 6 to 10, the cutting was done by them about 6 years or more before they gave evidence. They gave evidence early in April, 1951. The booking was done on the last day of 1957. The approximate time given by them taken along with a number of irregularities or unlawful acts in connection with the booking justifies, in my opinion, the earned trial Judge’s view that the billets cut in Narasimhadevarabetta and loaded in the lorry by P.Ws. 8 to 10 were sent straight to Rajanukunte railway station and then found their way to Bombay. Hence even as the charge stands, it appears to me that every element of it has been satisfactorily established by the evidence adduced in the case. 8 to 10 were sent straight to Rajanukunte railway station and then found their way to Bombay. Hence even as the charge stands, it appears to me that every element of it has been satisfactorily established by the evidence adduced in the case. Regarding the conviction of the 3rd accused for contravention of rule 8 of the Control of the Transit of Sandalwood Rules, it is enough to say that it is fully justified on the evidence. In the result, Criminal Appeals Nos. 261 and 262 of 1964 are allowed; Criminal Appeal No. 263 of 1964 is allowed in part and the following order made in modification of the order of the sessions Judge. 1. (a) The conviction of the 1st accused Y. Krishnaswami under charges I and IX under section 120-B read with sections 379 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and Rule 8 of the Control of the Transit of Sandalwood Rules, and the sentence of 3 year’s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000 and the default sentence of six months of further imprisonment are affirmed. (b) His conviction for forgery in respect of the forwarding note of 6th September, 1956 Exhibit P-52 under charge VII(a) is set aside along with the sentence imposed in respect of it. (c) His conviction under charge VII(b) and charge VII (c) for forgery of the forwarding notes Exhibit P-45 dated 27th August, 1957 and Exhibit P-47 dated 2nd September, 1957 is altered into a conviction for an offence punishable under section 465 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence reduced to two year’s rigorous imprisonment in respect of each charge. (d) His conviction under charges III(b), V(b) and VI(b) for using as genuine forged forwarding notes Exhibits P-42, P-45 and P-47 is altered into a conviction for an offence punishable under section 471 read with section 465 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence reduced to two year’s rigorous imprisonment in respect of each charge. (e) All the substantive sentences of imprisonment will run concurrently. I make it clear that except to the extent he has been convicted as aforesaid, he shall stand acquitted of all other charges. II. (e) All the substantive sentences of imprisonment will run concurrently. I make it clear that except to the extent he has been convicted as aforesaid, he shall stand acquitted of all other charges. II. (a) The conviction of the 2nd accused B.N. Rama Rao under charges I and IX for conspiracy under section 120-B read with sections 379 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and Rule 8 of the Control of the Transit of Sandalwood Rules and the sentence of 3 year’s rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 10,000 of fine with the default sentence of six months’ rigorous imprisonment are affirmed. (b) His conviction under charge VIII for forgery of the forwarding note dated 4th October, 1956 Exhibit P-43 is altered into a conviction for the offence punishable under section 465 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence reduced to two year’s rigorous imprisonment. (c) His conviction under charge V(b) for using as genuine the said forwarding note is altered into a conviction for the offence punishable under section 471 read with section 465 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence reduced to two year’s rigorous imprisonment. (d) All the substantive sentences of imprisonment awarded to him will run concurrently. I make it clear that except in regard to the conviction so stated, ha shall stand acquitted of all other charges. III. (a) The conviction of the 3rd accused C.M. Munivenkataramaiah under charges I and IX for conspiracy and the sentences imposed in respect of the are set aside. (b) His conviction under charge XI(a) for theft punishable under section 379 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence of 3 year’s rigorous imprisonment awarded to him in respect of it are affirmed. (c) His conviction under charge XI(b) for contravention of Rule 8 of the Control of the Transit of Sandalwood Rules and the sentence of fine of Rs. 2000 are affirmed. (d) His conviction under charge XI(d) for using as genuine the forwarding note dated 31st December, 1957 is altered into a conviction for the offence punishable under section 471 read with section 465 and his conviction under the same charge for using as genuine the false permit Exhibit P-4 under section 471 read with section 467 of the Indian Penal Code is affirmed and the consolidated sentence of 5 year’s rigorous imprisonment awarded to him in respect of the charge XI(d) is left unaltered. (e) The substantive sentences of imprisonment awarded to him will run concurrently. I make it clear that except as to the conviction so entered against him, he shall stand acquitted of all other charges. IV. The conviction of the 4th accused R.B. Santhayeera Aradhya for the charge of conspiracy under charges I and IX and the sentences awarded to him in respect of it are set aside and he is acquitted. V. The conviction of the 5th accused K.V. Pathy for conspiracy under charges I and IX and the sentences awarded to him in respect of it are set aside and he is acquitted. VI. Accused 1, 2 and 3 will surrender to their bail. The bail bonds of accuseds 4 and 5 will stand cancelled. I record my appreciation of the assistance rendered by the learned Counsel by careful analysis of the material and by highlighting only the points of real importance. S.V.S. ----- Order accordingly.