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1999 DIGILAW 1546 (RAJ)

Ram Das Agrawal v. State of Rajasthan

1999-12-22

G.L.GUPTA

body1999
JUDGMENT 1. - This is a misc. petition under section 482 Cr.P.C. calling in question the order dated 14.5.1998 and seeking the quashment of the proceedings pending against the petitioner in the Court of Addl. Civil Judge (Jr. Division) cum Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Jodhpur. 2. The relevant facts are these, Respondent Kapoor Chand Kulish, Editor of Rajasthan Patrika filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner on the Court of the Magistrate on 9.7.1996 for the offences punishable under sections 500 and 501 IPC. This complaint was addressed to the Court of First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur. The allegations in the complaint were that the respondent, in order to lower down the image of the complainant, uttered defamatory words against him, at Jaipur which were published in the issue of J.V.G. Times dated 17.6.1996 and in the Hindustan Times dated 18.6.1996, which news items were read amongst others by the four residents of Jodhpur named in the complaint. After holding enquiry under Chapter XV Cr.P.C. the learned Magistrate vide order dated 26.6.1996 issued process against the accused-petitioner. On his appearance, the accused-petitioner made an application before the Magistrate that he did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the matter as in the complaint it was not averred that the offence was committed in his territorial jurisdiction. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned Magistrate vide order dated 14.5.1998 rejected the application of the accused-petitioner and proceeded to hold the trial of the case. Hence, this petition. 3. Mr. Garg learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that in the complaint it is no-where stated that the alleged news items were read by the persons named in the complaint in the territorial jurisdiction of the Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Jodhpur. He also pointed out that the complaint was not even addressed to the Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Jodhpur and it was addressed only to First Class Magistrate, Jodhpur whereas no Court by the name first Class Magistrate existed at Jodhpur. He further pointed out that in the complaint it is not disclosed that the news items were published at Jodhpur. His contention was that the Court of Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Jodhpur did not have jurisdiction to entertain this matter. He cited the case of Union of India v. B.N. Annantha Padamanbhiah, 1971 SC 1836 . 4. Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent no. His contention was that the Court of Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Jodhpur did not have jurisdiction to entertain this matter. He cited the case of Union of India v. B.N. Annantha Padamanbhiah, 1971 SC 1836 . 4. Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 on the other hand, contended that the mentioning of the name of the Court of First Class Magistrate in the complaint was a typographical error and on that ground the complaint could not be thrown away. His main contention was that a Magistrate is empowered to take cognisance of any offence irrespective of the fact that it was not committed in his territorial jurisdiction. He emphasised that the restrictions imposed in Chapter XIII of the Code do not trammel the powers of a Court to take cognisance of the offence under section 190 Cr.P.C. Relying on the case of Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal, 1999 (5) SCALE 609 , he canvassed that the learned Magistrate has not committed any error when he took cognisance of the offence and issued process against the petitioner. Mr. Mehta also contended that a Magistrate posted in a district enjoys jurisdiction over the entire district even if the Chief Judicial Magistrate distributes the areas. His further contention was that the defect in territorial jurisdiction is curable under section 460 Cr.P.C. He relied on the case of Raj Kumari v. Deena, AIR 1977 SC 1101 . 5. I have considered the above arguments. The controversy stands squarely resolved by the recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Trisuns Chemical Industry (supra). In that case, it has been held that cognisance of the offence under section 190 Cr.P.C. can be taken by a Magistrate not having territorial jurisdiction to enquire or try the case. It is profitable to reproduce hereunder the observations at para no. 11 of the report: "It is an erroneous view that the Magistrate taking cognisance of an offence must necessarily have territorial jurisdiction to try the ease as well. Chapter XIII of the Code relates to jurisdiction of the criminal Courts "in enquiries and trials." That chapter contains provisions regarding the place where the enquiry and trial are to take place. 11 of the report: "It is an erroneous view that the Magistrate taking cognisance of an offence must necessarily have territorial jurisdiction to try the ease as well. Chapter XIII of the Code relates to jurisdiction of the criminal Courts "in enquiries and trials." That chapter contains provisions regarding the place where the enquiry and trial are to take place. Section 177 says that "every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed." But Section 179 says that when an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensured, the place of enquiry and trial can as well be in a Court "within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensured". It cannot be overlooked that the said provisions do not trammel the powers of any Court to take cognisance of the offence." [Emphasis supplied] 6. After reading Section 190 Cr.P.C., their lordships observed at para no. 12 as follows:- "Section 193 imposes a restriction on the Court of sessions to take cognisance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction. But "any" Magistrate of the First Class has the power to take cognisance of any offence, no matter that the offence was committed within his jurisdiction or not." [Emphasis supplied] 7. After comparing Section 190 of the Code of 1898 with Section 190 of the Code of 1973 it was observed as follows: "When there is nothing in Chapter XIV of the Code to impair the power of a Judicial Magistrate of first class taking cognisance of the offence on the strength of any territorial reason it is impermissible to deprive such a Magistrate of the power to take cognisance of an offence." 8. Again at para 14 their lordships observed as under:- "The jurisdictional aspect becomes relevant only when the question of of enquiry or trial arises and it is a fallacious thinking that only a magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case has the power to take cognisance of the offence. If he is a Magistrate of the First Class his power to take cognisance of the offence is not impaired by territorial restrictions. If he is a Magistrate of the First Class his power to take cognisance of the offence is not impaired by territorial restrictions. After taking cognisance he may have to decide as to the Court which has jurisdiction to enquire into or try the offence and that situation would reach only during the post cognisance stage and not earlier." [Emphasis supplied] 9. In view of the legal position stated by the Apex Court there is hardly any scope to argue that the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognisance of the offence. If for argument's sake, it is accepted that the alleged defamatory items were not read by the persons named in the complaint in the territorial jurisdiction of the Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Jodhpur yet he had the power to take cognisance of the offence. It may be that the defamatory words were uttered at Jaipur, yet the order of cognisance cannot be quashed in view of the Apex Court decision. If the Magistrate thinks at any stage of the case that the matter pertains to the territorial jurisdiction of some other Court, he may request the competent authority for the transfer of the case to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case. 10. In view of the latest decision of the Apex Court, it is not necessary to discuss the other cases relied on by the learned counsel for the parties. 11. There being no merits in this petition, it is dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******