Order.- The sole question that arises for decision in this reference under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Sessions Judge, Belgaum, is whether a Magistrate passing an order regarding the disposal of property under section 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can revise his own order. Briefly, the material facts are: The Police at Khanapur attached a lorry (carrying 70 bags of rice) under section 3 read with section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, on suspicion that the rice bags were being transported to Goa. The Judicial First Class Magistrate, Khanapur received the First Information Report on 17th February, 1966 at 4-15 P.m. and the names of the accused mentioned therein were those of the driver, the cleaner and one Kanteppa Alur. The Sub-Inspector of Police filed an application on 19th February, 1966 for sanction to sell these 70 bags of rice to a Society approved by the Government and to credit the sale proceeds to the Criminal deposit account of the Court. On that very day, the Magistrate passed the following order- "Sanction accorded as prayed for. Inform." Some time later, an application was filed on behalf of one Dastagir Mugutasaheb Bicchannawar who is the respondent in the present proceedings, stating that the goods attached from the lorry were owned by him and that he had been taking the same to Londa for retail sale. He prayed that the goods may be returned to him on taking security if necessary. He also mentioned in the said application that if the Court had passed an order for sale to any Society, the order might be stayed as he wanted to go in appeal or revision against the same. The alt:rnative prayer was that the order of disposal might be revised as he was willing to deposit the price of the rice. The Magistrate called for the say of the Police Prosecutor the latter stated that he had no objection to return the rice bags to the petitioner on taking proper security and on his undertaking to produce the rice bags before the Court when required. The learned Magistrate then passed an order to the effect that the 70 bags of rice attached from the truck be released to the petitioner in his executing a security bond for Rs. 6,000 with an undertaking to produce the same or its value whenever required by the Court. The learned Magistrate then passed an order to the effect that the 70 bags of rice attached from the truck be released to the petitioner in his executing a security bond for Rs. 6,000 with an undertaking to produce the same or its value whenever required by the Court. Thereafter the Magistrate moved the Sessions Judge for transfer of the case to some other Court on the ground that there were allegations and complaints against him in regard to the property concerned in the case. The Sessions Judge called for the records of the case. By that time, a charge-sheet against four accused including the said Dastagir Sab as A-4 had been submitted to the Magistrate on 11th April, 1966. During the course of the hearing, the learned Sessions Judge felt that the order passed by the Magistrate was without jurisdiction as he was not competent to revise or cancel his own order and the order for return of the property to the accused was improper as the rice bags were liable for confiscation under the relevant provisions of law. Mr. Rego appearing for the State supported the reference; Mr. Mandagi, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent Dastagir Sab submitted:hat the Magistrate was quite competent to revise his own order and that the reference made by the Sessions Judge was unsustainable and liable to be rejected. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decision of the Madras High Court in re Balasundara1. What is laid down by the Madras High Court in that decision is that an order rejecting a bail application by the Sessions Judge was nothing more than an interlocutory and tentative expression of his conclusion and that it was open to a convicted person to renew the application for the same relief pending his appeal. In my opinion, there can be no analogy between an order rejecting an application for bail and an order regarding disposal of property under section 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as the subject-matter of bail is covered by different sections included in Chapter XXXIX of the Code. Mr. In my opinion, there can be no analogy between an order rejecting an application for bail and an order regarding disposal of property under section 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as the subject-matter of bail is covered by different sections included in Chapter XXXIX of the Code. Mr. Mandagi, the learned Counsel for Dastagir Sab conceded that the impugned order cannot be regarded as one passed under section 517 of the Code, because the order to be passed under that section is one which has to be passed "when an enquiry or trial in any Criminal Court is concluded". The impugned order was passed before the charge-sheet was filed. Section 523 reads as follows: "523. Procedure by Police upon seizure of property taken under section 51 or stolen.-(1) The seizure by any Police Officer or property taken under section 51 or alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence, shall be forthwith reported to a Magistrate, who shall make such order as he thinks fit respecting the disposal of such property or the delivery of such property to the person entitled to the possession thereof or if such person cannot be ascertained, respecting the custody and production of such property. Procedure where owner of property seized unknown.-(2) If the person so entitled is known the Magistrate may order the property to be delivered to him on such conditions (if any) as the Magistrate thinks fit. If such person is unknown, the Magistrate may detain it and shall in such case, issue a proclamation specifying the articles of which such property consists, and requiring any person who may have a claim thereto, to appear before him and establish his claim within six months from the date of such proclamation." Under the first sub-section, as soon as the property taken under section 51 or alleged or suspected to have been stolen or found under circumstances which create suspicion of commission of any offence is reported to the Magistrate forthwith, the Magistrate has to make such order as he thinks fit respecting disposal of such property. It is open to him to pass an order for delivery of such property to the person entitled to its possession; if such person cannot be ascertained from the record, which at that stage would only be police report, it is open to him to make such order as he thinks fit respecting custody and production of such property. The property in this case was attached from the lorry, of which A-1 was the driver and A-2 was the cleaner. The Police Report did not disclose as to whether any of those two accused were or were not entitled to possession; none of them also claimed at the time when the order was passed, to be entitled to possession. On the other hand, an application seems to have been filed on behalf of the first accused that the property belonged to Dastagir Sab. Sub-section (2) empowers the Magistrate to order delivery of possession of the property subject to such conditions as he thinks fit if such person entitled to possession is known, if such person is unknown it is open to the Magistrate to detain the property and then issue a proclamation specifying the nature of the property and requiring any person claiming the same to appear before him and establish his claim within six months from the date of such proclamation. One thing that is manifest from both these sub-sections is that if the person entitled to possession is not known, it is open to the Magistrate to order detention of the property and to issue a proclamation requiring any person claiming the same to appear before him and establish his claim. Mr. Mandagi contended that if an order is passed under sub-section (1), that order would be in the nature of an interim order and it would be open to the Magistrate to revise that order under subsection (2). Sub-section (2) comes into operation where the person entitled to possession is unknown and the Magistrate has ordered the detention of the property pending the issue of a proclamation. If he has, however, passed an order of disposal under sub-section (1) and there is no detention of the property in his possession, the question of passing an order Under sub-section (2) does not arise. It does not therefore contemplate a revision of an order passed under sub-section (1). If he has, however, passed an order of disposal under sub-section (1) and there is no detention of the property in his possession, the question of passing an order Under sub-section (2) does not arise. It does not therefore contemplate a revision of an order passed under sub-section (1). In the present case, on receipt of the report from the Police in respect of the property attached, the Magistrate ordered that the property should be sold to a Society approved by the Government. It was thereafter that Dastagir Sab filed an application through his lawyer and prayed for delivery of the property to him. The Magistrate could not have accepted the application as he had already passed an order for sale of the rice bags to a Co-operative Society approved by the Government. That this position had been realised by the applicant Dastagir Sab himself is clear from his own statement requesting for an order of stay to enable him to go in appeal or revision against his earlier order, if any. Apart from the views expressed by the Magistrate, all that we are concerned with at this stage is the legality of the second order passed by him. By the second order, the Magistrate set aside the original order and directed delivery of the property to Dastagir Sab. It appears from section 523 that having once directed the disposal of the property in a particular manner, the Magistrate cannot revise his own order. This view is fortified by decisions of other High Courts to some of which a reference may be made here.. In Sakharam v. Jayaram1, on receipt of a police report, the Magistrate ordered the property to be returned to the person from whom it had been taken. Subsequently, the complainant petitioned against the order. The Magistrate then held an enquiry and ordered the property to be given to the complainant. On a reference by the Sessions Judge, the High Court accepted the reference and held that when once a Magistrate passes an order under section 523 of the Code, it is not open to him to vary that order subsequently. The same view has been expressed by the Lahore High Court in Ghulam Ali v. Emperor1, in which the scope of section 517 and that of section 523 came to be considered. The same view has been expressed by the Lahore High Court in Ghulam Ali v. Emperor1, in which the scope of section 517 and that of section 523 came to be considered. It is unnecessary to refer to the first portion of the judgment which relates to the scope of section 517 of the Code. In that case, the Police recovered a horse from the possession of Ghulam Ali on some information. Ghulam Ali approached the Magistrate for return of the horse; the Magistrate passed an order handing over the horse to him on a security of Rs. 400. No charge-sheet was sent by the Police in respect of the horse in pursuance of investigation. Thereafter the complainant moved the Magistrate by an application for restoration of the horse to him. The Magistrate ordered the horse to be made over to the complainant and directed Ghulam Ali to the Civil Court. In petition by Ghulam Ali, the High Court held that the second order amounted to a review of the first order and that a Criminal Court cannot review its own judgment. Dealing with the situation, this is what Blacker, J., stated- “..............It (the order of disposal of property) (could, however, be considered to have been one under section 523. But, as I have already stated, the Magistrate had already passed an order which must be presumed to have been under this section when he directed the property to be made over to the petitioner on security. His second order therefore amounts to a review of the first order and a Criminal Court cannot review its own judgment * *.” (The words within brackets are mine.) This decision has been followed by the Allahabad High Court in Muneshwar Bux Singh v. State2. A contention identical with the one advanced by Mr. Mandagi that the first order passed by the Magistrate was in the nature of an interim order seems to have been advanced before the Division Bench. In that case, a motor lorry had been attached from the possession of Raghunandan Prasad on a complaint by his brother-in-law Muneshwar Bux Singh charging the former with theft. The Police did not send any charge-sheet as they felt that the dispute was of a civil nature. The Magistrate passed an order on the application of Raghunandan Prasad that the lorry should be returned to him. The Police did not send any charge-sheet as they felt that the dispute was of a civil nature. The Magistrate passed an order on the application of Raghunandan Prasad that the lorry should be returned to him. Four days later, Muneshwar Bux Singh, the complainant filed an application for return of the lorry to him. The Magistrate thereupon ordered that the lorry should be returned to Muneshwar Bux. Certain other orders were passed in the case subsequently; they are not relevant for our purpose. It was contended on behalf of Muneshwar Bux Singh before the High Court that the first order passed in favour of Raghunandan Prasad for returning 1 he lorry on taking security, was merely an interim order. Their Lordships repelled this contention observing- “We find that there is no provision for passing an interim order. The mere fact that security was demanded from Raghunandan Prasad when the lorry was handed over to him would not make the first order an interim order....In our opinion the first order was an appropriate and legal order passed under section 523 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Such order cannot be reviewed. It is open to the aggrieved party to seek redress in a higher Court but the Magistrate after passing the order became functus officio and he could not revise his own order.” In the present case too, an order for sale of the rice bags had already been passed by the Magistrate. He could not have entertained the application of Dastagir Sab for revision of his own earlier order. The only course open to the Magistrate then was to have rejected the application and left Dastagir Sab to pursue such remedy as was open to him under the law. On a careful consideration of the provisions contained in section 523 and the decisions referred to above, I am satisfied that the second order passed by the Magistrate was without jurisdiction. The reference is accordingly accepted, and the order passed by the Magistrate in favour of Dastagir Sab is set aside. S.V.S. ----- Reference accepted.