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1999 DIGILAW 155 (RAJ)

Sampat Lal Daga v. Union of India

1999-02-09

B.J.SHETHNA

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Honble SHETHNA, J.–On the basis of Supreme Court judgment in case of M/s. Har Karan Das Mangi Lal vs. Union of India (1), learned counsel Shri Thanvi for the petitioner, submitted that the State Government as well as the Central Government both committed an error in passing the orders at Annex.5 dated 17.5.90 and Annex.11 dated 4.6.93, respectively only on the ground of delay. He also places on record photo-stat copies of the judgments of the learned Single Judges of this Court in case of Roshan Lal vs. State of Rajasthan (2), decided on 16.12.86 and case of Zakir Hussain vs. Union of India and another (3), decided on July 21, 1994 and submitted that two learned Single Judges of this Court relying upon the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court allowed the writ petitions. He, therefore, submits that this Court may allow the writ petition filed by the present petitioners and quash the impugned orders at Annexures 5 & 11 passed by the State Government and the Central Government, respectively. (2). In Har Karan Dass case (supra), the Apex Court observed as under:- ``It, however, appears from the order dated June 7, 1974, passed by the Central Government in another case (No. MV- i/5567/78), that in appropriate cases, the Central Government has the power to condone the delay caused in applying for renewal of the licence. If that be so, we do not appreciate for what special reasons the delay in the instant case could not be condoned by the Central Government. (3). Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, the above writ petition filed by Roshan Lal and Zakir Hussain respectively were also allowed by the learned Single Judges of this Court. (4). A pertinent query was put to learned counsel Shri Thanvi for the petitioner as to whether there is any provision either under the Rules or under the Act for condoning the delay in filing the renewal application late. Learned counsel Shri Thanvi stated at the bar that there is no such provision under the Act. (5). In the instant case, the last date of the lease was 22.3.90, therefore, the petitioner had to apply on or before 21.3.89 for renewal. However, he made an application on 10.4.89, which was filed late by 18 days after the last date of renewal. (5). In the instant case, the last date of the lease was 22.3.90, therefore, the petitioner had to apply on or before 21.3.89 for renewal. However, he made an application on 10.4.89, which was filed late by 18 days after the last date of renewal. Annexure-2 is a letter dated 17.10.89 addressed by the Mining Engineer to the petitioner calling upon the petitioner to explain the delay of 18 days within seven days. However, the explanation was submitted by the petitioner only on 16.1.90 (Annex.4) wherein it has been stated that he was a diabetic and heart patient, therefore, he could not apply for renewal of licence before the last date i.e. 21.3.89 and delay of 18 days was caused. The State Government simply rejected his renewal application on the short ground that the renewal application was filed late by 18 days. That order was challenged before the Central Government by the petitioner by way of a revision under Sec.30 of the Act, 1957 read with Rule 54 of the 1960 Rules. In para No.4 of the order passed by the Central Government it has been observed that the State Government had no powers to relax the prescribed period for filing a renewal application, therefore, the State Government had no other option but to reject the renewal application. It has also observed that the counsel for the petitioner was not able to show any provision under the Mines and Mineral (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 or the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 for condonation of delay in making the renewal application late. Accordingly, the revision petition was also dismissed on that ground alone. (6). Learned counsel Shri Jangir for the respondents submitted that when there is no provision for condoning delay, there was no question of condoning delay either by the State Government or by the Central Government. He further submitted that in case of Har Karan Das (supra), the Apex Court has passed the order only on the ground that in another case the Central Government passed an order on June 7, 1994 that in appropriate cases the Central Government has the power to condone the delay caused in applying for renewal of the licence. He submitted that if the error was committed in one case by the Central Government that would not mean that the error should be continued by the Central Government. He submitted that if the error was committed in one case by the Central Government that would not mean that the error should be continued by the Central Government. With greatest respect to the Apex Court, learned counsel Mr. Jangir submitted that the Apex Court had not at all considered this aspect that there is no provision either under the Act or the Rules to condone the delay. He further submitted that when there is no such provision then no curt can condone the delay. In support of his submission, he relied upon a Supreme Court judgment in the case of Caltex (India) Ltd. vs. Bhagwan Devi (4). In that case the Apex Court observed that: ``A lessee not having exercised the option of renewal within the time limited by the clause is not therefore entitled to a renewal. (7). However, learned counsel Shri Thanvi submitted that it was not a case arising out of the Mining Act where as Harkaran Dass case (supra) was relating to Mines and Mineral Act, therefore, he submitted that this Court should rely upon the Supreme Court judgment in Harkaran Dass case and not other cases particularly when two other Judges of this Court have relied on this case. (8). It appears that before both the learned Single Judges of this Court, the Supreme Court judgment in case of Caltex (India) was not brought to the notice. There is a lot of substance in the submission of learned counsel Shri Jangir that if there is no provision for condoning the delay then neither the State Government nor the Central Government has any jurisdiction to condone the delay. He gave an example that when there is a period provided to file suit and if that period is over then no court can condone the delay in filing the suit after the expiry of period be- cause no such provision is there for condoning the delay. He, therefore, submits that no court has any jurisdiction and unfortunately this aspect of the case was not considered by the Supreme Court in Har Karan Dass case and also not considered by two single Judges of this Court in two other cases. (9). He, therefore, submits that no court has any jurisdiction and unfortunately this aspect of the case was not considered by the Supreme Court in Har Karan Dass case and also not considered by two single Judges of this Court in two other cases. (9). In view of the above discussion, this petition is required to be dismissed as in my opinion, neither the State Government nor the Central Government has committed any error in rejecting the renewal application only on the ground that it was filed after the period of limitation. (10). Before parting I must state that even assuming for the sake of argument that there was a provision for condonation of delay and an application for condo- nation of delay was filed then also though the delay was of only 18 days, was not explained satisfactorily and immediately by the petitioner. The petitioner only came out with a case that he could not make the application before 21.3.89 because he was a diabetic and heart patient. Absolutely vague statement was made and that too on 16.1.90 and not immediately. (11). In view of the above discussions, I do not find any substance in this petition. This writ petition fails and is dismissed.