JUDGMENT :- Leave granted. 2. Appellant is the landlord while res-pondent is the tenant. The appellant filed two eviction suits in respect of premises let out to the respondent in the building known as Popatlal New Chawl. The ground on which eviction was sought was that the tenant had by using passages and spaces not let out to it, committed breach of the terms of the tenancy and in particular of Clause 11 and was therefore, not entitled to the protection of the Bombay Rent Control Act. Both the suits were heard by the trial Court together. The trial Court. on facts, found that the passages and spaces had not been let out to the respondent and that by using the passages and spaces in the manner in which the respondent was using, there had been a clear breach of the terms of the tenancy. The suits were however, dismissed on the ground that there was no proper service of the notice of forfeiture of the tenancy of the tenant. 3. While the appellant filed appeals before the appellate Court of the Small Causes, the respondent filed cross-objections. The appellate Court, on facts, found that the trial Court was right in concluding that the passages and spaces had not been let out to the respondent and that the manner in which the same had been used, was in breach of the terms of the tenancy. Against the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the two Courts, the respondent filed two petitions in the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The writ petitions were allowed and the findings of fact, as recorded by the two Courts below, were upset and the eviction set aside. Hence these appeals by the landlord on special leave. 4. We have perused the record and heard learned counsel for the parties. 5. Under Condition (11) of the Lease Deed, the respondent was not to use any space which did not form part of the demised premises. So far as the passage and space, as also the staircase passage, are concerned, they could be used by the respondent only for ingress and egress to and from the demised rooms and for no other purpose. So far as the passage and space, as also the staircase passage, are concerned, they could be used by the respondent only for ingress and egress to and from the demised rooms and for no other purpose. Both the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court, on the basis of the material on the record, came to the conclusion that the respondent had used the spaces and passages, which had not been let out to them, in a manner other than for use of ingress and egress and had committed breach of the terms of the tenancy of vital nature. Both the Courts detailed the manner in which the tenant had put to use the spaces 3496 and passages. These findings of fact could not have been interfered by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution must be sparingly exercised and may be exercised to correct errors of jurisdiction and the like but not to upset pure findings of fact, which falls in the domain of an appellate Court only. The High Court, thus, exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it by upsetting finding of fact and the impugned order, suffers from a jurisdictional defect. On this short ground, the appeals must succeed and are allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The eviction ordered against the respondent is maintained. 6. In the demised premises, it is not disputed that a Junior College and High School are being run. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that there are almost 600 students studying in the School and the College. Mr. H. N. Salve, learned counsel for the appellant, keeping in view that the demised premises are being used for an educational institution very fairly did not oppose the grant of time to the tenant till 31st May 2002 to vacate and handover the vacant possession to the landlord subject to the respondent filing the usual undertaking within four weeks. 7. Mr. A. M. Khanwilkar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, also fairly submitted that during this period, commencing 1st of February, 1999 till 31st May, 2002, the respondent shall pay rent for the demised promises (subject matter of these appeals) @ Rs. 1250/- per mensem plus all taxes to the landlord. 7. Mr. A. M. Khanwilkar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, also fairly submitted that during this period, commencing 1st of February, 1999 till 31st May, 2002, the respondent shall pay rent for the demised promises (subject matter of these appeals) @ Rs. 1250/- per mensem plus all taxes to the landlord. The parties shall act as per the statements, made by their learned counsel, as recorded above. Appeal allowed. FOR CITATION AIR 2000 SC 3495