Order.- This is a reference under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, made by the Sessions Judge, Coorg, for quashing the order of conviction passed by the First Class Magistrate, Mercara, in C.C.No. 164 of 1966 convicting the accused for an offence under section 235(1)(b) of the Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act, 1959 (hereinafter called the Act), and sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs. 25 and in default, to suffer S. I. for 7 days. The learned State Public Prosecutor appearing for the State and Sri Motaiah appearing for respondent 2 did not support the reference. Sri. Gaurishankar for the accused-respondent 1 has supported the reference made by the Sessions Judge, The facts leading to the reference are as follows: Respondent 1 in this case was the accused who was tried before the First Class Magistrate, Mercara. The accused was running a hotel at Makkandur having obtained a licence from the Village Panchayat of Makkandur. The period of the licence expired on 31st March, 1966. On 31st March, 1966, the accused-respondent 1 deposited Rs. 30 for renewal of the licence to run the hotel in that village and made an application along with it. No orders were passed by the Village Panchayat. He made another application on nth June, 1966, for renewal. The Village Panchayat issued him a notice as per Exhibit P-2 on 28th June, 1966, asking him to close down his hotel within 24 hours of the receipt of the notice failing which action would be taken against him as per law for running the hotel without a licence. In the said notice they informed him that the committee would inspect his hotel premises on 4th July, 1966, to find out whether all the conditions governing the grant or renewal of a licence were fulfilled. It is further stated in the notice that after inspection of the hotel premises the committee would consider the application for renewal. In reply to this notice, the accused sent a reply (Exhibit P-5) to the Chairman, Makkandur Village Panchayat, informing him that he had made an application before 31st March, 1966, for renewal of licence and that he would not close the hotel as directed by the Village Panchayat. In reply to this notice, the accused sent a reply (Exhibit P-5) to the Chairman, Makkandur Village Panchayat, informing him that he had made an application before 31st March, 1966, for renewal of licence and that he would not close the hotel as directed by the Village Panchayat. He further informed the Chairman that it would not be possible for him to be at the hotel at 1-30 p.m. on 4th July, 1966, as he had to go and appear before the Munsiff’s Court at Mercara. After the receipt of Exhibit P-5, the Officer of the Village Panchayat and some persons of the village paid a visit to the hotel of the accused on 30th June, 1966, and found that he was running the hotel without getting the licence renewed, and they drew up a mahazar as per Exhibit P-4. Thereafter the members of the Panchayat visited the hotel of the accused on 6th July, 1966, and on the same day they passed a resolution, Exhibit P-1, wherein they have noticed that the accused had not complied with certain conditions to run the hotel; They also resolved that his licence should not be renewed, and further they resolved to prosecute the accused for running the hotel without a valid licence. In pursuance of the resolution passed by the Village Panchayat, prosecution was launched against the accused on nth July, 1966, before the First Class Magistrate, Mercara. After the prosecution was launched, the accused filed Panchayat Appeal No. D.4. TDB. VPA. 89 of 1967 before the Deputy Commissioner of Coorg against the order of the Village Panchayat rejecting his application to renew the licence for the period after 31st March, 1966. The Deputy Commissioner granted a stay Order on 29th July, 1966. Thereafter, the Village Panchayat of Makkandur Village filed a complaint against the accused before the First Class Magistrate, Mercara, in C.C.No. 164 of 1966. The learned Magistrate put the accusation to the accused who pleaded not guilty to the offence. Thereafter the accused was tried and convicted as aforesaid. The accused challenged the conviction and sentence passed by the Magistrate before the Sessions Judge, Coorg, Mercara. The learned Sessions Judge, after hearing the Advocate for the accused and the Public Prosecutor, came, to the conclusion that the prosecution launched against the accused was illegal’ and the conviction and sentence passed by the Magistrate were not sustainable in law. The accused challenged the conviction and sentence passed by the Magistrate before the Sessions Judge, Coorg, Mercara. The learned Sessions Judge, after hearing the Advocate for the accused and the Public Prosecutor, came, to the conclusion that the prosecution launched against the accused was illegal’ and the conviction and sentence passed by the Magistrate were not sustainable in law. Therefore, he made the present reference. Three questions arise for decision in this reference: (1) Whether the accused was required to apply in writing for renewal under section 58(1) of the Act on payment in advance of a fee of Rs. 30 prescribed under law; (2) Whether the prosecution launched against the accused is illegal; and (3) Whether the stay Order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Coorg, operated as a bar for prosecution of the accused. Sri Gaurishankar, learned Advocate for accused-respondent in this Court, firstly contended that the accused had made an application on 31st March, 1966, along with the deposit. Nextly, he contended that there was no time limit fixed under the rules for making an application for renewal and that therefore he made another application on 11th May, 1966, requesting the Village Panchayat to renew the licence. Thirdly, he contended that he was running the hotel under the bona fide belief that the licence to run the hotel would be renewed. He further argued that section 58 of the Act does not require any application to be made for renewal of a licence. According to his argument, all that is required is only to make payment in advance of such fee as was prescribed. He urged that since the deposit was made by the accused on 31st March, 1966, he had satisfied the requirements of law under section 58, sub-section (1) of the Act. On the other hand, Sri Motiah, learned Advocate for respondent 2, contended that the provisions dealing with grant or renewal of licence implied that there must be an application made in writing. He relied upon the provisions of section 58(1) read with rule 3(iii) of the Mysore Panchayats Licensing, Permission and Fees Rules, 1960 (to be hereinafter called the Rules). He nextly contended that the date within which the accused was required by the law to file the application for renewal was the date of expiry of the licence. He relied upon the provisions of section 58(1) read with rule 3(iii) of the Mysore Panchayats Licensing, Permission and Fees Rules, 1960 (to be hereinafter called the Rules). He nextly contended that the date within which the accused was required by the law to file the application for renewal was the date of expiry of the licence. Thirdly, he contended that after Exhibit P-2 was served on the petitioner on 28th June, 1966, directing him to close down the hotel within 24 hours, the question of his bona fide believing that the. licence would be renewed does not arise at all and that therefore the Village Panchayat was a competent to launch prosecution against the accused for running the hotel without a licence as required under section 57 of the Act. Sri ‘Motaiah further contended that the stay Order obtained by the accused on 29th July, 1966, was no bar for prosecuting the accused for running the hotel without a licence on 30th June, 1966. The learned State Public Prosecutor supported the contention raised by Sri Motaiah. There is force in the contentions raised by Sri Motaiah and I find hardly any force in the contentions raised by Sri Gaurishankar or behalf of the first respondent-accused. The trial Court as well as the learned Sessions Judge have found that the accused had not filed any application on 31st March, 1966, for renewal of the licence. It is admitted by both the parties that the deposit was made on 31st March, 1966, Now the question is whether the provisions of the Act and the rules require an application to be made along with the deposit made for renewal of the licence. In order to determine the position of law it is necessary to refer to the relevant sections of the Act and also the Rules. In order to determine the position of law it is necessary to refer to the relevant sections of the Act and also the Rules. Section 57 of the Act reads as under: "No place within the jurisdiction of a Panchayat shall be used as a dairy, hotel, restaurant, eating house, coffee house, sweetmeat shop, bakery, boarding house or lodging house (other than a students’ hostel under public or recognised control) or a dharmashala or for manufacturing ice or aerated Water, except under a licence granted or renewed by the Panchayat and except in accordance with the conditions specified therein." It is clear from the above provision that for running a hotel within the jurisdiction of a Panchayat a licence granted by the Panchayat is absolutely necessary. Section 58 of the Act reads thus: "(1) A permission shall be granted under section 55 and a licence under sections 56and 57 shall be granted or renewed, only on payment in advance of such fee as may be prescribed. " (2) The Panchayat may, for reasons to be recorded in writing refuse to grant the permission under section 55 or to grant or renew a licence or to suspend or cancel a licence granted or renewed under section 56 or 57 for default of any of the condition subject to which the licence was granted. (3) Any person aggrieved by the refusal to grant permission under section 55 or to grant or renew a licence or by the suspension or cancellation of a licence under sub-section (2) may, within thirty days of the date of communication of the order, appeal to the Assistant Commissioner and the decision of the Assistant Commissioner on such appeal shall be final." In sub-section (1) of section 58 no doubt it is not specifically stated that while making payment in advance of such fee as may be prescribed, the person who applies for licence should make the request in writing. But on a reference to Rule 3(iii) to which my attention was invited by Sri Motaiah, there is reference for an implication to be made for grant or refusal of a licence. But on a reference to Rule 3(iii) to which my attention was invited by Sri Motaiah, there is reference for an implication to be made for grant or refusal of a licence. Rule 3(iii) of the Rules reads thus: "When any licence or permission is suspended or cancelled, or when the period for which it was granted or within which application for renewal should be made, has expired, whichever is later, the grantee shall, for all purpose of sections 55, 56 and 57 of the Act, be deemed to be without a licence or permission, until the order suspending or cancelling the licence is cancelled or until the licence or permission is renewed, as the case may be." It is clear from the first half of this sub-rule that an application should be made by a person for renewal of the licence which has expired. On a reading of the provisions of section 58(1) along with the provisions of rule 3(iii) there cannot be any doubt that a person who seeks renewal of a hotel licence should make an application for renewal of the licence while making payment in advance of the prescribed fee. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention of Sri Gaurishankar that under section 58(1) only payment in advance of the prescribed fee is required and no application need be made. In the instant case, as already stated above, the finding of both the Courts is to the effect that no application was made by the accused for renewal of the licence on 31st March, 1966. The next contention of Sri Gaurishankar is that there is no time limit prescribed under the Act or the Rules. No doubt the time limit is not prescribed in the rules. But, on a reading of section 58(1) and also rule 3(iii) it is char that as no separate time limit is prescribed, the accused was expected to make payment and also make an application before 31st March, 1966. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention that since no time limit had been fixed, the accused was. at liberty to make the application within any reasonable time. Since the accused had not made an application as required by law, his application which was made on 11th May, 1966, was rejected on 6th July, 1966, after the Village Panchayat inspected the hotel. at liberty to make the application within any reasonable time. Since the accused had not made an application as required by law, his application which was made on 11th May, 1966, was rejected on 6th July, 1966, after the Village Panchayat inspected the hotel. The village panchayat was well within its power to reject the application which was made long after the due date. By his failure to make an application before 31st March, 1966, the accused should be deemed to be without a licence to run the hotel as per the provisions of rule 3(iii) of the Rules. The prosecution was launched against the accused for running the hotel on 30th June, 1966. The contention of Sri Gaurishankar is that the accused was running the hotel under the bona fide belief that his licence to run the hotel would be renewed. Sri Motaiah met this point by arguing that after Exhibit P-2 was served on the accused on 28th June, 1966, directing him to close the hotel within 24 hours, the question of his bona fide believing that the licence would be renewed by the panchayat would not arise. I am in agreement with the argument advanced by Sri Motaiah. Therefore, it is clear that the accused who was running the hotel without a licence on 30th June, 1966, was liable for prosecution under the Act. Now turning to the contentions of Sri Gaurishankar that the stay order issued by the Deputy Commissioner operated as a bar for the prosecution launched against the accused, it is seen that the village panchayat authorities inspected 1 he hotel of the accused on 30th June, 1966 and found that he was running the hotel without a licence granted by the village panchayat. The village panchayat resolved as per Exhibit P-1 to prosecute the accused on 6th July, 1966. On 11th July, 1966, the village panchayat filed the complaint against the accused for running the hotel without a licence on 30th June, 1966. The accused appealed against the resolution dated 6th July, 1966, on 26th July, 1966, before the Deputy Commissioner, Coorg. On the same day, he obtained an order of stay. In view of the above facts, Mr. Motaiah argued that the Deputy Commissioner of Coorg dealing with an appeal under section 58(3) of the Act has no power to stay the criminal prosecution launched by the village panchayat against the excused. On the same day, he obtained an order of stay. In view of the above facts, Mr. Motaiah argued that the Deputy Commissioner of Coorg dealing with an appeal under section 58(3) of the Act has no power to stay the criminal prosecution launched by the village panchayat against the excused. But the argument of Mr. Motaiah ignores the power of the Deputy Commissioner under section 200 of the Act with regard to suspension of execution of any order or resolution of a panchayat which is unjust, unlawful or improper. In Coorg District, I am told the Deputy Commissioner, discharges the functions of the Assistant Commissioner falling within the purview of section 58(3) of the Act. At the same time, the Deputy Commissioner of Coorg is not precluded from exercising his powers under the provisions of section 200 of the Act. Therefore, it is very difficult to decide in the instant case without some more material as to whether the Deputy Commissioner merely acted under section 58(3) of the Act or that he exercised his power under section 200 of the Act also. It is not necessary to decide whether or not the Deputy Commissioner of Coorg has powers to stay prosecution of the accused when in fact the order of stay as well as the judgment do not refer to the prosecution of the accused. It is relevant to refer to the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Coorg, which reads as under: “The appellant has preferred an appeal under section 58(3) of the Mysore Village Panchayat and Local Boards Act, 1959, against the directions dated 7th July, 1S66 of the Chairman, Makkandur Village Panchayat regarding the rejection of the renewal of hotel licence of the appellant. The Deputy Commissioner is pleased to grant a stay of the directions of the Chairman, Makkandur Village Panchayat, cited above, pending hearing of the case. The case shall be heard next on Friday the 5th August, 1966, at 11-00 a.m. which the parties should note.” It is clear from the above stay order that the Deputy Commissioner granted stay of the directions of the Chairman of Makkandar Village Panchayat. In the first part of the order of stay, the direction dated 7th July, 1966, of the Chairman refers to the rejection of the renewal of the hotel licence of the accused. In the first part of the order of stay, the direction dated 7th July, 1966, of the Chairman refers to the rejection of the renewal of the hotel licence of the accused. It does not state anything about the resolution passed by the village panchayat to launch prosecution against the accused. In fact, as can be seen in Exhibit P-1, there are two resolutions. One refers to the prosecution of the accused far running the hotel without a licence on 30th June, 1966, and the other relates to the rejection of the renewal of the hotel licence. I have carefully read the final order passed by the learned Deputy Commissioner of Coorg in the appeal filed by the accused. Nowhere in the judgment has the learned Deputy Commissioner referred to the resolution passed by the village panchayat to launch prosecution against the accused Therefore, on a reading of both the stay order and the final order in appeal passed by the Deputy Commissioner it is clear that the Deputy Commissioner has not suspended the resolution relating to launching of the prosecution against the accused. Further, as contended by Mr. Motaiah, the stay order issued on 29th July, 1966, even it itintended to stay the prosecution, cannot be said to have retrospective effect and operate as a bar for the prosecution launched on 11th July, 1966. Therefore, the stay order did not operate as a bar to prosecute the accused. Hence, the contention of Sri Gaurishankar fails. The learned Sessions Judge while making the reference to this Court has failed to take note of the several points discussed above. His remarks against the village panchayat are unwarranted. As stated earlier, the accused was running the hotel without a licence on 30th June, 1966. and the prosecution launched against him is valid in law. Further, the learned Magistrate has rightly come to the conclusion that the accused was running the hotel without a valid licence and has also rightly found him guilty of an offence punishable under section 235(1)(b) of the Act. While sentencing the accused, the learned Magistrate has also leniently viewed the matter as the offence was only of a technical nature. Therefore, the conviction and sentence passed by the learned Magistrate in C.C.No. 164 of 1966 are sustainable in law. While sentencing the accused, the learned Magistrate has also leniently viewed the matter as the offence was only of a technical nature. Therefore, the conviction and sentence passed by the learned Magistrate in C.C.No. 164 of 1966 are sustainable in law. The reference is, therefore, rejected and the Criminal Revision Petition No. 1 of 1967 on the file of the Sessions Judge, Coorg, filed by the accused is dismissed. S.V.S. ----- Reference rejected.