Judgment :- AR. Lakshmanan, ag. C.J. Heard Mr. K.C. John, Sr. Advocate and Mr. N. Sankara Menon for petitioners, Mr. T.M. Yousuff, Addl. Advocate General and Smt. Molly Jacob, Government Pleader for the State and Mr. Babu Varghese, Standing Counsel for Water Authority. 2. The Original Petitions were filed by the petitioners challenging the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the respondents by Ext. P2 and P2(a ) as barred by limitation. Exts. P2 and P2(a ) are the notifications issued under S.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894), hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' for acquiring the lands specified therein situated in Aluva East and West Villages, Thrikkakara North, Vazhakkalaand Edapally South Villages. The lands are needed for a public purpose viz., "for Adhoc Augmentation of Kochi Water Supply Scheme". A notification in the gazette was issued by the Special Tahsildar (LA) General Ernakulam on 25.7.1996 (Ext. P2) in accordance with the provisions of sub-s.(1) of S.4 of the Act. In view of the urgency of the case, the Board of Revenue in its Order No. LIZ (C) 6-19762/96 K.Dis. dated 22.7.1996 under sub-s.(4) of S.17 of the said Act has directed that the provisions of S.5A of the Act shall not apply to this case. The acquisition proceedings are initiated for acquiring the land for the implementation of HUDCO Scheme to meet the acute shortage of drinking water in Ernakulam, Western Kochi and Vypeen Island. The scheme is intended to supply water where acute shortage being felt in the area mentioned above. Though 4(1) notification was published on 25.7.1996 and 12.8.1996 as per Exts. P2 and P2(a) the land acquisition proceedings could not be proceeded speedily due to the obstruction caused by the petitioners and other land owners having property within the alignment notified for acquisition. The survey work for the purpose of publishing S.6 declaration was able to be done only with the aid of police due to the obstructions caused by the land owners at various P1 aces coming within the alignment. However, S.6 declaration got approved by the Board of Revenue within one year from the last date of publication of S.4(1) notification. The details regarding the dates of 4(1) notification published in the Gazette, dailies, locality in the various villages and the details of S.6 declaration are given in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents. However, S.6 declaration got approved by the Board of Revenue within one year from the last date of publication of S.4(1) notification. The details regarding the dates of 4(1) notification published in the Gazette, dailies, locality in the various villages and the details of S.6 declaration are given in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents. We shall refer to the same at the appropriate stage. 3. O.P. No. 23586/98 was filedby 91 petitioners challenging the land acquisition proceedings initiated as per Exts. P2 and P2(a ) notifications which have been issued for the purpose of Adhoc Augmentation of Kochi Water Supply Scheme. Ext. P2 notification is in respect of acquiring land situated in Aluva Taluk, Aluva West and East Villages, Thrikkakara North and Vazhakkala Villages of Kanayannur Taluk. Exts. P2(a ) notification is for acquiring the land situated in Edapally South Village. 4. The main contention of the petitioners in the respective Writ Petitions is that Exts. P2 and P2(a) are barred by limitation and that the authorities are fixing the land value-as low as possible. It is also submitted by the petitioners that the respondents have fixed a ridiculously low compensation for the lands acquired and that the Government have not taken any steps in regard to the proposal of the resettlement of the evictees. 5. Mr. N. Sankara Menon, Learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners submitted that the Kerala Water Authority has formulated an unworkable adhoc scheme for ostensible purpose of augmentation of water supply to Corporation of Cochin and its environs at enormous cost running into hundreds crores of rupees without the mandatory sanction of the Ministry of Environment, Government of India. It is submitted that the adhoc scheme is to lay pipes at huge cost running to about 300 crores without improving the infrastructure and without completing the other allied schemes will not improve water supply to the City or to the Island in any appreciable manner. 6. The petitioners have also furnished the dates as culled out from Exts. P2 and P5 in para 9 of the Original Petition No. 23586/98. According to the petitioners the last date of the series of S.4(1) notification with respect of Aluva East Village is 27.9.1996 and S.6(1) notification ought to have been published by 26.9.97 at the latest. Admittedly the date of S.6(1) Gazette publication was made on 9.10.1997. P2 and P5 in para 9 of the Original Petition No. 23586/98. According to the petitioners the last date of the series of S.4(1) notification with respect of Aluva East Village is 27.9.1996 and S.6(1) notification ought to have been published by 26.9.97 at the latest. Admittedly the date of S.6(1) Gazette publication was made on 9.10.1997. Hence the notification is so far as S.4(1) has become barred. According to the respondents there was approval by the Board of Revenue of the notification on 26.9.1997 and therefore, the notification was intact. However, according to the petitioners, the approval by the Board of Revenue of the notification on 26.9.1997 was only an approval and that will be of no consequence. He invited our attention to R.9 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Rules which deals with publication of declaration. He would submit that declaration under S.6 will be effective only on publication and that the Rule does not contemplate a making of declaration by signing the same. According to the learned counsel two stages, viz., "approval and publication" are contemplated to complete the process and since there was no publication within the time stipulated to bring the notification within the period of limitation. An alternative argument was also advanced by Mr. N. Sankara Menon stating that even assuming but not admitting that the dates are correct even the declaration with respect to Aluva East and West Villages were issued after the period of one year from the date of 28.9.1996, ie, on 9.10.1997 and the Gazette publication having come beyond that date he submitted that the entire land acquisition notification has lapsed. A further argument was also advanced that the whole land acquisition being for a composite scheme cannot be implemented without acquiring the whole area. Hence the whole of S.6 notification not having come within the period prescribed, the whole of S.4(1) notification must fail. It is also submitted that the scheme is not sever able and even if one small patch of land is left out the scheme cannot be implemented. According to the learned counsel same is the position with respect to Edappally South Village also. Citing the decision reported in Krislii Utyadan Mandi Samithi v. Makrand Singh & Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 497) learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the relevant date for calculating limitation is the date of publication in the Gazette. 7. According to the learned counsel same is the position with respect to Edappally South Village also. Citing the decision reported in Krislii Utyadan Mandi Samithi v. Makrand Singh & Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 497) learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the relevant date for calculating limitation is the date of publication in the Gazette. 7. As already noticed the petitioners are opposing the acquisition not only on the ground that the scheme is barred by limitation but also on the ground that the scheme is not workable and it will not be beneficial to the public at large and that it is sheer wastage of public funds but also that there is no viable rehabilitation scheme. It is also submitted that the Water Authority has no funds available for being utilised for the land acquisition compensation. According to Mr. N. Sankara Menon the land acquisition authorities have put the value of land at low levels forcing the affected parties to go to court for proper compensation and that the compensation obtained after long number of years will be worth nothing. Submitting further Mr. N. Sankara Menons aid that even though the authorities submitted before the court that rehabilitation measures will he take no steps for rehabilitation measures have taken place and that the rehabilitation as provided in UN resist*<<*s as ratified by India have to be provided and that the results is legally binding on the Nation and has the force of law. He submitted that the forced evictions are violations of human rights and that such forced evictions without the sanction of law have to be declared as unlawful and illegal. 8. With the above grounds the petitioners have filed the Original Petitions to quash Exts. P2 and P2(a ) and also for the mandamus directing the respondents to fix the land value in terms of actual value fixed in similar cases. A further prayer by way of direction directing the respondents that in the event of acquisition proceedings, the reference shall be made forthwith and that the reference court shall proceed with reference on day to day basis and on the reference bearing answered, the fourth respondent shall deposit the amount immediately. A further prayer by way of direction directing the respondents that in the event of acquisition proceedings, the reference shall be made forthwith and that the reference court shall proceed with reference on day to day basis and on the reference bearing answered, the fourth respondent shall deposit the amount immediately. A further prayer by way of prohibition was also sought for directing the respondents that they shall proceed with the eviction only if the whole land value payable is deposited before the third respondent and further directing the respondents that they shall proceed with the present scheme only after completing all other uncompleted schemes. Along with O.P. 23586/98 petitioners have filed Exts. P1 to P18 most of which are paper reports. 9. Similar contentions have been raised in O.P.25410/98 filed by 43 persons. 10. O.P. 271/98 was filed by K. Madhusoodanan and two others seeking to quash 4(1) notification. 11. O.P. 22732/98 was filed by one Rajan of Aluva to declare Ext. P1 notification as lapsed in the light of S.6 proviso (ii) of the Land Acquisition Act and as such non erst in law and to quash Ext. P5 as not legally sustainable and for a mandamus directing the respondents 1 and 2 therein to proceed with the eviction only after providing rehabilitate measures. 12. In O.P.271/98, C.M.P.4422/99 was filed by the Communist Party of lndia(M) Ernakulam District Committee, Lenin Centre, Kaloor, represented by its Secretary, A.P. Varkey to implead them as additional respondent No. 7 in the above Original Petition. According to the petitioner they are vitally interested in the outcome of the above Original Petition. The said C.M.P. was allowed by this Bench on 2.2.1999. According to the petitioner in the above CMP the scheme is a scientifically designed one for augmenting the existing water supply system at Kochi. The Scheme was conceived by the first respondent State of Kerala and the fourth respondent Kerala Water Authority to meet the acute scarcity of drinking water in the City of Cochin and the suburban areas covering five Municipalities and 25 Panchayats which include a substantial portion of the coastal areas like Vypeen Island, all these places are having population density of the lightest degree and that the financial assistance for the scheme is promised by the HUDCO, New Delhi. According to them the scheme is a scientifically designed one for augmenting the existing water supply system at Kochi and that the petitioners in the Original Petitions have come forward with alternate suggestions to meet the acute scarcity for drinking water in the metropolitan area, to safeguard their ownership and possession over the land required for the execution of the scheme. They also referred to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court which constituted a committee to monitor water supply to Vypeen Island areas with the District Collector as Chairman. The Division Bench directed the said committee to study the feasibility of alternative schemes proposed by the petitioners in those cases and a report was accordingly submitted by the committee which has pointed out that the HUDCO scheme is the most viable and feasible scheme and after considering the report, the Division Bench vide order dated 8.4.97 directed the Kerala Water Authority to proceed with the HUDCO scheme. In the light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the petitioners in the above C.M.P. submitted that the land owners filed series of Writ Petitions including those styled as public interest litigation, letter O.P. etc and that their attempt is only to thwart the scheme. 13. Mr. N. Sankara Menon relied on the following judgments: i) Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samithi v. Makrand Singh and ors. 1995 (2) SCC 497 ii) Eugenia Misquita and Ors. v. State of Goa & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 3939 Hi) Khadim Hussain v. State of UP & Ors. 1976 (1) SCC483. 14. O.P. 24005/98 was filed by Saroja Mony and 10 others, raising similar contentions and praying for identical reliefs as in the other Writ Petitions. Mr. K.K. John, Sr. Advocate has reiterated the same contentions which have been raised in the other Original Petitions. According to him the notification under S.4(1) is barred by limitation as mentioned in para 12 of the Original Petition and that S.6 notification has been published beyond the period of limitation. Learned Senior Counsel relied on the decisions reported in Karjan. Jalasay Yojana Assargrasth Sahkar Ane Sangarsh Samithi v. Stare of Gujarat (AIR 1987 SC 532); Eugenia Misquita and Ors. v. State 'of Goa & Ors. (AIR 1997 SC 3939) in support of his contention. 15. W.A. 553/97 was filed by one Jacob Mathew against the judgment in O.P. 7243/96. Learned Senior Counsel relied on the decisions reported in Karjan. Jalasay Yojana Assargrasth Sahkar Ane Sangarsh Samithi v. Stare of Gujarat (AIR 1987 SC 532); Eugenia Misquita and Ors. v. State 'of Goa & Ors. (AIR 1997 SC 3939) in support of his contention. 15. W.A. 553/97 was filed by one Jacob Mathew against the judgment in O.P. 7243/96. K. S. Radhakrishnan, J. dismissed the Original Petition for the detailed reasons recorded in his judgment. The learned judge has observed that there is no illegality or irregularity in the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the Water Authority and therefore, the scheme in question is to be implemented with utmost urgency so as to meet the demand of the public. Demand for water itself is a constitutional right. Aggrieved by the said judgment above Writ Appeal was filed repeating the same contentions. 16. On behalf of the respondent State a detailed counter affidavit has been filed in O.P. No. 23586/98 and also by the Kerala Water Authority through its standing counsel Mr. Babu Varghese with enclosures. The matter was argued by the Addl. Advocate General and Mrs. Molly Jacob on behalf of the State. Learned Government Pleader cited the following decisions: i) Khadim Hussain v. State of UP & Ors. (1976(1) SCC 483) ii) Bhaskara Panicker v. State of Kerala (1989 (2) KIT 71) iii) Bhaskara Panicker v. State of Kerala (1991 (2) KLT 580) iv) Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samithi v. Makrand Singh and ors. (1995 (2) SCC 497) v) M. Syed Mohammed Shaft & Ors. v. State of Kerala (1996 (1) KLJ 202) vi) New Reviera Co-op. Housing Society andAnr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (1996 (1) SCC 731) Learned Addl. Advocate General submitted that since the land is sought to be acquired for a public purpose the land owners on proof of their ownership could be entitled only for compensation and therefore, they would be entitled to only the compensation and cannot, as a matter of right, ask for or pray for rehabilitation. He cited the following decisions: vii) Mathew Varghese v. Cochin International Airport. (1998 (2) KLT 123) ii) Chameli Singh & Ors. v. State of UP & Ors. (1996 (2) SCC 549) in) Ramnilal N. Bhutia v. State of Maharashtra (1997) I SCC 134). 17. Mr. He cited the following decisions: vii) Mathew Varghese v. Cochin International Airport. (1998 (2) KLT 123) ii) Chameli Singh & Ors. v. State of UP & Ors. (1996 (2) SCC 549) in) Ramnilal N. Bhutia v. State of Maharashtra (1997) I SCC 134). 17. Mr. Babu Varghese, Standing Counsel for the Kerala Water Authority, after inviting our attention to the relevant passages in the counter affidavit and the annexure has also cited the following decisions: i) Khadim Hussuin v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1976(1) SCC 483) ii) Bhaskara Panicker v. State of Kerala (1989 (2) KLT 71) iii.) Bhaskara Panicker v. State of Kerala (1991 (2) KLT 580) iv) Lt. K. Padmadas v. State of Kerala (1LR 1991 (3) Ker. 414) v) S.H. Rangappa v. Slate of Karnataka (JT 1998(6) SC 82 = (1998) 5 SCC 509). He also highlighted the importance of the scheme and the steps already taken by the Kerala Water Authority in the implementation of the scheme for the common good and in public interest. 18. According to the learned Government Pleader the Original Petitions have been filed without any bonafides and the same is not maintainable either in law or on facts. Kerala Water Authority is the agency of the Government of Kerala who have been entrusted with the function of providing drinking water to the citizens of Kerala and undertaking proper drainage schemes in various areas in Kerala. The scheme in question is one of the major projects being operated by the said authority. She would submit that the augmentation of the Kochi Water Supply Scheme was conceived by the Kerala Water Authority to meet the acute scarcity of drinking water to the people in the Kochi area mainly in the City of Kochi, five surrounding Municipalities and 25 panchayats suburb and to Kochi city. With this view the Kerala Water Authority prepared scheme under the Kerala Urban Development Project. The records placed before us show that the project report was prepared with the assistance of Tata Consulting Engineers and since the major project could not be taken up by the Kerala Water Authority the adhoc augmentation project has been taken up under the loan assistance scheme of HUDCO. The adhoc augmentation project is only a part of the major Kerala Urban Development Project which includes several components as mentioned in para 3 of the counter affidavit filed by the State of Kerala. The adhoc augmentation project is only a part of the major Kerala Urban Development Project which includes several components as mentioned in para 3 of the counter affidavit filed by the State of Kerala. It is seen from the records that the Government have accorded administrative and technical sanction as per G.O. Rt. No. 2560/95/LAD dated 5.5.95 and the Government, after considering the importance of the matter and also the necessity of completing the project on an emergency basis to solve the scarcity of water in Ernakulam Western Kochi and Vypin Island issued certificate No. 3754/4/FI/d6/LAD dated 4.5.96 requiring to acquire the land by invoking urgency clause. In the light of the above certificate issued by the Government, the Board of Revenue vide proceedings No. LR (c)6-14762/96/K.Dis. dated 22.7.96 accorded sanction to invoke the urgency clause under S.17 of the Act in respect of the land covered by the circular dated 4.5.1996. As a matter of fact the entire land acquisition proceedings was initiated based on the requisition from the Water Authority received at the Collectorate on 15.11.95. The delay in giving administrative sanction have also been explained in the counter affidavit. Even for the issuance of S.4(1) notification the land had to be surveyed and the exact details of the property required to be acquired had to be determined. As could be seen from the various proceedings the land owners including the petitioners in various Original Petitions have also obstructed the survey process. Based on the sanction accorded by the Board of Revenue for invoking the urgency clause on 22.7.1996 the respondent published Ext. P2 notification dated 25.7.96 under S.4(1) read with S.17(4) of the Act in respect of Aluva East and West, Thrikkakara North and Vazhakkala Village in the Kerala Gazette on 1.8.1996. Before that it was published in the Madhyamam daily dated 29.7.96 and Mathrubhoomi daily dated 30.7.96. The public notice under R.7(2) in respect of Aluva East Village was published in the locality on 27.9.1996 and in respect of Aluva West Village was published in Aluva Municipal area on 27.9.96 and Choornikkara Panchayat area on 28.9.96. The said notice under S.4(1) of the Act was published in the Gazette on 19.8.96 and in the Mathrubhomi daily on 20.8.96 and Madhyamam daily on 19.8.96 and public notice under R.7(2) was published in the locality on 30.11.96. The said notice under S.4(1) of the Act was published in the Gazette on 19.8.96 and in the Mathrubhomi daily on 20.8.96 and Madhyamam daily on 19.8.96 and public notice under R.7(2) was published in the locality on 30.11.96. For the purpose of publishing S.6 declaration under the Act detailed survey has to be conducted. The respondents had to approach the police authorities for removal of obstruction and the declaration in respect of Aluva East and West Villages was approved by the Board of Revenue in its proceedings dated 26.9.1997 and it was published in Mathrubhoomi daily dated 15.10.1997, Madhyamam daily on 16.1 (). 1997 and the Kerala Gazette Extra Ordinary No. 1394 dated 9.10.1997 and in the locality on 13.10.97. The public notice under R.7(2) in respect of Thrikkakara North Village was published in the locality on 5.10.1996 and the Board of Revenue approved its declaration as per proceedings dated 25.8.97 and it was published in the Gazette No. 1263 dated 12.9.1997 in the Mathrubhoomi daily dated 12.9.1997, Madhyamam daily on 9.9.1997 and in the locality on 12.9.1997. Likewise the notice under R.7(2) in respect of Vazhakkala Village was published in the locality on 27.9.1996, declaration under S.6 of the Act in respect of this village was approved by the Board of Revenue in proceedings dated 18.8.1997 audit was published in the gazette No. 1151 dated 20.8.97, in Mathrubhoomi daily dated 23.9.1997, Madhyamam daily on 21.9.1997 in the locality on 12.9.1997. The declaration under S.6 in respect of Edapally South Village was approved by the Board of Revenue vide proceedings dated 26.11.97 and was published in the Gazette No. 1646 dated 26.11.97, Mathrubhoomi daily dated 29.11.97, Madhyamam daily on 29.11.97 and in the locality on 30.11.97. 19. A close scrutiny of the above dates of publications could clearly go to show that there is no substance in the allegation of the petitioners that the land acquisition notification in Exts. P2 and P2(a) stands lapsed by efflux of time as provided in second proviso to S.6 of the Act. As a matter of fact in the affidavit filed on 5.11.1997 and 12.12.1997 in W.A. 553/97 the Special Tahsildar (LA), General, Ernakulam have clearly stated about the publication of 4(1) notification in respect of Edappally South Village was 30.11.96 and in the written statement filed as per Ext. P4, the date shown as 3.11.96. It is a mistake. As a matter of fact in the affidavit filed on 5.11.1997 and 12.12.1997 in W.A. 553/97 the Special Tahsildar (LA), General, Ernakulam have clearly stated about the publication of 4(1) notification in respect of Edappally South Village was 30.11.96 and in the written statement filed as per Ext. P4, the date shown as 3.11.96. It is a mistake. The dale 3.11.96 is evident from para 4 of Ext. P4 written statement. It is clearly slated therein that the declaration has been made by the competent authority before the expiry of one year from the date of publication of the notification under S.4(1) of the Act ie. 30.11.96. This declaration has been published in the official Go letter extraordinary No. 1646 dated 26.11.97, in the Mathrubhoomi daily dated 29.11.97, Madhyamam daily on 29.11.97 and in the locality on 30.11.97, in Village Office, Taluk Office etc. as provided in sub-s.(2) of S.6 of the Act. It has also been stated that public notice under R.7(2) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Rules has been published in the locality and in the Land Acquisition Officers Office on 30.11.96 and in the Village Office and Taluk Office on 15.11.96 and 18.11.96 respectively. In the affidavit dated 12.12.1997 filed before this Court in the above writ appeal if has been clearly stated that the local publication of the notice in respect of Edapally South Village was made on 30.11.96. From the facts mentioned above it can be easily seen that the contentions regarding limitations raised in the Original Petitions are incorrect and against the facts. 20. The contentions of learned counsel for the petitioners that S.4(1) notification in respect of Aluva East is barred by limitation as the last series of publication is 27.9.1996 and the date of Gazette publication of S.6(1) declaration is 9.10.1997 is incorrect. S.4(1) notification in respect of Aluva East was published lastly on 27.9.1996. The Board of Revenue has approved the declaration on 26.9.1997 vide its proceedings No. 22691/97/K.Dis which is within one year. S.6(3) states that the declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, as the case may be, and after making such declaration the appropriate Government may acquire the land in the manner mentioned in the Section. S.6(3) states that the declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, as the case may be, and after making such declaration the appropriate Government may acquire the land in the manner mentioned in the Section. The proviso to S.6(1) says that the bar in making the declaration is after the expiry of one year from the last date of publication of S.4(1) notification. This Court in Bhaskara Panicker v. Suite 6>/7fera/r; (1989 (2) KLT 71- Malimath C.J. & Bhaskaran Nambiar, J.) has held thus: "The statutory function created regarding the deemed date of publication of declaration is not for the purpose of sub-s.(1) of S.6 but in regard to later provisions. Hence the same has no bearing on interpreting clause (ii) of the said proviso to S.6(1) of the Act. The publication of the declaration contemplated by sub-s.(2) should not be confused with the making of the declaration contemplated by sub-s.(1) of S.6. The declaration under sub-s.(1) of S.6 is made when the declaration is duly signed by the authority competent to make the declaration. It is the date of signing such declaration that has to be regarded as the date on which the declaration is made. Though it is obligatory on the part of the authorities to publish such a declaration in the manner provided under S.6(2) of the Act, none of the dates of such publication can be regarded as the date on which the declaration is made. The declaration contemplated by sub-s.(1), of S.6 has to be regarded as having been made as on the date on which it is signed". In the above judgment, Kaliyappan v. State of Kerala (1988 (1) KLT 284), has also bee referred to. That decision has since been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kaliyappan v. State of Kerala (1988 (2) KLT 937). 21. The above decision was again relied on by the Division Bench of this Court Bhaskara Panickerv. State of Kerala (1991 (2) KLT 580 - Jagannadha Rao, C.J. & Viswanatha Iyer, J.). That decision has since been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kaliyappan v. State of Kerala (1988 (2) KLT 937). 21. The above decision was again relied on by the Division Bench of this Court Bhaskara Panickerv. State of Kerala (1991 (2) KLT 580 - Jagannadha Rao, C.J. & Viswanatha Iyer, J.). The Division Bench held : "The period of one year referred to in the second part of theprovisotoS.6(1)is to be counted from the date of the publication of the notification' as defined in S.4(1) upto the date or making of the declaration under S.6(1), that is, upto the date of signature of the Secretary to Government or of the duly authorised officer and even if dates of the three modes of publication of S.6(1) declaration, that is, in the gazette, in the newspapers or in the locality are beyond one year from the date of the publication of the notification' under S.4(1), it does not matter." In the above judgment, Bhaskara Panicker v. State of Kerala. (1989(2) KLT 71) and Padmadas v. State of Kerala (ILR 1991 (3) Ker. 414) were also relied on by the Division Bench. In Mohammed Kunhi v. Union of India (1992 (2) KLT 336), a learned single judge of this Court held that a reading of the relevant provisions will show that the crucial date in considering the statutory period in a case where S.4(1) notification was published after the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1894 is the date on which the declaration was made and not the date on which the declaration was published. Clause 2 of the first proviso to S.6 would clearly indicate this position. In view-of the above, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that the declaration was made out of time is not correct and not tenable. 22. Mr. Sankara Menon placed reliance on the judgment reported in Krishi UtpacIan MandiSamithiv. Makrand Singh & Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 497-by two judges) to substantiate his contention that the relevant date for calculating limitation is the date of publication in the gazette. The above decision was again followed in Eugenia Misquita and Ors. v. State of Goa & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 3939- by two judges). However, a Division Bench of this Court in M. Syed Mohammed Shafi & Ors. The above decision was again followed in Eugenia Misquita and Ors. v. State of Goa & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 3939- by two judges). However, a Division Bench of this Court in M. Syed Mohammed Shafi & Ors. v. State of Kerala (1996 (1) KLJ 202- K.T. Thomas, ag.o. & P. Shanmugam, J.) has taken the view that for reckoning the period of one year for making of the declaration, the last date of such publication of S.4(1) notification is to be taken. In the aforesaid ruling, it has been held thus: "Section 4(1) of the Act enjoins that a notification shall be published when it appears to the Government tlat land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. Three modes are prescribed for such publication: (1) in the official Gazette, (2) in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality (3) substance of the notification at convenient places in the locality. All the three modes of publication prescribed need not necessarily be implemented on the same date. They can be done on three different dates as well. If so, the last date of such publication becomes the date of publication for certain purposes as could be noticed from S.4(1) of the Act. The word "hereinafter' used in the last limb of that sub-section is expected to convey the legislation intent that the period of one year envisaged in the first proviso to S.6(1) of the Act, shall commence only from such last date of publication." The Division Bench has considered the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samithi's case (supra). Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the judgment of the Division Bench read thus: "14. Both sides have relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samithi & Ann v. Makrand Singh & Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 497) which was rendered by a Bench of two Judges (K. Ramaswamy & Venkitachala, JJ.) We may point out in mis context that the RambhaiLakhabai Bhakt v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1995 SC 1549) their Lordships (K. Ramaswamy and Hansaria, JJ.) have clearly stated the legal position which dealing with the contention in another land acquisition case that the declaration made under S.6 was invalid on the ground that it was published only alter one year of the notification. According to the learned judges: "It is seen that under clause (2) of S.6 the declaration shall be published within one year from the date of the publication of the notification under S.4(1). That section clearly adumbrates that one year has to be counted from the date of publication namely in the Gazette or last of the dates of publication envisaged thereunder excluding the time during which further proceedings were stayed by the High Court. The last date is referred to as the date of the publication of this notification to reckon one year." 15. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samithi v. Makrand Singh & Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 497) the question which Supreme Court considered was whether last publication of the declaration should be taken for reckoning the period of interval between the notification and declaration. It is clear from the decision that the starting date is the date of last publication of the notification, while the ending dates the first publication of the declaration (Publication in lie official Gazette). Supreme Court made the following observations in that decision: "The last date under S.6(2) shall be the date for the purposes hereinafter referred to would be not for computing the period of three years prescribed in clause (i) of the proviso to S.6(1) of the Act, as it was already done, but for purposes to be followed thereafter. Otherwise the language would have been 'hereinbefore done'. Sub-s.(2) as such did not prescribe any limitation within which the declaration under S.6(1) for other steps hereinafter to be taken, in otherwords, the steps to be taken thereafter in making the award under S.11 or in computation prescribed in S.11-A." We are now told that the above issue has been referred to a Larger Bench of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in S.H. Rangappa v. State of Karnataka (1998 (5) SCC 509). It is useful to reproduce the order of reference: "The short question involved in this SLP is whether notification under S.6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was made within the requisite period of one year from the date of publication of notification under S.4. Notification under S.4 was last published on 23.2.1988. There is no dispute between the parties that this is the starling point for limitation. Declaration under S.6 was signed by the Secretary on 22.2.1989 but it was gazetted On 9.3.1989. Notification under S.4 was last published on 23.2.1988. There is no dispute between the parties that this is the starling point for limitation. Declaration under S.6 was signed by the Secretary on 22.2.1989 but it was gazetted On 9.3.1989. Now the short question is what is the date of making of this declaration under S.6. If 22-2-1989 is the date taken for that purpose, it would obviously be wide in one year from the publication of S.4 notification. But if the date of making of the declaration of the notification is 9.3.1989, it is obviously beyond one year. There are two judgments of two Judge Benches of this Court that have taken the view Thai mere signing of the notification under S.6 by the Secretary without gazeting it would not be the relevant date for the purpose of computing period of limitation for issuance of S.6 notification. These two decisions are rendered in Krishl Utpadan Maruit Samithi v. Makrand Singh and Eugenia Misquita v. State o fGoa. However our attention was invited to a judgment rendered by four learned judges of this Court reported in KhadimHussainv. State of UP. The decision of the Bench of four learned judges of this Court seems to have taken a view which is contrary to the views propounded by decisions of two learned Judge Benches afore said. Under Unease circumstances, we deem it fit to direct that this SLP may be placed before a Bench of three learned judges for taking appropriate decisions in disconnection. The office to place dismantler before appropriate larger Bench after obtaining orders from Hon'ble Chief Justice of India". 23. Learned Government Pleader relied on a four judge decision of the Supreme Court in Khadim Hussain v. State of U.P. (1976 (1) SCC 843), as far as the question involved in this case is concerned. It is useful to extract the gist of paragraphs 25 and 26 of the above judgment: "That the declaration mentioned in S.6(1) differs from its notification is shown by the fact that it has to be signed by a Secretary or odder officer duly authorised. The declaration is in the form of an order. The notification is its publication and proof of its existence. The declaration is in the form of an order. The notification is its publication and proof of its existence. The object of the notification under S.6 is to ensure that the Government is duly satisfied, after an enquiry at which parties concerned are heard, that the land under consideration is really needed for a public purpose and that the declaration is to operate as conclusive evidence to show that this is so. The collusiveness of this declaration cannot be questioned anywhere if the procedure dealing with its making has been observed. The notification which takes place under S.6(2) follows and serves only as evidence of the declaration. Under S.4(2) of the Amendment Act, it is the declaration which has to take place within two years of the expiry of the commencement of the ordinance which came into force on January 20, 1967. In fact, S.4(2) of the Amendment Act of 1967 itself makes a distinction between a 'declaration' under S.6 and its 'notification' under S.4 of the principal Act. It does not say that nonotification under S.6 of the principal Act aui take place beyond the time fixed. The prohibition is confined to declarations made beyond the specified period." From the above judgment, it is seen that the date of publication of the declaration is not the relevant date to be taken into account for the purpose of computing the period of one year prescribed in the proviso to S.6(1) of the Act, which is the consistent view taken by this Court as per the judgments cited above. 24. The contention of learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that the scheme is unviable, unworkable and if may not be beneficial to the public at large cannot be countenanced. This Court, by order dated 30.7.1997 in CMP 3516 of 1997 in W.A. 553 of 1997, has directed the monitoring committee to consider the suggestions of Dr. T.V. Jacob also, who is one of the parties to the proceedings. This Court has ordered to place the report before it on 12.8.1997. Pursuant to the above direction, the committee considered the suggestions made by Dr. T.V. Jacob. He was also heard and thereafter the committee submitted its report before this Court, which is marked as Ext. R3(d). A perusal of Ext. This Court has ordered to place the report before it on 12.8.1997. Pursuant to the above direction, the committee considered the suggestions made by Dr. T.V. Jacob. He was also heard and thereafter the committee submitted its report before this Court, which is marked as Ext. R3(d). A perusal of Ext. R3(d) would clearly show that the committee had unanimously decided to submit the following to this Court by way of general conclusions: 1.43.5 MLD of additional water can be brought to Cochin by optimizing the existing system without furdier land acquisition at a cost of about Rs. 11 crores provided OD A design is accepted. However, Water Authority consultant disagrees wide the CR value of the design. The objections raised by Kerala Water Authority are due to the following reasons: a) The CR value used in the design is incorrect according to them, and therefore, the water availability will be much below the designed level; b) Booster station at Kalamassery involves substantial recurring costs; c) The work is an optimization of the existing system and therefore its implementation requires shutdowns for the existing water supply atleast partially; and d) Optimization of the existing system alone will not be sufficient to meet lie future water supply demand of Cochin and therefore, a new project is to be implemented in any case. However, the Kerala Water Authority is willing to undertake the works relating to the improvement of pumping system and electrical system wide ODA assistance, if provided. 2. In addition anodize 35 MLD of water can be brought to Kalamassery drought the proposed 24" additional pipeline. The extent of land acquisition for dais purpose from Aluva to Kalamassery and the cost have to be worked out as these details are not available at present. Thus the total water that can be brought at present is 78.5 MLD by these two methods. 3. The existing availability of water is 170 MLD. There is severe shortage of water in the western part of Kochi, Kochi City and Vypeen areas. By this scheme, an additional 7 8 MLD of water can be made available, though Kerala Water Authority Officials are not in agreement with this for reasons stated earlier. However, this is not a long term solution because the total water requirement is 500 MLD in 2011 AD and to satisfy this long term requirement, no proposal is available with Dr. T.V. Jacob. However, this is not a long term solution because the total water requirement is 500 MLD in 2011 AD and to satisfy this long term requirement, no proposal is available with Dr. T.V. Jacob. He opined that his optimization scheme is not an alternative to HUDCO project, but on ly a strategy to increase the water availability in Kochi by effecting certain improvements in the existing system. 4. In view of the above facts, the committee submits before the Hon'ble Court that no viable alternative acceptable to all without upsetting the time schedule and with substantial reduction in costs have been revealed by Dr. T.V. Jacob to the committee." It is thus clear from the above report of the committee that the present scheme is the only viable scheme to solve the drinking water scarcity in the areas of Cochin City, Western Kochi and Vypeen areas. 25. Much argument was advanced on the compensation payable. According to learned counsel for the petitioners that the authorities will not fix the due compensation payable to the land owners. We are unable to agree with the said contention. It is always open to the land owners to agitate the matter further before the civil forum by requesting the Land Acquisition Officer to refer the matter to the civil court under S.18 for a reference. It is always open to the petitioners to substantiate their claim for higher compensation by placing the necessary documents before the Land Acquisition Officer as well as before the civil court. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that there will be undue delay in payment of compensation because of the land acquisition proceedings and the land owners will not only be deprived of their value of land holdings but also deny the use of the compensation amount if it is not paid in time. This contention has no force. Under the Act, payment of interest is provided and if there is any delay, the authorities are liable to pay interest on the compensation amount. The said apprehension, in our opinion, has no merit. According to the respondents, in all cases where advance possession of land was taken covered by Exts. P2 and P2(a ) notification, 80% of the compensation was made and the Water Authority has already deposited Rs. 6 crores towards the expenses for land acquisition and Rs. 5.5 crores have already been spent. According to the respondents, in all cases where advance possession of land was taken covered by Exts. P2 and P2(a ) notification, 80% of the compensation was made and the Water Authority has already deposited Rs. 6 crores towards the expenses for land acquisition and Rs. 5.5 crores have already been spent. Certain paper reports have been filed by the petitioners to highlight their contention. According to the respondents, those paper reports do not show the true state of affairs and, therefore, there is no purpose in relying on them. We agree with the above submission made by learned counsel for the respondents. 26. Another contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that they have vested right to adequate housing facility when their existing house is taken away. The Act, in our opinion, does not envisage such a situation. In Chameli Singh & Ors. v. State of UP & Ors. (1996 (2) SCC 549- by three judges) the Supreme Court has held that the State is entitled to compulsorily acquire lands for public purposes in exercise of its power of eminent domain. Their Lordships also held that such a measure by the State does not amount to deprivation of right to livelihood and that the individual's right of an owner must yield place to the larger public purpose. The Supreme Court also held in that case that the acquisition of land for providing houses to delis, tribes and poor, the invocation of the urgency clause dispensing with enquiry under S.5 A is proper and that the urgency would continue to subsist till their housing problem is solved. The Supreme Court further held that for invocation of the urgency clause, the opinion of the appropriate Government is entitled to great weight unless vitiated by malafides or colourable exercise of power. We are of the opinion that such a contention has not been substantiated at all. In the instant case, the compulsory acquisition of land is resorted to in public interest. Providing of water to the people of Vypeen Islands and also to the people who live in Cochin area is a primary responsibility of the State and to discharge that obligation and duty, the acquisition in question is being done by the State of Kerala. In New -Reviera Co-op. Providing of water to the people of Vypeen Islands and also to the people who live in Cochin area is a primary responsibility of the State and to discharge that obligation and duty, the acquisition in question is being done by the State of Kerala. In New -Reviera Co-op. Housing Society and Ann v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (1996 (1) SCC 731- by two judges) the Supreme Court has taken view that the acquisition of land by the State exercising its power of eminent domain does not offend right to livelihood or right to shelter or dignity and that the State is not obliged to provide alternate site. One of us (K. Narayana Kurup, J.) while considering a similar contention for rehabilitation of traders in Saju Thomas v. State of Kerala & Ors. (1995 (2) KLJ 84) held as follows: "The declared public purpose is the widening of a public road. Petitioner does not oppose acquisition of his land for widening of the road. His grievance is against the proposal for acquisition of additional land owned by him for accommodating other shop owners who are likely to be affected adversely by the widening of the road which according to the petitioner, cannot be construed as a public purpose. This contention of the petitioner finds ample support in the decision referred to above (1992 (1) KLT 268) wherein it has been held that the proposal to accommodate the displaced traders in the shopping centre to be constructed for which the land was acquired would not become the purpose of acquisition. The Division Bench said: "We understand by the expression "purpose of acquisition' as the main or dominant purpose and not the subsidiary or incidental or ancillary use to which the acquired land may be put'. Viewed in the above perspective, I have no hesitation in holding that the proposal for rehabilitation of the traders is only an ancillary matter and does not become the purpose of acquisition." 27. We have already noticed that Exts. P2 and P2(a ) are not barred by limitation as urged by learned counsel for the petitioners. We have already referred to the various dates of publication, signing of the declaration etc. We are of the opinion that the contentions raised in the Original Petitions are devoid of merits in the light of the legal position and factual aspects of the matter. We have already referred to the various dates of publication, signing of the declaration etc. We are of the opinion that the contentions raised in the Original Petitions are devoid of merits in the light of the legal position and factual aspects of the matter. According to the respondents, the land value has been properly fixed and deposited and if the petitioners are aggrieved by the said fixation of compensation it is always open to them to seek for a reference under S.18 of the Act before the civil court. 28. The next contention relates to the proposal of re-settlement of the evictees. It is stated in the counter affidavit that the facility of rehabilitation is extended only to persons whose households are acquired in full having no sufficient land remaining there for construction of a new house. As a matter of fact, such a request was made by the District Collect for re-settlement for the smooth acquisition of land so as to complete the scheme at the earliest. As rightly pointed out by the learned Government Pleader, the very purpose has been defeated by the continuous obstruction caused by the land owners at the initial stage of survey and at other stages followed thereto. It is seen from the counter affidavit of the State that the land owners whose houses are to be acquired, the government issued GO (RT)63/99/IRD dated 14.1.1999 according sanction to the Managing Director of the Kerala Water Authority to allow the land owners from the alignment of pipeline in connection with the acquisition of land for Kochi Water Supply Scheme to dismantle and take away their building materials at concessional rates on the conditions specified in the Government Order. The conditions are as follows: 1. The amount to be paid by the purchaser is 5 % of the valuation certificate for buildings of value upto Rs. 30,000/- and 15% for building of value above Rs. 30,000/- plus applicable taxes; 2.The respective evictees should apply through Special Tahsildar (LA); 3. For SC/ST evictees no amount need to be remitted. They should furnish a certificate from the Special Tahsildar (LA) as proof for SC/ST; and 4. Dismanding and taking away of the building should be over wi thin 15 days after taking over possession." 29. 30,000/- plus applicable taxes; 2.The respective evictees should apply through Special Tahsildar (LA); 3. For SC/ST evictees no amount need to be remitted. They should furnish a certificate from the Special Tahsildar (LA) as proof for SC/ST; and 4. Dismanding and taking away of the building should be over wi thin 15 days after taking over possession." 29. The Government as per GO(Rt) 104/99/IRD dated 27.1.1999 has given approval to the Managing Director of the Kerala Water Authority to enter into agreement within M/s. Pioneer Polyfed for the supply and laying of 630 mm OD HDPE pipes from Vaduthala to Vypeen for the Adhoc Augmentation of Kochi Water Supply Scheme. The Government, as per GO(Rt) 103/99/IRD dated 27.1.1999 has further conveyed its approval to the Managing Director to enter into agreement with M/s. T.O. Abraham & Co. for the work of laying 800 mm spirally welded steel pipe with cement lining from Pookkattupady to Vaduthala for the Adhoc Augmentation of Kochi Water Supply Scheme. The National High Way Authorities have also no objection in laying the pipelines along the mutually agreed alignment. 30. Mr. Babu Varghese, learned Standing Counsel for Kerala Water Authority at the time of hearing, invited our attention to the various steps taken by the Water Authority to meet the scarcity of drinking water in Kochi and surrounding areas. According to him, the HUDCO Adhoc Augmentation Scheme is in progress and it is monitored by a committee constituted by a Division Bench of this Court and proceed with the said scheme as directed by this Court in OP 2155 of 1997 and batch. We have already referred to the report submitted by the committee and the order passed by this Court. A perusal of the entire records and the Scheme would show that the Water Authority has formulated a workable scheme for augmenting the existing water supply system in Kochi. The project is entirely based on a detailed sophisticated study conducted between 1988 and 1991 by M/s. Tata Consulting Engineers, Mumbai. The Scheme is expected to solve scarcity of water in Cochin Corporation area. The State Government is implementing projects to provide drinking water to all by 2000 AD and Water Authority is the Chief Organisation fully involved in the project. It is also submitted that norms formulated by the Central Public Health Environment Organisation have been strictly followed while schemes are executed. The State Government is implementing projects to provide drinking water to all by 2000 AD and Water Authority is the Chief Organisation fully involved in the project. It is also submitted that norms formulated by the Central Public Health Environment Organisation have been strictly followed while schemes are executed. The Water Authority is in possession of the drawing of works executed by the authority. They have already taken steps with the help of the Cochin Corporation to replace the damaged pipelines. It is submitted that the project will certainly benefit lakhs of people and it requires the entire extent of land now notified. As already submitted, the Original Petitions filed against Ext. P2 and P2(a ) have already been dismissed by this Court. Mr. Babu Varghese also submitted that as far as S.4(1) notification is concerned, the last date of such publication is the relevant date of publication of the notification. As far as S.6(1) declaration is concerned, as per the decision of the Supreme Court in Khadim Hussain's case ((1976) 1 SCC 843), signing the declaration by the authorised Revenue Officer is the relevant date. Thus, he would submit that as per the settled position of law, declaration under S.6(1) in all the four villages of Aluva East, Aluva West, Thrikkakara North, Vazhakkala and Edappally South were published within the stipulated time. Learned Standing Counsel would submit that the Water Authority has so far placed Rs. 6 crores at the disposal of the Special Tahsildar (LA) to be paid as compensation to land owners and not Rs. 50 lakhs as stated by the petitioners. He has also furnished the details of the land taken over by the Water Authority The details are as follows: Regarding the contention of Mr. Sankara Menon that the rate fixed by the Land Acquisition Authorities are ridiculously low, it is submitted that 233 plots are already taken over by the Water Authority, which is nearly 40% of the total requirement and the parties have received the compensation. So far, 237 structures are valued as per the existing rules and a sum of Rs. 6 crores has been placed at the disposal of the land acquisition authorities and they have so far disbursed Rs. 4.78 crores as compensation to the evictees. So far, 237 structures are valued as per the existing rules and a sum of Rs. 6 crores has been placed at the disposal of the land acquisition authorities and they have so far disbursed Rs. 4.78 crores as compensation to the evictees. According to learned counsel for the Water Authority, this project is not a bureaucratic fantasy, but is a realistic, scientifically designed project to quench the thirst of lakhs of people. As ground water in most of the districts is seldom potable, people have no option but to depend entirely on piped water supply system alone. Since the present supply is inadequate to meet the demand, Kerala Water Authority has to face the wrath of the public in the form of violent agitation, blockade etc. It is also to be noticed that an Original Petition' (No.12818 of 1996) filed by few land owners challenging the very same land acquisition proceedings was dismissed by the learned single judge of this Court on 18.3.1997, which was confirmed by a Division Bench in W.A. 751 of 1997 on 2.5.1997. The Special Leave Petition filed by the petitioners against the judgment in W.A. 75 lof 1997 was also dismissed by the Supreme Court on 20.3.1998. 31. On an anxious consideration of the entire materials placed before us in the form of pleadings, arguments by respective counsel and all the judgments cited by either side, we are of the opinion that none of the grounds raised by the petitioners in the respective petitions merit any consideration. There are absolutely no merit in the Writ Petitions. They are liable to be dismissed. In the result, the Original Petitions and Writ Appeals are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.