JUDGMENT This Second Appeal by the defendant-Municipal Council, Neemuch, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 3.5.1997 passed in 1st Appeal No. 11A/90, in affirmance of the judgment and decree dated 22.12.1989 passed by Civil Judge, Class II, Neemuch in Civil Suit No. 392A/88, decreeing suit of plaintiff-respondent No. 1 for promotion to the post of Sub-Inspector Revenue. Appellant was appointed on the post of Nakedar in Municipality, Neemuch on 28.1.1964 and was confirmed on that post on 8.6.1967. On 24.12.1968 he was removed from the post on certain charges. However, the order of removal was set-aside by Civil Court vide its judgment dated 14.12.1971 passed in Civil Suit No. 13A/1971. A decree of the trial Court was affirmed in 1st Appeal as also in Second Appeal and the plaintiff was accordingly reinstated on the post of Nakedar. In the meantime, one Ramchand Sharma who was working on the post of Sub-Inspector Revenue expired. As against this vacancy, the plaintiff was given temporary current charge of the post of Revenue Sub-Inspector until some regular appointment was made on that post. The appellant-Municipality vide its order dated 30.4.1985, while promoting respondents-defendants No. 3 to 5 namely Rajmal, Paras ram and Bherumal from the post of Nakedar to that of Sub-Inspector Revenue, reverted the plaintiff to his substantive post of Nakedar. The plaintiff there-upon filed suit challenging his reversion and also claiming promotion to the post of Revenue Sub-Inspector. According to him, he was senior to respondents No. 3 to 5 and he could not have been, therefore, reverted or superseded in the matter of promotion. The suit was resisted by the appellant/Municipality alone. The other defendants (respondents No. 3 to 5) remained ex-parte in the trial Court. It was contended on behalf of the appellant-defendant that the plaintiff had no right to the post of Revenue Sub- Inspector and that his appointment to the said post was purely temporary made on adapt basis. Since he was not selected for promotion by the District Selection Committee, he could not be promoted. Trial Court held that although the appointment of the plaintiff under the order dated 11.12.1984 was purely temporary made by way of stop gap arrangement. The plaintiff was entitled to promotion, even otherwise being senior to respondents No. 3 to 5. On this finding, the suit of the plaintiff was decreed. Trial Court held that although the appointment of the plaintiff under the order dated 11.12.1984 was purely temporary made by way of stop gap arrangement. The plaintiff was entitled to promotion, even otherwise being senior to respondents No. 3 to 5. On this finding, the suit of the plaintiff was decreed. In Ist Appeal, the decree of the trial Court has been affirmed thus giving rise to the Second Appeal which has been admitted on following substantial questions of law : "1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case no direction for promotion of respondent No. 1 to the post of Revenue Sub-Inspector could legally be made even when he has found unfit for promotion by the DPC ? and 2. Whether the decree impugned is contrary to law ?". I have heard Shri V.P. Khare, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri B.K. Joshi, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. The impugned decree is assailed by the appellant mainly on the ground that since the Selection Committee did not find the plaintiff fit for promotion, no direction could legally be given for his promotion. It was, further, contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that in any case the Court could have given direction only for consideration of the case of the plaintiff for promotion and no decree directing promotion straight-way could legally be passed. As regards the first part of the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, I find absolutely no averment in the W.S., to the effect that the case of the plaintiff was considered for promotion by the DPC and that he was not found it. Certainly, when a promotion is to be made on the basis of seniority-cum-merit, a person does not have any right to promotion merely on the basis of seniority, but he has certainly right to be considered for promotion. In the instant case, there is nothing on record to show that name of the applicant was considered for promotion when persons junior to him were considered and promoted to the post of Revenue Sub-Inspector. Finding of the two Courts below in this behalf cannot be, therefore, interfered with. However, as already pointed out, it was not open for the Courts below to have issued direction for promotion straight-way. Finding of the two Courts below in this behalf cannot be, therefore, interfered with. However, as already pointed out, it was not open for the Courts below to have issued direction for promotion straight-way. The Courts can only direct the appropriate authorities to consider the case of the plaintiff for promotion and in case he is found fit for promotion, to promote him from the date on which a person immediately junior to him was promoted. This appeal thus deserves to be allowed in part and the decree impugned is liable to be modified to the extent indicated above. Accordingly I allow the appeal in part and direct the appellant/Municipality to consider the case of the plaintiff for promotion and in case is found fit for promotion, he shall be promoted with effect from the date on which person immediately junior to him was promoted, with all consequential benefits. Since this case has already taken pretty long period, the appellant is expected to take appropriate decision in the matter within three months from the date of communication of this order. The decree impugned accordingly stands modified and the appeal is disposed of, but without any order as to costs.