Mathew, J.- The Food Inspector, Kottarakkara Panchayat, filed a complaint charging the accused with an offence punishable under section 16 (1)(a) read with section 7(1) of the Prevention of of Food Adulteration Act, (XXXVII of 1954) hereinafter referred to as the Act. The case against the accused was as follows: P.W. 1, the Food Inspector, went to the shop of the accused at Kottarakkara on 19th May, 1965 and purchased 21 packets of Asafoetida exhibited for sale in the shop. P.W. 1 packed them in three separate packets. He sent one packet to the Public Analyst for chemical analysis, gave another to the accused and retained the third with him. Exhibit P-1 is the mahazar prepared by him. Exhibit P-6 is the certificate of he Public Analyst. It states that on analysis the sample was found to contain wheat, starch and tapioca powder and also non-permitted coaltar dye, and so it was adulterated. On the basis of Exhibit P-6, P.W. 1 filed the complaint. The learned Magistrate found that although the asafoetida was adluterated the accused was protected by Exhibit D-1 warranty given by the seller. The learned Magistrate, therefore, acquitted the accused. The State has filed the appeal against the order of acquittal. The only point for consideration is whether Exhibit D-1 warranty would exonerate the accused from criminal liability. Section 19(2) of the Act runs as follows: "A vendor shall not be deemed to have committed an offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or misbranded article of food if he proves- (a) that he purchased the article of food- (a) in a case where a licence is prescribed for the sale thereof, from a duly licensed manufacturer distributor or dealer; (ii) in any other case, from any manufacturer, distributor or dealer, with a written warranty in the prescribed form; and (b) that the article of food while in his possession was properly stored and that he sold it in the same state as he purchased it.” Rule 12-A of the rules framed under the Act reads: “Every trader selling an article of food to a vendor shall, if the vendor so requires deliver to the vendor a warranty to Form VI-A: Provided that no warranty in such form shall be necessary if the label on the article of food or the cash memo. delivered by the trader to the vendor in respect of that article contains a warranty certifying that the food contained in the package or container or mentioned in the cash memo. is the same in nature, substance and quality as demanded by the vendor.” The prescribed form is Form VI-A in Appendix A to the Rules. The proviso to the rule would show that it is not necessary that the vendor should obtain a warranty in Form VI-A. The object of the rule making authority in introducing the proviso was to dispense with the necessity of obtaining the warranty in Form VI-A, if there is a warranty in the label or the cash memo. certifying that the article of food contained in the package or mentioned in the memo is the same in nature, substance and quality as demanded by the vendor. The contention of the accused was that Exhibit D-1 cash memo. issued by the seller contained such a warranty. The cash memo. states that “quality is up to the mark”, and on the packets of asafoetida purchased there is the statement “manamum gunamum niragna misky”(original in malayalam). Counsel for the accused submitted that the requirement of the proviso to rule 12-A is satisfied in the case because quality of the article of food has been warranted as up to the mark in the cash memo. He said that it is not necessary that cash memo. or label should contain the words”nature, substance and quality”as required by the proviso but that it is enough if the quality of the article is described as up to the mark. Reference was made to the meaning of the words ‘mark’ ana ‘quality’, as given in the Webster’s Revised Dictionary: “mark .......................... 2. Specifically: (a) A character or device put on an article of merchandise by the maker to show by whom it was made: a trade mark, (b) A character (usually a cross) made as a substitute for a signature by one who cannot write.......... ......... 8. Limit or standard of action or fact; as, to be within the mark; to come up to the mark.” “quality...................... I. The condition of being of such and such a sort as distinguished from others; nature or character relatively considered, as of goods; character; sort; rank.” Counsel relied upon certain English decisions to show that label or cash memo. 8. Limit or standard of action or fact; as, to be within the mark; to come up to the mark.” “quality...................... I. The condition of being of such and such a sort as distinguished from others; nature or character relatively considered, as of goods; character; sort; rank.” Counsel relied upon certain English decisions to show that label or cash memo. need not contain the words”nature, substance and quality”and that it would be sufficient if words importing the same idea are used. We doubt whether English precedents have much value in view of the difference in the wording of the sect on under which those rulings were rendered. Before dealing with the rulings, we will read section 25 of the English Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875: “If the defendant in any prosecution under this Act prove to the satisfaction of the Justices or Court that he had purchased the article in question as the same in nature, substance, and quality as demanded of him by the prosecutor, and with a written warranty to that effect, that he had no reason to believe at the time when he sold it that the article was otherwise, and that he sold it in the same state as when he purchased it, he shall be discharged from the prosecution, but shall be liable to pay the costs incurred by the prosecutor, unless he shall have given due notice to him that he will rely on the above”defence”. In Laidlaw v. Wilson1, a firm of lard manufacturers entered into a written contract on 17th December, 1892, for the sale of lard to the respondent in the following terms:”We have this day sold to you three tons Kilvert’s pure lard for delivery to end of January, 1893.” On 23rd December, a parcel of lard was consigned to the respondent by the said manufacturers and delivered to him under the said contract The respondent subsequently sold a portion of such parcel to the appellant as lard. Upon analysis it turned out to be adulterated. The respondent had sold it bona fide and in the same state as it was in when he bought it. Upon analysis it turned out to be adulterated. The respondent had sold it bona fide and in the same state as it was in when he bought it. On an information against the respondent for having, contrary to the provisions of the Sale of Good and Drugs Act, 1875, sold the lard not being of the nature, substance and quality demanded by the appellant, the Court held that the contract of 17th December, contained a sufficient written warranty of purity in respect of the specific parcel consigned on 23rd December, to satisfy section 25 of the Act, and that the respondent was entitled to be discharged from the prosecution. In the course of the judgment it was observed: "It is true that the contract does not in terms say that the purity of the lard is warranted, but in my judgment it is necessary that the word " warranted " should be actually used. To my mind it is enough if the language of the document imports a warranty, and shows an intention on the part of the vendor to warrant..............................................and at page 78 it is said: ".................................. The word ‘pure’ in the contract of 17th December, amounts to an agreement as an essential part of the contract that the lard supplied should be pure, and that is, in my opinion, a sufficient warranty of its purity within the meaning of the section." In Farmers and Cleveland Dairy Company (Ltd.) v. Stevenson1, the appellants before the High Court were convicted of having sold milk to the respondent not of the nature, substance, and quality demanded. They proved that they had bought the milk under a written contract with the producer, by which they were to be supplied with a certain quantity daily for six months. The contract contained the following clause, "and the vendor hereby warrants each and every supply of milk delivered, or in course of delivery, or to be delivered by himundcr this contract, to be pure, genuine, and new milk, unadulterated, and with all its cream on". The milk was delivered at a London terminus in cans, to each of which a label was attached stating that it contained such and such a quantity of "warranted genuine new milk with all its cream on". The milk was delivered at a London terminus in cans, to each of which a label was attached stating that it contained such and such a quantity of "warranted genuine new milk with all its cream on". The Court held that there was a sufficient warranty on the part of the producer to entitle the appellants to the protection afforded to them by section 25 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, and that the conviction must be quashed. In Robertson v. Harris2, upon the hearing of an information against the respondent for having contrary to the provisions of the Act, sold on 15th December, 1899, certain milk to the appellant which was not; of the nature, substance and quality demanded of him by the appellant, the respondent relied on an agreement in writing dated 20th January, 1899, by which a farmer agreed to sell to the respondent 1000 gallons of milk weekly, "the milk to be pure new milk". The Court held that, even if the agreement amounted to a warranty within the meaning of section 25, there must be some evidence in writing to show that the particular milk sold to the appellant was purchased with that warranty, and that in the absence of that evidence the agreement afforded no defence to the respondent. In Plowright, v. Burrell3, the appellant before the Court, being charged under the Sale of Food and Durgs Act with selling milk that was not of the nature, substance, and quality of the article as demanded by the purchaser, provide that the milk had been bought of him from a company under a written agreement and had beensold by him in the same state as when it was purchased. The agreement provided that "the company hereby warrants each and every consignment of milk delivered under this contract to be pure genuine new milk with all its cream according to the conditions of the Food and Drugs Act", and that no responsibility is taken by the company after delivery other than under the Food and Drugs Act, and that for all other purposes the buyer must satisfy himself at the time of delivery that the milk was pure, and that he should be entitled to make any claim against the company for damages in respect of milk accepted by him. The Court held that the agreement constituted a good warranty within section 25 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, and that the appellant was, therefore, entitled to be discharged from the prosecution. In Lindsay v. Rook1, the appellant before the High Court bought a cask of vinegar from G. & Co., Limited. The cask had on it a printed label bearing the words, “Vinegar warranted unadulterated-G & Co., Limited, Cumberland Market, London;” and the vinegar was invoiced to the appellant as “G’s vinegar”: The Court held that there was a sufficient written warranty to entitle the appellant to the protection afforded her by section 25 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875. In Blaydon Co-operative Society v. Young2, on an information before Justice, under section 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, for selling an article of food not of the nature, substance, and quality demanded, the defendants relied on a written warranty from their vendor. The article demanded was blackberry jelly, and there was a label on the jar in which it was sold with the words “Finest Quality Blackberry Jelly. Prepared from the choicest fruit of the season and fruit juice”, The Analyst certified that the sample contained at least 2 per. cent of apple pulp and he stated in evidence that he believed that the sample consisted of two-thirds apple and one-third blackberry. Evidence was given for the defendants that the jelly was sold as it was purchased and that they had no reason to believe it to be otherwise than as demanded. The Justices, however, found that the defendant were aware that the contents of the jar were not of the nature, substance, and quality demanded, and that they had reason to believe that the article was otherwise than as demanded when they sold it: It was held that except for the label there was no evidence of the defendants’ knowledge of the contents of the jar, and that the label was not sufficient evidence to support the finding of the Justices that the defendants had reason to believe that the article was otherwise than as demanded; and therefore that the conviction must be quashed, although had the Justices found merely that they were not satisfied as to the defendants’ belief that the article was in accordance with the warranty the conviction might have been supported. These rulings may go to show that it is not essential under the English Act to mention the words, “nature, substance, quality” in the warranty. The words in section 25 of the English Act “with a warranty to that effect” may be noted in this context. But, so far as the case at hand is concerned, we have to go by the wording of section 19(2) of the Act, which insists upon a “warranty in the prescribed form”. The proviso to rule 12-A states that the warranty must certify that the food contained in the package or container or mentioned in the cash memo. is the same in “nature, substance, and quality”, as demanded by the vendor. What the rule-making authority had done by the proviso is to relax the rigour of the rule insisting upon obtaining a warranty by the vendor in Form VI-A. But, that would not dispense with the necessity of obtaining a warranty certifying that the articles of food sold is the same in nature, substance and quality as demanded by the vendor. The idea behind the proviso is only to save the vendor from the inconvenience of obtaining a separate warranty in Form VI-A but that does not mean that the warran:y on the label or in the cash memo. need not certify that food contained in the package or mentioned in the cash memo. is the same in nature, substance and quality as demanded by the vendor. It was argued that when the quality of an article of food is stated in the cash memo. or label to be up to the mark, it implies that the nature, substance and quality of the article is up to the prescribed standard. That the rule making authority intended different connotations for the words ‘nature’, ‘substance’ and ‘quality’ is clear from their collocation. If the word ‘quality’ would connote the same idea as the word ‘substance’ or ‘nature’, why there is the collocation of these words in the rule? The word ‘quality’ alone need have been used if distinct or different ideas were not intended to be conveyed by the words ‘nature’ and ‘substance’. Therefore, we think that the word ‘quality’ cannot convey the idea, denoted by ‘nature’ or ‘substance’. The word ‘quality’ alone need have been used if distinct or different ideas were not intended to be conveyed by the words ‘nature’ and ‘substance’. Therefore, we think that the word ‘quality’ cannot convey the idea, denoted by ‘nature’ or ‘substance’. It is not open to the Court to say that when quality alone was certified to be up to the mark that it would imply that the ‘nature’ or ‘substance’ of the article was warranted to be the same as demanded by the vendor. As to what is ‘substance’ and what is ‘quality’, see Aristotle on “Categories”, translated by E. M. Edghill in “The Basic Works of Aristotle”, page 7. A philosophical speculation on this aspect of the matter is quite unnecessary as the rule-making authority has made a distinction among the words ‘nature, ‘substance’, and ‘quality’. Counsel for the appellant referred to the decision in Baborally Sardar v. Corporation of Calcutta1, and said that the warranty must be in the form as required by rule 12-A and that the words ‘nature, substance and quality’, are absolutely essential in a warranty. We do not think that the Supreme Court laid down any such proposition in that case. That case was concerned with the particular warranty on the label of the condensed milk tin in question in that case and does not throw much light upon the question now in controversy. We do not think that the statement on the labels extracted above was intended as a warranty by the seller nor can we hold that the statement satisfies the requirement of a warranty as mentioned in the proviso to rule 12-A. As the asafoetida in question was found to be adulterated and as the accused is not protected by Exhibit D-1 warranty, we hold the accused guilty. We, therefore, set aside the order of acquittal and convict the accused of the offence under section 16(1)(a) read with section 7(1) of the Act. On the question of sentence, it was argued that the Court should exercise its discretion under the 2nd proviso to section 16(1)(f) and dispense with a sentence of imprisonment in view of the fact that the accused is suffering from coronary thrombosis. On the question of sentence, it was argued that the Court should exercise its discretion under the 2nd proviso to section 16(1)(f) and dispense with a sentence of imprisonment in view of the fact that the accused is suffering from coronary thrombosis. We have considered the question whether it is open to the Court under the proviso to dispense with imprisonment altogether in Crl.R.P.No. 2 of 1967 and there we have arrived at the conclusion that the Court has no option to dispense with it. A copy of the order in Crl.R.P. No. 2 of 1967 will be appended to this judgment. The accused has produced a medical certificate stating that he is suffering from coronary thrombosis. We think, this is sufficient reason for taking a lenient view in the matter of imposing the sentence of imprisonment. We, therefore, sentence the accused to undergo S.I. for seven days and to pay a fine of Rs. 950, and in default of payment to undergo S.I. for 30 days. The appeal is allowed. M.C.M. ----- Appeal allowed; accused convicted.