Santhosh, J.- This is an appeal by Special Leave of this Court filed by the Superintendent, Central Excise, Bangalore, under section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the acquittal of the respondent, who was accused-1 in C.C.No. 1462 of 1965 in the Court of the Second Magistrate, Bangalore. The respondent was charged with having committed an offence under section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962. He was also charged with having violated rule 126-P(2) read with rule 126-H (6) and 126-x(10) of the Defence of India (Amendment) Rules, 1963. The learned Magistrate acquitted the respondent of both the charges. Along with the respondent, in the same trial, accused-2 Nagesh Chandrakant Kalal was also charged with having abetted these two offences by the respondent. Accused-2 pleaded guilty and he was convicted for having abetted the respondent in the commission of the offence under section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962, and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for four months by the learned Magistrate. In this appeal, the correctness and legality of the order of acquittal of the respondent (accused-1) is challenged. The prosecution case, briefly stated, is as follows: The respondent arrived from Bombay by plane at the H.A.L. Airport, Bangalore on 20th February, 1964, at about 5-20 p.m. He was carrying a suit-case and tried to get into a taxi at the Airport. The behaviour of the respondent roused the suspicion of P.W. 1 Kulkarni, who was the Inspector of Central Excise and Customs on vigilance duty. When questioned, the respondent did not give satisfactory answers and the suit-case in his hands was very heavy. P.W. 1 Kulkarni took the respondent to the security room and in the presence of P.W. 2 Vaithesewaran, Traffic Assistant, Indian Airlines Corporation, he searched the suit-case and inside it, in a pillow-cover, 23 pieces of gold each weighing 10 tolas were concealed; 20 other similar pieces of gold were kept in the suit-case wrapped in a Turkey-towel. All these gold pieces had foreign markings. They were seized under the mahazar, Exhibit P-4. Thereafter P.W. 1Kulkarni handed over the respondent and the properties to P.W. 4 Rajadurai, Superintendent of Central Excise. P.W. 4 took the respondent to the office of the Collector of Central Excise and recorded his statement, Exhibit P-6. All these gold pieces had foreign markings. They were seized under the mahazar, Exhibit P-4. Thereafter P.W. 1Kulkarni handed over the respondent and the properties to P.W. 4 Rajadurai, Superintendent of Central Excise. P.W. 4 took the respondent to the office of the Collector of Central Excise and recorded his statement, Exhibit P-6. In Exhibit P-6, the respondent stated that one Gopaldas Kesariwal of Bombay had entrusted the gold pallets to him to be handed over to one Sohanlal Jain at Bangalore. A letter-head containing the address of Sohanlal Jain and his phone number was also given to him. Gopaldas Kesariwal had promised to meet all his expenses to and fro and give him a commission of Rs. 400 for transporting the gold from Bombay to Bangalore. Adjudication proceedings were taken against the respondent by the Collector of Central Excise. On 22nd April, 1965, that is, a year and two months after the seizure, accused-2 appeared in the office of the Collector of Central Excise and presented an affidavit, Exhibit P-14, wherein he stated that on 20th December, 1963, he had given one packet containing gold to the respondent at Bombay, to be handed over to a person in Bangalore. Accused-2 stated that when he gave the packet tothe respondent, he had not told him that the packet contained gold. On the same day, the statement of accused-2 (Exhibit P-15) was recorded by P.W. 5 Rasool, Superintendent of Central Excise. In Exhibit P-15 accused-2 stated that he had tied up in a white paper with a string 43 pieces of gold and given it to the respondent. Accused-2 also admitted that he had told the respondent that the packet contained gold. After the adjudication proceedings were over, as stated earlier, both the accused were prosecuted in the Court of the Second Magistrate, Bangalore. Accused-2 pleaded guilty to the charge of having abetted the offences by respondent and he was convicted by the learned Magistrate. The learned Magistrate did not rely on Exhibit P-6, statement made by the respondent to P.W. 4, Superintendent of Central Excise, as, in his opinion, there were strong circumstances which created doubt with regard to the voluntary nature of the statement. The learned Magistrate did not rely on Exhibit P-6, statement made by the respondent to P.W. 4, Superintendent of Central Excise, as, in his opinion, there were strong circumstances which created doubt with regard to the voluntary nature of the statement. Though the respondent admitted that 43 pieces of gold were seized from his suit-case on 20th February, 1964, at the H.A.L. Airport, Bangalore, the learned Magistrate accepted his plea that he had no knowledge that he was carrying the gold pieces in his suit-case and held that the respondent was not in conscious possession of the gold pieces and was not guilty of the offences with which he was charged, and acquitted him. Sri Keshava Iyengar, learned Central Government Pleader, appearing on behalf of the appellant, has contended that Exhibit P-6 was a voluntary statement made by the respondent and it was not shown that it was got by threat or coercion and the learned Magistrate was wrong in discarding the same. He also argued that even excluding Exhibit P-6, there was overwhelming evidence against the respondent to justify his conviction of the charges framed against him. Sri Keshava Iyengar also stressed the fact that as the respondent has not disputed the seizure of the gold pieces and as they were seized by the Customs authorities under the reasonable belief that they were smuggled goods under section 123 of the Customs Act, the burden of proof is shifted to the respondent to establish that they were not smuggled goods. From the evidence and the facts and circumstances of this case, ho argues, the only inference that can be drawn is that the respondent was in conscious possession of smuggled gold. He contends that the order of the learned Magistrate is manifestly erroneous and there are compelling reasons to set aside the same. Taking first the question whether Exhibit P-6, statement made by the respondent to P.W. 4 Rajadurai, Superintendent of Central Excise, is admissible in evidence and can be used against the respondent, there is no difficulty in holding that Exhibit P-6 is not hit by section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. This Court, in State of Mysore v. Budaku Joti Savant.1, and other cases has consistently held that a statement recorded by a Customs and Central Excise Officer is not hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act. This Court, in State of Mysore v. Budaku Joti Savant.1, and other cases has consistently held that a statement recorded by a Customs and Central Excise Officer is not hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act. When Jeti Savant’s case1, referred to above was taken up in appeal to the Supreme Court their Lordships of the Supreme Court Badaku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore2, affirmed the view of this Court that a statement made to a Customs and Central Excise Officer is not hit by suction 25 of the Evidence Act. The only question for consideration is whether Exhibit P-6 is hit by section 24 of the Evidence Act. In Pyare Lal Bhargava v. The State of Rajasthan3, Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) in the leading case under section 24 of the Evidence Act has laid down that the expression “appears” in section 24 is equivalent to the word “seems”. It imports a lesser degree of probability than proof. The standard of a prudent man is not completely displaced, but the stringent rule of proof is relaxed. Even so, the laxity of proof permitted does not warrant a Court’s opinion based on pure surmise. A prima facie opinion based on evidence and circumstances may be adopted as the standard laid down. To put it in other words, on the evidence and circumstances in a particular case, if it appears to the Court that there was a threat, inducement or promise, though the said fact is not strictly proved, the Court may reject the confession. He has further laid down that the mere existence of the threat, inducement or promise is not enough, but, in the opinion of the Court, the said threat, inducement or promise should be sufficient to cause a reasonable belief in the mind of the accused that by confessing he would got an advantage or avoid an evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. Bearing in mind the principles laid down in the said decision, let us examine whether the opinion expressed by the learned Magistrate is based on any evidence and circumstances from which a prima facie opinion can be formed that the statement is not voluntary and is induced by threat or promise, with reference to the charge against the respondent. Bearing in mind the principles laid down in the said decision, let us examine whether the opinion expressed by the learned Magistrate is based on any evidence and circumstances from which a prima facie opinion can be formed that the statement is not voluntary and is induced by threat or promise, with reference to the charge against the respondent. P.W. 1 Kulkarni, Deputy Superintendent of Central Excise and P.W. 4 Rajadurai, Superintendent of Central Excise, have spoken to the recording of Exhibit P-6. They have both denied that any threat, inducement or promise was held out to the respondent when Exhibit P-6 was recorded. It is interesting to note the different suggestions made on behalf of the respondent at different stages of the case to different persons. The suggestion made to P.W. 1 Kulkarni was that the interrogation of the respondent went on till early morning and that there was an earlier statement made by the respondent which was torn. Later, when P.W. ,4 Rajadurai was examined, the suggestion made to him was that he made the respondent stand throughout the night and did not allow him to sleep and being disgusted, the respondent agreed to sign whatever was written. When questioned under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, about Exhibit P-6, the respondent stated that P.W. 4 Rajadurai got prepared a statement and forcibly took his signature and that he was also threatened that he would be hammered if he did not sign. Hence, under coercion and threat he signed. In paragraph 6 of his written statement, filed in the case the respondent has stated as follows: "* * * Being tortured for the full night the accused had no other go except to sign on the dotted line" * * *" From what is stated above, it is clear that the respondent had no definite case but went on making random allegations at different stages. The learned Magistrate seems to have equated the statement recorded under -section 24 of the Evidence Act with a confession recorded by a Magistrate under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code. He observes that the Excise authorities should not have questioned the respondent during the night but should have given him time to reflect and must have recorded his statement next morning. He observes that the Excise authorities should not have questioned the respondent during the night but should have given him time to reflect and must have recorded his statement next morning. He was also of the opinion that the Excise Officer ought to have explained to the respondent the serious consequences that would follow if he gave a statement implicating himself and should have given him time to think over the matter; since the respondent was a graduate, the learned Magistrate also thought, the respondent should have been asked to write out the statement in his own hand. One of the reasons given by the learned Magistrate for not acting on Exhibit P-6 is that the respondent was produced before the Magistrate only on the next evening at 7 p.m. The evidence of P.W. 1 Kulkarni and P.W. 4 Rajadurai indicates that the interrogation and the recording of the statement took about an hour on the night of 20th February, 1964. Because the statement was long, the learned Magistrate was of the view that it must have taken at least two hours. The learned Magistrate himself observes that the recording of the statement must have been completed by midnight. If the statement was completed by mid-night, the fact that the respondent was produced before the Magistrate on the evening, of the next day will have no relevance. It is obvious that the Central Excise Officers must have tried their best the next day to trace through the respondent, the person who was the consignee of the gold at Bangalore. Apart from the various different suggestions made at different stages of the case which were all denied by P.W. 1 Kulkarni and P.W. 4 Rajadurai, there does not seem to be any evidence or circumstance from which it is possible to say that Exhibit P-6 was got by inducement, threat or promise from the respondent. Nor is there any material to show that any threat, inducement or promise was held out which was sufficient to cause reasonable belief in the mind of the respondent that he would get, by confessing, advantage- or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him, as is laid down in Pyare Lal Bhargava v. The State Of Rajasthan1, referred to above. We are therefore of opinion that Exhibit P-6 is not hit by section 24 of the Evidence Act and the learned Magistrate was wrong in rejecting Exhibit P-6. If Exhibit P-6 can be relied on against respondent, it clearly shows that the respondent knowingly undertook to transport the 43 pieces of gold form Bombay to Bangalore on payment of a commission of Rs. 400. P.W. 3 Acharya who is a jeweller and appraiser of the Canara Syndicate Bank has stated that these 43 pieces of gold were of 24 carat purity and were of foreign origin. We have already pointed out that all these pieces of gold bore foreign markings. Hence, in view of this evidence, it is clear that the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the charges against the respondent. Even if Exhibit P-6 is ignored, as contended by Sri Keshava Iyengar, there is ample evidence before the Court which establishes the charges against the respondent. The respondent, when questioned under section 342 Criminal Procedure Code about the finding of 23 pieces of gold with foreign markings inside his pillow-cover and 20 pieces of gold with foreign markings wrapped in a Turkey-towel, inside his suit-case has stated: “Yes. Gold pieces were there.” We have pointed out that there can be no doubt that these gold pieces were foreign gold. The respondent has thus admitted that he was found in possession of 43 pieces of foreign gold. To a case like this, section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962, would apply. Section 123 reads as follows: “(1) Where any goods to which this section applies are seized under this Act in the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods shall be on the person from whose possession the goods were seized.” As per sub-section (2) of the said section, this section would apply to gold, diamonds etc. In his statement under section 342 Criminal Procedure Code, the respondent does not even give an explanation as to how he came to be in possession of these 43 pieces of gold with foreign markings. It is only in the written statement filed by him, he came out with the version that the second accused had put the gold pieces into his suit case and he had no knowledge of the same till the gold was seized from the suit case. It is only in the written statement filed by him, he came out with the version that the second accused had put the gold pieces into his suit case and he had no knowledge of the same till the gold was seized from the suit case. The respondent who was admittedly found in possession of 43 pieces of gold with foreign markings which were seized under the reasonable belief that they were smuggled goods, has not discharged the burden placed on him by section 123 of the Customs Act of proving that these gold pieces were not smuggled goods. The learned Magistrate has held that the prosecution failed to prove that the respondent was in conscious possession of the 43 pieces of gold, nor had he knowledge that they were foreign gold. The Learned Magistrate even goes to the extent of observing that it would have been very easy for anybody to put the contraband gold into the suit case when the respondent was travelling. It may be pointed out that even the respondent has not put forward any such extreme contention. The evidence discloses that the suit-case was locked and to key was with the respondent. Even ignoring Exhibit P-6, we will examine the defence put forward by the respondent. In the affidavit, Exhibit P-14 produced by accused-2, a theory is put forward that he handed over one pocket containing gold to the respondent without informing him that it was gold. It may be pointed out that Exhibit P-14 was produced by accused-2 only on 22nd April, 1965, a year and two months after the seizure of the gold from the respondent, which was on 20th February, 1964. It may further be pointed out that in the said affidavit sworn to before a Magistrate, the second accused has specifically stated that he entrusted one packet containing gold at Bombay to the respondent on 20th December, 1963. So, the entrustment of one packet containing gold to the respondent was two months before he transported it from Bombay to Bangalore. It may also be pointed out that the case of accused-2 through-out was that he handed over one packet containing gold. But, when the gold was seized in the Airport from the suit-case of the respondent, they were not found in one packet, but 23 pieces were found hidden inside a pillow-cover and 20 pieces were wrapped up in a Turkey-towel. But, when the gold was seized in the Airport from the suit-case of the respondent, they were not found in one packet, but 23 pieces were found hidden inside a pillow-cover and 20 pieces were wrapped up in a Turkey-towel. This clearly shows that even assuming for the sake of argument that accused-2 had handed over one packet of gold to the respondent without telling him that it was gold, this gold had been unpacked and hidden in a pillow-cover and a turkey-towel. In these circumstances it is futile to contend, particularly as the gold pieces bore foreign markings, that the respondent did not know that he was carrying foreign gold. The prosecution has also relied on the statement Exhibit P-15 made by accused-2 on 22nd April, 1965 to P.W. 5 Rasoal, Superintendent of Central Excise on the very day he produced his affidavit, Exhibit P-14 before him. In this statement again, accused-2 repeats in four places that he gave on 20th December, 1963, 43 pieces of gold tied in a white paper packet with a string to the respondent. It also clearly states that accused-2 told the respondent that the packet contained gold. With regard to the date on which he handed over these gold pieces, lower down in the statement, accused-2 has stated that the date mentioned by him, viz., 20th December, 1963 both in his statement and in his affidavit is a mistake for the date 20th February, 1964. How he could have made a mistake and mentioned that he handed over the gold pieces on 20th of December, 1963 for the date 20th of February, 1964, is rather difficult to understand. When questioned by Court whether the statement Exhibit P-15 given by him in his own hand-writing in Marathi language was a voluntary statement, accused-2 stated “It is true.” But, in the written statement filed by him later, he has stated that he made that statement because of the inducement held out to him that he would not be prosecuted and that accused-1 would be prosecuted. We are of opinion that exhibit P-15 is not hit by section 24 of the Evidence Act. But, it has to be remembered that it is evidence only against accused-2 and it can be only taken into consideration against the respondent under section 30 of the Evidence Act, if there is other satisfactory evidence against the respondent. We are of opinion that exhibit P-15 is not hit by section 24 of the Evidence Act. But, it has to be remembered that it is evidence only against accused-2 and it can be only taken into consideration against the respondent under section 30 of the Evidence Act, if there is other satisfactory evidence against the respondent. Sri Keshava Iyengar has cited before us Soni Vallabhdas Liladhar v. Assistant Collector, Customs1. In paragraph 11 of the said judgment, their Lordships observed: “Once it is proved that the gold is smuggled gold, it follows that it was brought into the country without payment of duty or in violation of the prohibition or restriction in force and whosoever brought it and whosoever dealt with it thereafter knowing it to be smuggled in the manner provided in the section must be held to have intention of evading the payment of duty or violating the prohibition or restriction.” In Assistant Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. Sitaram2, their Lordships stated that “the words in any way concerned in any manner dealing with prohibited goods in section 167(8) of the Sea Custom Act, 1878, are of very wide import. The word ‘concerned’ would mean ‘interested in’, ‘involved in’ and ‘mixed up with’.” The words used in section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962, are in pari materia with those in section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. On the evidence on record, there is no difficulty in holding that the respondent possessed or was in any way concerned in carrying on dealing with imported goods and his intention was to evade the payment of duty. It is clear that even though a person is not a direct importer, or in any way concerned in such direct import of smuggled goods, any person who knowingly deals with such smuggled goods, would come within the ambit of section 135 of the Customs Act. This Court, in the Division Bench decision in Budaku Joti Savant’s case3 has laid down this proposition. As already pointed out, this decision has been approved by the Supreme Court in Badaku Joti Svant v. State of Mysore4. The Supreme Court has held that section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act can also take in persons who may not be concerned with actual import of prohibited goods. As already pointed out, this decision has been approved by the Supreme Court in Badaku Joti Svant v. State of Mysore4. The Supreme Court has held that section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act can also take in persons who may not be concerned with actual import of prohibited goods. We have already pointed out that the words in section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962, are in pari materia with the relevant portion of clause (81) of section 167 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that the prosecution has proved against the respondent by reliable and satisfactory evidence, the charge of contravention of section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962. With regard to the charge of contravention of Rule 126-P(2) of the Defence of India (Amendment) Rules, 1963, the learned Magistrate was of the opinion that this charge was covered by the offence under section 135 of the Customs Act. The learned Magistrate was also of the opinion that Rule 126-P (2) was not applicable to the facts of this case. It is difficult to follow the reasoning of the learned Magistrate when he deals with this question in paragraph 22 of his order. The learned Magistrate also holds that the definition of “gold” in Rule 126-A of the Defence of India Rules dealing with Gold Control refers to gold in general and does not include smuggled gold. It is not possible for us to agree with the view of the learned Magistrate. To hold that Rule 126-A of the Defence of India Rules which relates to Gold Control does not apply to smuggled gold, would be to defeat the very purpose of gold control. The definition of “gold” does not in any way exclude smuggled gold. Rule 126-P (ii) reads as follows: “Whoever has in his possession or under his control any quantity of gold in contrav:ntion of any provisions of this Part shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term of no less than six months and not more than two years and also with fine.” The evidence clearly discloses that the respondent was in possession of 43 pieces of foreign gold and had not made the requisite declaration under the Gold Control Rules; nor did he have any permit issued by the Gold Control Authority. Hence, in our opinion, the charge under Rule 126-P (2) of the Defence of India Rules that he was in possession or had in his control some quantity of gold in contravention of the Defence of India Rules has been clearly made out. Rule 126-P(2) of the Defence of India Rules is entirely different and not covered by section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962. The decision of the learned Magistrate is manifestly erroneous and there are compelling reasons to set aside the same. In the result, for the reasons stated above, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of acquittal of the respondent passed by the learned Second Magistrate, Bangalore, and convict the respondent of an offence under section 135 of the Customs Act and sentence him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. We also convict the respondent of the offence under Rule 126-P (2) of the Defence of India (Amendment) Rules, 1963, and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. The sentences are directed to run concurrently. S.V.S. ----- Appeals allowed.