Brijesh Kumar, C.J.- The dispute in the present two appeals mentioned above, relates to the same subject matter viz. about promotions in the Department of Assam Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services. These appeals have been listed and heard together. They are being disposed of by this order. 2. The Writ Appeal No. 212 of 1996 has been preferred against the judgment dated 29.3.96 passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Rule No. 2535 of 1992. It may be indicated here that by means of the said judgment the learned Single Judge had disposed of two petitions namely, Civil Rule No. 104 of 1993 along with Civil Rule No. 2535 of 1992. In Civil Rule No. 2535 of 1992, out of which the present appeal arises, a prayer was made to declare Rule 11(5) of the Assam Animal Husbandry, Veterinary and Dairy Development Services Rules, 1988, ultra virus as well as for a Mandamus commanding the respondents to refrain from acting in pursuance of the advertisement dated 11.11.92 published in the Assam Tribune by which applications were invited for direct recruitment to the different posts of officers in the department. In Civil Rule No. 104 of 1993 filed by Dr. Gopal Baruah also the virus of Rule 11 (5) of the Rules of 1988 referred to above and the advertisement dated 11.11.92 were impugned. Hence, the civil rules noted above were decided by one order. 3. So far as Writ Appeal No. 598 of 1996 is concerned, it arose out of Civil Rule No. 2361 of 1996. By means of the said petition the selection held in pursuance of the advertisement dated 11.11.92 was challenged and a prayer was made for quashing the list of selected candidates for appointment, on various posts in the Department of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary namely, on the posts of Additional Director, Joint Directors, Deputy Directors, Assistant Directors and Sub-Divisional Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Officer. As a matter of fact, the process of selection was challenged which according to the petitioner suffered from many defects. The petition was, however, dismissed by judgment and order dated December 10, 1996. 4. As a matter of fact, the process of selection was challenged which according to the petitioner suffered from many defects. The petition was, however, dismissed by judgment and order dated December 10, 1996. 4. It may also be noted here that Civil Rule No. 1371 of 1991 was filed by the Assam Animal Husbandry Rules Implementation Action Committee, with the prayer that Rule 11 (5) of the 1988 Rules may be implemented and a direction 8 to that effect be given to the authorities concerned. The petition was allowed with an observation that in case the authorities felt any difficulty in implementing the Rules, they could come for modification of the order. The Court took the view that once statutory provisions were there, they must be implemented. 5. Heard Mr. A. Roy, learned counsel for the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 212 of 1996 and learned State Counsel for the respondents as well as Mr. AK Phukan, learned Senior Counsel representing the interest of those who were selected and recruited in pursuance of the impugned advertisement. The main contention raised on behalf of the appellants revolves around the validity of Rule 11 (5) of the Assam Animal Husbandry, Veterinary and Dairy Development Service Rules, 1988, for short 'Rules of 1988'. 6. Since Rule 11 (5) of the Rules of 1988 provides that 25% of promotional posts are to be filled up by direct recruitment in all the cadres, the Assam Public Service Commission on 11th November, 1992 advertised for filling up by direct recruitment, two posts of Additional Directors, two posts of Joint Directors, 19 (nineteen) posts of Deputy Directors, 8 posts of Assistant Directors and two posts of Sub-Divisional Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Officers. As indicated earlier the said advertisement had been challenged by two petitions. The learned Single Judge while dismissing the petitions held that it was permissible to fill up the posts from two sources, namely, direct recruitment as well as by promotion and so long a Rule is there, the authorities have to implement the same. It was further held that 75% of the posts were still available to the officers for promotion. Hence, it is not a case where there are no promotional avenue available for the officers of the lower cadres. It was further held that 75% of the posts were still available to the officers for promotion. Hence, it is not a case where there are no promotional avenue available for the officers of the lower cadres. It has further been observed that so far as the prejudice apprehended to be caused by fixing the age of 45 years for direct recruitment would be prejudicial to the persons in service, the learned Single Judge observed that Rule 7 (3) gives power to relax age limit. Hence, that ground also did not hold good. It was also held that legitimate expectation for promotion is not affected by the impugned provision and the advertisement. Hence, no merit was found in the submissions made. 7. We feel that to appreciate the submissions made on behalf of the appellants in regard to virus of the Rules, it will be proper to have a look on the relevant Rules. Regarding recruitment to different posts the Rule 5 of the Rules of 1988 prescribes as follows : “5. Recruitment to the service shall be made in the manner prescribed hereinafter-(1) Recruitment to the cadre of Director shall be made on promotion in accordance with Rules 12 and 14: Provided that if the Governor is satisfied on the recommendation/opinion of the Board that there is no suitable candidate, direct recruitment to the cadre may be made by public advertisement through the Commission. (2) Recruitment to the cadre of Additional Director and Joint Director in Class I (Senior Grade), to cadre of Deputy Director, District Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Officer of the rank of Deputy Director, Assistant Director, Sub-Divisional Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Officer in Class I and to the cadre of Senior Class II of the service shall be made by promotion in accordance with Rules 11 and 12. (3) Recruitment to the cadre of Veterinary Assistant Surgeons and equivalent posts in Class II (Junior) of the service shall be made by direct recruitment in accordance with Rules 6 and 17. Rule 11 of the Rules of 1988 reads as follows : “11. (3) Recruitment to the cadre of Veterinary Assistant Surgeons and equivalent posts in Class II (Junior) of the service shall be made by direct recruitment in accordance with Rules 6 and 17. Rule 11 of the Rules of 1988 reads as follows : “11. (1) Recruitment by promotion to the cadres of Director, Additional Director, Joint Director, Deputy Director, District Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Officer Assistant Director, Sub-Divisional Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Officer to Class II in Senior Grade shall be made by the Governor in the manner prescribed herein below: (3) Subject to suitability as may be decided by the Board and by the Appointing Authority in consultation with the Commission as provided under Rule 12 (6) and 13 and also subject to possessing qualifications and experience as prescribed hereinafter, an officer shall be eligible for promotion from one cadre to another of service in the manner provided below: I. From Additional Director to Director. II. From Joint Director to Additional Director. III. From Deputy Director and District Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Officer and equivalent posts to Joint Director. IV. From Assistant Director to Deputy Director. V. From Sub-Divisional Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Officer to Assistant Director. VI. From Senior Grade in Class II to Sub Divisional Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Officer. VII. From Junior Grade Class II to Senior Grade Class II. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules, 25% of the vacancies available in a year shall be filled up by direct recruitment in all the promoted cadre posts.” 8. Rule 12 (3) provides that selection shall be made on the basis of merit cum-seniority. The promotions of the candidates selected by the Board and by the appointing authority shall be in consultation with the Commission as provided under Rule (3) of the Rules of 1988. 9. The provisions for direct recruitment are provided under Rule 6 of the Rules. It would be on the basis of the recommendation of the Commission. Rule 7 provides for the age limit as regards a candidate for direct recruitment to the different posts, which reads as follows : “7. 9. The provisions for direct recruitment are provided under Rule 6 of the Rules. It would be on the basis of the recommendation of the Commission. Rule 7 provides for the age limit as regards a candidate for direct recruitment to the different posts, which reads as follows : “7. (1) A candidate for direct recruitment to a cadre of the service shall be within the minimum and maximum age limit on the first January of the year of recruitment as prescribed herein below: Age limit (Years) Name of the cadre Minimum Maximum (i) Director 40 52 (ii) All Class I Services 35 45 (iii) All Class II Services 21 30 (2) The maximum age limit as prescribed herein above shall be relaxed in case of candidate belonging to Special Categories like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or any other categories as laid down by the Govt from time to time. (3) In case of candidates already borne in the service the maximum age limit for the purpose of direct recruitment to the cadre shall be relaxed upto the extent of their actual period of working in the service provided such period does not fall short of the relaxation provided under sub-rule (2) of this rule.” 10. The qualification for direct recruitment are provided under Rule 8 of the Rules of 1988, which reads as follows: “8. The academic qualification of a candidate for direct recruitment shall be as prescribed by the Governor from time to time. The qualifications and experience prescribed as on the date of commencement of these rules are given in Schedule II.” 11. It is to be noticed that for all the posts for promotion it is provided that a candidate must have a given period of experience in the Department himself, out of which a certain period must be on administrative post. For example, for the post of Director, it is provided that a candidate should have 20 years service experience under the Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Department, out of which 10 years should be in administrative posts. Similarly, for the post of Additional Director, an experience of 15 years service in Department with 5 years experience on administrative post is required. The age for the said posts is not to be below 40 years for the post of Director and not below the age of 35 years for the posts of Class I Services. Similarly, for the post of Additional Director, an experience of 15 years service in Department with 5 years experience on administrative post is required. The age for the said posts is not to be below 40 years for the post of Director and not below the age of 35 years for the posts of Class I Services. A candidate for recruitment to the post of Joint Director is required to have an experience of 10 years service under the Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Department out of which 5 years must be on administrative post. Similarly, for the post of Deputy Director, 8 years experience including on administrative post is required in the Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Department. As indicated earlier, Rule 7 prescribes the minimum and maximum age limits of candidates for different posts in the Animal Husbandry and veterinary Department for Director and all posts in Class I and Class II services. 12. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that reserving 25% posts of promotional quota by direct recruitment is unreasonable. Once posts are provided to be filled up by promotion as provided under Rule 5 (2) of the Rules in accordance with Rule 11 and 12, there was no reason to slice out 25% of promotion posts for direct recruitment. It is further submitted that direct recruitment against 25% posts is virtually recruitment from amongst those who are working in the Department and this is like filling up posts by promotion. It only creates a class within the class. It is further submitted that Rule 11 (5) read with Rule 7 and Schedule n of Rule 8 provides double opportunity of consideration for recruitment to the higher posts only to those who fall within the age limit as provided under Rule 7 (1) of the Rules. Those officers working in the Department who have crossed the maximum age limit prescribed are not to be considered against 25% quota sliced out for direct recruitment. It is also submitted that the criteria of age would be no reasonable ground to create a class for direct recruitment. Hence, Rule 11 (5) is bad and discriminatory. 13. Those officers working in the Department who have crossed the maximum age limit prescribed are not to be considered against 25% quota sliced out for direct recruitment. It is also submitted that the criteria of age would be no reasonable ground to create a class for direct recruitment. Hence, Rule 11 (5) is bad and discriminatory. 13. At the very outset we may indicate that it is always permissible under the law to make recruitment to the posts of any cadre in the department from one or more than one sources namely, a certain percentage may be kept for direct recruitment and the rest by promotion from the lower cadre. Generally, those deserving promotion according to the criteria laid down under the Rules and fall within the zone of consideration are promoted departmentally. The direct & recruitment is a source which throws open the recruitment from open market so as to attract talent from outside the department and from within the department in case Rules so permit, as in the present case which is not challenged except on the ground of fixing age. 14. It is to be noticed that Rule 5 (2) no doubt provides for filling of the posts indicated there by promotion, but it further provides that it would be in accordance with Rules 11 and 12 of the Rules. In turn Rule 11 (5) as indicated earlier, provides for filling up of 25% of promotion posts by direct recruitment. Rule 11 (5) begins with 'notwithstanding anything contained in the Rules.' So, the reservation of 25% of the vacancies to be filled up by direct recruitment is in accordance with the provisions of the Rules. In our view the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the petitioner-appellant cannot have any grievance that 25% of the posts cannot and should not be filled up by direct recruitment. We do not find any reason to disagree with the finding arrived at by the learned Single Judge. 15. In our view the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the petitioner-appellant cannot have any grievance that 25% of the posts cannot and should not be filled up by direct recruitment. We do not find any reason to disagree with the finding arrived at by the learned Single Judge. 15. The next question that it is to be considered is whether or not direct recruitment is confined only to the candidates already working in the Department or there is scope for persons working outside the Department too, to apply for recruitment Learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to Schedule II of the Rules which lays down the qualifications for recruitment to different posts, namely, Director, Additional Director, Joint Director etc. So far as experience required for appointment for the post of Director and Additional Director is concerned, it has prescribed service experience should be under the Department namely, Animal Husbandry, Veterinary and Dairy Development, Assam for a given period of service on administrative post as well. From the said provision relating to experience, it is inferred by the appellant that a candidate for direct recruitment must only be from the Department itself and there is no scope d for outsider to apply for these posts. In this connection it would be noticed that the provision for experience for the post of Director reads as follows : “(c) The candidate should have 20 years service experience under Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Department/Dairy Development Department, Assam out of which 10 years should be in Administrative post.” In so far as it relates to the post of Additional Director, it reads as follows: ”(c) The candidate should have 15 years service under Animal Husbandry and Veterinary/Dairy Development, Assam out of which five years must be in Administrative post. 16. The above provisions by no means indicate that a candidate must be working in the Department itself while applying for direct recruitment. All that is required by the above noted two provisions is that the experience of 20 years and 15 years service for the post of Director and Additional Director should be under the Animal Husbandry and Veterinary/Dairy Development, Assam. All that is required by the above noted two provisions is that the experience of 20 years and 15 years service for the post of Director and Additional Director should be under the Animal Husbandry and Veterinary/Dairy Development, Assam. It is quite possible that there may be persons who may have worked for required number of years having experience in the department in Assam itself, but thereafter may have joined some other employment, such persons would be eligible to apply for the direct recruitment even though they may not be working in the department at the time of applying for the recruitment. In this connection it is also to be noticed that where the experience as provided for the posts of Joint Director, Deputy Director and Assistant Director, it only says that there should be minimum 10 years, 8 years and 6 years experience respectively under the Animal Husbandry and Veterinary/Dairy Development for the said posts. It does not mention 'Assam' after naming the department as has been provided in clause (c) relating to Director and Additional Director. That is to say, it can be said that the required experience for the post of Joint Director, Deputy Director and Assistant Director need not necessarily be in the Animal Husbandry and Veterinary/Dairy Development, Assam, since it is not so specified, as in the case of Director and Additional Director, for the above noted three categories of posts as it is not necessary that a candidate must be working in the department while applying for direct recruitment. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant that direct recruitment is confined to the Departmental candidates only. It is true that there may be some candidates from the department and there may be from outside the department as well. Therefore, it cannot be said that Rule 11 (5) has been made to give double benefit to certain persons failing within the given age group in the department. No grievance can be raised if a part of the recruitment is left to be made on merit attracting talent from open market including those who may be working in the department after filling up 75% of the posts on the basis of their seniority or working in the department. No grievance can be raised if a part of the recruitment is left to be made on merit attracting talent from open market including those who may be working in the department after filling up 75% of the posts on the basis of their seniority or working in the department. Since it would be open competition amongst the candidates from outside the department as well, it would not be correct to say that this provision had been inserted to give double benefit to the Departmental candidates. The fact that the recruitment is open for the candidates outside the department as well, would also be evident from looking the provision contained in sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 of the Rules of 1988, which provides for relaxation in the maximum age limit for the candidates already born in the service in the matter of direct recruitment. It is indicative of the fact that there can be candidates from outside the department as well, but the benefit of age relaxation would be admissible only to the departmental candidates. We, therefore, find us unable to hold that direct recruitment to the extent of 25% as provided under Rule 11 (5) is confine to the departmental candidates alone creating a class within the class. As observed earlier, it is always open to have two sources of recruitment for the e posts of a cadre. One by giving benefit of experience and seniority to those who are working within the department and reserving some posts for being filled up by direct recruitment on the basis of merit to provide chance for having better talent including those who are working in the department. It does not violate any rule of law or any constitutional mandate. 17. The next submission which has been most vehemently urged before us is that prescribing maximum age limit under Rule 7 for direct recruitments is bad in law. In this connection it may be observed that it is always open, rather generally as a rule minimum and maximum age is always fixed for any recruitment. There does not seem to be any infirmity in Rule 7(1) of the Rules prescribing minimum and maximum age for the post of Director or all Class I and Class II services of the department. The submission has, however, been built up on the basis that the direct recruitment is confined to the departmental candidates only. There does not seem to be any infirmity in Rule 7(1) of the Rules prescribing minimum and maximum age for the post of Director or all Class I and Class II services of the department. The submission has, however, been built up on the basis that the direct recruitment is confined to the departmental candidates only. We have already held that it would incorrect to say that direct recruitment is confined to departmental candidates. That being the position, it takes away the foundation of the argument. It is submitted that classification on the basis of age is not permissible. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently urged that those persons working in the department and who have crossed the maximum age limit would not be entitled for consideration for direct recruitment. For example, if an officer working in the department crosses the age of 45 years he would become ineligible for consideration for direct recruitment to Class I services, but those working in the department below the age of 45 years, they all will be eligible and will also be considered for direct recruitment as well. It is submitted that classification could be based on qualification or in such other grounds, but classification merely based on age is arbitrary and bad in law. Firstly, as observed earlier person's having number of years of experience and of a given age group may be working in the department or outside have to compete amongst themselves. It is always open to fix minimum and maximum age. Looking to the experience required for the post and the working potential as may be desirable, but the submission which has been made also fails in view of the provisions contained in sub-rule (3) of Rule 7, which reads as follows : “7. (3) In case of candidates already borne in the service the maximum age limit for the purpose of direct recruitment to the cadre shall be relaxed up to the extent of their actual period of working in the service provided such period does not fall short of the relaxation provided under sub-rule (2) of the rule.” 18. (3) In case of candidates already borne in the service the maximum age limit for the purpose of direct recruitment to the cadre shall be relaxed up to the extent of their actual period of working in the service provided such period does not fall short of the relaxation provided under sub-rule (2) of the rule.” 18. In view of the above provision a departmental candidate otherwise eligible for consideration for direct recruitment would not be deprived of that chance merely because of crossing the maximum age limit as prescribed in the above noted Rule, which provides for relaxation in maximum age limit for departmental candidates. In this connection it would be appropriate to have perusal of sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 which reads as follows : “7. (2) The maximum age limit as prescribed herein above shall be relaxed in case of candidate belonging to Special Categories like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or any other categories as laid down by the Govt from time to time.” 19. The above sub-rule provides for relaxation in maximum age in case of candidates belonging to Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes or any other category as may be laid down by the Govt from time to time. So far the departmental candidates are concerned, relaxation is provided under sub-rule (3) which shall be available to the extent of their actual period of working in the service. The relaxation under sub-rule (3) is not to fall short of the relaxation allowed under sub-rule (2) of Rule 7. The relaxation is by virtue of operation of Rule 7 (3) itself. Therefore, no grievance can be raised that departmental candidates who may I cross the maximum age as provided in Rule 7(1) would be discriminated against. I Relaxation in age is not provided for outside candidates except those who fall in the category of Schedule Castes/Scheduled Tribes or any other category which may be prescribed by the Govt. Reading sub-rules (2) and (3) of Rule 7 of the Rules of 1988, together makes it clear that further safeguard has been provided to the departmental candidates where sub-rule (3) provides for period of relaxation which may not fall short of relaxation provided under sub-rule (2). Reading sub-rules (2) and (3) of Rule 7 of the Rules of 1988, together makes it clear that further safeguard has been provided to the departmental candidates where sub-rule (3) provides for period of relaxation which may not fall short of relaxation provided under sub-rule (2). In our view such an exigency would arise in case where a departmental candidate may also be eligible for relaxation under sub-rule (2) namely, he may be belonging to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes or any other prescribed category as well as for relaxation under sub-rule (3) being a departmental candidate. In that event what has been safeguarded is that relaxation of age under sub-rule (3) shall not be less than what is provided under sub-rule (2). Suppose, there may be a case where relaxation provided under sub-rule (2) is more as compared to the relaxation admissible under sub-rule (3), relaxation of maximum age for a departmental candidate cannot be less than what is provided under sub-rule (2). Hence, the proviso as provided in sub-rule (3) does not in any manner militate against the interest of departmental candidates. 20. In view of the discussion held above, we are of the view that no discrimination has been made by providing 25% posts to be filled up by direct recruitment. All those eligible according to the qualification laid down, may be departmental or outsider, would be entitled for consideration. The maximum age limit having been made relaxable to the extent of period of service rendered, leaves no cause for discrimination as alleged as the departmental candidates having crossed the maximum age limit would also eligible for consideration. There will be no deprivation of chance of consideration as direct candidate on the ground that they crossed the maximum age. No case of discrimination is thus made out. We, therefore, find no substance in the submission mat these provisions are ultra virus. As a matter of fact, it was rightly pointed out by the learned State counsel that though Rule 11 (5) was being attacked on the ground of being discriminatory in view of maximum age limit prescribed under Rule 7(1), yet the Rule 7 (1) as such was not impugned in the petition. In any case, we have considered the submission raised by the appellant challenging the validity of Rule 11 (5) in the context of Rule 7 (1) of the Rules of 1988. 21. In any case, we have considered the submission raised by the appellant challenging the validity of Rule 11 (5) in the context of Rule 7 (1) of the Rules of 1988. 21. It has next been submitted that no educational qualification has been laid down in Schedule n for the post of Joint Director, Deputy Director or Assistant Director, whereas in the advertisement qualifications are prescribed for all of them. Hence, it is bad in law. We, however, find no substance in the submission made. It is true, there may be some confusion about the heading given where the educational qualification given for the post of Additional Director, but in Part B of Schedule II different clauses are to be read together. Clause (a) and (b) prescribe the educational qualification and clause (c) experience for the post of Additional Director. Thereafter, Clause (e) provides experience for the post of Joint Director and clause (f) experience for the post of Deputy Director, and clause (g) experience for the post of Assistant Director. It thus makes clear that variation is only to the extent of period of experience required for different posts. Whereas the educational qualification for all the posts remain the same as prescribed in clause (a) and (b). It is also to be notice that wherever there is difference in the educational qualification, it is indicated in that part of sub-rule. For example. Clause (j) Part B of Schedule II which relates to recruitment in Class n (Junior Grade), it provides different qualification. We, therefore, find no force in the submissions made on behalf of the appellant. It is also found that nothing has been indicated to show that in what manner they have been prejudiced by the qualification indicated in the advertisement. Clause (j) Part B of Schedule II which relates to recruitment in Class n (Junior Grade), it provides different qualification. We, therefore, find no force in the submissions made on behalf of the appellant. It is also found that nothing has been indicated to show that in what manner they have been prejudiced by the qualification indicated in the advertisement. We hardly feel it necessary to discuss certain decisions which have been cited on the question of having nexus of classification and reasonableness, namely AIR 1960 SC 4578 Kangshari Haldar & another vs. State of West Bengal; (1983) 1 SCC 305 , DS Nakara & others vs. Union of India; (1987) 4 SCC 646 , Durgacharan Mishra vs. State of Orissa; (1998) 6 SCC 720 , BV Sivaiah & others vs. K. Addanki Babu & others and (1998) 8 SCC 218 , State of Bihar vs. Bihar Rajya Sahkarita Prabandhak Seva Sangh, and some other decisions which have been cited on the point since there is no dispute on the point that classification must be based on the reasonable ground and must have nexus with the purpose sought to be achieved. We have already held on facts that it cannot be said that any unreasonable classification has been made by prescribing the maximum age limit for candidates for direct recruitment. 22. We may now consider the argument advanced in Writ Appeal No.598 of 1996. 23. Shri R. Gogoi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has mainly challenged the process of selection adopted by the Assam Public Service Commission. The alleged infirmities in the process of selection have been averred in paragraph 8 of the writ petition. It is alleged that during the interview the members of the Selection Board did not put relevant questions relating to the subject rather questions like names of VIPs like President of India etc had been put. The interview was over within a few minutes. The candidates were not asked about their experience nor the testimonials were seen. It has also been alleged that no standard marking system or grading method was evolved by the Interview Board to evaluate compa­rative merit of candidates. It is also alleged that the selection process was based on extraneous consideration. However, we noticed that this allegation of extraneous consideration has not at all been elaborated, but left vague. It has also been alleged that no standard marking system or grading method was evolved by the Interview Board to evaluate compa­rative merit of candidates. It is also alleged that the selection process was based on extraneous consideration. However, we noticed that this allegation of extraneous consideration has not at all been elaborated, but left vague. Yet another allegation is that the petitioners understood that experts assigned to the Interview Board did not have prior information from the Assam Public Service Commission as to the basis on which the candidates are to be assessed. That is to say, what weight age was to be given to the qualifications, experience and performance at the interview etc. Yet, another allegation is that experts interviewed the candidates without any apparent co-ordination. We also noticed that one of the averments made in para 8 is: “While the other two members were making their respective assessment of each candidate, the basis of such assessment were not make known to the expert in spite of repeated requests.” While expert gave weight age to a candidate's experience and qualifications in addition to his/her performance in the interview, it is not known whether any such weight age against qualification and experience was given by the other two (2) members ...” Later in the same paragraph it is further mentioned that the petitioners came to learn it that "the result sheets were not signed by if the Technical Expert after finalisation of the result sheet by the Selection Board". It is also pointed out that the averments made in paragraph 8 have not been denied by the Assam Public Service Commission in their counter affidavit. A perusal of paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit filed by the Assam Public Service Commission shows that it has been averred therein that candidates were interviewed about their subjects and it was incorrect that only questions like asking names of VIPs etc alone were put to the candidates. After certain averments it is averred that the allegations made in the said paragraph have no basis at all and the interview was duly held in accordance with the provisions of the Rules. 24. We feel that it cannot be said that the averments made in paragraph 8 of the petition have not been denied by the Assam Public Service Commission. 24. We feel that it cannot be said that the averments made in paragraph 8 of the petition have not been denied by the Assam Public Service Commission. We also find that paragraph 5 of the petition has been sworn in the affidavit to be true to own knowledge of the deponent. The affidavit is sworn by one of the petitioners, Dr. Bodhan Tewari. It is surprising, how it could be true to own knowledge of the deponent that other two members were making their respective assessment of each candidate, the basis of which was not made known to the experts. First of all, the deponent could not have the knowledge about the basis of assessment for other candidates as he would not be present personally when other candidates b might have been interviewed. The allegation that the expert made repeated request in the presence of the deponent to two other members to indicate to him the basis of their assessment but it was refused by the members, does not inspire confidence. We also find mat in such a situation, where such allegations about the conduct of the members of the Selection Board have been made, these members should also been made parties by name so as to enable them to meet the imputation made against them as such facts could not be replied by any one else. We doubt that such averments as indicated above, have been made bona fide. It is alleged in paragraph 8 that the petitioner 'learnt' that the result sheets were not signed by the Technical Experts after finalisation of the result sheets. This allegation has also been sworn on the basis of the own knowledge of the deponent and not based on record. It is surprising that the deponent would have own knowledge of some fact which took place after finalisation of the result sheet by the Selection Board since such sheets would obviously not have been prepared in his presence while he was being interviewed. It is also surprising to find that in the same paragraph it is averred that more or less the same situation prevailed in case of others facing the Selection Board. In the swearing clause of the affidavit a column for "knowledge based on record and information" is there, but the averments made in paragraph 8 are not assigned to that column. In the swearing clause of the affidavit a column for "knowledge based on record and information" is there, but the averments made in paragraph 8 are not assigned to that column. On the whole, therefore, it is difficult to go by the averments made in paragraph 8 of the writ petition which have been denied in paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit filed by the Commission. 25. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon a decision reported in it (1996) 6 SCC 282 , Secretary (Health), Department of Health & FW & another vs. Dr. Anita Puri. It is submitted that where the statutory guidelines are not provided the Selection Board should evolve its own method for evaluating comparative merit of candidates. In paragraph 7 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed: “In adjudging suitability of a person for the post, the expert body like Public Service Commission in the absence of any statutory criteria has the discretion of evolving its mode of evaluation of merit and selection of the candidate.” It is further observed that competence and merit of a candidate is adjudged not on the basis of the qualification he possesses but also taking into account the other curriculum, experience in any field in which the selection is going to be held, his general aptitude for the job to be ascertained in course of interview with the matter. It would not be difficult to allege that one or two persons were put questions not relevant to the subject or that interview was over within few minutes whereas it should have taken some time. So far the allegation of asking the names of VIPs in the interview is concerned, it would not be a question which can said to be totally irrelevant in assessing over all fitness and personality of a candidate. Such question relate to general knowledge. On the basis of the averments made in para 8 it cannot be said that the Board only put questions asking names of President and Prime Minister of India and no other question was put to him. It also does not happen that the same question must be put to all the candidates. It all depends upon spot position as to what kind of question to be put to a candidate. It also does not happen that the same question must be put to all the candidates. It all depends upon spot position as to what kind of question to be put to a candidate. The Member of Selection Board may have doubt about a candidate, who might not have even the knowledge about the name of President of India, but he may not put same question in this regard to another candidate. Therefore, such question can be put to one candidate and may not to the other. It is thus not possible to draw any interference from such averments made in paragraph 8 of the petition. 26. On behalf of the respondents it has been submitted that the petitioner should not be allowed to challenge the selection proceedings at this stage as he did participate in the selection and waited till the result was out, to challenge it. In this Connection the learned Single Judge has also made reference to two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1995) 3 SCC 486 , Madanlal & others vs. State of J & K & others and AIR 1986 SC 1043 , Om Prakash Sukla vs. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla & others. There is no doubt about the proposition laid down in the above decisions that one would be estopped by his own conduct to challenge something to which he has submitted to, with a view to take chance to derive benefit out of the same. In such a situation it will not be permissible to turn round and challenge the event on being unsuccessful. Learned counsel for the appellant has, however, relied upon the decision of the Apex Court as reported in (1997) 9 SCC 527 , Raj Kumar & others vs. Sakti Raj & others. Our attention has particularly been drawn to para 16 of the decision. In the said decision the Apex Court considered the decision in Madanlal (supra) and held as under: “...... But in his case, the Govt have committed glaring illegalities in the procedure to get the candidates for examination under the 1955 Rules, so also in the method of selection and exercise of the power in taking out from the purview of the Board and also conduct of the selection in accordance with the Rules. Therefore, the principle of estoppel by conduct or acquiescence has no application to the facts in this case. Therefore, the principle of estoppel by conduct or acquiescence has no application to the facts in this case. Thus, we consider that the procedure offered under the 1955 Rules adopted by the Govt or the Committee as well as the action taken by the Govt are not correct in law.” In the above circumstances, it was found on the facts of the case that the principle enunciated in the case of Madanlal (supra) would not be applicable. It was a case where wrong Rules seem to have been applied. 27. We feel in a case where the constitution of the Selection Board may be challenged to be defective, which fact was within the knowledge of a candidate before he took the chance and appeared before the Selection Board, it would be appropriate case where he may be estopped from challenging constitution and proceedings of the Selection Board on that ground. But, where infirmities or irregularities come to the knowledge of a candidate or could come to the knowledge of a candidate only during the course of the selection proceedings itself, it cannot be said that such proceedings cannot be challenged merely because the candidate submitted to the selection. It is not that when the interview was in progress and irregularities was noticed the candidate may quits or withdraws from the interview. Normally, he would be there till interview is completed. Such a situation would not bar him to challenge the selection proceedings. 28. In the instant case, however, precisely what is objected to on behalf of the respondents is that the petitioner had participated in the interview and according to their own allegations they became aware of the alleged irregularities during the course of the selection proceedings itself. Therefore, immediately after the selection was over, it would have been proper that the petitioners had challenged the proceedings, rather to wait till result was declared and the petitioners came to know that they remained unsuccessful. It is not to be taken mechanically that since the petitioners participated in the interview that they may not be heard complaining about the same. But what is objectionable is that they were keeping quiet after the alleged irregularities came to their knowledge till the result was out. It is not to be taken mechanically that since the petitioners participated in the interview that they may not be heard complaining about the same. But what is objectionable is that they were keeping quiet after the alleged irregularities came to their knowledge till the result was out. Respondents would not be unjustified in pointing out that this period of waiting, for result to be declared, was only for the purpose of taking a chance and on being declared unsuccessful they turned round to challenge the proceedings in respect of which they did not raise objection before the result was declared. In the case of Rajkumar (supra) relied upon by the appellant, the Hon'ble Supreme d Court did not deviate from what has been laid down in Madanlal (supra), but in view of the facts under consideration and application of wrong rules, it was found to be a glaring mistake on the part of the State hence the Court interfered in the matter. We are of the view that the petitioner was entitled to challenge the proceedings of the selection pointing out the alleged irregularities, but within a reasonable time of the irregularities coming to their knowledge, namely, after their interview was over. But their conduct in springing up into action only after the result was declared, which was not favourable to them raises doubt about their bona fides and it may amended to acquiescence to the selection process in which they took part and waited to challenge it till the result was declared. 29. In view of the above discussions and findings recorded in both the appeals the Writ Appeal No. 212 of 1996 and Writ Appeal No. 598 of 1996 are dismissed. There would, however, be no order as to costs.