JUDGMENT Kamlesh Sharma, J.—The appellants are the defendants whereas the respondent is the plaintiff and they will be referred to as such in this judgment. The defendants have filed this appeal against the decree and judgment dated 31.7.1997 passed by Addl. District-Judge (I), Kangra at Dharamshala whereby the appeal of the defendants was partly accepted and the decree and judgment dated 16.8.1996 of Sub Judge 1st Class (I), Palampur District Kangra is modified to the extent that the plaintiff is declared the owner of 1/2 share of the suit land and thereby held entitled to joint possession of the suit land alongwith defendants. Sub-Judge 1 l Class had decreed the suit for possession of the suit land to the extent of 1/2 share in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. The suit land is comprised of Khasras No. 125, 191, 194 and 269 Kita 4 measuring 0-79-84 hectares, situated in Mohal Kanjrahar, Mauja Deol, Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra. 2. The brief facts of the case are that father of the plaintiff and grand-father of defendants, namely, Chamaru was the tenant of the suit land. He died in the year 1970 leaving behind the plaintiff and the father of the defendants, namely, Chuni Lal as his heirs. The case of the plaintiff is that he and Chuni Lal had been jointly cultivating the suit land as tenants on payment of rent to the owners after the death of their father, though he was in exclusive possession of Khasra No. 194 after the death of their father. It was in the last week of May, 1992 that defendant No. 1, namely, Hari Singh told him that the suit land had been mutated in favour of the defendants and they have also become owners thereof and have been paying land revenue, therefore, he has no right to cultivate the land. The plaintiff also found that his brother Chuni Lal, father of defendants, had got made entry of tenancy exclusively in his favour after the death of their father Chamaru taking undue advantage of minority of plaintiff who had succeeded to the tenancy rights of his father alongwith Chuni Lal and accordingly proprietary rights were also conferred in favour of defendants as Chuni Lal had died in the meantime. It is further alleged that thereafter on the basis of wrong revenue entries in their favour the defendants took possession of the suit land from the plaintiff on 12.6.1993 which gave cause of action to the plaintiff to file the civil suit. 3. The defendants contested the suit by taking preliminary objections, inter-alia, of maintainability, cause of action and estoppel and on merits it was alleged that the suit land was under the exclusive tenancy of their late father and the proprietary rights have been conferred on them vide mutation No. 160. According to them, the suit land was never cultivated by the plaintiff or his father, as such, they have denied that he has any right, title or interest in the suit land. 4. Both the courts have concurrently rejected the preliminary objections and have concurrently found that the suit land was cultivated by Chamaru, the father of the plaintiff and the grand-father of the defendants and after his death the plaintiff and the father of defendants, namely, Chuni Lal, were entitled to inherit the tenancy rights whereas late Chuni Lal got himself exclusively recorded as tenant during settlement as he was managing the suit land being elder and the plaintiff being minor at the time of death of their father Chamaru. It is also concurrently held by both the Courts below that the plaintiff and his brother late Chuni Lal continued cultivating the suit land jointly after the death of their father, as such, after coming into operation of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called the Act) proprietary rights should have been conferred on the plaintiff and the defendants in equal share. These findings of fact are correctly arrived at by both the Courts below on the appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record. Not only the witnesses produced by the plaintiff, namely, Prithu Ram (PW-2), Ghogru Ram (PW-3) and Chanda Ram (PW-4) have supported his case that after the death of Chamaru he, alongwith his brother late Chuni Lal, had been cultivating the suit land but even the witnesses of appellants-defendants, namely, Hirdu Ram (DW-2) and Hoshiar Singh (DW-3) have also stated that defendants have been exclusively cultivating the land since 1992. Hoshiar Singh (DW-3) has admitted that plaintiff was about 12/13 years of age when his father Chamaru had died. Hoshiar Singh (DW-3) has admitted that plaintiff was about 12/13 years of age when his father Chamaru had died. One of the witnesses of the plaintiff, namely, Prithu Ram (PW-2) being one of the landlords, is the best person to depose that who had been cultivating the land in dispute after the death of Chamaru. He has also proved the receipts of rent Exts. P-l and P-2. So far revenue entries are concerned, before settlement, in which Misal Haquiat Ext. P-4=D-1 was prepared, Chamaru was shown as tenant and after his death instead of attesting the mutation of inheritance of tenancy rights in favour of the male descendants of late Chamaru i.e. late Chuni Lal and plaintiff, only name of Chuni Lal was shown as tenant which entry continued on the basis of which proprietary rights were also conferred on the defendants on coming into operation of the Act. Both the Courts have rightly come to the conclusion that the defendants have not been able to prove that how and why the entry of exclusive tenancy in favour of their father late Chuni Lal was effected denying the tenancy rights in respect of 1/2 share to the plaintiff. 5. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. At the time of admission substantial question of law was not framed. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the defendants has urged that concurrent findings arrived at by both the Courts below deserve to be interfered with on the substantial questions of law (i) whether non-occupancy tenancy under the Punjab Tenancy Act was heritable; (ii) Whether the presumption of truth attached to the revenue entries which are in favour of the defendants that their father late Chuni Lal was in exclusive possession as tenant stood rebutted to hold the plaintiff in joint possession with him and after his death with defendants. Arguing the first substantial question of law, learned counsel has pointed out that in the year 1970 when Chamaru had died the Act had not come into force and the Addl. District Judge has erred in holding that plaintiff had a right to inherit the tenancy rights to the extent of 1/2 share under Section 45 of the Act. Arguing the first substantial question of law, learned counsel has pointed out that in the year 1970 when Chamaru had died the Act had not come into force and the Addl. District Judge has erred in holding that plaintiff had a right to inherit the tenancy rights to the extent of 1/2 share under Section 45 of the Act. According to the learned counsel, since the suit land is in District Kangra, which is part of erstwhile State of Punjab, before its mereger with State of Himachal Pradesh, the Punjab State Tenancy Act was applicable and the inheritance of tenancy rights will be governed by it under which there is no provision for succession of non-occupancy tenancy rights. This submission is correct and there is no difficulty in accepting it but unfortunately it does not help the learned counsel for the defendants. No doubt, Section 59 of Punjab Tenancy Act governs the succession in the case of tenant having a right of occupancy and a tenant having a right of non-occupany i.e. tenant at will are not covered by this provision. Therefore, the question arises which law will govern the succession in the case of a tenant having a right of non-occupancy (tenant at will). The answer will be found in the general law of succession i.e. Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 8 of which provides that widow and son(s) succeed to the estate of the deceased in equal shares. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the plaintiff had a right to succeed to the tenancy rights of the suit land aiongwith his brother late Chuni Lal in equal share after the death of their father in the year 1970 and he has been deprived of that right wrongly and illegally as held by both the Courts below. For taking this view, this Court has taken support from the judgment of learned Single Judge in Smt. Nathi v. Shri Neel Chand, 1997 (2) Shim. L.C. 179. 6. For taking this view, this Court has taken support from the judgment of learned Single Judge in Smt. Nathi v. Shri Neel Chand, 1997 (2) Shim. L.C. 179. 6. Coming to the second substantial question of law, the entries in favour of late Chuni Lal showing him in exclusive possession of the suit land as tenant on the basis of which defendants were also shown as tenants after his death and lateron conferred proprietary rights on coming into force of the Act, have not been proved to be entered in accordance with law, as earlier entries were showing the father of late Chuni Lal and the plaintiff, namely, Chamaru as non-occupancy tenant of the suit land and after his death mutation of inheritance of his tenancy rights was required to be attested in favour of his both male descendants i.e. late Chuni Lal and the plaintiff. There is nothing on record to justify the change of entry of tenancy in favour of late Chuni Lal and also to show that it was made by following the procedure in law as well as after giving notice to the plaintiff. In this view of the matter, presumption of truth does not arise in respect of the revenue entries recording late Chuni Lal in exclusive possession as tenant. 7. Learned counsel for the defendants has also tried to raise another substantial question of law that the suit of the plaintiff was barred by limitation. Again both the Courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that suit was based on title and it was filed within a period of limitation of 12 years from the date of dispossession or the threat of dispossession which gave cause of action to the plaintiff. So far revenue entries not showing him in possession are concerned, these are not proved to be in his knowledge or otherwise also these did not give him actual cause of action. In this view of the matter, even this substantial question of law does not arise. 8. The result of above discussion is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is rejected. No costs. Appeal dismissed.