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1999 DIGILAW 158 (ORI)

RABINARAYAN SUNDARAY v. SUSHILA DEI

1999-05-12

PRADIPTA RAY

body1999
JUDGMENT : Pradipta Ray, J. - The defendant has preferred litis appeal against judgment and decree dated April 29, 1995 passed by the Additional District Judge. Jaipur in Title Appeal No. 31 of 1991 affirming those dated August 19, 1991 passed by the Munsif, Jajpur in Title Suit No.29 or 1990 2. The plaintiff-respondent instituted Title Suit No.29 of 1990 for permanent injunction restraining the defendant appellant from making any construction over the suit plots recorded as passage of the co-sharers and the villagers, from creating any obstruction or interfering with the right of way of the plaintiff-respondent thereon and from obstructing free-flow of air and light to the house of the respondent and further for mandatory injunction directing the defendant-appellant to remove the constructions stated to have been made by him on the suit land. 3. Undisputedly the suit plots arc (he joint family properties of the co-sharers in the family of the plaintiff and the defendant and recorded as common passage. The respondent has alleged that on December 5. 1987 defendant-appellant with the help of his sons and other mischievous persons of the locality started laying a brick foundation of a small room and also constructed an open latrine on the common passage obstructing the passage and interfering with the flow of air and light to the house of the respondent from the eastern side. In the written statement the defendant-appellant has denied not only the allegation of making any construction but denied existence of any construction on the suit plots. The defendant has also raised a question about the maintainability of the suit at the instance of the respondent on the ground that the suit for mere injunction without any prayer for declaration of title is not maintainable. Both the courts below have found that the defendant-appellant has made constructions blocking the common passage and on the basis of such finding decreed with suit. 4. In the Trial Court a plcader-commissioner was appointed to report whether there was any construction and obstruction by the defendant on suit passage. The pleader-commissioner has reported existence of construction on a portion of the suit passage. In view of the said report the existence of the alleged structures cannot be disputed. 4. In the Trial Court a plcader-commissioner was appointed to report whether there was any construction and obstruction by the defendant on suit passage. The pleader-commissioner has reported existence of construction on a portion of the suit passage. In view of the said report the existence of the alleged structures cannot be disputed. However, in his evidence the defendant has claimed that the latrine was constructed more than forty yours back by his father and the allegation of raising any construction on December 5, 1989 is totally false. In support of his case that the latrine was an old one. the defendent has relied upon a report of the Revenue Inspector (Ext., "D") in which it has been mentioned that the latrine is a very old one. 5. On behalf of the appellant questions have been raised about the maintainability of the suit on the ground that:- (i) all the co-sharers have not been made parlies, and; (ii) there is no prayer for declaration of title. None of these submissions is acceptable. In the present case, there is no dispute that the respondent is a co-sharer of the suit plots. Although the defendant sought to take a plea that the plaintiff-respondent had transferred her interest in the suit property in favour of her son, there is nothing on record to support such plea. There being no dispute about her title, no relief for declaration of title is necessary. It is well settled that where the title is not in dispute, a suit for injunction is maintainable. In this connection reference may be made to the decision reported in AIR 1936 Madras 936 (Muthayyan Swaminatha Sastrial and others v. S. Narayanaswaini Sastrial and others). It is also well settled that a co-sharer can file a suit for injunction against another co-sharer restraining him from committing any act interfering with his right to enjoy the common property. When the allegation is against a particular co-sharer the other co-sharers are not necessary parties inasmuch as no relief is claimed against them and the reliefs claimed in the suit are not going to affect any right of any other co-sharers. It has been laid down by the Privy Council in Midnapur Zamindary Co Ltd. v. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy and others. It has been laid down by the Privy Council in Midnapur Zamindary Co Ltd. v. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy and others. reported in AIR 1924 Privy Council 144 that a co-sharer cannot deal with the joint property in a manner which is detrimental to the right of another co-sharer. 6. The decision cited by Mr. Chose are clearly distinguishable. In Sachindra Nath Sarkar v. Binapani Basu, reported in AIR 1976 Calcutta, 277 the relief of injunction was not given as the plaintiff co-sharer therein could not establish that he would sustain any injury by the acts complained of. There, by the construction of balcony the passage was not blocked. The Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Chhedi Lal v. Chhotey Lal, reported in AIR 1951 Allahabad, 199 does not support the submission of Mr. Ghose. It has been stated therein that the grant of relief will depend on the circumstances of each case and there can be no inflexible rule regarding the circumstances in which the relief for demolition and injunction should be granted or refused. In the present case, a co-sharer cannot be permitted to block and admitted common passage on joint property. 7. Existence of two constructions on the common passage has been established. The defendant-appellant in his written statement totally denied existence of any construction on the suit passage. He did not plead in his written statement that the latrine was in existence and that the same was constructed by his father long back. In his evidence, for the first time the defendant sought to make out a case that the latrine is an old one and has been in existence for more than 40 years at the time of institution of the suit. The courts below have rightly pointed out that the defendant-appellant cannot be permitted to take a plea of fact not pleaded in the written statement That apart, defendant-appellant has also failed to prove his plea that the latrine was an old one. The report of the Revenue Inspector (Ext. 'D') cannot be accepted as proof of the said plea. Original report or a certified copy was not available, only a copy stated to be true copy has been exhibited. The Revenue Inspector, who submitted the report Ext. 'D'), has admitted in his evidence that he made the purported inspection without giving any notice to any party. 'D') cannot be accepted as proof of the said plea. Original report or a certified copy was not available, only a copy stated to be true copy has been exhibited. The Revenue Inspector, who submitted the report Ext. 'D'), has admitted in his evidence that he made the purported inspection without giving any notice to any party. There is no other corroborative evidence by any other person. The courts below have considered the said report, but rightly could not place reliance upon it. The courts below after consideration of all evidence have recorded concurrent Finding that the defendant has made the constructions on the common passage interfering with the use of the common passage by the respondent. This Court does not find any sufficient reason for interfering with such finding of fact in second appeal. 8. For the reasons. aforesaid, the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. L.C.R. be sent down immediately. Final Result : Dismissed