JUDGMENT : - A.K. Yog, J. Smt. Jaya Devi and another (Vijai Kumar) have filed this petition in order to challenge judgment and order 31st August, 1999 in Rent Control Appeal No. 10 of 1997 (Anncxure-9 to the Writ Petition) where by the Appellate Authority, exercising powers under Section 22 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972) (for short called "the Act") held that application under Section 21 (l) (b) of the Act was liable to be allowed on the finding that the accommodation in question (in occupation of the petitioner) required demolition and reconstruction because of itself being very old and in a dilapidated condition (particular page 86ol the paper book). 2. THE Appellate Authority observed that landlord had submitted a plan and an estimate through an approved Engineer. Appellate Authority also observed, on the basis of evidence on record that estimate and report/plan were submitted by an authorised Engineer of the Development Authority copy of the estimate has been filed as Annexure-5 to the petition (particular page 48 of the paper book). This document shows that Engineer Ravindra Kumar Nikhra, who had submitted plan/report and estimate was an approved Engineer of Jhansi Development Authority, Jhansi. It may be stated that release application was both under Section 21 (l) (a) and (b) of the Act. 3. THE Prescribed Authority, on the basis of material on record, concluded that need of the landlord was not bona fide and rejected the application. Prescribed Authority also found that application could not be allowed on the ground contemplated under Section 21 (l) (a) of the Act, Release application was, accordingly, rejected. 4. FEELING aggrieved, landlord filed Rent Control Appeal No. 10 of 1997 (Smt. Ram Kunwar v. Smt. Jaya Devi and others), and same has been, as stated above, al lowed only on the ground as contemplated under Section 21 (l) (b). Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that release application under Section 21 (l) (b) has been wrongly allowed without recording finding with regard to Clause (i) and Clause (iii) of Rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Act. 5. FOR convenience, Rule 17 is quoted below: "17. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that release application under Section 21 (l) (b) has been wrongly allowed without recording finding with regard to Clause (i) and Clause (iii) of Rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Act. 5. FOR convenience, Rule 17 is quoted below: "17. Application for release on the ground for demolition and new construction Sections 21 (I) (b) and 348 (8)1-(1) Before allowing an application for release of a building under Section 21 (l) (b) on the ground that it is required for purposes of demolition and new construction, the prescribed authority shall satisfy itself: (i) that the building require demolition; (ii) that a proper estimate of expenditure over the proposed demolition and new construction has been prepared; (iii) that a plan has been duly prepared and conforms to the bye-laws or regulations of the local authority or other statutory authority under any law in that behalf for the time being in force; and (iv) that the landlord has the financial capacity for the proposed demolition and new construction. " 6. REQUIREMENT of Rule 17 (i): With reference to Clause (i) of Rule 17, it is argued that unless it was pleaded and a finding was arrived at to the effect, that building required demolition because of its being beyond repair, the Court below could not allow application under Section 21 (l) (b). It may be noted that on behalf of tenant-petitioner Original Suit No. 200 of 1995 (Sri Ashok Kumar and others v. Sri Bhagirath and another), was filed in the Court of Munsiff Jhansi for seeking decree of mandatory injunction to direct the landlord to reconstruct/carry our repairs in the southern wall of the house in question (Annexure-1 to the Writ Petition). Paragraph Nos. 3, 4 and 5 of the plaint are relevant. In para 5 of the plaint, Tenant (present Petitioner) admitted by asserting that in case of the southern side wall not being repaired, the entire house was liable to become ruinous and they will be compelled to vacate the same. A Commissioner's report was also filed in Original Suit No. 200 of 1995 It is brought on record of present release proceedings. Copy of inspection report dated 17-5-1995 is being filed as Annexure-2 to the Writ Petition. 7. A Commissioner's report was also filed in Original Suit No. 200 of 1995 It is brought on record of present release proceedings. Copy of inspection report dated 17-5-1995 is being filed as Annexure-2 to the Writ Petition. 7. PARAGRAPHS, I, 2 and 3 of the said report show that house was in shambles, standing in a pitiable condition, southern-western portion is very weak, there were cracks on first floor portion and it was liable to fall any time. Inspection report further mentioned that in case house was not vacated by the tenant, house could not be repaired. Copy of the release application, giving rise to present petition has been filed as (Annexure-3 to the Writ Petition). PARAGRAPHS 2, 3, 4 and 8 are relevant for the purpose of Rule 17. Landlord did plead that house was in dilapidated condition which they wanted to reconstruct. 8. WRITTEN statement filed on behalf of the tenant (Annexure -4 particular page 16 of the Writ Paper Book) shows that averments in Paragraph 16 of the release application, for carrying out the repairs in southern wall of the house in question have been admitted in para 16 of the writ ten statement. Tenant has not categorically pleaded that house did not require reconstruction nor pleaded that building was beyond "repairs" or that question of demolition and reconstruction did not arise as it could be made safe by carrying out repairs. On the other hand, tenant con tested the said issue by filing affidavits and lead evidence as desired. The tenant, however, did not file report of approved Engineer to show that condition of the building was not such, which it could be said to be beyond repairs. It is not permissible to allow the tenant to allege that building is not in a dilapidated condition or that it was not in such a bad condition as may require demolition. 9. CONCURRENT finding that building in question is in a dilapidated condition, is a finding of fact, which does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of record warranting interference under writ jurisdiction of this Court. 10. 9. CONCURRENT finding that building in question is in a dilapidated condition, is a finding of fact, which does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of record warranting interference under writ jurisdiction of this Court. 10. REQUIREMENT of Rules 17 (ii), (iii) and (iv): On the facts of the present case, borne out from record and in view of averment contained in the plaint of Original Suit No. 200 of 1995, this Court has no doubt that "accommodation in question" was in a "bad shape" which required demolition and reconstruction. The tenant did not plead that building was "not beyond repair". Tenant con tested the proceedings knowing fully well the issues to be decided. There is no grievance that petitioner has been prejudiced and could not lead evidence on any issue because of absence of pleading or due to non-framing of an issue. In view of it, the petitioner cannot be permitted to find fault with the finding recorded by Appellate Court (namely building is dilapidated) on this score. In my opinion, petitioner has not at all been prejudiced in any manner even if landlord did not "in so many words' averred that the building was beyond repair. The Appellate Court has recorded a finding of fact on appraisal of evidence, I do not find permissible ground for interfering with the same. Expression used in Rule 17 shows that it is not a condition precedent to show that building is dilapidated and beyond repair before attracting provisions of Section 21 (l) (b). See 1984 ARC 306 (DB) (Paras 6, 7 and 9) LB. Petitioner has filed copy of an affidavit of the landlord dated 10th May, 1996 (Anncxurc-5 to the Writ Petition). Paragraphs 23, 25 and 28 of the affidavit are relevant wherein landlord stated on oath that he had capacity to reconstruct the house as per estimate as per proposed plan which he got prepared for getting it sanctioned from the Jhansi Development Authority. Learned counsel for the petitioner admitted, on a question being put to him, that the contents of Paragraphs 5 and 28 of the said affidavit (particular pages 45 and 46 of the Writ Paper Book) have not been controverted by the tenant. Rather he submitted that they were not required to be controverted. Copy of estimate has been filed by the tenant/petitioner as Annexure-6 to the Writ Petition. Rather he submitted that they were not required to be controverted. Copy of estimate has been filed by the tenant/petitioner as Annexure-6 to the Writ Petition. It shows that it was got prepared by an approved Engineer of Jhansi Development Authority, Jhansi. Petitioner failed to point out, in spite of a specific query by this Court, that tenant disputed the authenticity or the qualification of the Engineer Ravindra Kumar Nikhra, who had submitted that "plan" and the "estimate" on behalf of the landlord in the present case. The Appellate Court in para 20 of its judgment (particular page 87 of the paper book) made a categorical observation on the basis of material on record as well as decision of this Court that plan was not required to be approved. Name and status of the Engineer who prepared the Plan and Estimate is evident from Annexure-6 to the Writ Petition. Petitioner has filed copy of his affidavit (Anncxurc-7 to the Writ Petition) in reply to the Landlord's affidavit (Annexure-5). Perusal of this affidavit (Annexure-7 to the Writ Petition) shows that tenant did not plead, that plan submitted by the landlord did not conform to the bye-laws and regulation of the concerned Authority. Petitioner at no relevant stage or before this Court indicated specifically as to which regulation of building regulations was violated. 11. TAKING into account the totality of the pleadings of the respective parties, their affidavits and evidence, I hold that petitioner cannot be permitted to raise a technical plea in writ proceedings and render all the exercise before the Courts below fruitless. Petitioner has failed, even before this Court, to point out violation of any particular Bye-law or Regulation as far as the plan submitted by landlord concerned. In Anil Kumar Jain v. VI! Additional District Judge, Saharanpur, 1995 (2) ALR 298 : 1995 (1) JCLR 49 (A11) Para 65 it is held that, it is the duty of a party assailing the plan to point out the precise bye-law, which was flouted by the plan, and then of course, the Prescribed Authority would be duty bound to examine and come to the conclusion whether or not it conforms to the regulation governing building construction by the concerned Local Authority, Anil Kumar Jain, (supra), completely demolishes Petitioner's contention with reference to Rule 17 (iii). 12. 12. IN another decision in Ram Shankar v. District Judge, Faizabad and others, 1998 (3) ALR 509 : 1998 (1) ARC 282-Paras 11, 15 and 17, considered requirement of Section 21 (l) (b) of the Act and 17 of the Rules framed thereunder. It refers to the case of Ram Chandra Sinha v. District Judge, 1983 (9) ALR 404, wherein it was observed: "7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Under this clause the only requirement is that there should be a duly prepared plan for the building which is to be constructed after demolition of the existing building and this plan should conform to the bye-laws or the regulations of the local authority. A duly prepared plan had been placed on the record by the petitioners. It was not the case of the opposite parties that the said plan did not conform to the bye- laws or the regulations of the local authority. There is no requirement under Rule 17 that a sanctioned plan must be placed on record. IN the circumstances I am of the opinion that the insistence of filing the sanctioned plan contained in the orders of the two authorities below is not justified. " Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, placed reliance upon the decision in Ram Kumar Hayaran v. Shankar Lal Hayaran and another, 1990 (1) ARC 593-Paras 11 and 14. Notice of this Court is drawn to para 14 of the said judgment. Perusal of para 14 shows that controversy raised in the said case was entirely different. Petitioner, however, wants to take advantage of observation to be read in isolation wherein learned Single Judge ob served that even of the plan was sanctioned, the Court should consider whether it conformed to the bye-laws. Mere sanctioning of the plan will not debar the Court from examining the requirement of Rule 17 (3) that the plan was in accordance with the bye-laws. Learned Single Judge observed:. . . . . . . . . . . "nothing has been pointed out in the objection or in the writ petition to say that it was not so". The petitioner, in this case seeks to raise an objection without factual foundation. 13. Learned Single Judge observed:. . . . . . . . . . . "nothing has been pointed out in the objection or in the writ petition to say that it was not so". The petitioner, in this case seeks to raise an objection without factual foundation. 13. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner then referred to decision reported in Sheo Mural alias Chain v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others, 1986 (1) ARC 190-Para 4, wherein it is held that it is "statutory obligation" upon the Prescribed Authority and Court below to satisfy that the four conditions of Clauses (i) to (iv), Rule 17 are fulfilled. 14. THERE is no disagreement with the ratio laid down in this decision. The question is whether, in the facts of the present case, petitioner can be al lowed to challenge judgment on the ground of non-compliance of Rule 17 and to what extent. As already noted above landlord pleaded requisite facts, which fulfil the requirement of Rule 17, Clauses (i) to (iv). The tenant contested but did not raise specific objections nor made specific pleas in the written statement. The lower Appellate Court has recorded necessary findings, on the material before it- required under Rule 17. Further reliance has been placed on the decision in Mohd. Ibrahim alias Bafati v. Additional District Judge (Special Judge), Allahabad and others, 1995 (26) ALR615; 1995 (2) JCLR 736 (All). Paras 5 and 6 of the said judgment are relevant. Ratio laid down in the case is that plan/map need not be approved by the local authority. Regarding map being in conformity with the regulation/bye-laws, learned Single Judge observed "even in the present writ petition the petitioner has not stated anywhere that the map submitted for the proposed construction does not conform to the bye-laws. It is not open to the petitioner to urge that respondent No. 3 has not complied with Rule 17 (iii) of the Rules framed under the Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . " The said decision is in fact against the petitioner. In the last, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision in Smt. Shashi Goyal v. llnd Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr and another, 1997 (30) ALR 175; 1997 (2) JCLR 45 (All ). . . . . . . . . . . . . " The said decision is in fact against the petitioner. In the last, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision in Smt. Shashi Goyal v. llnd Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr and another, 1997 (30) ALR 175; 1997 (2) JCLR 45 (All ). With reference to para 9 of the said judgment it is submitted that landlord ought to have expressed "willingness" to allow re-entry to the tenant after reconstruction by making necessary averments in the release application at the lime of filing. 15. ARGUMENT has no force. Section 21 (l) (b) of the Act does not require landlord to express willingness in the release application. Learned counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded on this aspect. Object of giving option of re-entry to the tenant enshrined in Section 24 (2) (b) of the Act is to ensure that landlord may not abuse release under Section 21 (l) (b) of the Act because he gets possession, not for his personal need as contemplated under Section 21 (l) (a) of the Act, but for only reconstruction after demolition at the time when he deems it appropriate to demolish-considering his position and circumstance with reference to his financial aspect, legal obligation under Municipal bye-laws, availability and cost of building material, labour, etc, 16. NEITHER Section 21 (l) (b) nor Section 24 (2) of the Act require "willingness" to be expressed by the landlord. Section 24 (2) of the Act con templates that tenant, who has been evicted under Section 21 (l) (b) of the Act has a right to approach District Magistrate by filing an application indicating his willingness for allotment, when building is reconstructed as contemplated under Section 21 (l) (b) of the Act. It is not at all dependent upon "willingness" being expressed by the landlord in the application of release itself. 17. It is not at all dependent upon "willingness" being expressed by the landlord in the application of release itself. 17. ABSENCE of word requiring landlord to express "willingness" to allow re-entry to the outing tenant, under Section 21 (l) (b) and Section 24 (2) of the Act and categorically putting an obligation/duty upon the tenant to file an application expressing "re-entry",-before District Magistrate who may, after considering his requirement and subject to revised rent (to the fixed on the basis disclosed in that section) allot the newly reconstructed building go to show, that omission of 'such words' in these provisions is a deliberate omission rather than- "casusomissus". See AIR 1982 SC 149 -Paras 56,271,197 and 273. 18. IN view of clear language of Section 21 (l) (b), I hold that willingness is not to be expressed by the landlord in the release application under Section 21 (l) (b) of the Act. Even otherwise this objection having not been taken before Appellate Court, I am not prepared to allow this objection, it cannot be allowed to be taken at this stage. Learned counsel for the petitioner posed a question during his argument as to what will happen if the landlord does not reconstruct. It is true, the Act is silent on this aspect. It appears to be intentional and conscious omission on the part of legislature. It is because a landlord may file an application under Section 21 (l) (b), bona fide and with genuine intension 10 reconstruct but situation of landlord may, in a given case, change and he may not be able to reconstruct the building due to financial or circumstantial circumstance. 19. THERE is another aspect of the case. This Court categorically expressed that it was prepared to clarify, assuming for argument sake that petitioner shall have a right of re-entry in view of provision of Section 24 (2) of the Act when building is reconstructed by the landlord, so as to dispel his apprehensions and protect the tenant-petitioner. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, for no reasons to be disclosed to this Court decline to agree to the same. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, for no reasons to be disclosed to this Court decline to agree to the same. The plea on this score, therefore, appears to be taken only for the sake of objection in order to take advantage of the circumstance that in case Writ Petition is admitted once, it is not likely to be pending for several years and thereby petitioner will manage to stall proceedings of release under interim order. 20. PETITIONER is directed to vacate the accommodation in question forthwith. I find no merit in this case and it is accordingly, dismissed in limine. After judgment was dictated, (but before it was finally signed). Application No. 69348 of 1999 dated 29th September, 1999 has been filed mentioning that petitioners be granted six months' time on their undertaking for vacating the accommodation. 21. SINCE petitioners have given an undertaking to this Court vide their above application dated 29th September, 1999,1, considering the facts, grant six months' time to the petitioners for vacating the accommodation subject to the conditions mentioned hereunder: 1. The tenant petitioner files before concerned Prescribed Authority, on or before 31st October, 1999, an application along with his affidavit giving an unconditional undertaking to comply with all the conditions mentioned hereinafter; 2. Petitioner tenant shall not be evicted from the accommodation in his tenancy for six months i.e., up to 30th April, 2000. Tenant petitioner, her representative/assignee, etc. , claiming through her or otherwise, if any, shall vacate without objection and peacefully deliver vacant possession of the accommodation in question on or before 30th April, 2000 to the landlord or landlord's nominee/representative (if any, appointed and intimated by the landlord) by giving prior advance notice and notifying to the landlord by Registered A. D. post (on his last known address or as may be disclosed in advance by the landlord in writing before the concerned (Prescribed Authority) time and date on which landlord is to take pos session from the tenant; 3. Petitioner shall on or before 31st October, 1999. deposit entire amount due towards rent etc. up to date i.e. , entire arrears of the past, if any, as well as the rent for the period ending on the 31st March, 2000; 4. Petitioner and everyone claiming under her undertake not to "change" or "damage" or transfer/alienate/assign in any manner, the accommodation in question; 5. deposit entire amount due towards rent etc. up to date i.e. , entire arrears of the past, if any, as well as the rent for the period ending on the 31st March, 2000; 4. Petitioner and everyone claiming under her undertake not to "change" or "damage" or transfer/alienate/assign in any manner, the accommodation in question; 5. In case tenant petitioner fails to comply with any of the conditions/or direction/s contained in this order landlord shall be entitled to evict the tenant-petitioner forthwith from the accommodation in question by seeking police force through concerned prescribed authority; 6. If there is violation of the undertaking of any one or more of the conditions contained in this order, the defaulting party shall pay Rs. 25,000 (Rupees Twenty five thousand only) as damages to the other party besides rendering himself/herself liable to be prosecuted for committing grossest contempt of the Court. 22. WRIT Petition stands dismissed subject, to the conditions indicated in the body of the judgment. No. order as to costs. Petition dismissed.