R. K. ABICHANDANI, J. ( 1 ) THESE four appeals raise a common question and are argued together since they arise from the same judgment and award in consolidated claim petitions arising out of a vehicular accident that occurred on 3-9-1992 in the evening around 8-00 p. m. when a jeep car driven by Karansinh Rana rammed into the stationary public carrier which according to the claimants was parked at night without any reflectors or lights to indicate that it was lying on the road in a stationary condition. In the jeep car were travelling one Bhupendrabhai Fulchand Maniyar, a Deputy Executive Engineer who died in the accident and other injured claimants who were the employees of the Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board to which the jeep belonged. The accident had occurred on the Kandla-Ahmedabad National Highway. ( 2 ) THE Tribunal, on the basis of the material on record, came to a finding that there was negligence on the part of the drivers of both the vehicles. It was held that the driver of the public carrier which was parked on the road, ought to have affixed indicators to that it was lying there while the jeep driver ought to have stopped his vehicle on seeing the public carrier. The panchnama Exh. 68 indicates that there were neither reflectors nor back lights or indicators to show that the public carrier was lying in a stationary condition on the national highway at night. The injured persons who were examined, narrated the incident and the Tribunal, in our opinion, has rightly found that there was contributory negligence to the extent of 50% on the part of both the drivers. ( 3 ) ON the basis of the material on record, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 9, 20, 000. 00 in M. A. C. Petition No. 1016 of 1995 (relatable to F. A. No. 4226 of 1998) which was apportioned on the basis of the contributory negligence, in equal shares between the owners and insurers of the two offending vehicles. In M. A. C. Petition no. 1017 of 1995 (relatable to F. A. No. 4227 of 1998), the Tribunal awarded a total amount of Rs. 15, 000. 00 apportioned in the same manner. In M. A. C. Petition No. 1018 of 1995 (relatable to F. A. No. 4228 of 1998), it awarded a total amount of Rs. In M. A. C. Petition no. 1017 of 1995 (relatable to F. A. No. 4227 of 1998), the Tribunal awarded a total amount of Rs. 15, 000. 00 apportioned in the same manner. In M. A. C. Petition No. 1018 of 1995 (relatable to F. A. No. 4228 of 1998), it awarded a total amount of Rs. 50, 000/ - payable in equal shares by the owners and insurers of the two vehicles. In M. A. C. Petition No. 1019 of 1995 (relatable to F. A. No. 4229 of 1998), a sum of Rs. 25, 000/ - was awarded to be paid in the same manner. ( 4 ) THE only contention that was raised before us on behalf of the appellant in all these appeals is that the appellant-Insurance Company which had insured the jeep car should not have been held liable under the policy in question, because, in view of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the liability in respect of the employees of the insured carried in the insureds vehicle, was not statutorily required to be covered. It was submitted that the limited liability that too only in respect of categories of employees mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of proviso (i) of Sec. 147 was required to be statutorily covered. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel in support of this contention on a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Thakor Bhemaji Ganeshji and Ors. , reported in 1993 (2) [xxxiv (2)] GLR 1051 in which it was held that in deciding the case of State of Gujarat v. Hansa Visanji Rana, reported in 1988 (2) tac 135, the Division Bench had proceeded on an unwarranted assumption that sub-clause (i) of Sec. 95 (2) (b) prescribes limit for a third party only and it erroneously held that the persons carried by reason of or in pursuance of the contract of employment would be covered by sub-sec. (2 ). The Full Bench agreed with the view taken by the earlier Division Bench in the case of Oriental Fire and General Insurance co. v. Ganchi Ramanlal Kantilal, reported in 1979 GLR 134 holding that it had taken a correct view by impliedly determining the liability for the employees under subclause (i ). (2 ). The Full Bench agreed with the view taken by the earlier Division Bench in the case of Oriental Fire and General Insurance co. v. Ganchi Ramanlal Kantilal, reported in 1979 GLR 134 holding that it had taken a correct view by impliedly determining the liability for the employees under subclause (i ). ( 5 ) THE accident had occurred on 3-9-1992 after the coming into force of the motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and, therefore, the provisions of Sec. 147 thereof will govern the field. The relevant provision that falls for our consideration reads as under :"147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability : (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which - (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx xxx (i) xxx xxx xxx (ii) xxx xxx xxx provided that a policy shall not be required - (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmens Compensation act, 1923 (VIII of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee - (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or, (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or (d) to cover any contractual liability. Explanation :- xxx xxx xxx (2) Subject to the proviso to sub-sec. (1), a policy of insurance referred to in subsec. (1), shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any accident up to the following limits namely :- (a) save as provided in clause (b), the amount of liability incurred. (b) xxx xxx xxx (3) xxx xxx xxx (4) xxx xxx xxx (5) xxx xxx xxx" ( 6 ) THE requirements of Chapter XI of the said Act must reflect in the policy of insurance as indicated in Sec. 147. Such a policy must insure a person or classes of persons specified therein to the extent specified in sub-sec. (b) xxx xxx xxx (3) xxx xxx xxx (4) xxx xxx xxx (5) xxx xxx xxx" ( 6 ) THE requirements of Chapter XI of the said Act must reflect in the policy of insurance as indicated in Sec. 147. Such a policy must insure a person or classes of persons specified therein to the extent specified in sub-sec. (2) against any liability which may be incurred by the person insured in respect of a death of or bodily injury to any person. The policy, however, shall not be required to cover liability in respect of a death of an employee or bodily injury sustained by the employee arising out of and in the course of employment of the person insured other than a liability arising under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of such death of or bodily injury. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the proviso specify types of employees to whom these provisions apply and these are the employees engaged in driving the vehicle, or engaged as a conductor of the public service vehicle or in examining tickets on the public service vehicle or employees who are carried in the vehicle which is a goods carriage. It will be seen from the above proviso that it does not carve out the employees of the insured as an exception to a liability arising in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person as contemplated under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 147, but only limits the liability to the extent that would arise under the provision of the workmens Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the three specified categories of the employees namely; driver, conductor or ticket examiner, and those who are carried in a goods carriage. This proviso does not deal with the question of the liability arising in respect of the other categories of employees who would fall under the expression "any person" occurring in Sec. 147 (1) (b) (i) of the act. This proviso does not deal with the question of the liability arising in respect of the other categories of employees who would fall under the expression "any person" occurring in Sec. 147 (1) (b) (i) of the act. The employees other than those falling in the said three specified categories in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of proviso (i) to Sec. 147 (1) of the act are simply not dealt with in this proviso and to construe this proviso so as to include all the employees of the insured would amount to enlarging its scope to a field not intended to be covered by it and to unduly reduce the efficacy of the main provision contained in Sec. 147 (1) (b) (i) of the Act which requires the policy to cover any liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person, which expression will, a fortiori, include everyone including the employees towards whom the liability of the insured arises out of the use of vehicle in a public place. On its true interpretation under the said proviso (i) the extent of liability, which otherwise would be the "amount of liability incurred" by virtue of the expression "any liability" in sub-sec. (1) (b) (i) of Sec. 147 read with sub-sec. (2) (a) thereof, is limited to the extent provided under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 in the cases of the three categories of employees specified in the said proviso (i ). If all the employees of the insured were intended to be covered, there was no need to specify these three categories of employees in proviso (i ). The statutory liability of the insurer in respect of these three specified categories of the employees seems to have been limited due to the nature of their employment as driver, conductor or as an employee carried in a goods carriage and it could not be the intention of the legislature to exclude a large number of the employees who fall outside these three categories and would be covered under the main provision of Sec. 147 (1) (b) (i) since they would fall in the expression "any person". We are, therefore, of the view that barring these three categories of the employees who are mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the provision (i) of Sec. 147 (1), in respect of all other employees, the extent of the liability of the Insurance Company will be the "amount of liability incurred" as contemplated by clause (a) of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 147 of the Act. ( 7 ) RELIANCE placed on the Full Bench judgment of the Court in the case of New india Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Thakor Bhemaji Ganeshji (supra) is wholly misconceived because it was rendered in the context of the proviso (ii) to Sec. 95 (1) (b) which proviso is absent in the corresponding provisions of Sec. 147 of the Act. It would also be seen that under the new provisions subject to the proviso to sub-sec. (i) of sec. 147, a policy of insurance referred to therein shall cover any liability incurred, in respect of any accident upto the amount of the liability incurred as laid down in sub-sec. (2) (a) of Sec. 147 of the Act, in respect of a death of or bodily injury to any person. Therefore, the new corresponding provision relating to the limit of liability does not specify the monetary limits which were earlier specified in subsec. (2) of Sec. 95 of the Act of 1939 in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person arising out of the use of a vehicle in a public place. In the case of new India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Thakor Bhemaji Ganeshji (supra), it was contended on behalf of Insurance Company that even if the victim of the accident was assumed to be carried in a vehicle by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, liability of Insurance Company in respect of such passenger would be limited to Rs. 50, 000. 00 as per sub-clause (iii) of Sec. 95 (2) (b) of the Act and not under sub-clause (i) of Sec. 95 (2) (b) which according to the Insurance Company applied in the case of a third party risk. The Full Bench observed that in view of the limited scope of controversy, it was not necessary to consider the implications of sub-sec. The Full Bench observed that in view of the limited scope of controversy, it was not necessary to consider the implications of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 95 and the proviso thereto which provided for compulsory insurance coverage against any liability which may be incurred in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person including the passengers of a public service vehicle and employees of the insured and any passenger carried in a vehicle. These observations occur in para 4 of the judgment of the Full Bench. It is thus clear that the decision in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Thakor Bhemaji Ganeshji (supra) which was in the context of the provisions of Sec. 95 of the Act of 1939, cannot assist the appellant especially when the Full Bench itself made it clear that it did not consider it necessary to go into the implications of the provisions of sub-sec. (1) and proviso thereto of Sec. 95 of the Act. As observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Mallawwa v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. , reported in JT 1988 (8) SC 217, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is now replaced by 1988 Act and sec. 147 which corresponds to the old Sec. 95 has been substantially altered by the legislature. In view of what we have said above, there is no substance in the only point which was canvassed in these appeals. All these appeals are, therefore, summarily dismissed with no order as to costs. .