JUDGMENT : - The Court: This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 17th November, 1998 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court whereby and where under the writ application filed by the private respondent herein was allowed with certain directions. 2. The fact of the matter is not much in dispute, Premises nos. 42/ 1, 42/A and 42/B Jawharlal Nehru Road, Calcutta belonged to Maharaja of Darbhanga. The said properties allegedly under the orders of the Supreme Court of India were sold in auction. The writ petitioner/private respondent purchased the said properties in the said auction. The respondents filed an application for amalgamation of the said three premises for the first time in 1995. No decision on the said application had been taken, as a result whereof the private respondents filed the aforesaid writ application claiming inter alia the following reliefs:- "(a) A writ or and/or in the nature of Certiorari do issue calling upon the respondents and each one of them, their servants, and/or agents to certify and send up to this Hon'ble Court all records and documents relating to the instant case so that conscionable justice may be done; (b) A writ or and/or in the nature of Mandamus do issue commanding the respondents and each one of them, their servants, and/or agents to forthwith amalgamate or cause to be amalgamated the said premises No.42A, 42B and 42/1, Chowringhee Road, now known as Jawharlal Nehru Road, into one new premises number. (c) Rule Nisi in terms of prayers (a) and (b) above; (d) Rule issued herein be made absolute if no sufficient cause is shown by the respondents; (e) Direction upon the respondents and each one of them, their servants and/or agents to forthwith carry out the amalgamation of the said premises bearing three several municipal premises No. 42A, 42B and 42/1, Chowringhee Road, now known as Jawharlal Nehru Road, Calcutta into one new premises number. (f) Ad-interim order in terms of prayers (d) and (e) above;" 3. From the records it appears that the writ petitioners had sent various representations as regards its prayer for amalgamation of the said three premises by reason of their letters dated 17.11.98, 27.11.98, 8.1.99, 15.1.99 and 6.2.99. 4. (f) Ad-interim order in terms of prayers (d) and (e) above;" 3. From the records it appears that the writ petitioners had sent various representations as regards its prayer for amalgamation of the said three premises by reason of their letters dated 17.11.98, 27.11.98, 8.1.99, 15.1.99 and 6.2.99. 4. Before the learned Trial Judge the appellants inter alia contended that an Advocate of Allahabad High Court raised an objection in view of a pendency of a suit in this Court and amalgamation would amount to develop within the meaning of sections 2 and 3 of the West Bengal Town & Country Planning and Development Act, 1979 where for permission would be required. It was further alleged that a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act having been issued no order of amalgamation could be granted. Admittedly, the writ petitioners/private respondents filed two writ applications-one questioning the said notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and another in which the impugned judgment has been passed. Both the writ applications, as it appears from the order passed by the learned Trial Judge, were heard together. The learned Trial Judge had allowed both the writ applications and thus inter alia set aside the notification issued by the State of West Bengal under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. 5. Before the learned Trial Judge as also before us the principal question raised was as to whether the appellant herein had any power to direct amalgamation of different premises in terms of section 178 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (for the sake of brevity hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The learned Trial Judge by reason of the impugned judgment inter alia held that such power exists in the appellant under section 178 of the said Act and keeping in view the fact that it had refused to exercises its discretion, directed amalgamation of such holdings allegedly on the ground that there exists a statute mandate to the effect that the properties shall be treated as one unit for the purpose of assessment. . 6. Mr. P.K. Roy, learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has principally raised three contentions in support of this appeal. . 6. Mr. P.K. Roy, learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has principally raised three contentions in support of this appeal. The learned counsel firstly submitted that as no Municipal Assessment Code had been framed in terms of section 178 of the said Act, the question of taking recourse to such sections 3 and 4 thereof which are dependant on the framing of the rules by the State of West Bengal, would not arise. 7. The learned counsel submitted that in absence of any power in the Municipal Commissioner or any other authority, the application filed by the first respondent must be held to be wholly disconceived. Mr. Roy would urge that in any view of the matter the learned Trial Judge committed a serious error of law in directing the appellant herein to amalgamate the said three premises. Our attention has also been drawn to a decision of this Court in Sati Development Private Ltd. vs. Calcutta Municipal Corporation, reported in 1999 (1) CHN 25 . 8. Mr. Das, learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents on the other hand submitted that non-framing of any rule by the State Government in terms of section 178 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act would not mean that sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 178 of the said provision had not come into force. According to the learned counsel, a bare perusal of the plan would show that the premises in question are not only contiguous but in effect and substance come within the purview of clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of section 178 of the said Act and thus the learned Trial Judge cannot be said to have been committed any illegality in passing the said order. Strong reliance has been placed in this connection in Corporation of Calcutta vs. Sambhu Das Pyne, reported in 1985 (I) CHN 195 . It has further been submitted that this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can exercise the same power which the statutory authority can while exercising his discretionary power. Reliance has been placed in connection in the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Gian Prakash, New Delhi & Anr. Vs. K.S. Jagannathan & Anr., reported in AIR 1987 SC 537 ; State Transport Authority, W.B. vs. Asis Kr. Reliance has been placed in connection in the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Gian Prakash, New Delhi & Anr. Vs. K.S. Jagannathan & Anr., reported in AIR 1987 SC 537 ; State Transport Authority, W.B. vs. Asis Kr. Roy & Ors., reported in AIR 1995 Cal 42 ; State Transport of West Bengal & Ors. vs. Ashis Kumar Roy & Ors., reported in 100 CWN 591 and Mohit Kr. Saha vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., reported in AIR 1997 Cal 179 . 9. Attention of this Court has further been drawn to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Calcutta Municipal Corporation vs. M/s. Bala Bestos India Ltd., reported in 1998 (1) CHN 492 for the proposition that therein also a contention had been raised in relation to interpretation of sub-section (3) of section 178, but this Court refused to exercise its discretion in favour of the writ petitioner/appellant and directed it to take recourse to the alternative remedy. The learned counsel also distinguished the decision in Sati Development (supra) stating that the said decision had been rendered on its own fact and it cannot be said that therein the question had either been raised or had been answered. According to the learned counsel •the said decision cannot be relied upon as a precedent and in support of the said contention reliance has been placed in Jaya Sen vs. Sujit Kumar Sarkar, reported in AIR 1998 Cal 288 . Lastly, Mr. Das would urge that in any event keeping in view the statements made by Mr. Dipankar Sinha which has been published in the daily Ananda Bazar Patrika on 23rd December, 1998 it will be futile to refer the matter back to the authority concerned. Strong reliance has been placed upon a decision of the Apex Court in K.I. Shephard & Ors. vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1988 SC 686 . 10. Mr. Das further submitted that in any event if the matter is remitted back to the appropriate authority of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, the result would be the same. 11. The principal question which arises for consideration by this Court is as to whether the Municipal Commissioner has any power to pass an order for amalgamating or separating the land or building or portion thereof in respect of the premises for which an assessment has been or to be made. 12. 11. The principal question which arises for consideration by this Court is as to whether the Municipal Commissioner has any power to pass an order for amalgamating or separating the land or building or portion thereof in respect of the premises for which an assessment has been or to be made. 12. Section 178 provides for framing of Municipal Assessment Code. In terms of Section 178 of the said Act the State Government may by rules provide for the detailed procedure for determination of the annual value of lands or buildings in Calcutta and the matters connected therewith and such rules together with any regulations made under the Act shall constitute the Municipal Assessment Code. Admittedly, no rule has been framed by the State Government in terms of the said provision. Admittedly, no regulation has also been made by the Corporation in that regard. 13. Mr. Das further submitted that in the event the learned Trial Judge having exercised its discretion this Court sitting in appeal shall not set aside the same even if the said order is wrong. Reliance has been placed in Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & Ors., reported in AIR 1980 SC 1896 . 14. Before proceeding to deal with the matter we may however place on record that Mr. Das had placed before us some documents to show that guidelines had been framed to that effect as if a regulation has been framed by the Corporation but nothing has been brought on records to show that such regulation conforms to the requirements of sections 602 and 604 of the said Act. It is, therefore, evident that neither any rule has been made by the State nor any regulation has been made by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation so as to bring into effect the Municipal Assessment Code. 15. Sub-section (2) of section 178 of the Act enumerate the matters to be covered by such rules. Sub-section (2) of Section 178 reads as follows: 'all lands or buildings, to the extent these are contiguous or are within the same cartilage or are on the same foundation and are owned by the same owner or co-owners as an .undivided property, shall be treated as one unit for the purpose of assessment under this Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 178 reads as follows: 'all lands or buildings, to the extent these are contiguous or are within the same cartilage or are on the same foundation and are owned by the same owner or co-owners as an .undivided property, shall be treated as one unit for the purpose of assessment under this Act. Sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) of section 178 reads thus: (3) Notwithstanding the assessments made before the commencement of this Act, the Municipal Commissioner on his own may amalgamate or separate or continue to assess as such, as the case may be, lands or buildings or portions thereof so as to ensure conformity with the provisions of this section. (4) If the ownership of any land or building or a portion thereof is sub-divided into separate shares or if more than one land or building or portions thereof by amalgamation come under one ownership, the Municipal Commissioner may on an application from the owners or co-owners, separate or amalgamate, as the case may be, such lands or buildings or portions thereof so as to ensure conformity with the provisions of• this section. 16. Admittedly, the Municipal Commissioner had not taken any action suo motu and, therefore, sub-section (3) of section 178 has no application in the instant case. As indicated hereinbefore, according to Mr. Roy keeping in view the fact that no rule has yet beep made and thus Municipal Assessment Code having not come into force, the question of taking recourse to sub-sections (3) and (4) thereof by the Municipal Commissioner does not arise. Mr. Das, however, on the other hand would urge that the words so as to ensure conformity with the provisions of this section "would mean that the provision of sub-sections (3) and (4) had come into force despite non-framing of Rules" and in that view of the matter clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of section 178 of the Act can also be given effect to, as has been held by the learned Trial Judge. 17. Section 178, as noticed hereinbefore, speaks of Municipal Assessment Code. Although heading of the section cannot be taken aid of for the purpose of construction of a statute when the wordings thereof are absolutely clear but in a case where ambiguity exists, the heading can also be referred to for the purpose of construction of the section. 17. Section 178, as noticed hereinbefore, speaks of Municipal Assessment Code. Although heading of the section cannot be taken aid of for the purpose of construction of a statute when the wordings thereof are absolutely clear but in a case where ambiguity exists, the heading can also be referred to for the purpose of construction of the section. Reference in this connection has been made in Dhan Raj & Ors. vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., reported in 1998 (4) SCC 30 . 18. The very fact that sub-sections (3) and (4) occur under the heading, 'Municipal Assessment Code', we are of the opinion that sub-sections (3) and (4) do not confer any independent power upon the Municipal Commissioner unless the Municipal Assessment Code itself comes into force by reason of the rules and regulations made in terms of section 178 read with section 600 vis-a-vis. section 602 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 19. It is true as has been contended by Mr. Das that only because rules have not been made, the same may not mean the statute itself has not come 'into force. The law, in our opinion, is that a statute comes into force despite non-framing of the rules, if the same can be given effect to on its own force. In other words if despite non-framing of the rules the statute is a workable one the same comes into force. However, in a case where for bringing a statute into effect reference to the rules which are yet to be framed is necessary in absence whereof, the statute cannot be given effect to, unless' the rules are framed the statute cannot be said to have come into force. 20. However, in a case where for bringing a statute into effect reference to the rules which are yet to be framed is necessary in absence whereof, the statute cannot be given effect to, unless' the rules are framed the statute cannot be said to have come into force. 20. Francis Bennion in his work on Statutory Interpretation 3rd edition page 209 states, as follows:- 'Where an Act which (or any provision' of which) does not come into force immediately on its passing confers power to make delegated legislation, or to make appointments, give notices, prescribe forms or do any other thing for the purposes of the Act, then, unless the contrary intention appears, the power may be exercised, and any instrument made there under may be made so as to come into force, at any time after the passing of the Act so far as may be necessary or expedient for the purpose- (a) of bringing the Act or any provision of the Act into force; or (b) of giving full effect to the Act or any such provision at or after the time when it comes into force'. 21. In Corporation of Calcutta vs. Sambhu Das Pyne, reported in 1985 (1) CHN 195 a Division Bench of this Court was considering a question as to whether is absence of coming into force of Municipal Assessment Code an order of assessment on 'Busti', would be valid? 22. It has been held that such assessment would be valid in law. No exception to the said proposition of law can be taken in view of the fact that even the 1980 Act provides for a charging section which is contained in section 170 and further provides for assessment of consolidated rate in section 171. Exemptions which are to be granted to some occupiers are specified in sections 172 and 173 of the Act. Section 174 provides for determination of annual valuation. Section 175 specifies the manner in which annual valuation of land, hut and building has to be made which are comprised in thika tenancy. Exemptions which are to be granted to some occupiers are specified in sections 172 and 173 of the Act. Section 174 provides for determination of annual valuation. Section 175 specifies the manner in which annual valuation of land, hut and building has to be made which are comprised in thika tenancy. Section 176 provides for annual valuation of lands or buildings belonging to various Statutory bodies; whereas section 177 provides for determination of annual valuation of building where lands are consolidated under the provisions of sections 170 to 177, which provide that all lands and buildings subject to the exceptions referred to therein shall be subject to assessment of consolidated rate and the methodology therefore and the detailed procedures in respect thereof had been laid down therein. 23. It may be that the makers of the Act thought of framing a Municipal Assessment Code so as to provide for a better machinery and methodology for assessments of consolidated rates in respect of lands and buildings as also the matters connected therewith. 24. The matter relating to amalgamation or separation is a matter connected with the assessment of the consolidated rate which depends upon that determination of the annual valuation of lands and buildings. 25. In view of the fact that unless the Rule are framed, the Assessment Code itself had not come into force, in our opinion, keeping in view the words used in sub-sections (3) and (4) to the effect that such orders must ensure conformity with the provision of the section would mean such section which had come into force and not otherwise, as in absence of any Rule no Municipal Assessment Code can be said to have been framed. Attempts to find out source of such power to pass an order of amalgamation or separation in sub-section (2) of section 178 cannot be countenanced. 26. The learned Trial Judge, therefore, in our opinion, was not correct in holding that such a power exists in clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of section 178 of the Act. 27. The question which now arises for consideration is as to whether despite the same can it be said that Municipal Commissioner does not have any power to pass an order, relating to amalgamation or separation of the holdings whatsoever? 28. Mr. 27. The question which now arises for consideration is as to whether despite the same can it be said that Municipal Commissioner does not have any power to pass an order, relating to amalgamation or separation of the holdings whatsoever? 28. Mr. Roy, in answer to our specific query, as to whether at any point of time since enactment of Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 any contention had been raised by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation that they have no such power, could not bring to our notice any case whatsoever. On the other hand, the cases relied upon by the learned Counsel for both parties clearly suggest that such a contention had never been raised. As a matter of fact, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, in the instant case also, had not raised a contention before the learned Trial. Judge that the Municipal Commissioner has no power to pass an order on the application for amalgamation filed by the petitioners. It had taken various pleas but not the plea of absence of power. Furthermore, Mr. Roy himself suggested while interpreting the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 178 that the matter of amalgamation or separation would come within the purview of this words "and for other matters connected therewith" occurring in subsection (1) of section 178. The power of assessment determining the annual valuation, as noticed hereinbefore, had been provided in the said Act. An order of amalgamation or separation would, therefore, be a matter which would be incidental or ancillary to the power of assessment of determination of the annual value, on the basis whereof consolidated rates of lands and buildings has to be assessed. When there exists a long-standing practice and the owners of the lands and buildings as also the authority concerned had all along acted thereupon, there cannot be any doubt that the doctrine of legitimate expectation can be taken in aid of, for holding that such a power existed in the authorities of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and the same had all along been exercised. In a recent decision in M.P. Oil Extruction vs. State of M.P., reported in 1997 (7) SCC 592 , G.N. Ray, J. speaking for the Division Bench stated:- "44. The renewal clause in the impugned agreements executed in favour of the respondents does not also appear to be unjust or improper. In a recent decision in M.P. Oil Extruction vs. State of M.P., reported in 1997 (7) SCC 592 , G.N. Ray, J. speaking for the Division Bench stated:- "44. The renewal clause in the impugned agreements executed in favour of the respondents does not also appear to be unjust or improper. Whether protection by way of supply of sal seeds under the terms of agreement requires to be continued for a further period, is a matter for decision by the State Government and unless such decision is patently arbitrary, interference by the Court is not called for. In the facts of the case, the decision of the State Government to extend the protection for further period cannot be held to be per se irrational, arbitrary or capricious warranting judicial review of such policy decision. Therefore, the High Court has rightly rejected the appellant's contention about the invalidity of the renewal clause. The appellants failed in earlier attempts to challenge the validity of the agreement including the renewal clause. The subsequent challenge of the renewal clause, therefore, should not be entertained unless it can be clearly demonstrated that the fact situation has undergone such changes that the discretion in the matter of renewal of agreement should not be exercised by the State. It has been rightly contended by Dr. Singhvi that the respondents legitimately expect that the renewal clause should be given effect to in usual manner and according to past practice unless there is any special reason not to adhere to such practice. The doctrine of "legitimate expectation" has been judicially recognized by this Court in a number of decisions. The doctrine of "legitimate expectation" operates in the domain of public law and in an appropriate case, constitutes a• substantive and enforceable right." 29. In Calcutta Municipal Corporation vs. Bala Bestos India Ltd., reported in 1998 (1) CHN 492 this Court although referred to the provision of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 178 of the Act, no decision thereupon had been rendered but therein the writ petitioner was merely asked to avail the alternative remedy of Statutory appeal provided under the Act. The said decision, therefore, cannot be said to have any application in the instant case. In Sati Development Private - Limited vs. Calcutta Municipal Corporation and Ors., reported in 1999 (1) CHN 25 . The said decision, therefore, cannot be said to have any application in the instant case. In Sati Development Private - Limited vs. Calcutta Municipal Corporation and Ors., reported in 1999 (1) CHN 25 . Learned Single Judge of this Court upheld an order rejecting the prayer for amalgamation on the ground that the same was contrary to an expert committee report. In fact, by reason of the said decision the learned Trial Judge had upheld the authority of the Municipal Commissioner to reject an application for amalgamation inter alia on the ground that the same not only was a reasoned order but was backed up by a report of an expert body. In the aforementioned situation the learned Trial Judge had refused to exercise his discretion in the matter. 30. The next question which arises for consideration is as to whether the appellants herein acted illegally in not passing an order on the petitioner's application for amalgamation of the aforementioned premises. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that a statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction reasonably. In view of the doctrine of reasonableness embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the statutory authorities are expected to pass an order in exercise of their statutory power within a reasonable time. If a statutory authority does not pass an order within a reasonable time, the same itself would attract Article 14 of the Constitution of India in which event the Court would be entitled to issue a writ of mandamus directing them to exercise such power within a time frame to be specified by the Court in this behalf. 31. Admittedly no such order had been passed. The Court, therefore, was entitled to issue a writ of mandamus but could not issue such a writ, in the manner as has been done in the instant case. 32. The learned Trial Judge proceeded on the basis that sub-section (2) of section 178 which has come into force and thus a duty has been cast upon the Municipal Commissioner to pass an order in the manner laid down therein and in no other manner. As sub-section (2) of section 178 had not come into force such a direction could not have been given. Furthermore, the appellants herein had raised a number of contentions as regards the fulfilment of the requirements for exercising such power by the Municipal Commissioner. As sub-section (2) of section 178 had not come into force such a direction could not have been given. Furthermore, the appellants herein had raised a number of contentions as regards the fulfilment of the requirements for exercising such power by the Municipal Commissioner. The Writ Court while exercising its jurisdiction should not enter into a disputed question and at the first instance should allow a statutory authority to exercise its statutory discretion. Mr. Das is correct in submitting that on several occasions the Apex Court as also this Court had issued such directions but the fact situation in each of the cases referred to by the learned Counsel was different. It is relevant to notice a recent decision of the Apex Court in State of W.B. vs. Nuruddin Mallick and Ors., reported in 1998 (8) SCC 143 wherein the Apex Court in no uncertain term rejected such a contention stating : 28. It is not in dispute in this case that after the management sent its letter dated 6.8.92 for the approval of its 31 staff, viz. both teaching and non-teaching staff, both the District Inspector of Schools and the Secretary of the Board sought for certain information through their letters dated 21.9.1992. Instead of sending any reply, the management filed the writ petition in the High Court, leading to passing of the impugned orders. Thus till this date the appellant-authorities have not yet exercised their discretion. Submission for the respondents was that this Court itself should examine and decide the question in issue based on the material on record to set rest the long standing issue. We have no hesitation to decline such a suggestion. The Courts can either direct the statutory authorities, where it is not exercising its discretion, by mandamus to exercise its discretions or when exercised, to see whether it has been validly exercised. It. would be inappropriate for the Court to substitute itself for the statutory authorities to decide the matter. The dicta had been repeated in paragraph 30 of the judgment in the following terms :- 'As we have hold above, without the statutory authority applying its mind for their approval and the impugned order not adjudicating the issue in .question how could the impugned orders be sustained. 33. The dicta had been repeated in paragraph 30 of the judgment in the following terms :- 'As we have hold above, without the statutory authority applying its mind for their approval and the impugned order not adjudicating the issue in .question how could the impugned orders be sustained. 33. For the reasons aforementioned and keeping in view the contentions raised by the respondents, we are of the opinion that a direction can only be issued to the Municipal Commissioner to consider the matter by issuing a writ of or in the nature of mandamus. It is also true that the Apex Court in K. I. Shephard & Ors. vs. Union of India, reported in 1988 SC 686 held that normally statutory authority pass the same order it had passed, but in the instant case the situation is absolutely different. 34. The Municipal Commissioner is yet to exercise his discretion. He had not yet passed any order. Only in the .affidavit-in-opposition same contention, has been raised, but there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that before an appropriate final order is passed, the Municipal Commissioner being a high ranking officer is expected to act independently fairly and reasonably. Such an order also is required to be passed only upon giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant or their representative. If their exists any deficiency in filing the said application, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the respondent herein who are fifteen in numbers would be permitted to make necessary corrections in the application and/or to rectify the same. It will be preposterous for us to proceed on the presumption that only because an officer of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation has issued certain statements in the newspaper, the respondents would not get any relief. The newspaper report as is well known cannot be relied upon in absence of any affidavit inasmuch as the same is a second hand secondary evidence. In Laxmi Raj Shetty and Anr. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in 1998 (3) SCC 319 the Apex Court held :- "25. As to the first, the accused Laxmi Raj Shetty was entitled to tender the newspaper report from the Indian Express of the 29th and the regional newspapers of the 30th along with his statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. As to the first, the accused Laxmi Raj Shetty was entitled to tender the newspaper report from the Indian Express of the 29th and the regional newspapers of the 30th along with his statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Both the accused at the stage of their defence, in denial of the charge had summoned the editors of Tamil dailies Malai Murasu and Makkal Kural and news reporters of the Indian Express and Dina Thanthi to prove the contents of the facts stated in the news item but they dispensed with their examination on the date fixed for the defence evidence. We cannot take judicial notice of the facts stated in a news item being in the nature of hearsay secondary evidence, unless proved by evidence aliunde. A report in a newspaper is only hearsay evidence. A newspaper is not one of the documents referred to in section 78(2) of the Evidence Act, 1872 by which an allegation of fact can be proved. The presumption of genuineness attached under section 81 of the Evidence Act to a newspaper report cannot be treated as proved of the facts reported therein. 26. It is now well settled that a statement of fact contained in a newspaper is merely hearsay and therefore, inadmissible in evidence in absence of the maker of the statement appearing in Court and deposing to have perceived the fact reported. The accused should have, therefore, produced the persons in whose presence the seizure of the stolen money from appellant 2's house at Mangalore was affected or examined the" press correspondence in proof of the truth of the contents of the news item. The question as to the admissibility of newspaper reports has been dealt with by this Court in Samant N. Balkrishna vs. George Fernandez. The question arose whether Shri George Fernandez, the successful candidate returned to Parliament from the Bombay South Parliamentary Constituency had delivered a speech at Shivaji Park attributed to him as reported in the Maratha a widely circulated Marathi newspaper in Bombay, and it was said: (SCC p. 261, para 47) 'A newspaper item without any further proof of what had actually happened through witnesses is of no value. It is at best a secondhand secondary evidence., It is well known that reporters collect information and pass it on to the edits the news item and then publishes it. It is at best a secondhand secondary evidence., It is well known that reporters collect information and pass it on to the edits the news item and then publishes it. In this process the truth might get perverted or garbled. Such news items cannot be said to prove themselves although they may be taken into account with other evidence if the other evidence is forcible. We need not burden the judgment with many citations. There is nothing on record to substantiate the facts as reported in the newspapers showing recovery of the stolen amount from the residence of appellant 2 at Mangalore. We have, therefore, no reason to discard the testimony of P.W. 50 and the seizure witnesses which to establish that the amount in question was actually recovered at Madras on the 29th and the 30th as alleged.'" 35. In Quamarul Islam vs. S. K. Kanta "& Ors., reported in 1994 (1) JT 452 , the Apex Court held : '48. Newspaper reports by themselves are not evidence of the contents thereof. Those reports are only hearsay evidence. These have to be proved and the manner of proving a newspaper report is well settled. Since, in this case, neither the reporter who heard the speech and sent the report was examined nor even his reports produced, the production of the newspaper "by the Editor and Publisher, P.W. 4 by itself cannot amount to proving the contents if the newspaper reports. Newspaper, is at the best secondary evidence of its contents and it not admissible in evidence without proper proof of the contents under the Indian Evidence Act.' 36. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever about the proposition of law to the effect that normally an Appeal Court would not interfere with the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by a Court only because the same is not right but would interfere therewith only when" it is clearly wrong as has been observed by Krishna Ayer, J. in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. (supra). But in the instant case the learned Trial Judge misdirected himself in law in posing a wrong question. Ask a wrong question and get a wrong answer is an age old saying. The learned Trial Judge not only has misinterpreted the provision of law but had proceeded on the basis of a nonexistent law. But in the instant case the learned Trial Judge misdirected himself in law in posing a wrong question. Ask a wrong question and get a wrong answer is an age old saying. The learned Trial Judge not only has misinterpreted the provision of law but had proceeded on the basis of a nonexistent law. The directions issued by the learned Trial Judge, therefore, are clearly wrong and requires interference to that extent. 37. For the reasons aforementioned we allow the appeal in part and direct the Municipal Commissioner to consider "the application for amalgamation filed by the writ petitioners/respondents as expeditiously as possible but not later than two months from the date of communication of this order. Such an order must be a speaking one and before passing such orders the writ petitioners/respondents shall be given an opportunity of hearing through their authorised representative or a Counsel. 38. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. 39. All parties to act on a xerox certified copy of this judgment to be delivered on priority basis, on the usual undertakings. Appeal allowed in part.