The Order of Court was made by Somnath Iyer, J.- In this application presented under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we are asked to issue a direction of the nature of a habeas corpus under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of that section that a certain Veeresh who is the husband of the applicant be set at liberty. On the material facts there is very little dispute. It is common ground that on 25th September, 1964, a political organisation known as “The Samyukta Socialist Party of India” organised what is described as the Bharat Band day to ‘protest against the food policy of the Government and to urge the Government to bring down the prices of the foodstuffs.’ It is stated in the application made by the wife of the detenue that when a procession consisting of a large number of persons was taken out in the town of Bellary on that day, the procession became unruly and some persons indulged in unlawful acts such as looting of shops. The detenue with whom we are concerned in the case before us is a resident of the town of Bellary. In consequence of the incidents which happened on the Bharat Band day, the police authorities in Bellary presented 14 charge-sheets before a Magistrate of Bellary in which the detenue along with several other persons were accused of various offences including offences of rioting and dacoity. The detenue had been placed under arrest during the course of investigation of those offences on 27th September, 1964. It is an admitted fact that in all the cases in which the detenue was prosecuted, applications for bail were made. The earliest of those applications was made on 31st October, 1964. The Magistrate made orders enlarging the detenue on bail in all the fourteen cases in which he was an accused. The earliest order was made on 30th October, 1964 and the last order on 12th November, 1964. It took some time for the detenue to furnish security which Was required of him, and, so, the order for his release from custody was made eventually only on 13th November, 1964. In the meanwhile the Deputy Commissioner of Bellary had made the impugned order of detention under rule 30(1)(b)and rule 30(4) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. It took some time for the detenue to furnish security which Was required of him, and, so, the order for his release from custody was made eventually only on 13th November, 1964. In the meanwhile the Deputy Commissioner of Bellary had made the impugned order of detention under rule 30(1)(b)and rule 30(4) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. This order was made by him on 8th October, 1964, and was served on the detenue after he was released from custody in implementation of the order granting him bail. On 11th January, 1965, the wife of the detenue who is the applicant before us made the present application to us for a direction that the detenue should be set at liberty. The principal complaint made in this application is that the order of detention is a mala fide order. In that context what was pressed on us was that the impugned order which was made during the pendency of the applications for bail, had for its aim the nullification of the effect of any order that might be made by the Magistrate granting bail. It was also contended during the course of the argument, although no such allegation was made in the affidavit accompanying the application, that an order of the State Government made on 6th January, 1965 which Was necessary under sub-rule (6) of rule 30-A and by which the State Government confirmed the order of detention, was mechanically made without the application of their mind to the relevant circumstances and that the continuance of the detenue in detention was also illegal. It was also submitted that the order of detention was both illegal and improper and that the detenue was, therefore, entitled to be set at liberty. It is not controverted before us that the power to make an order of detention which is authorised by rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 and of which the repository was the State Government, was delegated under section 40(2) of the Defence of India Act, by an order made for that purpose by the State Government on 20th August, 1963. The delegate was the Deputy Commissioner of each district within his respective jurisdiction. That being so, it is not disputed that the Deputy Commissioner of Bellary who made the order of detention had acquired the power to make it. The delegate was the Deputy Commissioner of each district within his respective jurisdiction. That being so, it is not disputed that the Deputy Commissioner of Bellary who made the order of detention had acquired the power to make it. Now the impugned order of detention reads: “Whereas I, Sri D.S. Raghavendrachar, I.A.S., Deputy Commissioner, Bellary, District am satisfied that it is necessary to prevent the person known as Sri K.S. Veeresh s/o Sri Kotrappa now residing in Bellary Town from acting in a manner prejudicial to the Defence of India and Civil Defence, the public safety and maintenance of public order and therefore it is necessary to make an order directing him to be detained. Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred on me under clause (b) of sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (4) of rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, read with State Government Notification No. HD 221 SST 62 dated 20th August, 1983, I hereby direct that the said person Sri K.S. Veeresh, be detained in the Central Jail, Bangalore. Given under my hand and seal this day the 8th October, 1964. Sd. D.S. Raghavendrachar. Deputy Commissioner, Bellary District.” The fact that if the Deputy Commissioner was satisfied that with a view to prevent the detenue from acting in a manner prejudicial tothe Defence of India and Civil Defence, public safety and maintenance of public order, it was necessary to detain him, he would have undoubted competence to make an order of detention is not disputed. Since in the order of detention it is stated that the Deputy Commissioner was satisfied that it was necessary to detain Veeresh with a view to prevent the prejudicial activities such as those referred to in the order of detention, if nothing else could be said about the matter, it would follow that the order of detention would be above reproach. What is equally clear is that as declared by the Supreme Court in Makan Singh v. The State of Punjab1 the President’s order made under Article 359 of the Constitution suspends the right to move this Court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution if the deprivation of those rights was caused under the Defence of India Act, 1962 or the Defence of India Rules, 1962. So it was maintained by Mr. So it was maintained by Mr. Hiremath before us that he would not urge in support of this application that there was any deprivation of any fundamental right created by Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution. He depended upon the elucidation made by the Supreme Court that notwithstanding the President’s order, this Court would have jurisdiction and power to investigate into the justification for the detention, where a contravention of the Defence of India Act or the Rules is established or where it is proved that the order of detention was made mala fide. Mr. Hiremath made the further submission that it was pointed out by the Supreme Court that the argument in support of a direction under section 491(1)(b)of the Code of Criminal Procedure may also be advanced if there was excessive delegation of the power to make the detention and that cases in which powers could be exercised by the Court such as those specified by the Supreme Court were merely illustrative and not exhaustive. So it was pressed on us that we could issue the direction that the detenue should be set at liberty if it was established that the order of detention was made mala fide or if it was established that there was contravention of the Defence of India Act or the Rules. In addition, it was submitted that even if the order of detention was not illegal, the release of the detenue could be ordered if we are satisfied that the detention was, in the circumstances, improper. Section 491(1)(b)of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads: Power to issue directions of the nature of a habeas corpus. 491. (1) Any High Court may, whenever it thinks fit, direct: * * * * * * (b) that a person illegally or improperly detained in public or private custody within such limits be set at liberty; * * * * * *" The first question that would, therefore, arise in the context of the argument that the detention was both illegal and improper is whether as urged for the detenue, the order of detention was a mala fide order. In support of the submission that it was, it was said that the very fact that the detaining authority made an order of detention on 8th October, 1964, within a week after the earliest application was made by the detenue for his enlargement on bail, was itself more than sufficient proof of the intention on the part of detaining authority to defeat the purpose of that bail application. It is true that although the disturbances emanating from the agitation happened on 25th September, 1964 and the accused was arrested during the investigation of the offences said to have been committed during such disturbances on 27th September, 1964, the order of detention was made only on 8th October, 1964 after the very first application for bail was presented on 3rd October, 1964. But it is clear that this chronology or sequence cannot but constitute extremely slender foundation for the theory that the order of detention was made for the collateral purpose suggested. Neither the fact that the detenue sought bail, nor even the fact that there were prosecutions pending against the detenue, can by itself establish that the order of detention was made for an oblique purpose. Mr. Advocate-General, in my opinion, was right in contending before us that the Deputy Commissioner could not be accused of having teen actuated by any mala fides when he made the order of detention, even if the purpose in making the order of detention was that in the event of the accused being able to obtain bail, he should not be able to secure freedom to engage himself in prejudicial activities such as those stated in the order of detention, if there were grounds for entertaining the belief that the freedom secured through the order of bail would only enable the detenue to engage himself in that manner and he was likely to do so. In Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. The State of Punjab1 it was explained by the Supreme Court that even in such a case the order of detention is not liable to he assailed on the ground that it was made in anticipation of the enlargement on bail of the detenue by a Court before whom he was being prosecuted for some other offence. This is what was said in that case: "Even though the appellant was in jail custody, it is not unlikely that he could have applied for bail and might have obtained an order of bail, and bearing that contingency in mind, the appropriate authority would be justified in making an order of detention against the appellant, provided of course, the authority waited for the service of the order after the appellant was released on bail;........In fact, we were told that after the criminal case pending against the appellant was transferred from Amritsar to a Court of competent jurisdiction in U.P. the said Court has allowed the appellant’s application for bail, subject, of course, to his detention under the impugned order of detention: and so, the possibility that the appropriate authority might have apprehended that the appellant would move for bail and might succeed in that behalf cannot be ruled out in dealing with the question about the validity of the making of the order......" (1125). The principle which emerges from the three pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the cases of Makhan Singh1, Makhan Singh2 and Smt. Godavari Shamrao Parulekar v. The State of Maharastra3 is that the fact that a person is already in jail custody facing a prosecution for some other offence is no impediment to an order of detention under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, provided, however, the order of detention is not served on the detenue when he is still in such custody. Indeed in Godavari’s case3 what was further elucidated was that if a detenue was not in jail custody either as an under-trial prisoner or because he has already been convicted of an offence and is undergoing imprisonment, it was not necessary for the detaining authority, to serve the order of detention, to wait for the detenue to come out of the jail where he is in custody. That was a case in which after the substitution of an order of detention under the Preventive Detention Act by an order of detention made under the Defence of India Rules, the detenue was served with an order of detention even before he had been released from the custody in which he was, in consequence of the preceding order of detention. It was explained by the Supreme Court that insistence upon the service of the order of detention under the Defence of India Rules only after he had been freed from detention under the Preventive Detention Act, was, in the circumstance an empty formality. So, what is clear from what has been said so far is that neither the fact that there were prosecutions pending against the detenue, nor the fact that he had been arrested in connection with the offences for which he was being prosecuted, and not even the fact that the order of detention was made during the pendency of an application for enlargement on bail, could constitute any legal impediment to an order of detention if it was otherwise permissible. Mr. Hiremath, however contended that although it was legally permissible for the detaining authority to make an order of detention when the detenue was in jail custody and after he had made an application for his enlargement on bail, the order of detention would still be liable to be denounced as a mala fide order if it is established that its purpose was no more than detention notwithstanding enlargement on bail without there being any bona fide intention or desire to prevent the prejudicial activities. So stated, the proposition would be unexceptionable. If indeed the desire on the part of the detaining authority was to bring about a deprivation of the benefit of bail and to somehow or other keep him under duress without there being any real satisfaction in the mind of the detaining authority that it was necessary to make an order of detention with a view to prevent prejudicial activities, the detenue would, of course, be entitled to be set at liberty. We were asked to say that the real purpose of the order of detention was that the enlargement of the detenue on bail should not become effective, and, that there was really no satisfaction in the mind of the detaining authority that the detention was necessary to prevent any prejudicial activity. In support of this argument, more than one submission was made. It was said that we should deduce mala fide from more than one circumstance. It was first said that the Superintendent of the Central Jail who was having the custody of the detenue did not allow the legal advisers of the detenue to have interviews with him. In support of this argument, more than one submission was made. It was said that we should deduce mala fide from more than one circumstance. It was first said that the Superintendent of the Central Jail who was having the custody of the detenue did not allow the legal advisers of the detenue to have interviews with him. The relevant allegation in the affidavit of the wife of the detenue reads: “11. When an interview was sought by legal advisers with my husband the person in charge of the custody of my husband refused to grant an interview saying that there is a rule not to grant any interview. As far as my knowledge goes I am not aware of any such rule.” It may be that Mr. Hiremath is right when he urges that the refusal of the interview on the ground that there was no express rule authorising it, may be open to criticism particularly by reason of the provisions in section 44 of the Defence of India Act which prohibits interference with ordinary avocations of life except to the extent demanded by public safety and interest. So, when the detenue was facing a large number of prosecutions against him, if he really wanted interviews with his legal advisers unless such interviews were injurious to public safety or interest, their refusal might be impermissible. But it is not, to my mind, right to say that from the refusal of the interviews by the Superintendent who was having the custody of the detenue, any deduction is possible that the detaining authority had any responsibility for such refusal or that such refusal is attributable to mala fides on his part when he made the order of detention. It should he pointed out here that paragraph 11 of the wife’s affidavit is somewhat obscure, since, it does not very clearly state whether the interview which was refused was an interview between the legal advisers appearing before this Court to support this application, or, whether it was an interview by the legal advisers defending the detenue in the other prosecutions. It should also be mentioned here that after this application was made, we were asked for a direction that the detenue should be produced before us and that direction was made on the Advocate-General consenting to it. After his production, Mr. It should also be mentioned here that after this application was made, we were asked for a direction that the detenue should be produced before us and that direction was made on the Advocate-General consenting to it. After his production, Mr. Hiremath does not dispute, that when he was produced here whatever interview was necessary in connection with this application became available and that he was able to have all the discussion which he wished to have with the detenue in the case before us. Then again for a period of 15 days thereafter the detenue was on parole by an order made by the State Government. It is urged that in a case where interviews like the one with which we are concerned is unreasonably and improperly refused this Court may issue an appropriate direction that that interview shall be made possible, subject of course to conditions which may be imposed in that regard. But it does not appear to me that on the materials before us it would at all be proper to think that any mala fides could be deduced on the part of the detaining authority by reason of the refusal of an interview by the Jail Superintendent even if such refusal was unreasonable. It was however said that there was some interference with the right of the detenue to engage a Counsel which he could exercise under section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of the prosecutions pending against him. About that, there is not only no allegation in any of the two affidavits produced before us but there is also no proof. On the contrary, Mr. Hiremath who made this submission during the course of the arguments had to admit that a Counsel did appear for the detenue both before the Magistrate and before this Court to support his applications for bail. In the view I take, the observations in Prabhakar Kesheo Tare v. Emperor1 and Vimala Bai Deshpande v. Emperor2 made by their Lordships of the Nagpur High Court on which Mr. Hiremath depends in the context of the permissibility or appropriateness of refusal of interviews do not really arise for discussion. Considerable dependence was next placed on the presentation of applications for the transfer of the criminal cases pending before the Magistrate of Bellary after he had granted bail in those proceedings. Hiremath depends in the context of the permissibility or appropriateness of refusal of interviews do not really arise for discussion. Considerable dependence was next placed on the presentation of applications for the transfer of the criminal cases pending before the Magistrate of Bellary after he had granted bail in those proceedings. It was in paragraph 10 of the wife’s affidavit that she stated thus: “I have learnt that the Prosecutor has applied for the transfer of these cases, on the ground that the Magistrate granted bail to my husband and others, which shows that State has no confidence in the ordinary Court of law established under the ordinary law. Granting bail to an accused is one of the incidents of the administration of Criminal Justice. If on such a ground the State is to ask for the transfer of the cases, it shows the clear intention of mala fides on the part of the State.” This allegation is confuted by the detaining authority in his affidavit in which he asserts that he made no direction for the presentation of any application for transfer of any of the cases in which the detenue had been implicated. He added that he had learnt that applications had been made by the Assistant Public Prosecutor of Bellary for such transfer on the ground that there was some kind of a premature expression of opinion on the merits of the case when the Magistrate granted the bail. The allegation by the wife that the presentation of the transfer applications was attributable to undermined confidence in the mind of the State Government in the ordinary criminal Court in which the detenue was being prosecuted, and, the further allegation that the transfer applications demonstrated mala fides on the part of the State, make it impossible for anyone to suggest that those transfer applications can constitute any index of any absence of good faith or mala fides on the part of the detaining authority who asserts that he was in no-wise responsible for the presentation of those applications. What was however, next urged was that it is just possible that the order of detention was founded on no other material than that the detenue had committed offences with which he was charged. It was urged that if that be the true position two consequences ensue. What was however, next urged was that it is just possible that the order of detention was founded on no other material than that the detenue had committed offences with which he was charged. It was urged that if that be the true position two consequences ensue. First it was said that the detention would become illegal by reason of simultaneous and concurrent exercise of two powers one of which was the power to prosecute the detenue under the ordinary law and the other being the power to make an order of detention. Mr. Hiremath submitted that a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Maledath Bharathan Malyali v. The Commissioner of Police1 made the enunciation that once the detaining authority made an order of detention under the Bombay Public Security Measures Act detaining a person who was alleged to have committed an offence, it became no longer permissible for him to investigate the offence while the person was still under detention. Mr. Hiremath pointed out that in Makhan Singh’s case2 the Supreme Court abstained from expressing any opinion on the correctness of that proposition. So, Mr. Hiremath urges that he was free to submit to us that once the accused was arrested in connection with the prosecutions pending against him during the investigation of the offences said to have been committed by him, the detaining authority became divested of his power to make any order of detention under the Defence of India Rules. This submission assumes that the order of detention was made by the detaining authority for the same purpose for which the detenue was arrested during the investigation of the offences with which he was charged. It would have been possible for us to say that if the purpose was the same, then the question would of course arise whether the detention in those circumstances was possible. Mr. It would have been possible for us to say that if the purpose was the same, then the question would of course arise whether the detention in those circumstances was possible. Mr. Advocate-General contended before us that the assumption made for the detenue that he was detained merely on the ground that he had committed the offences which form the subject-matter of the prosecutions against him, was groundless, as indicated by the order of detention in which it was very clearly stated that the detaining authority was satisfied that it was necessary to make an order of detention in order to prevent the detenue from engaging himself in activities prejudicial to the Defence of India, civil defence, public safety and maintenance of public order. Mr. Advocate-General maintained that so long as the detaining authority was satisfied of the necessity for such detention, even if that satisfaction was derived from the fact that there was some past conduct or antecedent history of the detenue such as is deducible from the activities in which he engaged himself during the disturbances and which formed the subject-matter of the prosecutions, the order of detention could not be condemned or called in question on the suggested ground. Since the grounds for his detention were not communicated to the detenue and such communication is not enjoined by the Defence of India Act or the Rules, we should not feel surprised that neither the detenue nor his wife has any knowledge of those grounds. So, Mr. Hiremath very properly did not assert that in truth and in fact the only ground on which the detention was made was that the detenue had committed the offences with which he was charged in the prosecutions before the criminal Court. What is urged before us was that it is not improbable that the order of detention was made on that ground notwithstanding there being a statement in the order of detention that the detention rested upon the apprehended activities prejudicial to national security. What is urged before us was that it is not improbable that the order of detention was made on that ground notwithstanding there being a statement in the order of detention that the detention rested upon the apprehended activities prejudicial to national security. We were, therefore, asked to say that in the situation in which the order of detention was made for which the background was the prosecution of the detenue for having committed offences under the Penal Code, it was enough for the detenue to suggest that the detention was made only on the ground that he had been accused of those offences and that the moment that suggestion was made, it became the duty of the detaining authority to produce the grounds of detention so that this Court might really satisfy itself that the detention was not made on the sole ground that the detenue had been accused of offences punishable under the Penal Code. I should here state that at one stage during the arguments Mr. Hiremath sought permission to produce an additional affidavit of which the deponent was the detenue himself in supplementation of the affidavit already produced by his wife. It was explained by Mr. Hiremath that although that affidavit had been prepared and completed on 2nd February, 1965 no application was made for permission for its production till yesterday since this further affidavit which was more in the nature of amplification of an earlier affidavit incorporates no new ground in support of the application. There was only one new matter introduced into that affidavit to which I will refer at the appropriate stage. Mr. Advocate-General had no objection to the reception of this further affidavit and we were of the view that in the interests of justice and in a matter in which the subject-matter of the application before us involves the right of a person to personal liberty, we should not refuse to receive the affidavit even at the late stage. We, therefore, accorded permission for its production and in that affidavit the detenue states thus: “It was not stated exactly what was the nature of the activities of the petitioner, which would really cause prejudice to the Defence of India and civil defence, public safety and the maintenance of public order. We, therefore, accorded permission for its production and in that affidavit the detenue states thus: “It was not stated exactly what was the nature of the activities of the petitioner, which would really cause prejudice to the Defence of India and civil defence, public safety and the maintenance of public order. Whether it was the same act of the petitioner participating in the ‘Bharat Band Day’ on 25th September, 1964 or a different act, which was responsible for passing the detention order, was not mentioned clearly. If it was the act of the petitioner participating in the ‘Bharat Band Day’ which was cause for detention order being passed, the order of detention was clearly mala fide, as already an action was taken against the petitioner under the ordinary criminal law and the action under the Defence of India Rules was unwarranted. The respondent No. 2 should have stated specifically what were the reasons which compelled him to pass the order of detention and placed all the materials before this Hon’ble Court.” It is clear from this portion of the affidavit on which the submission before us was constructed that there is not even any specific or definite averment by detenue that the order of detention rests on the unlawful activities of the detenue attributed to him on the ‘Bharat Band Day’. He is himself not sure about it and invites the detaining authority to disclose the ground so that we might reach a conclusion on that matter. Not unnaturally Mr. Advocate-General asked attention to the relevant part of the detaining authority’s counter-affidavit in which it was said that not only was the detaining authority satisfied from the confidential reports made by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bellary and countersigned by the Superintendent of Police that the detenue should be prevented from engaging himself in the relevant prejudicial activities, but also that he was satisfied that his detention was necessary in order to stop and prevent such dangerous activities. These statements contained in paragraphs 2, 4 and 6 of the counter-affidavit amount to a very clear averment by the detaining authority that he was satisfied about the existence of facts and ingredients such as could authorise detention under Rule 30(1)(b)of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. Indeed that is exactly what was said even in the impugned order of detention. Indeed that is exactly what was said even in the impugned order of detention. That being so, since neither the grounds for detention nor the satisfaction arising therefrom as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdawan1 is justiciable, it is, I think not possible for the detenue on the allegations made by him to insist upon the production of the grounds for detention so that the detaining authority might refute a mere possibility that the detention was based on some other fact. It is true that in Rameshwar Shaw’s case1, it was explained that where the detention is impugned as a mala fide detention and there are facts and circumstances demonstrating such mala fides, the grounds of detention could also be perused in the context of the allegation of mala fides. It is likewise true that the order of detention would stand defeated if the grounds on which it rests are irrelevant. But so long as there is no specific allegation that the grounds are irrelevant and so long as there is no other material on which we could deduce the mala fides, it would not be permissible for the petitioner to insist upon the production of grounds of detention in the context of the plea raised by him. Any other view would make it possible for the detenue to force the production of the grounds for detention by making an allegation such as the one made by the detenue before us. Where the order of detention is challenged on the ground of mala fides, the duty to establish the truth of the allegation that the order was made mala fide is plainly on the detenue. It is obviously insufficient for anyone to say that the order of detention is mala fide and to contend that notwithstanding that denunciation, the detaining authority made no endeavour to defend the order of detention. The duty on the part of the detaining authority to defend his order of detention when there is an allegation of mala fides, arises only when the detenue produces sufficient evidence or proof indicating mala fides. Until that stage is reached, the onus does not shift from the detenue or the person who impeaches the order of detention to the detaining authority. Until that stage is reached, the onus does not shift from the detenue or the person who impeaches the order of detention to the detaining authority. That was what was explained by the Federal Court in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad1, and by the Supreme Court in Ashutosh Lahiry v. The State of Delhi2. Although in the affidavit produced by the wife there were certain other allegations, Mr. Hiremath very properly told us that he would withdraw from those allegations which stood displaced from the further investigations made by him. Mr. Hiremath told us that although in paragraph 10 of that affidavit it was stated that the detenue was not produced before the Magistrate on any date of hearing in the cases in which he figured as an accused after he was detained, that allegation could not be supported. Indeed in paragraph 9 of the counter-affidavit, the detaining authority enumerated the numerous dates of hearing on which the detenue was produced before the Magistrate. It was again said in paragraph 12 of the wife’s affidavit that the detaining authority had not reported, as he was bound to do, under sub-rule (5) of Rule 30-A of the Defence of India Rules, the detention ordered by him to the reviewing authority. From that statement again Mr. Hiremath withdrew on his being satisfied that that report had indeed been made by the detaining authority. What I have so far discussed yields the result that it has not been established for the detenue that the order of detention was actuated by any collateral considerations such as those on which Mr. Hiremath depended in the course of his submissions. But Mr. Hiremath submitted to us that it is a firmly established principle that an order of detention becomes illegal not only when there is malice in fact but also where there is malice in law as explained in Shearer v. Shields3. As to the existence of there being malice in fact, there is no proof as already observed, and, as to the existence of malice in law, what was pressed on us was that there was exercise of power under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules in contravention of the plain provisions of sections 42 and 44 of the Defence of India Act. The use for which section 42 was employed by Mr. The use for which section 42 was employed by Mr. Hiremath was for founding an argument that although that section preserves the jurisdiction of ordinary Courts before which the detenue was being prosecuted, the order of detention was made in derogation of that jurisdiction or power of ordinary Courts. The discussion which I have already made fully demonstrates that this submission is really unsupportable since the order of detention even if it rested upon the tendencies and inclinations deduced from the activities of the detenue on the ‘Bharat Band Day’, as they could be depended upon as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Rameshwar Shaw’s case4, that order made for the prevention of the prejudicial activities referred to therein in no manner interferes or impedes the exercise of jurisdiction of the criminal Court before which the accused is facing the prosecutions against him. I am similarly unable to find that there has been any transgression of the provisions of section 44 of the Defence of India Act which enjoins that no authority or person acting under the Act shall interfere with the ordinary avocations of life and the enjoyment of property of anyone except to the extent necessary for ensuring public safety and interest and the Defence of India and Civil defence. It was urged by Mr. Hiremath that there was illegitimate interference with the ordinary avocations of the detenue’s life. We were asked to say that the detention has resulted in the deprivation of opportunities which the detenue was entitled to claim for the preparation of his defence in the criminal cases and their conduct. That the detenue, if he was free to do so, could have equipped himself with the funds necessary for the conduct of his defence by exercising some profession or profitable activity and that the order of detention prevents him from doing so was the argument placed before us. Since the consequences pointed out by Mr. That the detenue, if he was free to do so, could have equipped himself with the funds necessary for the conduct of his defence by exercising some profession or profitable activity and that the order of detention prevents him from doing so was the argument placed before us. Since the consequences pointed out by Mr. Hiremath must necessarily and inevitably ensue in every case in which there is an order of detention, and, since in my view section 44 of the Defence of India Act does not bestow or create any absolute right for the pursuit of the ordinary avocations of life but only forbids undue interference with such avocations which is not demanded by public safety and interest or the Defence of India or civil defence, I do not share the view that there has been any infraction of the provisions of this section. What was next submitted to us was that the order of detention was liable to be denounced on the ground of malice in law because it contravenes the provisions of the Defence of India Rules since there was really no satisfaction in the mind of the detaining authority that the detention was necessary for the prevention of prejudicial activities. We were asked to say that the counter-affidavit of the detaining authority incorporates an admission that he was merely guided by the views entertained by the Deputy Superintendent of Police who made a confidential report to the Superintendent of Police who countersigned it. Our attention was asked to paragraph 2 of the counter-affidavit in which the detaining authority alluded to that confidential report and stated that he satisfied himself “that the report was based on facts found from records from the District Police office”. That there was no;ndependent satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority in his own mind and that he merely depended upon the satisfaction of the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Superintendent of Police and that that is not the satisfaction which authorises a detention was the postulate. I do not agree that it is possible to say that there is anything in the detaining authority’s counter-affidavit which can lend sustenance to the view that the satisfaction on which the order of detention rested, was, the satisfaction of the police authorities and not the satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority. I do not agree that it is possible to say that there is anything in the detaining authority’s counter-affidavit which can lend sustenance to the view that the satisfaction on which the order of detention rested, was, the satisfaction of the police authorities and not the satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority. More than one part of the counter-affidavit the relevant paragraphs of which are 4 and 6, contain the clearest indication that there was as full an application of the mind of the detaining authority as is necessary to the consideration of the question whether it was necessary to prevent the enumerated prejudical activities of the detenue and whether it was necessary to detain him to arrest those dangerous propensities. It is equally clear from his affidavit that he was satisfied that the order of detention was necessary in that way. So, we should, in my opinion, repeal the charge that there was any species of mala fides which could vitiate the order of detention. Mr. Hiremath at one stage suggested to us that we might ourselves peruse the grounds of detention and satisfy ourselves that the detention was not made purely for the reason that the detenue was charged with the various offences which were the subject-matter of many prosecutions against him. The discussion which I have made in another context concerning this submission makes it unnecessary for us to peruse the grounds of detention even if it could be said that we have the power to do so. It was next maintained that even if the order of detention has not been established to be mala fide or illegal, it is still open to the condemnation that it is improper. Indeed the argument advanced in support of this submission overlaps the submission made in another context. We were asked to say that the order of detention was extremely improper since it was not proper or right to detain a person who was facing as many as fourteen prosecutions in which it was alleged that he committed offences as serious as the offence of rioting and dacoity, and, that it was improper to detain a person in that situation, since, in consequence of the order of detention he would not find it possible to defend himself satisfactorily or adequately, and, that what produces the element of impropriety is the impediment to a proper defence. It was urged that we should therefore exercise power under section 491(1)(b)of the Code of Criminal Procedure and set at liberty the detenue. Support for this submission was sought to be deduced from the decision of the High Court of Orissa in Ratanlal Gupta v. The District Magistrate of Ganjam1, in which a detention when a criminal charge was under investigation was deprecated as improper. It does not appear to me possible to say that for any of the reasons suggested by Mr. Hiremath we should characterise the order of detention as improper. The word ‘improper’ occurring in section 491(1)(b)means ‘wrongful’ and it has not been demonstrated to us and it cannot be said that the order of detention which is otherwise permissible and good can be condemned as wrongful. The decision in Ratanlal Gupta’s case1, can be of no assistance to Mr. Hiremath since all that was said in that case by Jagannadhadas, J., was that he would hesitate to accept as correct the broad proposition that the power of detention cannot be exercised as against a person who is being prosecuted onthe same facts which constitute the grounds of the detention and that an order of detention in such cases without making a choice between the two courses is ipso facto and without more, abuse of power of detention. Although it is true that in another part of the judgment the learned Judge said that an imminently prospective prosecution might have a reasonable bearing on the bona fides of the order of detention, there is nothing even in that observation on which any dependence could be placed in support of the submission that the order of detention with which we are concerned in this case was improper. What remains to be considered is the submission based on the imperative provisions of sub-rules (4) and (5) of Rule 30-A of the Defence of India Rules. Sub-rule (4) of this Rule directs that a detention order made by an officer empowered by the State Government shall be reviewed in manner provided by that sub-rule. Sub-rule (5) enjoins the officer empowered by the State Government who made the order of detention to forthwith report the fact that he made the order of detention to the appropriate reviewing authority specified in clause (a) of sub-rule (4). Sub-rule (5) enjoins the officer empowered by the State Government who made the order of detention to forthwith report the fact that he made the order of detention to the appropriate reviewing authority specified in clause (a) of sub-rule (4). Sub-rule (6) next provides that on receipt of a report under sub-rule (5) the reviewing authority shall, after taking into account all the circumstances of the case, recommend to the State Government that the detention may be confirmed or cancelled. It next provides that thereupon the Government shall either confirm or cancel the order as it may deem fit in the light of the recommendation. Although at one stage in the affidavit produced by the wife it was stated that there was disobedience to the provision of sub-rule (5) by reason of the neglect on the part of the detaining authority to forthwith report the detention order to the appropriate authority, Mr. Hiremath, as already observed, withdrew from that allegation. He submitted that since the detaining authority stated in his counter-affidavit that he did make the report, he would not press that allegation. The detaining authority in his affidavit states that on the very same day on which he made the order of detention, he made the required report to the reviewing authority. Of that there cannot be any doubt, nor is the truth of that statement questioned before us. But Mr. Hiremath at one stage developed the argument that even if it cannot be doubted that there was that report, there has been no obedience to the provisions of sub-rule (6) under the provisions of which it was the duty of the State Government to decide whether the order of detention should be confirmed or cancelled on the basis of the recommendation of the reviewing authority. Now it is not disputed before us that the reviewing authority did make its recommendation to the State Government and that the State Government did make an order on 6th January, 1965 confirming the order of detention. A copy of that order which was served upon the detenue while he was in detention, was produced before us during the argument, and, in the further affidavit which the detenue produced and which was allowed by us yesterday, a ground is raised that that order made by the Government was made mechanically without the application of their mind to the relevant circumstances and facts. Since this was raised for the first time only yesterday during the argument, Mr. Hiremath made the submission that he would not object to the production by Mr. Advocate-General of the original proceedings of the Government in which they confirmed the order of detention, for the purpose of satisfying ourselves that there was the required bestowal of thought and attention by the Government to the question whether the order should or should not be confirmed. This becomes necessary, according to Mr. Hiremath by reason of the fact that the order served upon the detenue was a cyclostyled order in which in a place which had been left blank, the name of the detenue was subsequently typewritten.. Mr. Hiremath contended that the order was not prepared after any reflection or thought, but, that cyclostyled orders had already been prepared at some antecedent point of time providing for confirmation of orders of detention and that all that was done by the Government was to pick up one such cyclostyled form and to insert in the blank space allotted for the purpose, the name of the detenue and pass on that order to him. That an order prepared in that way is not an order enjoined by sub-rule (6) and that, therefore, there has been failure on the part of the Government to consider whether the order of detention should be confirmed or cancelled and that the continuance of the detention is therefore, unlawful, was the submission made to us. In support of this submission the decision of the Federal Court in Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee1 and the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Keshav Gokhale v. Emperor2 and the decision of the Madras High Court in M.R.S. Marti v. District Magistrate, Mathurai3 in addition to the decision of the former High Court of Mysore in N.D. Shankar v. Government of Mysore4 were depended upon. It is true that in these cases the impugned order was a cyclosytled order, and, taking into consideration all the surrounding circusmtances, it was decided that the order was not a good or valid order. But in none of these cases was it stated as an absolute proposition that where the impugned order is a cyclostyled order, that, by itself is a sufficient ground for invalidating it. But in none of these cases was it stated as an absolute proposition that where the impugned order is a cyclostyled order, that, by itself is a sufficient ground for invalidating it. The real question is where the original order of detention is above reproach and what is challenged in that context is its continuance, whether although the order served on the detenue is a cyclostyled order, there was really no application of the mind on the part of the Government to the relevant question before the order was made. Mr. Advocate-General has shown us the proceedings of the Government in the course of which they made the order confirming the order of detention Those proceedings reveal that there was the required application of the mind of the Government to the question whether the order of detention should or should not be confirmed and that in the light of the recommendation of the reviewing authority which the Government had before them, they came to the conclusion that the order should be confirmed. When we intimated to Mr. Hiremath that that was what the proceedings revealed, Mr. Hiremath intimated to us that he would not further pursue the matter. It is, therefore, not possible to say that there was no proper confirmation of the order of detention under sub-rule (6) of Rule 30-A of the Defence of India Rules. In my opinion, this application should be dismissed and it is ordered accordingly. Ahmed Ali Khan, J: I agree. S.C.S. ----- Application dismissed.