JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.—This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 14.1.1993 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Kullu. 2. The facts leading to the presentation of this appeal are that the plaintiff-respondents (hreinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) instituted a suit against respondent-defendant Municipal Committee, Kullu (hereinafter referred to as the committee) and the defendant-appellant Smt. Champa Devi who is since dead and whose legal representatives have been brought on record as appellants for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from causing any sort of unlawful intereference with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over one storeyed building bearing House No. AKH-32 having one shop, one store and way to the room, one room, one kitchen and a verandah specifically detailed in the plan attached with the plaint, situate at Akhara Bazar, Kullu, Phati Dhalpur, Kothi Maharaja, Tehsil and District Kullu (hereinafter referred to as the suit property) and from dispossessing the plaintiff therefrom in any illegal manner and from demolishing the suit property on the basis of illegal and void notices and otherwise. 3. The case of the plaintiffs, as made out in the plaint, is that they are the tenants in occupation of the suit property since long on payment of rent Rs. 13/- per month under defendant Champa Devi and are residing and running barber shop within the suit property which is situate within the limits of the committee. It is further the case of the plaintiffs that Jagat Ram, husband of Champa Devi, retired as Kanungo and has influence in# various offices including the office of committee. Without taking recourse to law to secure the eviction of the plaintiffs from the suit property, defendant Champa Devi deceased exercising her influence and thus having the help of defendant committee, hatched a conspiracy pursuant to which a notice dated 2.1.1990 was issued by the committee through its Secretary requiring the defendant Champa Devi and the tenants that the suit property should be demolished within six hours otherwise, the committee itself would demolish the same because it was adjudged dangerous. The notice which was affixed on the building in question made reference to some earlier notice dated 27.9.1989 also. The notice which was affixed on the building in question made reference to some earlier notice dated 27.9.1989 also. It was claimed for the plaintiff that the notice has been issued with mala fide intention by the committee in connivance with deceased Champa Devi in order to harass the plaintiff and to provide a wrongful gain to her inasmuch as the building in question is not at all dangerous and is in good and habitable condition. However, defendants were conniving to dispossess the plaintiffs from the building and to demolish the building whereas they have no right to cause any sort of unlawful interference and to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit property. Hence the suit. 4. The suit was contested by the defendants and they submitted separate written statements. The defendant committee, in its written statement, admitted that as per its record, one Janak Raj is recorded in occupation of the shop and that husband of Champa Devi was working in the revenue department and rest of the allegations regarding connivance and influence etc. as made in the plaint have been denied. It has been claimed that the committee had received complaints from defendant Champa Devi and some other persons of the locality that the building in question is in dilapidated condition and likely to collapse at any time and thereby cause harm to the property of the adjoining owners and passers-by. On receipt of such complaints, the committee made spot inquiry and deputed its engineer for holding spot inquiry. On receipt of the report from the engineer so deputed, the committee served notice on the deceased defendant Champa Devi to repair the premises within one month and when she failed to do so and informed the defendant committee that she was not in a position to effect repairs, the municipal J.E. and engineer again visited the spot and reported that building is likely to collapse, therefore, it was adjudged dangerous and in view of the public safety, the committee served deceased defendant Champa Devi and the tenants with a notice requiring them to vacate the building within 14 days and to report compliance to the office accordingly. The tenants refused to accept the service, therefore, the same was affixed on the premises. However, there was no compliance of the notice, therefore, another notice dated 2.1.1990 requiring them to demolish the building within six hours was issued. The tenants refused to accept the service, therefore, the same was affixed on the premises. However, there was no compliance of the notice, therefore, another notice dated 2.1.1990 requiring them to demolish the building within six hours was issued. It is further claimed that the notices were issued according to law and procedure and sufficient time was given to the owner and the tenant to comply, which they failed to do. Therefore, the decision of the committee to remove the nuisance is legal and valid, according to the H.P. Municipal laws and Rules and, thus, the claim of the plaintiff has been denied. 5. Defendant Champa Devi, in her written statement, denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between her and the plaintiff and, thus, claimed that the plaintiffs had no locus-standi to file and maintain the present suit; that the plaintiffs had not come to the court with clean hands and had suppressed and concealed true and material facts from the Court and, therefore, were not entitled to the discretionary relief of injunction and that there has been unnecessary delay and latches in filing the suit and as such, the same deserves to be dismissed. It has been averred on merits, that one Kuljasrai and his brother Jagdish Prasad were owners in possession of the land measuring 2 biswas comprised in khasra No. 1575 khata khatauni No. 365/622 as mentioned in the jamabandi for the year 1966-67 and the suit property is standing on one portion of the said land. On 2.5.1995, the said owners mortgaged the aforesaid land and the shed standing thereon in favour of one Mallo Devi of Akhara Bazar, Kullu for Rs. 1,500/- with possession and thereafter Mallo Devi entered into the possession of the mortgaged property except the shed which was already in possession of one Baziru as tenant under the earlier owner. Subsequently, said Baziru vacated the said shed and ceased to be the tenant thereof. Mallo Devi then inducted one Laturia Ram as tenant in the shed without the consent of the owners. Kuljasrai sold his share in the land and the shed to one Chet Ram on 26.2.1969 with mortgage intact and thereafter said Chet Ram and Jagdish Prashad sold the entire property to deceased defendant Champa Devi through a registered sale deed dated 24.12.1973 and, thus, the became the owner of the suit property. Kuljasrai sold his share in the land and the shed to one Chet Ram on 26.2.1969 with mortgage intact and thereafter said Chet Ram and Jagdish Prashad sold the entire property to deceased defendant Champa Devi through a registered sale deed dated 24.12.1973 and, thus, the became the owner of the suit property. She redeemed the suit property from Mallo Devi and, thus came to possess the property. It has been denied that the plaintiffs or Laturia were inducted as tenants by defendant Champa Devi or the plaintiffs ever paid any rent in any manner. In case said Laturia Ram was inducted as tenant by Mallo Devi mortgagee, the plaintiffs cannot claim more than the right which Mallo Devi mortgagee was possessing and, thus, are not tenants under Champa Devi defendant. It is further averred that the shed in question (the premises referred to as building in the plaint) is in existence for more than 85 years and adjoins the National Highway and being old has been considerably damaged and is in dilapidated condition to the extent that when any vehicle passes in speed on the road, the slates and tins of the roof of the premises are falling down and since there is heavy traffic in the vicinity, the premises are likely to collapse at any time and thus endanger human life and has thus, become a permanent source of nuisance to the general public. Therefore, so many persons lodged complaints about the apprehended collapse of the building and danger to their lives but despite request of the replying defendant, the premises are being unauthorisedly occupied by the plaintiffs and they are not paying any heed, therefore, Champa Devi also made a complaint to the committee. She has not challenged the action of the committee in issuing the notices but has claimed that the notices served on the plaintiffs are legal and valid. Thus, she has denied the claim of the plaintiffs. 6. Plaintiffs filed replications to the written statements wherein they denied the grounds of defence of the respective defendants and re-affirmed the claim as made in the plaint. 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiffs are tenants of the suit premises under defendant No. 2 as alleged ? OPP. 2. Whether the suit premises requires demolition as alleged? OPD. 3. 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiffs are tenants of the suit premises under defendant No. 2 as alleged ? OPP. 2. Whether the suit premises requires demolition as alleged? OPD. 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of permanent injunction? OPP. 4. Relief. 8. Vide its judgment dated 25.10.1990, the trial court decided issues 1 and 3 in favour of the plaintiffs and issue No. 2 against the defendants and accordingly decreed the suit. 9. Feeling aggrieved, the defendant Champa Devi preferred an appeal which came to be heard and decided by the learned Addl. District Judge, Kullu, who by the impugned judgment, dismissed the appeal. Hence the present appeal. 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records. 11. This appeal has been admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law: "Whether in the absence of any specific authority in the mortgage deed authorising the mortgagee to create tenancy which would continue beyond the period of mortgage, the findings of the court below that Laturias tenancy irrespective of redemption, continues to be binding on mortgagor, are vitiated?" 12. It was contended for the defendants that Laturia was not inducted as a tenant by the mortgagor but was inducted by the mortgagee without the consent of the mortgagor and without any covenant in the mortgage deed authorising the mortgagee to create a lease over the suit premises. Therefore, tenancy created h^ the mortgagee in favour of Laturia does not make him and after his death his successors, the tenants of the owner. 13. On the other hand it was argued for the plaintiffs that Laturia was a tenant of the premises even before these premises were mortgaged with Malo Devi, therefore, the tenancy having been created by the owner-mortgagor, the tenancy is binding on the owner of the premises. 14. The question which thus arises for consideration is whether Laturia predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff was inducted as a tenant of the premises in suit by the mortgagor or the mortgagee. Both the Courts below have concluded that Laturia was a tenant under the mortgagor even before the premises in suit were mortgaged with Malo Devi. 14. The question which thus arises for consideration is whether Laturia predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff was inducted as a tenant of the premises in suit by the mortgagor or the mortgagee. Both the Courts below have concluded that Laturia was a tenant under the mortgagor even before the premises in suit were mortgaged with Malo Devi. Ordinarily concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below are not interfered with in second appeal but in case such findings are contrary to the facts established and thus unsustainable on the basis of evidence on record, those will have to be set right in the interest of justice. 15. It is case of the plaintiff that Laturia was a tenant of the premises in suit even before these premises were mortgaged, therefore, it is for the plaintiff to prove it. The admitted position is that one Bajira was a tenant of the premises duly inducted by the owner-mortgagor. Though he was brother of Laturia but a tenancy in favour of Bajira cannot be treated as a tenancy in favour of Laturia as well. Even plaintiff Subhadra Devi (PW-1) has admitted that Bajira was earlier a tenant under the landlord. It is not their case that Laturia was a co-tenant with him. What they claim is that Laturia was also residing with Bajira. This position even if admitted to be true, it does not make Laturia a co-tenant with Bajira. It emerges from the material on record that Bajira died. It is admitted by PW-1 Subhadra Devi plaintiff that Bajira died about 20 to 22 years before the date of recording of her statement in the trial court on 16.6.1990. Thus, in view of this statement, Bajira died sometimes in the year 1968-70. It is nobodys case that tenancy in favour of Bajira had come to an end in any manner before his death. Thus it is clear that till his death in the late sixties, Bajira was a tenant of the premises in suit. It is thus evident that Laturia was inducted as a tenant of the premises in suit after the death of Bajira. It is precisely the case of defendants. 16. It is admitted case of the parties that the premises in suit were mortgaged by the then owner Kuljas Rai in the year 195.5 with one Malo Devi. It is thus evident that Laturia was inducted as a tenant of the premises in suit after the death of Bajira. It is precisely the case of defendants. 16. It is admitted case of the parties that the premises in suit were mortgaged by the then owner Kuljas Rai in the year 195.5 with one Malo Devi. It is also not the case of the plaintiff that said Malo Devi motgagee had the authority to induct a tenant over the suit property for a period beyond the date of redemption. 17. To hold that Laturia was a tenant inducted by the owner-mortgagor, the two Courts below have mainly relied on the statement of PW-1 Subhadra Devi plaintiff which is neither cogent nor reliable. She has stated that she is in possession of the premises in suit for the last 50/55 years and there is no dispute that at the time of making such statement she was 50 years of age. She was admittedly married to Laturia about 35 years before and therefore, could not be residing in these premises for a longer period than 35 years. Her having clearly and unambiguously admitted that Bajira was the tenant of the original landlord-mortgagor and having not claimed co-tenancy with Laturia and the failure of the plaintiffs to produce any receipt of rent paid by Laturia to the owner-mortgagor clearly show that Laturia was inducted as a tenant of the premises by Malo Devi, the mortgagee after the death of Bajira sometimes in late sixties. The conclusion becomes irresistible in view of the statement of plaintiff (PW-1) when she states that she is not the tenant under Champa Devi, the admitted owner at the time of making of such statement. 18. The legal position is well settled that the tenancy created by a mortgagee will stand extinguished with the redemption of the mortgage, unless the tenancy is created with the consent of the mortgagor or under the authority given in the mortgage deed to create a tenancy even for a period beyond the date of redemption. 19. The Honble Supreme Court while dealing with a similar question in case Pomal Kanji Govindji and others etc. 19. The Honble Supreme Court while dealing with a similar question in case Pomal Kanji Govindji and others etc. v. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit and others etc., (AIR 1989 SC 436) has held as under: "41.............the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court observed that where a lease is created by the mortgagee in possession of an urban immovable property, such a lease would not be binding on the mortgagor after redemption of mortgage assuming that the lease is such as a prudent owner of property would have granted in usual course of management. The Court observed that that was so because Section 76(a) could not apply to a case of urban immovable property and hence a lease created by the mortgagee in possession of an urban immovable property would not be binding on the mortgagor after redemption of the mortgage. Even apart from Section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act if the words of the mortgage deed clearly and indubitably express an intention to allow expressly creation of a tenancy beyond the term of the mortgage, then only the lease created in exercise of the power expressly conferred by the mortgage deed would be binding on the mortgagor. If the words of the mortgage deed do not clearly and indubitably disclose the intention to allow expressly the creation of a tenancy beyond the terms of the mortgage, the mere fact that the mortgage deed authorises the mortgagee with possession to induct a tenant would not create a tenancy binding on the mortgagor after the redemption of the mortgage. In such a case a tenant inducted on the property by a mortgagee with possession when the tenancy of that tenant is not binding on the mortgagor after the redemption of the mortgage is not protected under the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid view expressed by the Chief Justice Diven on behalf of the Full Bench represents the correct position in law in respect of the second aspect of the question conyassed before us." 20. In case Jadavji Purshottam v. Dhami Navnitbhai Amaratlal and others, (AIR 1987 SC 2146), the Apex Court held as follows: "16. In case Jadavji Purshottam v. Dhami Navnitbhai Amaratlal and others, (AIR 1987 SC 2146), the Apex Court held as follows: "16. Since it has been found that the morgagors had not empowered the morgagee to create a lease which would be binding on them after the redemption of the mortgage and since the appellants rights, as a tenant, did not become enlarged by means of any Tenancy legislation which came to be enacted after the lease was granted, the appellant can claim tenancy rights only as against his landlord viz. the mortgagee and not against the mortgagors. As soon as the morgagees rights became extinguished by the redemption of the mortgage, neither he nor anyone inducted by him has a right to be in possession of the mortgage property. Consequently, the mortgagors were entitled to seek ejectment of the mortgagee and the tenant inducted by him........." 21. In view of the above position of law, the plaintiffs cannot claim to be the tenants under the defendant-owners. 22. As a result, the findings of the Courts below that the plaintiffs are tenants of the premises in suit under the defendant-owner cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside and are accordingly set aside. 23. Be it stated that the mortgage has been redeemed by the owner without intervention of the court and there is no executable decree having been passed by a court and the plaintiffs admittedly in possession of the suit premises, therefore, the plaintiffs cannot be dispossessed from the premises in suit except in accordance with law. The version that the notices about demolition of the premises in suit had been issued by the defendant-Municipal Committee in collusion with Jagat Ram husband of Champa Devi, the original defendant in the suit has been accepted by the two courts below and I have no hesitation whatsoever in agreeing with their findings that issue of such notices is a mere short cut to dispossess the plaintiffs in a summary manner thereby avoiding recourse to law. 24. As a result, this appeal is partly allowed and the decree passed by the learned trial Judge and affirmed by the learned District Judge, is modified to the extent that the defendants are restrained from evicting the plaintiffs from the suit premises pursuant to the notices of demolition or by use of force save anr1 except in accordance with law. Costs on parties. Costs on parties. Appeal partly allowed.