Hegde, J.- In this petition, under section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, the petitioner, a detenu lodged in the Central Jail, Mysore, complains that he is illegally and improperly detained in Jail. He prays that this Court may be pleased to set him at liberty. This petition was submitted from Jail. After notices to the respondents, it was taken up for hearing on 1st June, 1965. The detenu argued the case in person. After hearing the detenu, as well as the learned Government Pleader we thought that it would be in the interest of justice if the detenu’s case is handled by an Advocate. We accordingly, with the consent of the detenu, requested Sri V.S. Malimath to argue the case for the detenu as amicus curiae. He readily agreed to do so. He presented the detenu’s case clearly and forcibly. He has taken us through all the relevant decisions bearing on the issues arising in the case. We are thankful to him as well as to the learned Advocate-General who appeared for the State at the further hearings of this case, for their useful assistance. In his petition, the petitioner urged that his detention under clause (b) of sub-rules (1) and (4) of rule 3o of the Defence of India Rules, to be hereinafter referred to as the “Rules” is an illegal detention. According to him, the impugned order is an arbitrary and mala fide order. He urged that the impression of the second respondent that he is a Communist or at any rate a Communist supporter is an erroneous impression; evidently that impression was created by the fact that he happened to print the left Communist Weekly “Aikya Ranga”; but in fact he used to print that paper in the course of his business as a professional printer and he had nothing to do with the Communist Party. He says that he is not a member of the Communist Party of India-rightist or leftist; nor is he a member of any political party in this country; he has not openly or secretly subscribed to any political idealogy; he has not publicly or privately associated himself or supported any movement acquiescing with the Chinese aggression against this country; hence the action of respondents 1 and 2 in ordering his detention is illegal and misconceived; the same has, without justification deprived him of his personal liberty. He challenges respondents 1 and 2 to produce even the slightest proof in support of their view that he is a Communist supporter. He further complains that his detention has imposed unreasonable restrictions on the freedom of his trade and therefore the same is violative of Article 19 of the Constitution. He also complains that a true copy of the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Additional District Magistrate, S. Kanara, Mangalore had not been furnished to him either at the time of his arrest on 30th December, 1964, or thereafter. It is not likely that the petition submitted by the petitioner from jail was drafted by an Advocate. Hence pleas taken therein have not been formulated in a precise manner. Sri Malimath, in the course of his arguments, did not press many of the contentions taken by the petitioner in his petition. He confined his arguments to six specific questions, namely: (i) the order of detention passed by the second respondent is an invalid order, inasmuch as the same was made without any reasonable basis; (ii) the said order is liable to be struck down as it is a mala fide order; (iii) it is also liable to be struck down as it, under any circumstance, amounts to an undue interference with the ordinary avocations of the petitioner and hence is violative of section 44 of the Defence of India Act, 1962, to be hereinafter referred to as the “Act”; (iv) the order of confirmation made by the State Government is an invalid order as that order purports to have been made on 8th April, 1965, but it was actually signed by one of the Secretaries to the Government on 7th April, 1965; and (v) the impugned order does not show on the face of it that the second respondent was “satisfied” that with a view to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the Defence of India and Civil defence, the public safety, or the maintenance of public order, it is necessary to direct his detention, hence the same is invalid; and lastly (vi) on an examination of the materials before the second respondent at the time he made the impugned order it would be seen that it was a routine order made by the second respondent without applying his mind to the materials before him, hence the same is liable to be struck down. The impugned order of detention reads: “Office of the Deputy Commissioner and Additional District Magistrate S. Kanara, Mangalore, dated 29th December, 1964. Order.- Whereas, I, Sri P.M. Mujahid, Deputy Commissioner and Additional District Magistrate, S. Kanara, am satisfied, that it is necessary to prevent the person known as Sri M. Vasukumar, Printer, ‘Aikya Ranga’, Mangalore, now residing at Mangalore from acting in a manner prejudicial to the Defence of India and Civil Defence, the public safety and the maintenance of public order, and therefore necessary to make an order directing him to be detained; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred on me under clause (b) of sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (4) of rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, read with Notification No. H.D. 221, SST. 62 dated 20th August, 1963, of the Government of Mysore. 1. I, Sri P.M. Mujahid, Deputy Commissioner and Additional District Magistrate, S. Kanara, do hereby direct that the said person Sri M. Vasukumar, Printer, ‘Aikya Ranga’, Mangalore, be detained in Jail at Mangalore. Issued under my hand and seal of this 29th day of December, 1964. 62 dated 20th August, 1963, of the Government of Mysore. 1. I, Sri P.M. Mujahid, Deputy Commissioner and Additional District Magistrate, S. Kanara, do hereby direct that the said person Sri M. Vasukumar, Printer, ‘Aikya Ranga’, Mangalore, be detained in Jail at Mangalore. Issued under my hand and seal of this 29th day of December, 1964. (Sd.) (Seal) Deputy Commissioner and Additional District Magistrate, S. Kanara, 29th December, 1964.” The material portion of rule 30(1), under which the second respondent directed the detention of the petitioner reads as follows: “The Central Government or the State Government, if it is satisfied with respect to any particular person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the Defence of India and Civil defence, the public safety, the maintenance of public order, India’s relations with foreign powers, the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part of India, the efficient conduct of military operations or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community; it is necessary so to do, may make an order- ****** (b) directing that he be detained.” Sub-rule (4) of that rule says: “So long as there is in force in respect of any person such an order as aforesaid directing that he be detained, he shall beliable to be detained in such place, and under such conditions as to maintenance, discipline and the punishment of offences and breaches of discipline, as the Central Government, or the State Government, as the case may be, may from time to time determine.” Admittedly, the State Government’s power under the above rule, subject to certain conditions had been delegated to the Additional District Magistrates who are also Deputy Commissioners. The validity of that delegation was not challenged before us. What was challenged was the manner of its exercise and the manner in which it was purported to have been confirmed by the State Government. Before proceeding to consider the contentions formulated above, it is necessary to set out briefly the circumstances leading to the detention of the petitioner. On 8th September, 1962, the Chinese attacked the northern border of India and thereby posed a threat to the security of this country. Before proceeding to consider the contentions formulated above, it is necessary to set out briefly the circumstances leading to the detention of the petitioner. On 8th September, 1962, the Chinese attacked the northern border of India and thereby posed a threat to the security of this country. On 26th October, 1962, the President issued a Proclamation under Article 352 of the Constitution, proclaiming that he was satisfied that a grave Emergency existed whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened by war or external aggression. On the same day, he issued Ordinance No. IV. That was amended by Ordinance No. V. On 3rd November, 1962, the President issued an order under Article 359(1) suspending the rights of citizens to move any Court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution for the period during which the Proclamation of Emergency issued on 26th October, 1962, would be in force. On 6th November, 1962, the Rules framed by the Central Government were published. The Presidential Order was amended on nth November, 1962, by inserting for the words and figures, “Article 21” the words and figures “Articles 14 and 21”. On 6th December, 1962, rule 30 as originally framed was amended and rule 30-A was added. The “Act” came to be enacted on 12th December, 1962. Section 48(1) of the “Act” repealed Ordinances Nos. IV and VI of 1962. Section 48(2) provides that notwithstanding such repeal, any rules made, anything done or any action taken under the aforesaid two Ordinances shall be deemed to have been made, done or taken under the “Act” as if the “Act” had commenced on 26th October, 1962. That is how the Rules made under the Ordinance continue to be the Rules under the “Act”. Article 19(1) of the Constitution confers certain fundamental rights on the citizens of India which include amongst others the right to move freely throughout the territory of India and to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Article 22 guarantees protection against arrest and detention subject to certain conditions. Sub-Articles (4) to (7) of Article 22 prescribe the conditions under which a person can be kept in preventive detention. Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Article 22 guarantees protection against arrest and detention subject to certain conditions. Sub-Articles (4) to (7) of Article 22 prescribe the conditions under which a person can be kept in preventive detention. Article 358 says that while a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, nothing in Article 19 shall restrict the power of the State as defined in Part III to make any law or to take any executive action which the State would but for the provisions contained in that part be competent to make or to take, but any law so made shall, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect as soon as the Proclamation ceases to operate, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the law so ceases to have effect. Article 359 provides: “(1) Where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the President may by order declare that the right to move any Court for the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part III as may be mentioned in the order and all proceedings pending in any Court for the enforcement of the rights so mentioned shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation is in force or for such shorter period as may be specified in the order. (2) An order made as aforesaid may extend to the whole or any part of the territory of India. (3) Every order made under clause (1) shall, as soon as may be after it is made, be laid before each House of Parliament.” The impact of Articles 358 and 359 on applications made under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as under section 491, Criminal Procedure Code was considered by the Supreme Court in Makham Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab1. Therein the Court by a majority ruled that the suspension of Article 19 during the pendency of the Proclamation of Emergency under Article 352 removes the fetters created on the legislative and Executive powers by Article 19; if the Legislatures make laws or the Executive commits acts which are inconsistent with the rights guaranteed by Article 19, their validity is not open to challenge either during the continuance of the emergency or even thereafter; as soon as the Proclamation ceases to operate, the legislative enactments passed and the executive actions taken during the course of the said emergency shall be inoperative to the extent to which they conflict with the rights guaranteed under Article 19 because as soon as the Emergency is lifted, Article 19 which was suspended during the emergency is automatically revived and begins to operate; Article 358, however, makes it clear that things done or omitted to be done during the emergency cannot be challenged even after the emergency is over; in other words, the suspension of Article 19 is complete during the period in question and legislative and executive action which contravenes Article 19 cannot be questioned even after the emergency is over. Dealing with Article 359, the majority judgment held that that Article does not purport expressly to suspend any of the fundamental rights; it authorises the President to issue an order declaring that the right to move any Court for the enforcement of such of the rights in Part III as may be mentioned in the Order and all proceedings in any Court for the enforcement of the rights so mentioned shall remain suspended for the period during which proclamation is in force or for such shorter period as may be specified in the Order; the rights are not expressly suspended, but the citizen is deprived of his right to move any Court for their enforcement; the Presidential Order cannot widen the authority of the Legislatures or the Executive; it merely suspends the right to move any Court to obtain relief on the ground and that the rights conferred by Part III have been contravened if the said rights are specified in the Order; the inevitable consequence of this position is that as soon as the Order ceases to be operative, the infringement of the rights made either by the Legislative enactment or by executive action can perhaps be challenged by a citizen in a Court of law and the same may have to be tried on the merits on the basis that the rights alleged to have been infringed were in operation even during the pendency of the Presidential Order; if at the expiration of the Presidential Order, Parliament passes any legislation to protect executive action taken during the pendency of the Presidental Order and afford indemnity to the executive in that behalf, the validity and the effect of such legislative action may have to be carefully scrutinized. It was further observed therein that the consequence of the Presidential Order is that any proceeding falling within the mischief of Article 359(1) and the Presidential Order issued under it, if instituted after the Order has been issued, it will have to be dismissed as being incompetent; in other words, Article 359(1) and the Presidential Order issued under it, constitutes a sort of moratorium or a blanket ban against the institution or continuance of any legal action subject to two important conditions; the first condition relates to the character of the legal action and requires that the said action must seek to obtain a relief on the ground that the claimant’s fundamental rights specified in the Presidential Order have been contravened, and the second condition relates to the period during which this is to operate; the ban operates either for the period of the Proclamation or for such shorter period as may be specified in the order. That decision further held that in plain language, the words “any Court” in Article 359(1) cannot mean only the Supreme Court, they would necessarily take in all Courts of competent jurisdiction. So the right to move High Court under Article 226 falls within the mischief of Article 359(1). The words “any Court” include the Supreme Court and the High Courts before which the specified rights can be enforced by the citizen. If a citizen moves any Court to obtain a relief on the ground that his fundamental rights specified in the Order have been contravened, that proceeding is barred. In determining the question as to whether a particular proceeding falls within the mischief of the Presidential Order or not, what has to be examined is not so much the form which the proceedings has taken, or the words in which the relief is claimed, as the substance of the matter and consider whether before granting the relief claimed by the citizen, it would be necessary for the Court to enquire into the question whether any of his specified fundamental rights have been contravened. If any relief cannot be granted to the citizen without determining the question of the alleged infringement of the said specified fundamental rights, that is a proceeding which falls under Article 359(1) and would, therefore, be hit by the Presidential Order issued under the said Article. If any relief cannot be granted to the citizen without determining the question of the alleged infringement of the said specified fundamental rights, that is a proceeding which falls under Article 359(1) and would, therefore, be hit by the Presidential Order issued under the said Article. The sweep of Article 359(1) and the Presidential Order issued under it is thus wide enough to include all claims made by citizens in any Court of competent jurisdiction when it is shown that the said claims cannot be effectively adjudicated upon without examining the question as to whether the citizen is in substance, seeking to enforce any of the said specified fundamental rights. The majority judgment rejected the contention that the provision in Article 359 and the Presidential Orders did not touch the rights conferred on a person under section 491, Criminal Procedure Code. It laid down that the order of detention cannot be challenged under section 491(1), Criminal Procedure Code, or under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that, the “Act” and the Rules contravened the fundamental rights under Articles 14, 21 and 22. The Court further laid down that detenu can challenge the detention order on the ground that it is in violation of the mandatory provisions of the “Act”; the right of the detenu to move for his release on such a ground cannot be affected by the Presidential Order; similarly, the detenu can move the Court for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his detention has been ordered mala fide; the exercise of a power mala fide is wholly outside the scope of the “Act” conferring the power and can always be successfully challenged; but a mere allegation that the detention is mala fide would not be enough; the detenu will have to prove the mala fides; but if the mala fides are alleged, the detenu cannot be precluded from substantiating his plea on the ground of the bar created by Article 359(1) and the Presidential Order; it is only in regard to that class of cases falling under section 491(1)(b)where the legality of the detention is challenged on grounds which fall under Article 359(1) and the Presidential Order that the bar would operate; in all other cases falling under section 491(1) the bar would be inapplicable and proceedings taken on behalf of the detenu will have to be tried in accordance with law. We shall now proceed to examine the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner in the lights of the above observations. The petitioner complains that he has been ordered to be detained without any reasonable basis. He feels that the second respondent erroneously suspected that he was a member of the left Communist Party and because of that erroneous belief, he ordered his detention. He asserts that there is no real basis for the suspicion of the second respondent that he is a Communist supporter; the second respondent could have easily found out the truth if he had cared to enquire into the matter. This contention, in our opinion, is besides the point. The authority concerned has been given power to direct the detention of a person if that authority is ‘satisfied’ that with a view to preventing him from acting in one or the other of the ways enumerated in rule 30, it is necessary to detain him. The ‘satisfaction’ contemplated by rule 30 is a subjective satisfaction. The reasonableness of that ‘satisfaction’ cannot be investigated into. Courts cannot also investigate into the sufficiency of the material on which the authority had been ‘satisfied.‘All that could be said is that whenever powers of this kind or indeed other statutory powers are conferred, they must, to the extent to which specific provision has been made in the statute conferring the powers, be exercised by that authority in the manner specified in the statute and in strict conformity with the provisions thereof. The Court can see whether this has been clone. See Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee.1 The next contention pressed at the hearing was that the impugned order is liable to be struck down as it is a mala fide order. The averments in the petitioner’s affidavit in this regard are extremely vague. The only thing that was stated therein was “the petitioner prays that the Hon’ble High Court be pleased to issue a writ as above quashing the illegal, arbitrary and mala fide order No. nil dated 29th December, 1964, passed by the Deputy Commissioner and Additional District Magistrate, S. Kanara, Mangalore......” The plea in question is devoid of particulars. It is not stated that the order in question was made on extraneous grounds. The burden of establishing that the impugned order was made for collateral reasons is on the petitioner. He has to satisfactorily establish the same. It is not stated that the order in question was made on extraneous grounds. The burden of establishing that the impugned order was made for collateral reasons is on the petitioner. He has to satisfactorily establish the same. He cannot merely challenge the bona fides of the second respondent and ask him to establish his bona fides. This very questions came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Makhan Singh’s case2 referred to earlier. Therein the Court laid down that the detenu can move the Court for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his detention has been ordered mala fide; the exercise of a power mala fide is wholly outside the scope of the “Act” conferring the power and can always be successfully challenged; but a mere allegation that the detention is mala fide would not be enough; the detenu will have to prove the mala fide pleaded. It is not the case of the petitioner that the second respondent was inimically disposed towards him or that he had any oblique reason for directing his detention. The petitioner is not right in his contention that once he puts forward the plea of mala fides, it is for the authority to prove their bona fides. The rule of evidence in cases of this type does not differ from other cases that come up before Courts. It is for the party who assails the order on the ground of mala fides to pleade his case fully and substantiate it with convincing material. The Patna High Court in Sobran Lal v. State of Bihar3 ruled that though it is open to a person detained under rule 30 of the Rules to challenge the bona fides of the Government and to show that Government was not really of the opinion stated in their order, but was induced by some different reasons to detain him; but normally the Court will require definite evidence in proof of that plea. As mentioned earlier, there is absolutely no evidence in this case to support the plea of mala fides. As mentioned earlier, there is absolutely no evidence in this case to support the plea of mala fides. The next contention is that under any circumstance the order in question is liable to be struck down as it amounts to an excessive exercise of the power and therefore invalid under section 44 of the “Act.” The petitioner’s case in this regard is that the only grievance the Government can possibly have against him is that he is printing the weekly known as “Aikya Ranga” published by the left Communist Party. If the Government does not want him to do that work, it could have easily issued a direction to him, under the “Act” restraining him from printing that weekly. There was no need to detain him. This contention of the petitioner in our opinion, is based on a misreading of the counter-affidavit filed by the second respondent. From that counter-affidavit, it is clear that the petitioner’s detention had not been ordered with a view to preventing him from printing the weekly “Aikya Ranga.” The fact that he was printing that weekly was taken note of in arriving at the conclusion that he is a supporter of the left Communist Party. That circumstance is pointed out to show the close association between the petitioner and the left Communist Party. Hence, if the detention order is otherwise held to be valid, it cannot be struck down on the ground that the circumstances of the case did not justify the drastic step taken. In this view, it is not necessary to examine the scope of section 44 of the “Act.” A recent decision of the Madras High Court in K.T.K. Thangamani v. State of Madras1 has taken the view that section 44 is directory and not mandatory, and any violation of the provisions contained therein is not justiciable. The Supreme Court in Godavari Shamrao Parulekar v. State of Maharashtra2, refrained from examining the scope of that section. The contention that the order of confirmation made by the Government is an illegal order is based on the fact that whereas the Secretary to the Government who issued that order is purported to have signed the same on 7th April, 1965, the order is dated 8th April, 1965. The contention that the order of confirmation made by the Government is an illegal order is based on the fact that whereas the Secretary to the Government who issued that order is purported to have signed the same on 7th April, 1965, the order is dated 8th April, 1965. The learned Advocate-General informed us that the order in question received the approval of the Home Minister on 5th April, 1965, it was signed by the concerned Secretary on 7th April, 1965; it was issued on 8th April, 1965; but due to an inadvertent mistake it is shown to have made on 8th April, 1965. We have no reason to reject this explanation. The mistake in question, though regrettable, particularly in an order of detention does not in any manner affect the merits of the case or the legality of the order. It was next urged that the impugned order does not show ex facie that the second respondent was ‘satisfied’ that with a view to preventing the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, civil defence, the public safety, or the maintenance of public order, it is necessary to direct his detention. What the order says is that the second respondent is ‘satisfied’ that it is necessary to prevent the person known as Sri M. Vasukumar, Printer, “Aikya Ranga,” Mangalore, now residing at Mangalore from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India and civil defence, the public safety and the maintenance of public order and therefore necessary to make an order directing him to be detained. It was urged by Sri Mallimath, that the requirement of rule 30 is that the detaining authority must be satisfied that unless the person concerned is detained, he is likely to act in one or other ways set out in rule 30; it is that satisfaction that is the crux of the matter. According to him the key words in rule 30(w)are: “with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India and civil defence, the public safety,” etc. Sri Mallimath urged that in the instant case what the second respondent was satisfied is that it was “necessary to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India and civil defence” etc., that would be so in the case of every one of us. Sri Mallimath urged that in the instant case what the second respondent was satisfied is that it was “necessary to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India and civil defence” etc., that would be so in the case of every one of us. He strenuously contended that very wide and unbridled power is given to the detaining authority; that power is not subject to any judicial review; therefore, it is necessary to see that the power in question is exercised strictly in accordance with the Rules; any material departure from the requirements laid down therein, according to him, would necessarily vitiate the order. On the other hand, it was contended by the learned Advocate-General that the order in question substantially complies with the requirements of rule 30, a mere inadvertent error that might have crept into it at the time of drafting of that order cannot vitiate the same. Let us now proceed to examine as to which one of these contentions should be accepted. Rule 30 of the “Rules” is modelled on the lines of Regulation 18-B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, in Britain, and rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939. Hence, the decisions rendered on those provisions are of assistance to us, to the extent they bear on the point under consideration. The leading case on the point is the decision of the House of Lords in Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson1. Therein the scope of Regulation 18-B came up for consideration. Paragraph I of that Regulation read: “If the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe any person to be of hostile origin or associations or to have been recently concerned in acts prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm or in the preparation or instigation of such acts and that by reason thereof it is necessary to exercise control over him, he may make an order against that person directing that he be detained.” One Liversidge filed a suit for damages for false imprisonment on the ground that his detention made by an order of Sir John Anderson, as Home Secretary, was unlawful. Liversidge applied for particulars of the grounds on which the Home Secretary had reasonable cause to believe Liversidge to be a person of hostile association and of the grounds on which the Home Secretary had reasonable cause to believe that by reason of such hostile association it was necessary to exercise control and impose restriction over the movements of Liversidge. His application was refused by the Judge in Chambers as well as the Court of Appeal and the matter came up finally before the House of Lords, which ultimately affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal, Lord Atkin dissenting. It was held that where the Secretary of State, acting in good faith under Regulation 18-B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, makes an order in which he recites that he has reasonable cause to believe a person to be of hostile associations and that by reason thereof it is necessary to exercise control over him and directs that the person be detained, a Court of law cannot inquire whether in fact the Secretary of State had reasonable grounds for his behalf. The matter is one for the executive discretion of the Secretary of State. Therefore, the Court cannot compel the Home Secretary to give particulars of the grounds on which he had reasonable cause to believe Liversidge to be a person of hostile association or that by reason of such hostile associations it was necessary to exercise control over Liversidge. The production by the Home Secretary of an order of detention, made by him and ex facie regular and duly authenticated, constitutes a defence to such an action unless Liversidge discharges the burden of establishing that the order is invalid. Viscount Maugham, addressing the House of Lords observed thus (at page 221 of the report): “Secondly, it is admitted that the Home Secretary can act on hearsay and is not required to obtain any legal evidence in such a case, and clearly is not required to summon the person whom he proposes to detain and to hear his objections to the proposed order. Since the Home Secretary is not acting judicially in such a case, it would be strange if his decision could be questioned in a Court of law. Since the Home Secretary is not acting judicially in such a case, it would be strange if his decision could be questioned in a Court of law. Thirdly, and this is of even greater importance, it is obvious that in many cases he will be acting on information of the most confidential character, which could not be communicated to the person detained or disclosed in Court without|the greatest risk of prejudicing the future efforts of the Secretary of State in this and like matters for the defence of the realm. A very little consideration will show that the power of the Court (under section 6 of the Act) to give directions for the hearing of proceedings in camera would not prevent confidential matters from leaking out, since such matters would become known to the person detained and to a number of other persons. It seems to me impossible for the Court to come to a conclusion adverse to the opinion of the Secretary of State in such a matter. It is beyond dispute that he can decline to disclose the information on which he has acted on the ground that to do so would be contrary to the public interest, and that this privilege of the Crown cannot be disputed.” Dealing with the same point Lord Macmillan stated thus (at pages 251 and 252): “The fact that the nation is at war is no justification for any relaxation of the vigilance of the Courts in seeing that the law is duly observed, especially in a matter so fundamental as the liberty of the subject -rather the contrary. But in a time of emergency when the life of the whole nation is at stake it may well be that a regulation for the defence of the realm may quite properly have a meaning which because of its drastic invasion of the liberty of the subject the Courts would be slow to attribute to a peace time measure. The purpose of the regulation is toensure public safety, and it is right so tointerpret emergency legislation as to promote rather than to defeat its efficacy for the defence of the realm. The purpose of the regulation is toensure public safety, and it is right so tointerpret emergency legislation as to promote rather than to defeat its efficacy for the defence of the realm. That is in accordance with a general rule applicable to the interpretation of all statutes or statutory regulations in peace time as well as in war time.” Dwelling on the same point Lord Wright observed as follows (at page 260): "All the Courts today, and not least this House, are as jealous as they have ever been in upholding the liberty of the subject. But that liberty is a liberty confined and controlled by law, whether common law or statute. It is, in Burke’s words, a regulated freedom. It is not abstract or absolute freedom. Parliament is supreme. It can enact extraordinary powers of interfering with personal liberty. If an Act of Parliament, or a statutory regulation, like Regulation 18-B, which has admittedly the force of a statute, because there is no suggestion that it is ultra vires or outside the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, under which it was made, is alleged to limit or curtail the liberty of the subject or vest in the executive extraordinary powers of detaining a subject, the only question is what is the precise extent of the powers given. The answer to the question is only to be found by scrutinising the language of the enactment in the light of the cricumstances and the general policy and object of the measure. I have ventured on these elementary and obvious observations because it seems to have been suggested on behalf of the appellant that this House was being asked to countenance arbitrary, despotic or tyrannous conduct. But in the constitution of this country there are no guaranteed or absolute rights. The safeguard of British liberty is in the good sense of the people and in the system of representative and responsible Government which has been evolved. If extraordinary powers are here given, they are given because the emergency is extraordinary and are limited to the period of the emergency." In the course of the judgment it has been observed at several places that the discretion vested in the Secretary of State is an executive discretion and that the control exercised by the Secretary of State is preventive and not punitive and the action taken by him is not open to judicial review. It was also observed that under Regulation 18-B, it is a duty which the Secretary of State should discharge on his own responsibility to the utmost of his ability, weighing, on the one hand, the suspect’s right to personal liberty, and on the other hand, the safety of the State in the dire national peril. In the course of his address Lord Romer observed (at page 279): "Take, for instance, the case of a person against whom an order for detention has been made because the Secretary of State believes him to have been recently concerned in acts prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm. If that person brings an action for false imprisonment or moves for a writ of habeas corpus the Secretary of State may be placed in the dilemma of having to make public information the disclosure of which may imperil the security of this country or of having to refuse to disclose it with the result that the person detained, who may be a dangerous "Fifth Columnist" will be released and set at liberty to continue his traitorous activities. For, if the question whether the Secretary of State had reasonable grounds for the belief on which his order was founded is one for a Court of law to determine, it is plain that the Court must be placed in full possession of all the relevant facts, and if some of those facts are withheld from it, even though it be by reason of public policy, it will have no option but to say that no reasonable grounds for his belief have been shown to exist, and the release of the detained person will follow as a matter of course." From the above decision it is clear that the Courts have no jurisdiction to examine the reasonableness of the order of detention made by the Secretary of State. They cannot also examine whether the material before the authority is sufficient for coming to a conclusion that the person concerned must be detained. It further follows from that decision that the Secretary of State cannot be called upon to disclose the information that he has, in justification of the order of detention made by him. They cannot also examine whether the material before the authority is sufficient for coming to a conclusion that the person concerned must be detained. It further follows from that decision that the Secretary of State cannot be called upon to disclose the information that he has, in justification of the order of detention made by him. But, in Liversidge’s case1 the Courts were not called upon to consider as to what would be the effect if the order of detention issued does not disclose that the detaining authority was ‘satisfied’ that with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner contemplated in the Regulation, it is necessary to detain him. In Rex v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs2, MacKinnon, L.J., while agreeing with Scott and Goddard, L.JJ., observed thus: "The power of the Home Secretary to issue a valid order depends on the fulfilment of a condition. The nature of that condition is very material. It is not the existence of an objective fact, for example, that the person concerned is an alien. It is the existence of a subjective state of mind in the Home Secretary, that is, that he has reasonable grounds for believing certain facts to exist, and, by implication, that he honestly entertains that belief. If an order asserting the existence of that state of mind and belief, in valid form has been made, the onus on the applicant of disproving its existence is obviously much more difficult than would be the disproof of an objective fact, for example, that the man is an alien. Evidence of the applicant that he does not know that there are any reasons for the Home Secretary’s belief, or denial that there are or can be any reasons for it, is not a sufficient discharge of the onus so as to call on the Home Secretary to explain and justify the assertion of his order." From these observations it is clear that the order of detention must on the face of it show the subjective state of mind of the detaining authority i.e., that he is ‘satisfied’ that with a view to preventing the person concerned for acting in the manner contemplated by rule 30, it is necessary to detain him. Such an assertion in the order is proof of the satisfaction required. Such an assertion in the order is proof of the satisfaction required. The decisions rendered by the Indian Courts both on rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939 and rule 30 of the "Rules" have consistently taken the view that it is not open to the Courts to inquire into the reasons which induced the detaining authority to think that the person ordered to be detained is likely to act in the manner specified in those Rules-See: Re Manuhhai Bhikabha Patel1 and the decision of the Supreme Court in Makhan Singh’s case2. But the above quoted decisions did not consider as to what would be the effect, if a detention order does not ex facie show that the detaining authority was satisfied on the material before it that with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in one or the other ways mentioned in the Rule, it is necessary to detain him. In Sib Nath Banerjee v. A.E. Porter3 a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court laid down that while the Courts cannot enquire into the grounds of satisfaction or the sufficiency thereof, still certainly have the jurisdiction to enquire as to whether that authority or the person was satisfied as a matter of fact before he made the order of detention. In other words, it was held therein that it is open to the Courts to examine whether as a matter of fact the detaining authority was really satisfied on matters in which the law requires him to be satisfied before ordering the detention of the detenue. Dealing with the same point in Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee4 (on an appeal from the decision of the Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court, referred toearlier) the Federeal Court held that the Court cannot investigate into the sufficiency of the material or the reasonableness of the grounds upon which the Governor had been satisfied; but whenever powers of this kind or indeed other special statutory powers are conferred, they must to the extent to which specific provision has been made in the statute conferring the powers, be exercised by the authority and in the manner specified in the statute and in strict conformity with the provisions thereof and the Court can see whether this is done. In Keshav Gokhale v. Emperor5 delivering the judgment of the Court, Stone, C.J., opined (at page 214) that Mr. In Keshav Gokhale v. Emperor5 delivering the judgment of the Court, Stone, C.J., opined (at page 214) that Mr. Millard, Collector of Belgaum, who signed the detention warrant failed to appreciate the nature, the extent and the implications of the grave and onerous powers and duties delegated to him by Government for the purpose of curtailing by preventive detention the liberty of His Majesty’s subjects without trial or process of the Courts. Proceeding further, the learned Chief Justice observed thus (at page 215): "But in each case the Court must consider the order of detention in the light of the actual language used and the circumstance surrounding the making of it. But the principle to be deduced from the decision of the Federal Court Sibnath Banerjee’s case4 is clear, namely, that if on a perusal of the order it becomes clear that the authority or officer making it the order did not apply its or his mind as required by rule 26, the order must be held to be invalid.".. In Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji6 the Judicial Committee laid down that where persons who are detained under rule 129 are ordered to be detained under rule 26 as a matter of routine on a mere recommendation of the police, the orders are bad in law as it does not appear that the matter was considered by the Governor at any stage much ‘less that at the time the order was made he was ‘satisfied’ with regard to any of the matters set out in the order of detention. Again in Emperor v. Vimlabai Deshpande1 the Judicial Committee held that an order of detention can be made if the authority concerned is ‘satisfied’ with respect to any particular person that with a view to preventing him from indulging into the activities specified, it is necessary to do so, but the Government must, however, be ‘satisfied,‘mere suspicion is not enough. In Purshottam Trikamdas v. Emperor2 the Bombay High Court laid down that it is incumbent on the authority directing thedetention of a person to apply all possible care and attention to the materials placed before it before making the order of detention; and even a slight error or evidence of carelessness would tend to show that the necessary amount of care and attention had not been bestowed in the examination and consideration of such materials by such authority. Dealing with that aspect, this is what Sen, J., who spoke for the Court observed (at page 336): “In Keshav Talpade v. King Emperor3, the Federal Court remarked that where the recital of a duly authenticated order of detention contained a statement as to the existence of the condition necessary to the valid making of that order, such a recital within the normal case, in the absence of any evidence as to its inaccuracy, be accepted by a Court as establishing that the necessary condition was fulfilled, and that”the presence of the recital in the order will place a difficult burden on the detenu to prove admissible evidence sufficient to establish even a prima facie case that the recital is not accurate.“This view was approved by their Lordships of the Privy Council, who also referred in this connection to the rule of presumption enacted in sub-section (2) of section 1, Defence of India Act, a provision which has been reproduced in sub-section (3) of section 10 of Ordinance 3(iii) of 1944. The difficult position in which a detenu is placed in such circumstances, therefore makes it incumbent on the authority directing the detention to apply all possible care and attention to the materials placed before it before making the order of detention and even a slight error or evidence of carelessness would tend to show that the necessary amount of care and attention had not been bestowed in the examination and consideration of such materials by such authority. Such a conclusion would indeed be regrettable in a case in which the executive is given almost unlimited power and discretion”to deprive His Majesty’s subjects of their liberty without the intervention of the Courts of law“to use the words used in a case recently decided by the Court; Emperor v. Bajirao Yamanappa4. We feel constrained to observe that such a conclusion is not excluded in the circumstances of the present case.” In re: V. Venkataraman5 Yahya Ali, J., observed that the ‘satisfaction’ required by the detaining authority must be honest, careful and deliberate. The said ‘satisfaction’ must be reached by the detaining authority after exercising due care and caution. We feel constrained to observe that such a conclusion is not excluded in the circumstances of the present case.” In re: V. Venkataraman5 Yahya Ali, J., observed that the ‘satisfaction’ required by the detaining authority must be honest, careful and deliberate. The said ‘satisfaction’ must be reached by the detaining authority after exercising due care and caution. This is what his Lordship observed (at page 532): “That the satisfaction must be honest, careful and deliberate, arrived by the detaining authority after exercising due care and caution.” Proceeding further his Lordship observed: “The most important limitation upon the essential jurisdiction of the executive in exercising the powers under such a sweeping enactment is that there should be no fraud or abusive exercise of the power conferred thereby and that the power should not, to any extent, be exceeded. In other words, the power should be exercised for the purpose contemplated by the Act and should come strictly within the limits, scope and ambit of the enactment. It has to be remembered that the Act avowedly commits tremendous inroads upon the liberty of the subject, and commensurate with that authority it is essential on the part of the executive that they should realise that it is in essence and in substance, a preventive and not a punitive jurisdiction and that detention should not be ordered or continued for the purpose of punishing a person for acts done in the past but wholly and solely for the purpose set out at the forefront of the Act of preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order.” From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that while exercising the power conferred on him under rule 30, an executive power which empowers him to deprive a citizen of his cherished right, the detaining authority must act conscientiously, apply his mind seriously to the facts of the case and see whether from the material before him, he can be ‘satisfied’ that there is a case for detention. Prima fade proof of that satisfaction must be found in the order itself. Taking into consideration the sweep of the power conferred on the detaining authority to make inroads into the personal liberty of a citizen, every order of detention must be strictly construed. Prima fade proof of that satisfaction must be found in the order itself. Taking into consideration the sweep of the power conferred on the detaining authority to make inroads into the personal liberty of a citizen, every order of detention must be strictly construed. If the order of detention does not ex facie show that the detaining authority had the required satisfaction, then the burden of establishing that before he directed the detention of the detenu, he was satisfied that the detention was necessary for one or the other of the reasons mentioned in Rule 30, is on the detaining authority. A mere assertion by him in his counter-affidavit that he was ‘satisfied’ is not sufficient. He must establish by acceptable evidence that the condition precedent prescribed in the Rule had been complied with. In such cases the burden shifts on the detaining authority. In the instant case, the impugned order does not show that with a view to prevent the petitioner from acting in the manner specified in rule 30, the order of detention had been made. Therefore on the basis of that order, it is not possible to come to the conclusion that the detaining authority had the required satisfaction on the date he made the order of detention. No other material was placed before the Court to establish that fact. The assertion of the second respondent in his counter-affidavit that at the time he made the impugned order of detection, he was satisfied that with a view to preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India and civil defence, the public safety and the maintenance of public order, it was necessary to detain him, is by itself not sufficient to establish that he had the required satisfaction on the date he directed the detention of the petitioner. Therefore, we hold that the impugned order was not made in accordance with rule 30 and consequently the same is an invalid order. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Godavari Shamrao Parulekar v. The State of Maharashtra1, the learned Advocate-General contended that a strict compliance with rule 30 is not necessary and it is sufficient if there is a substantial compliance with that rule. In that case, the order impugned therein read: “No. S.B. III/DOR. 1162-IV, HOME DEPARTMENT (Special) ORDER. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Godavari Shamrao Parulekar v. The State of Maharashtra1, the learned Advocate-General contended that a strict compliance with rule 30 is not necessary and it is sufficient if there is a substantial compliance with that rule. In that case, the order impugned therein read: “No. S.B. III/DOR. 1162-IV, HOME DEPARTMENT (Special) ORDER. Whereas the Government of Maharashtra is satisfied with respect to the person known as Shri Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar of Bombay that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the public safety and the maintenance of public order, it is necessary to make the following Order: Now therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, the Government of Maharashtra does hereby direct that the said Shri Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar be detained. By Order and in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra. (Sd.) Deputy Secretary to Government of Maharashtra (Home Dept.) Dated at Sachivalaya, Bombay, this 10th day of November, 1962.” That order shows clearly without any ambiguity that the Government of Maharashtra ‘was satisfied’ with respect to the person known as Shri Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar of Bombay that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the public safety and the maintenance of public order, it was necessary to direct his detention. From the order in question, there is no doubt that the detaining authority had the required satisfaction. The mistake pointed out in that order was of a trivial character. It is in that context the Supreme Court observed: “Reading the order on a whole, in substance it does say that it is necessary to detail the person with a view to preventing him from acting in the manner prejudicial to the defence of India, etc.” The order impugned in this case fails to include therein the crucial words of rule 30, namely, “with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the public safety, etc.” Hence, in our opinion, the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Godavari’s case1 is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. For the reasons mentioned above, we hold that the impugned order cannot be sustained and that it is liable to be quashed. For the reasons mentioned above, we hold that the impugned order cannot be sustained and that it is liable to be quashed. Now coming to the last contention formulated above, it would be most inappropriate to allow the detenu to know the grounds on which he is detained. If that information is made public or even if the same is made available to the detenu then public interest may suffer. In that event, the very purpose of rule 30 may be defeated. What that Rule requires is the satisfaction of the detaining authority on matters mentioned therein and not the satisfaction of this Court. This Court cannot go into the question, as mentioned earlier, whether the satisfaction of the detaining authority is well founded or not. Hence, we are unable to entertain the prayer of the petitioner to call for and examine the material before the detaining authority on the basis of which the impugned order had been made, for determining whether the detention order was justified. As we have come to the conclusion that the impugned order is not in accordance with rule 30, we are constrained to held that the petitioner is illegally and improperly detained. In the result, we allow this petition and direct that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith. M.C.M. ----- Petition allowed.