JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner-employer has challenged the order, dated 18 February 1992, passed by the Third Labour Court, Nagpur, partly allowing the respondent-employee's application under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), holding him entitled to claim Rs. 2,76,390.18 from the petitioner with 12 per cent interest per annum on the amount of Rs. 2,57,287.48 with effect from 21 April. 1989, till payment of the amount. 2. The petitioner is a partnership firm haying its place of business at Nagpur and it prints and publishes a daily newspaper Nava-Bharat from Nagpur. The respondent was one of the employees of the petitioner having been appointed on 4 December 1951 as Sub-Editor. In a dispute relating to categorisation of employees, however, it has been held that the respondent was a Chief Sub-Editor. The respondent, along with other working journalists employed with the petitioner, had raised an industrial dispute for being given the category and wages of Chief Sub-Editor from the date of the respondent's appointment as he was carrying out the duties of Chief Sub-Editor. The Industrial Tribunal, as per its award, dated 3 January 1977, had made an award that the respondent should be given a category and wages of Chief Sub-Editor from the date of his appointment. This award was challenged by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 884 of 1977 before this Court. This writ petition was dismissed by this Court by its judgment, dated 21 April 1989, with little modification in the order of the Industrial Tribunal, in that the respondent's claim for wages of Chief Sub-Editor from the date of his appointment as allowed by the Industrial Tribunal was held to be unjustified and it was held that the respondent was entitled to the wages of Chief Sub-Editor only from 29 May 1959. This judgment of the High Court undisputedly has become final and binding upon the parties. 3. While the respondent was working as Chief Sub-Editor, on 1 November 1971, a chargesheet was served upon him alleging some misconduct on his part. Pending inquiry the respondent was suspended by order, dated 6 June 1972. Industrial dispute was raised by the respondent relating to the validity of his suspension and the same came to be referred to the Third Labour Court, Nagpur, for adjudication. Pending inquiry the respondent was suspended by order, dated 6 June 1972. Industrial dispute was raised by the respondent relating to the validity of his suspension and the same came to be referred to the Third Labour Court, Nagpur, for adjudication. The text of the dispute referred to was as follows: “Nava Bharat should withdraw form with the illegal and arbitrary action of suspension against Sri Saxena and reinstate him with back-wages from 6 June 1972.” 4. This reference was registered as Reference No. 29 of 1972, and was ultimately disposed of as infructuous on 6 September 1988, by the Third Labour Court as the dismissal was ordered in the meanwhile which as challenged in Reference No. 157 of 1985, and which came to be decided on 8 March 1988 by the Second Labour Court and further since the respondent had also in the meantime attained the superannuation in the year 1983. 5. It may be pointed out specifically here that during the pendency or this reference No. 29 of 1972 a domestic inquiry was conducted and the enquiry officer submitted his report on 5 March 1973, holding the charges as proved and the petitioner had agreed with the report and decided to dismiss the respondent. The respondent, being a protected workman, however, the petitioner could not take any action on the report of the enquiry officer without obtaining the permission under S. 33(3) of the Act from the Industrial Court. Therefore, Application No. 102 of 1973 under S. 33(3) of the Act was made on 17 April 1973 before the Industrial Court, Nagpur, seeking permission to dismiss the respondent. The Industrial Court rejected the permission by order, dated 28 February 1976. The petitioner thereupon made this Court in Special Civil Application No. 4728 of 1976 which was decided on 24 November 1983, remanding the matter with a direction to the Industrial Court for decision afresh. The Industrial Court on remand, after hearing both the sides, passed order on 22 August 1984, granting permission to the petitioner to dismiss the respondent. In the meantime the respondent had reached the age of superannuation of 60 years and stood retired on 3 July 1983. On receipt of the permission from the Industrial Court the petitioner passed order, dated 19 January 1985, dismissing the respondent. 6. The respondent raised industrial dispute regarding his dismissal from service. In the meantime the respondent had reached the age of superannuation of 60 years and stood retired on 3 July 1983. On receipt of the permission from the Industrial Court the petitioner passed order, dated 19 January 1985, dismissing the respondent. 6. The respondent raised industrial dispute regarding his dismissal from service. This dispute was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. The reference was in the following terms: “Sri Ghanshyam Saxena who has been terminated from the employment of Nava Bharat, Hindi Dainik, should be reinstated with payment of back-wages, continuity of service with effect from 19 January 1985.” 7. The reference was registered as Reference No. 157 of 1985 on the file of the Second Labour Court, Nagpur. In this reference ultimately the award was passed on 8 March 1988. It was held that the action of the petitioner in dismissing the respondent by order, dated 19 January 1985, was illegal. The Second Labour Court in this award, dated 8 March 1988, also observed that since the action taken by the petitioner was illegal, the respondent would be entitled under Taw to claim his wages for the entire period during which The was placed under suspension as also during which he was not paid the wages. The Second Labour Court, however, did not grant relief of reinstatement to the respondent explaining the difficulty for granting such a relief having regard to the jurisdiction conferred on it by the reference. The Labour Court further observed that for the relief of salary and other benefits the respondent will have to approach the proper forum. 8. The respondent then on 13 June 1988, filed application under S. 33C(2) of the Act before the Third Labour Court at Nagpur claiming back-wages, bonus, provident fund, gratuity and encashment of leave. The total claim put-forth was at Rs. 3,35,622.58. The petitioner opposed the claim on several counts by filing its written statement on 30 November 1988. The respondent had filed three annexures and summary along with his application, giving calculations about the claim made. The respondent also filed his affidavit on 2 June 1990. The petitioner cross-examined the respondent on this affidavit. 3,35,622.58. The petitioner opposed the claim on several counts by filing its written statement on 30 November 1988. The respondent had filed three annexures and summary along with his application, giving calculations about the claim made. The respondent also filed his affidavit on 2 June 1990. The petitioner cross-examined the respondent on this affidavit. The petitioner on its own, however, led no evidence excepting of filing of its calculations regarding the respondent's claim, Exhibit 25, The Third Labour Court then passed the award, dated 18 February 1982, partly allowing the respondents application, holding him entitled to claim Rs. 2,76,390.18 from the petitioner. Since the petitioner had already deposited an amount of Rs. 19,102.70 in the Court for being paid to the respondent; the net amount payable after deduction of that amount was arrived at Rs. 2,57,287.48. The petitioner was directed to pay this amount forthwith to the respondent and was further directed to pay the interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on this amount of Rs. 2,57,287.48 with effect from. 21 April 1989 till the date of payment of the amount. This award, dated 18 February 1992, passed by the Third Labour Court, Nagpur, is under challenge in the instant petition. 9. Sri Bhangde, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, firstly contended that in Reference No. 157 of 1985 the Second Labour Court had not decided the question relating to the entitlement of the respondent to the back-wages and there was no existing right in favour of the respondent to enable him to move the Labour Court under the summary remedy provided by S. 33C(2) of the Act and as such the learned Labour Court. ought to have dismissed the respondent's application on this short ground alone. The contrary conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court on this aspect, in the submission of Sri Bhangde, is not justified by the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant matter and the law governing the same. 10. Sri Bhangde next contended mat the learned Labour Court also erred in holding that the respondent gets the existing right to claim back-wages under the Standing Order 14(6) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. 10. Sri Bhangde next contended mat the learned Labour Court also erred in holding that the respondent gets the existing right to claim back-wages under the Standing Order 14(6) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Sri Bhangde then contended that the impugned award passed by the Second Labour Court is also vitiated on the count that the learned Labour Court has not given aproper opportunity to the petitioner to file its calculations of the wages, etc., payable to the respondent. In the submission of Sri Bhangde, the learned Labour Court also erred in holding that the dismissal orders related back to the date of suspension. In the submission of Sri Bhangde, the Labour Court also erred in granting to the respondent claims towards encashment of leave, provident fund and bonus, In the submission of Sri Bhangde, the Labour Court in any case has committed an error in accepting the calculations given by the respondent as it is without verifying its correctness, the wage committee's report and recommendations of the Second Wage Board for Working Journalists, Palekar Award, and so also the notifications issued by the Government of India. In the submission of Sri Bhangde, according to the calculations which the petitioner has made, the respondent cannot be said to be entitled for the amount of more than Rs. 1,16,335.98. He pointed out that in fact after the impugned award the petitioner had sent a communication on 7 April 1992 to the respondent intimating him that the calculations of back-wages for the concerned period have been made by the petitioner and they came to Rs. 1,16,335.98 and the respondent was requested to accept the correctness of the calculations. Then again reminder was sent to him on 15 May 1992. The petitioner, Sri Bhangde submitted, has made these calculations according to the First Wage Committee's report, recommendations of the Second Wage Board and Palekar Award. He submitted that had proper opportunity been given to the petitioner, the petitioner would have been able to assist the Court in arriving at a proper calculation. In the submission of Sn Bhangde, the Labour Court has failed in its duty in accepting the calculations as made by the respondent without verifying the correctness thereof, even assuming that the petitioner had an opportunity to give its calculations but failed in providing the same for one or the other reason. In the submission of Sn Bhangde, the Labour Court has failed in its duty in accepting the calculations as made by the respondent without verifying the correctness thereof, even assuming that the petitioner had an opportunity to give its calculations but failed in providing the same for one or the other reason. Sn Bhangde submitted that in the event of non-acceptance of his other submissions, the matter at least needs to be remanded for correctly calculating the amounts payable to the respondent in the interest of justice. Sri Bhangde also submitted that direction to pay interest is without jurisdiction and in any case rate of interest as granted and the date from which it is granted is also arbitrary, 11. Sri Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand challenged the correctness of the submissions made by Sri Bhangde and submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the wake of tile provisions of law governing the matter, the award made by the Second Labour Court cannot be said to be vitiated on any count and the petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. Even as regards the acceptance of the calculations by the Second Labour Court, Sri Thakur submitted that the petitioner cannot be said to have been denied any opportunity as such to file the calculations and no grievance on this count, therefore, can be accepted. Sri Thakur, however, submitted that in case the matter is to be remanded back for calculating the amount payable to the respondent, the amount already deposited by the petitioner, Rs. 1,18,000 under the order of this Court, dated 24 September 1992, may be immediately permitted to be withdrawn by the respondent since even according to the petitioner's calculation as informed to the respondent by its communication, dated 7 April 1992, the back-wages payable to respondent come to Rs. 1,16,335.98. 12. The first contention of Sri Bhangde that the learned Labour Court was not correct in coming to the conclusion that the respondent was having an existing right to claim the money benefit, cannot be accepted. In Para. 1,16,335.98. 12. The first contention of Sri Bhangde that the learned Labour Court was not correct in coming to the conclusion that the respondent was having an existing right to claim the money benefit, cannot be accepted. In Para. 30 of the award, dated 8 March 1988, in Reference No. 157 of 1985, as already indicated, the Labour Court had observed that since the action taken by the petitioner against the respondent was illegal, the respondent under law would be entitled to claim his wages for the entire period during which he was placed under suspension. After observing this in the operative portion of the award the Second Labour Court again specifically held that so far as the claim for salary and other monetary benefits to which the respondent may be entitled till 3 July 1983, he will have to approach a proper forum. Some debate was raised since the word “may” has been used in this part of the order by raising a contention that the question whether the respondent’ is entitled or not has been left open and unless the entitlement is determined, the respondent cannot be said to be having an existing right to put forth his claim under S. 33C(2) of the Act. This contention, however, has no force having regard to the earlier part of the award, particularly Para. 30 thereof which clearly indicates that the Labour Court was of the view that since the action taken by the petitioner was illegal, the respondent was entitled to claim his wages for the entire period during which he was placed under suspension as also the period during which he was not paid the wages. But for the specific terms of the reference, it is apparent from the contents of Para. 30 of the award, that the Labour Court itself would have ordered the payment of back-wages to the respondent. It is not in dispute that this award, dated 8 March 1988, has become final and binding between the parties. It was, however, sought to be urged by Sri Bhangde that the observations and/or finding recorded by the Labour Court in Para. It is not in dispute that this award, dated 8 March 1988, has become final and binding between the parties. It was, however, sought to be urged by Sri Bhangde that the observations and/or finding recorded by the Labour Court in Para. 30 of the award have to be held as beyond the jurisdiction since the question about the wages or salary of the respondent prior to the impugned action of dismissal on 19 January 1985, was not referred and, therefore, the respondent cannot take the benefit of any observation or finding recorded in Para. 30 by the Labour Court in its award, dated 8 March 1988, for claiming the pre-existing right for approaching the Labour Court under S. 33C(2) of the Act and it was necessary on the part of the respondent to raise an industrial dispute about the payment of back-wages and other benefits payable to him before initiating the proceedings under S. 33C(2) of the Act. 13. Sri Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent, invited my attention to the pleadings and the stand taken by the petitioner in their written submissions filed Wore the Labour Court. In Para 11 of the written statement (page 118-119) the petitioner had submitted as under: “It is submitted that this question of claim of back-wages was a matter which was to be adjudicated upon under the proceedings raised by the applicant under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act for which a reference was made by the appropriate Government to the Second Labour Court, Nagpur, which was numbered as Reference No. 157 of 1985. It was decided by the learned Second Labour Court,. Nagpur, and the learned Presiding Officer has specifically denied back-wages to the applicant prior to 19 January 1985 because the said question was never a subject-matter of reference. Since the question of grant of back-wages was decided by the learned Second Labour Court, Nagpur, in the said award and the said Labour Court specifically denied the claim of back-wages to the applicant in the said award prior to 19 January 1985 and which date goes back to the date of making an application for permission, no right has been created in favour of the applicant for claim of any back-wages as per the said award.” 14. Pointing out this, Sri Thakur contended mat the petitioner cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold. Pointing out this, Sri Thakur contended mat the petitioner cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold. Before the Third Labour Court, as can be gathered from the written statement the petitioner's case was that the question of grant for wages was decided by the Labour Court and it had denied the claim of back-wages to the respondent and as such no right has been created in favour of the respondent. Here in the petition, however, the petitioner says that in the award, dated 8 March 1988, the entitlement of the respondent for back-wages for the period 6 June 1972 to 2 July 1983 was not decided by the Third Labour Court in Reference No. 157 of 1985. Leaving apart this aspect, Sri Thakur rightly submitted that in the reference No. 157 of 1985 the Third Labour Court did in fact recognised the right of the respondent to get the back-wages from the petitioner and it is only because of technical difficulty, instead of passing consequential appropriate orders in that regard, it left it open to be done by proper forum. Sri Thakur further rightly submitted that the respondent had not approached the Labour Court under S.33C(2) of the Act, merely on the assumption of his dismissal being wrongful, out here is a case mat the respondent's dismissal was already held to be specifically illegal by the award, dated 8 March 1988, and the computation of wages in the circumstances was merely just consequential. Inviting my attention to a case reported in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, Ltd. v. Its workmen [ 1974 (2) L.L.N. 78 ], it is contended that the Supreme Court has observed that the question as to whether the dismissal was unjustified would be the principal matter for adjudication, and computation of wages would be just consequential upon such adjudication. The Labour Court has dealt with in details on this aspect and has rightly come to the conclusion that the award, dated 8 March 1988, has to be held as recognising an existing right in favour of me respondent as regards the back-wages and other benefits. The conclusion so arrived at cannot be held to be bad on any count. The contrary submissions made by Sri Bhangde, therefore cannot be accepted. 15. The conclusion so arrived at cannot be held to be bad on any count. The contrary submissions made by Sri Bhangde, therefore cannot be accepted. 15. The next contention raised by Sri Bhangde that the learned Labour Court committed an error in holding that the respondent gets right to claim back-wages under the Standing Order 14(6) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, also similarly cannot be accepted. It is not in dispute mat the petitioner is a newspaper establishment where the respondent was working as journalist and that the Model Standing Orders framed for working journalists under the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, are applicable. The Standing Order 14(6), provides that if on enquiry the charges against the working journalist are not proved to be correct he shall be deemed to have been on duty during the period of suspension and shall be entitled to the wages which he could have received had he not been suspended. As already indicated, by the award, dated 8 March 1988, the Second Labour Court, Nagpur, has held that the findings of the enquiry officer in relation to the respondents were shockingly disproportionate and the dismissal of the respondent was illegal. In such a situation provisions of Standing Order 14(6) are squarely applicable creating existing rights in favour of the respondent to claim wages and other benefits for the period of suspension as if he was not suspended. Similarly, having regard to the applicability of the Model Standing Orders to the working journalist like the respondent as observed above, it is difficult to accept the contention raised by Sri Bhangde that the Labour Court erred in holding that the dismissal order related back to the date of suspension. If the dismissal order ultimately is found to be illegal the suspension of the respondent is wiped out automatically and the respondent becomes entitled to claim relief mom the date of suspension. What is then vehemently urged by Sri Bhangde is that the Second Labour Court had not given proper opportunity to the petitioner to file its calculation of wages, etc., payable to the respondent. In any case, Sri Bhangde pointed out, that the Labour Court has committed an error in accepting the calculations given by the respondent as it is without verifying its correctness. In any case, Sri Bhangde pointed out, that the Labour Court has committed an error in accepting the calculations given by the respondent as it is without verifying its correctness. Inviting my attention to some of the errors in the calculations made by the Labour Court Sri Bhangde submitted that an opportunity of being heard by the Labour Court on this count is required to be granted, in the interest of justice. This contention of Sri Bhangde was opposed by Sri Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent, by contending that the Labour Court cannot be blamed for lapse on the part of the petitioner for non-filing of the calculations by the petitioner, inasmuch as it was apparent from the record that several opportunities had been given by the Labour Court to the petitioner in this regard. The submission of Sri Thakur that, it was the petitioner who failed to file calculations and thereby compelled the Court to proceed in the matter on the basis of the calculations which were on the record. On hearing both the counsel on this aspect of the matter and particularly having regard to the flaw pointed out in the calculations as made, it, however, appears that it would be in the fitness of things even without going into the aspect as to whether the petitioner itself had to be blamed in this regard or not, to give an opportunity to the petitioner to put forth the calculations as regards the wages, etc., before the Labour Court and direct the Labour Court to decide the quantum of the amount ultimately payable to the respondent after giving ah opportunity of being heard to both the sides instead of doing the calculations here itself. It is in this view of the matter, it is not necessary to dwell upon the aspect as to whether the respondent is entitled to the claim towards the encashment of leave, provident fund, etc. This aspect can be agitated by the petitioner before the Labour Court itself at the time of hearing me petitioner and the respondent on the aspect of calculations of back-wages. The Labour Court in the circumstances will have to decide afresh the respondent's entitlement towards the encashment of leave, provident fund, etc., on hearing both the sides. The petition consequently has to be allowed partly. 16. What remains to be dealt with is the aspect regarding interest. The Labour Court in the circumstances will have to decide afresh the respondent's entitlement towards the encashment of leave, provident fund, etc., on hearing both the sides. The petition consequently has to be allowed partly. 16. What remains to be dealt with is the aspect regarding interest. Writ Petition No. 2636 of 1992 has been filed by the respondent only for the limited relief of quashing and modifying the rate of interest of 12 per cent as awarded by the Labour Court on the amount which was found payable to the respondent by the petitioner. The petitioner claims that the directive to pay the interest is without jurisdiction and that at any rate, the rate of interest as granted and the date from which it is granted is arbitrary. The respondent on the other hand in his petition claims that interest ought to have been awarded at the rate of 18 per cent per annum and not 12 per cent and it should have been made payable with retrospective effect instead of from 24 January 1989. It is difficult to accept the contention that direction to pay the interest is without jurisdiction. When any amount is unlawfully withheld the party entitled to such amount gets a right to claim interest thereon. In so far as the rate and date of payment of interest is concerned the trial Court has considered both these aspects in Paras. 29 and 30 of its award. On hearing the learned counsel for both the sides on this aspect of the matter I do not find any reason to take a view different than the one taken by the Labour Court in this regard Writ Petition No. 2636 of 1992 in the circumstances has to be dismissed and it is accordingly so dismissed with no order as to costs. Writ Petition No. 2100 of 1996 as already indicated is hereby partly allowed and the impugned judgment and order is quashed and set aside to the extent as indicated hereinabove only and the matter is remitted back to the Labour Court, Nagpur, to calculate afresh the exact amount payable to the respondent by the petitioner after giving an opportunity to both the sides to put forth their say in this regard as indicated hereinabove. 17. 17. Under the interim order of this Court, dated 24 September 1992, passed in Writ Petition No. 2100 of 1992 the petitioner had deposited a sum of Rs. 1,18,000 in the First Labour Court, Nagpur. Sri Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that if the respondent's claim for back-wages is ultimately accepted by this Court, since even according to the petitioner the respondent is entitled at least to the amount of Rs. 1,16,335.98 as indicated by the petitioner himself in its communication, dated 7 April 1992, and if the matter is remanded only for recalculation of the amount payable to the respondent which in the circumstances cannot be less than the amount of Rs. 1,18,000 which has been deposited by the petitioner with the Labour Court, the respondent be permitted to withdraw the said amount without any conditions as regards furnishing of the security, etc. The request as made by Sri Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent, in the facts and circumstances of the case is accepted and the Labour Court is directed to deliver the amount of Rs. 1,18,000 which the petitioner has deposited with it on 21 October 1992 pursuant to the order of this Court, dated 24 September 1992s, in Writ Petition No. 2100 of 1992 immediately on demand by the respondent. This amount of Rs. 1,18,000 shall be treated as having been paid to the respondent as on today and accordingly would be taken into consideration while arriving at the net payable amount to the respondent ultimately. In Writ Petition No. 2100 of 1992 rule is made absolute in the above terms with no order as to costs.