JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, A.C.J. 1. Chawa Gram (hereinafter referred to as the accused-appellant) faced trial for allegedly having committed murder of Sudhu (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased'). The accused-appellant was also alleged to have caused serious injuries to Jagannath (P.W,l), He was found guilty and was convicted for commission of offences punishable under Sections 302 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, 'Indian Penal Code') by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rourkela, but the co-accused Bicha Oram was acquitted. Accused- Appellant was sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for the conviction u/s 302, Indian Penal Code, but no separate sentence was awarded for the other offence. 2. Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is that on 11A,1990, the day following the widely celebrated function Sarnl festival two persons named Eta Oram (P.W.3) and Lada Oram (P.W.1) were sitting on the verandah of the house of accused- Appellant, At about 8 p.m. Jagannath Gram and Menga Gram (P, W,2) came there, Seeing them Eta and Lada left the place immediately, Accused appellant abused Jagannath and Manga saying that because of their unwelcome arrival his friends Eta and Lada left the place, Over this issue there was exchange of words between the accused-appellant and Jagannath Oram, Hearing their shouts, deceased Sudhi Oram, elder brother of Manga, came there and asked Jagannath and Manga to leave the place immediately. Accused-appellant suddenly stabbed the deceased with a knife at the chest, abdomen and left hand as a result of which the deceased sustained bleeding injuries and fell down in front of the house of the accused persons, When Jagannath protested, the accused-appellant also stabbed him with the knife on his forehead causing bleeding injury. At this juncture Bicha Oram, the co-accused (since acquitted) came out from the house with bow and arrow and threatened to shoot anyone who would go near deceased Sudhu, Jagannath and Manga left the spot out of fear, When the sister of the deceased came to give water to him, the co-accused threatened to shoot them. They also left, The matter was reported to the villagers by Jagannath and Manga and thereafter the matter was reported at the police station, By the time the police arrived, deceased Sudhu had breathed his last. Investigation was undertaken and charge-sheet was submitted against both the accused persons, 3. They also left, The matter was reported to the villagers by Jagannath and Manga and thereafter the matter was reported at the police station, By the time the police arrived, deceased Sudhu had breathed his last. Investigation was undertaken and charge-sheet was submitted against both the accused persons, 3. Jagannath and Manga (P. Ws 1 and 2) are stated to be eye witnesses to the occurrence. Placing reliance On their version as well as the version of Eta Oram (P.W.3) learned trial Judge found the accused-appellant guilty. 4. In support of the appeal, Mr. B.P. Ray, learned Counsel submitted that on the self-same evidence the co-accused having been acquitted, there is no substance to convict the accused-appellant as the evidence is tainted with falsehood. The evidence of eye witnesses, i.e., P. Ws 1,2 and 3, who claim to have seen major part of the occurrence is attacked on the ground that same was definitely partisan. Alternatively it is submitted that the assault took place in course of sudden quarrel and therefore, Section 302, Indian Penal Code has no application to the facts of the case. Learned Counsel for State supported the order of conviction and sentence stating that the learned trial Judge has analyzed the evidence in detail and has come to conclusion of guilt of the accused. It is submitted that merely because the co-accused has been acquitted, that person cannot be aground for discarding the evidence which unerringly proves the guilt of the accused-appellant. 5. Nothing has been shown as to how P. Ws. 1 and 2 are partisan. Even if a witness happens to be a relative of the deceased or the injured that cannot be a ground to discard the evidence if it is otherwise credible. The learned trials Judge have elaborately analyzed the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 to hold the accused-appellant guilty. 6. In Dalip Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab it has been laid down under: A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means the witness has caused such an enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit a falsely implicate an innocent person. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit a falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth: However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalization. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudery. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts. 7. This decision has since been followed in Guli Chand and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan, in which Vadivelu Thevar Vs. The State of Madras, was also relied upon. 8. We may also observe that the ground that the witness being a close relative and consequently, being a partisan witness, should not be relied upon, has no substance. This theory was repelled by Apex Court as early as in Dalip Singh's case (supra) in which Apex Court expressed its surprise over the impression which prevailed in the minds of the members of the Bar that relatives were not independent witnesses. Speaking through Vivian Bose, J., the Apex Court observed: We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the tow eye-witnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rules. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavored to dispel in Rameshwar Vs. The State of Rajasthan. We find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgment of the Courts, at any rate in the arguments of counsel. 9. Again in Masalti Vs. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavored to dispel in Rameshwar Vs. The State of Rajasthan. We find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgment of the Courts, at any rate in the arguments of counsel. 9. Again in Masalti Vs. State of U.P. Apex Court observed: But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses. The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. 10. To the same effect is the decision of Apex Court in The State of Punjab Vs. Jagir Singh, Baljit Singh and Karam Singh. In view of the aforesaid, the learned trial Judge is justified in holding that the accused appellant is the author of the crime. 11. Next question is whether Section 302, Indian Penal Code has application to the facts of the case. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the accused-appellant that the blow was given in course of a sudden quarrel. This is not a case where defense claimed sudden provocation. On the contrary, its stand was that the blow was given in course of sudden quarrel. In the case at hand, the blow was given in course of a quarrel. The fourth Exception of Section 300, Indian Penal Code covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with a case of prosecution, not covered by the first Exception, after, which its place would have been more appropriate. The Exception is founded upon the same principle for in both there is absence of premeditation, but while in the case of Exception 1 there is the total deprivation of self-control in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not other wise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 an in Exception 1, but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. There is provocation in Exception 4 an in Exception 1, but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact, Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties put them in respect of guilty upon 'equal footing 'sudden quarrel' implies mutual provocation'. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception I. There is no previous deliberation or determination to quarrel. A quarrel suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each person quarrelling. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused; (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the 'fight' occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300, Indian Penal Code is not defined in the I.P.C. It takes two to make a fight, Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passion to cool down and in this case there was verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression 'undue advantage' as used in the provision means 'unfair advantage'. Considering the background facts as indicated above, in our opinion, this is a case where Exception 4 to Section 300 is to be applied. 12. In view of the factual position as highlighted above, assaults appear to have been made in course of sudden quarrel. Therefore, Section 302, Indian Penal Code has no application, and conviction is altered from Section 302, Indian Penal Code to one u/s 304, Part II, Indian Penal Code and the sentence is reduced to the period of custody already undergone. It appears from records that from the date of arrest till date, the accused-appellant is in custody. 13. So far as conviction u/s 324, Indian Penal Code is concerned, evidence of the injured is relevant, and no infirmity in the reasoning indicated by the learned trial Judge is holding the accused persons guilty has been pointed out. Learned trial Judge has rightly held the accused to be guilty of offence punishable u/s 324, Indian Penal Code. It is seen from the judgment that no sentence was awarded for the conviction u/s 324, Indian Penal Code on the ground that the accused has already been convicted u/s 302, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Even if such a sentence is awarded, the Court ought to award separate sentence. We award sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year for commission of said offence and direct that both the sentences shall run concurrently. In view of the order relating to sentence, accused-appellant be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required to be in custody in connection with any other case. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. B.P. Das, J. 14. I agree. Final Result : Allowed