Order.- This revision petition is directed against an order of he Additional Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Guntur passed on 7th August, 1965. It arises in the following circumstances. Shri V.M. Luther, Deputy Superintendent of Central Excise and Shri P. Bhiksheswara Rao, Inspector of Central Excise of the Divisional Preventive Section of Vijayawada conducted a stock-taking in the tobacco warehouse of Messrs. Rajasthan Tobacco Company at Koppuravur, Guntur District. Daring the said stock-taking, they found several irregularities. They, therefore initiated some proceedings against one Bhavarlal (A-2) who is the Cashier and Modumal (A-1) who is the proprietor of the said firm. While matters stood thus, Modumal (A-1) appeared before the Deputy Collector of Central Excise on 4th January, 1964 with a complaint dated 27th December, 1963 alleging inter alia that the said two Officers of the Excise Department had taken loans of Rs. 200 and Rs. 100 from the Company and gave signed vouchers therefor. These vouchers were produced before the Deputy Collector along with an extract of day-book for 16th November, 1963. The Deputy Collector asked these officers to explain. They denied the allegations and stated that the receipts have not been signed by them and that they are forged. The receipts, therefore, were sent to the Government Examiner of Questioned Documents, Simla to be compared with the admitted signatures of the said two Officers. In his letter dated 23rd June, 1964, the Expert gave opinion that the signatures appearing on the two vouchers do not tally with the admitted signatures. Consequently, the Headquarters Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad sent a complaint on 20th January, 1965 against Sri Modumal (A-1) to the Superintendent of Crime Branch, C.I.D., Hyderabad. The said Superintendent endorsed the original complaint to Inspector Venkata Rao of Crime Branch, C.I.D., Hyderabad for necessary action on 21st January, 1965. The Inspector Venkata Rao thereupon filed an application before the Principal Judicial Second Class Magistrate, under section 155(2) Criminal Procedure Code, on 22nd January, 1965 and sought permission to investigate. The Principal Judicial Second Class Magistrate at Guntur passed an order on 22nd January, 1965 under section 155(2), Criminal Procedure Code, permitting the said Inspector, Crime Branch, C.I.D. to investigate into the case. The Inspector of Police, Crime Branch, C.I.D., Hyderabad, registered the F.I.R. on 23rd January, 1965 and conducted investigation into the matter. The Principal Judicial Second Class Magistrate at Guntur passed an order on 22nd January, 1965 under section 155(2), Criminal Procedure Code, permitting the said Inspector, Crime Branch, C.I.D. to investigate into the case. The Inspector of Police, Crime Branch, C.I.D., Hyderabad, registered the F.I.R. on 23rd January, 1965 and conducted investigation into the matter. On completion of the investigation, the said Inspector filed a charge-sheet dated 29th March, 1965 against both the accused for offences under sections 465, 467, 468, 469 and 471 read with section 34 and section 109, Indian Penal Code, before the Principal Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Guntur on 1st April, 1965. Before enquiry was started in the case, the accused filed an application on 24th April, 1965 taking two preliminary objections to the continuance of the enquiry. It was contended firstly, that since the offences alleged to have been committed in reference to two vouchers on the foot of which two suits, S.C.S. Nos. 484 and 485 of 1964 have been filed before the District Munsif, Guntur the prosecution cannot be continued without the appropriate sanction of the superior Court to the District Munsif or without the complaint from the District Munsif in pursuance of section 195(1)(c),Criminal Procedure Code. The second contention was that the Inspector of Police, Crime Branch, C.I.D., Hyderabad is not an officer-in-charge of a Police Station. He could not, therefore, have investigated the case and, as the investigation and filing the charge-sheet is by an incompetent Police Officer, the prosecution is vitiated. The trial Court, negativing these two contentions, rejected the application. The accused have come up in revision against that order. The same two contentions have been raised before me by Mr. Dwarkeswara Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioners. Now in regard to the first contention, before I deal with the legal aspect, it is proper that some additional facts are mentioned. As stated above, A-1 appeared before the Deputy Collector on 4th January, 1964 along with a complaint dated 27th December, 1963. It is with this complaint that he produced the two vouchers alleged to have been signed by the said Excise Officers. These vouchers continued to be with the Excise Officers first and then were transferred to the Inspector, C.I.D., Crime Branch, Hyderabad who filed the same along with the charge-sheet before the Principal Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Guntur. It is with this complaint that he produced the two vouchers alleged to have been signed by the said Excise Officers. These vouchers continued to be with the Excise Officers first and then were transferred to the Inspector, C.I.D., Crime Branch, Hyderabad who filed the same along with the charge-sheet before the Principal Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Guntur. These documents are still with the Judicial Second Class Magistrate in this case. The two Small Cause Suits were filed on 15th June, 1964, without producing these vouchers in original, before the Small Causes Court. It seems an application was filed before the Small Causes Court to send for these documents. They are however still not sent to the Small Causes Court and they continued to be with the Criminal Court. It is upon these facts that I have to consider whether the case comes within the purview of section 195(1)(c), Criminal Procedure Code. Section 195(1)(c),Criminal Procedure Code, is in the following terms: “Section 19(1).-No Court will take cognizance- * * * * * * (c) of any offence described in section463 or punishable under section 471, section 475 or section 476 of the same Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such Court, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate.” It is plain that sanction of the superior Court or the complaint of the Court is necessary when the offences referred to in that clause have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding. The two vouchers, in respect of which it is alleged that the offence of forgery is committed by the accused, have not been produced or given in evidence in the Small Causes Court in the said two suits. The question of sanction of a superior Court or complaint by the Small Causes Court does not, in my opinion, arise in this case. Merely because suits have been filed on the foot of these two vouchers, it cannot mean that these two documents have been produced in the Small Causes Court or that they were given in evidence. The question of sanction of a superior Court or complaint by the Small Causes Court does not, in my opinion, arise in this case. Merely because suits have been filed on the foot of these two vouchers, it cannot mean that these two documents have been produced in the Small Causes Court or that they were given in evidence. This view not only, accords with the plain words of clause (c) of section 195(1), Criminal Procedure Code, but is supported by the practical common sense of the matter. Before any document is produced or given in evidence before a Court, the Court would not obviously be in a position to express any opinion upon the genuineness or otherwise of the two vouchers. Filing of any copy, as is alleged in the grounds of revision, of the original document or referring the documents in the complaint without filing them along with it, would not enable the Court to judge whether the documents are genuine or not. It cannot obviously, therefore, grant or refuse to grant any sanction envisaged by section 195(1)(c), Criminal Procedure Code. That is why, if the documents are not produced or not given in evidence, the provisions of section 195(1)(c),Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be said to have been attracted to such a case. I am fortified in my view by a decision of the Privy Council in Sanmukh Singh v. The King1, wherein their Lordships held: “Where the document in respect of which a charge of forgery had been laid against the accused had not itself been produced or given evidence in certain proceedings but on the contrary a copy of it had been produced, the absence of complaint under section 195(1)(c), Criminal Procedure Code cannot operate as a bar to the trial of the accused.” I do not therefore, find any difficulty in rejecting this contention. I do not find any substance in the second contention also. The argument is that under section 155, Criminal Procedure Code, in a non-cognizable case it is the officer-in-charge of a Police Station who can investigate even after the sanction of the Court and since in this case the C.I.D. Inspector, Crime Branch, Hyderabad who is not an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station has conducted the investigation although with the permission of the Judicial Second Glass Magistrate, Guntur, the investigation introduces an infirmity in the case and vitiates the entire proceedings. Now, according to section 155(1), Criminal Procedure Code, if information is given to an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station of the commission within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable offence, his duty is to enter it in a book to be kept for that purpose, the substance of such information and refer the informant to the Magistrate. Sub-section (2) however does not refer to an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station but states that no police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate of the first or second class having power to try such case or commit the same for trial, or of a Presidency Magistrate. The words ‘Police Officer’ are not synonymous with an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station. There is absolutely no warrant to limit the scope of the words ‘Police Officer’ used in sub-section (2) to an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station referred to in sub-section (1) of that section. The Legislature cannot be said to be unaware of the distinction between the two expressions. In regard to a non-cognizable case, the intention of the Legislature is to make the provision wider than the first clause. That is why the words ‘Police Officer’ are used. Such a Police Officer can investigate into a non-cognizable case with the permission of the appropriate Magistrate. His powers of investigation in such cases are the same as of an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station except the power to arrest without warrant. Sub-section (3) of section 155, Criminal Procedure Code, supports the view that these two expressions have different connotations. There is hardly any reason to interpret the words ‘Police Officer’ to mean only an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station. Unless I am compelled by any authority or any provision of law, I am inclined to hold that any Police Officer is competent to investigate a non-cognizable case of course with the permission of the appropriate Magistrate. In this case, since the offences have b;en alleged to have been committed at Guntur, it is not denied that the Principal Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Guntur is empowered to try the case. In that view of the matter, the application which was filed by the Inspector, C.I.D., Crime Branch, Hyderabad before the Principal Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Guntur cannot be said to be suffering from any infirmity. In that view of the matter, the application which was filed by the Inspector, C.I.D., Crime Branch, Hyderabad before the Principal Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Guntur cannot be said to be suffering from any infirmity. It is an application filed before an appropriate Magistrate by a Police Officer validly under sub-section (2) of section 155, Criminal Procedure Code. It is not denied that the Inspector, C.I.D., Crime Branch Hyderabad is also a Police Officer. It is only in pursuance of the order of the Magistrate that the said Inspector investigated and consequently filed the charge-sheet. I do not, therefore, agree with the contention that the investigation was conducted by an incompetent officer. Assuming that the words ‘Police Officer’ used in sub-section (2) of section 155, Criminal Procedure Code, are synonymous with the words ‘Officer-in-charge of a Police-Station’ of sub-section (1) of section 155, Criminal Procedure Code even then I do not think that the said Inspector was incompetent to investigate or file the charge-sheet merely because he is not an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station. According to section 551, Criminal Procedure Code, a Police Officer superior in rank to an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station can exercise the same powers, throughout the local area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station. It cannot be in doubt that the Inspector, C.I.D. Crime Branch who is admittedly superior in rank to the Officer-in-charge of a Police Station can exercise the jurisdiction throughout the State. This view gathers support from a decision of the Madras High Court in King Emperor v. Nilakanta and thirteen others1, wherein their Lordships observed: “An Inspector of Criminal Investigation Department has power to investigate in cases to which section 156, Criminal Procedure Code, applies. As such, his ‘local area’ is the Presidency of Madras”. The second contention is, therefore, rejected. Since no other arguments are advanced, the revision petition is dismissed. A.B.K. ----- Revision dismissed.