D. K. SETH, J. The judgment an order dated 17-9-1999 passed the learned Additional District Judge, IInd Court, Dehradun in Appeal No. 85 of 1997 under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act affirming the judgment and order dated 27-5-1996 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Dehradun in Misc. Case No. 101 of 1991 under Section 30/33 of the Arbitra tion Act has since been challenged in this application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Mr. Tarun Agarwal, learned Coun sel for opposite party had taken a prelimi nary objection that the application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Proce dure, hereinafter called as the Code, is not maintainable in view of U. P. Amendment of the said section against an order passed on an appeal. 3. Mr. S. C. Budhwar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Anil Sharma, learned Counsel for the applicant, on the other hand contended that since the ap peal was an appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act it was not an appeal within the meaning of the Code as provided in Section 96 and as such the U. P. Amend ment cannot be attracted. He further con tended that the appeal did not arise out of a suit but of a proceeding under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act which takes the matter outside the scope and ambit of the U. P. Amendment of Section 115. He next contends that the appeal being an appeal under the Arbitration Act being Central Legislation, the U. P. Amendment cannot be attracted and Section 115 as contained in the Code irrespective of the U. P Amendment would be attracted and as such this matter can very well be agitated under Section 115 of the Code. 4. In order to examine this proposi tion it would be beneficial to refer to U. P. Amendment of Section 115 of the Code which is quoted hereunder: " 115. 4. In order to examine this proposi tion it would be beneficial to refer to U. P. Amendment of Section 115 of the Code which is quoted hereunder: " 115. Revision.-The High Court, in cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value of one lakh rupees and above, including such suits or other proceedings in stituted before August 1,1978, and the District Court in any other case, including a case arising out of an original suit or other proceedings in stituted before such date, may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court or District Court, as the case may be, and in which no appeal lies thereto. . . . . . . . . . " 5. In order to mark the difference within U. P. Amendment and Section 115 of the Code, we may refer to the same as quoted hereunder below: " 115. Revision.- (1 ). The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto. . . . . " 6. In fact Section 115 of the Code describes that High Court may call for the record of any case that has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court. Whereas in the U. P. Amendment the same has been substituted with the expression that High Court in case arising out of Original Suits and other suits of the value of 20,000 rupees subsequently amended to one lakh rupees and above that has been decided by any Court subordinate to such Court or District Court as the case may be called for the records. Thus there is an apparent distinction between the two propositions. By the U. P. Amendment the jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code was bifurcated and those below one lakh rupees passed by subordinate Court would lie to the District Judge and those above one lakh rupees passed by subordinate Court were retained to the High Court. Exhaustive expression "cases" as used in Section 115 of the U. P. Amendment has qualified the cases with the words "arising out of original suits or other proceedings. Exhaustive expression "cases" as used in Section 115 of the U. P. Amendment has qualified the cases with the words "arising out of original suits or other proceedings. " Thus there is a marked departure in respect of the matters in which jurisdiction under Section 115 can be exercised by the High Court in the State of U. P. It is only those cases arising out of Original Suits or other proceedings shall be subject matter of revision either before the High Court or before the District Judge as the case may be depending on the valuation or depend ing on the Court passing the order. 7. Mr. Budhwar had strenuously argued that other proceedings includes an appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act and the expression "original" qualify suits only and not other proceedings. Therefore, it would include an order passed on an appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. 8. In my view the argument though very attractively advanced by Mr. Budhwar, yet does not appear to be sound. Inasmuch as the word "original" qualifies suits or other proceedings. There being no coma after the word suits, the expression "or other proceedings" cannot be read dis-jointly. The other proceedings arc to be an original proceeding. In other words, it would be original suits or original other proceedings. Unless it is so interpreted, in that event, the object and purpose of the U. P. Amendment could not be fulfilled. The statement and object of the said amendment prescribes in order to reduce the pressure on the High Court, the amendment was brought for and part of the jurisdiction was conferred on the Dis trict Judge so that the pressure on the High Court is reduced. If other proceedings is meant to include all other proceedings including other proceedings which are not original in nature, in that event, the pur pose of incorporating or restriction with regard to the Original Suits or other proceedings would be infructuous and purposeless in that event it would be meaning Original Suits and all other proceedings including Original Suits or appeals or revisional proceedings. The embargo that has been created for exercise of Section 115 of the Code in respect of proceedings is for a proceeding from which no appeal lies thereto. The embargo that has been created for exercise of Section 115 of the Code in respect of proceedings is for a proceeding from which no appeal lies thereto. Therefore, if other proceeding is, interpreted to mean all proceedings, in that event it would also include the very expression used in Section 115 of the Code viz. , cases without any qualification. The object would be frustrated if the expression original suit is segregated for its application to suits only. In that event the orders passed by on an appeal under Order XL1ii by the District Judge would also be subject to revision under Section. But that proposition has been finally settled in the case of Ganga Saran v. Civil Judge, Harpur, 1991 (17) ALR 380, where an application under Ar ticle 226/227 was found to be maintainable against an order passed by the learned District Judge on an appeal under Order XLIII of the Code only on the ground that there was no remedy open to a person to challenge the said order passed on an ap peal by the learned District Judge under Section 115 of the Code as such it is very difficult to accept the interpretation as has been sought to be argued by Mr. Budhwar. 9. Then again it cannot be conceived that simply because the appeal was an ap peal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, the U. P. Amendment cannot be at tracted since the same was the Central Act and as such the Civil Procedure Code without the U. P. Amendment would be attracted. Inasmuch as U. P. Amendment begins with the expression that "for Sec tion 115 of the said Code the following section shall be substituted by Section 115 as amended in U. P. ". Even if it is not a suit but the proceeding is a proceeding within the meaning of Section 33 of the Arbitra tion Act within the scope and ambit of other proceeding is original in nature wherefrom an appeal under Section 39 lies^ Thus judgment and decree is not an original proceeding. Even if it is not a suit but the proceeding is a proceeding within the meaning of Section 33 of the Arbitra tion Act within the scope and ambit of other proceeding is original in nature wherefrom an appeal under Section 39 lies^ Thus judgment and decree is not an original proceeding. It is in effect the proceeding on appeal, therefore, it cannot become within the scope and order of other proceeding as incorporated in Section 115 of the Code amended in U. P. Section 115 without such amendment having no application in U. P. since been substituted by the U. P. Amendment there is no scope for resorting to a provision which has no manner of application in U. P. even if the proceeding is not a proceeding within the meaning of the Code. Though it may not be appealable under Section 96 of the Code since it is not decree it is appealable as an order by virtue of Section 39. But then under provisions of the Arbitration Act an award is made decree of the award as such it is a legal fiction by which t he-award is said to be award and not a decree. In effect the nature of the proceeding or the Arbitration Act is a suit. But then by reason of special constitution, it assumes the characteristic different from the char acter of suit within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure in view of the special constitution it is subject to provisions contained therein and has been appealable under Section 39 without providing for any second appeal. This was one of the point urged by Mr. Budhwar to the extent that there is no second appeal and as such Section 115 is the only proce dure under which the same would be chal lenged. When the statute has not provided for any other remedy one cannot complain about the same but the situation has been taken care of by reason of incorporation o f Article 227 of the Constitution of India envisaging the power of superintendence over the subordinate Court on the High Courts. As such it cannot be said that in the absence of any second appeal provided in the Arbitration one is remedy-less. As such it cannot be said that in the absence of any second appeal provided in the Arbitration one is remedy-less. Even if it cannot be challenged under Section 115 of the Code but it can very well be chal lenged under Article 227 of the Constitu tion within the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction exercised thereunder. In such circumstances I am unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Budhwar. In my view the application under Section 115 of the Code against an order under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act not being an original proceeding is not maintainable. 10. At this stage Mr. Budhwar had filed an application for amendment of the cause title and conversion of the applica tion under Section 115 of the Code into one under Article 227 of the Constitution by payment of Court fees therefore. Mr. Tarun Agarwal objects to the conversion. But it is by now a well settled principle that it is open to a Court to convert an applica tion under Section 115 of the Code. Even when it is not maintainable into one under Article 227, the power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution upon High Court is a power of superintendence which can be exercised even without any applica tion as soon it is brought to the notice of the Court if the Court so thinks fit. The question of conversion is no more res-integra in view of the various decisions of the High Court including our own High Court as well as the apex Court for which refer ence may be made in the following cases: (i) The Reliable Water Service of India (P.) Ltd. v. The Union of India and others, AIR 1971 SC 2083 ; (ii) Arunlata v. The Civil Judge, Bulandshahar and another, 1997 (31) ALR 30 (Sum): AIR 1998 All 29 . In such circumstances leave is granted to convert this application into under Article 227 of the Constitution and the said ap plication for conversion stands allowed. 11. After the above preliminary ob jection was decided, the matter was taken up for hearing on merit. Both Mr. Budhwar and Mr. Agarwal had addressed the Court on merit of the case. Today Mr. 11. After the above preliminary ob jection was decided, the matter was taken up for hearing on merit. Both Mr. Budhwar and Mr. Agarwal had addressed the Court on merit of the case. Today Mr. Anil Sharma had also addressed the Court in reply and relied upon two decisions and on a passage from Russell on Arbitration (19th Edition 1979) to which reference would be made at appropriate stage. 12. Mr. Budhwar had drawn my atten tion to the arbitration agreement which is Annexure-1 to the application for interim order. Relying on clause 7 of the said agreement Mr. Budhwar contends that so far with regard to the contention as to whether a part of the property was orchard or not was subject to an arbitration as contemplated in Clause 7 which is inde pendent of the arbitration clause con tained in Clause 19 of the said agreement. According to him Clause 7 has carved out a particular kind of the dispute for being arbitrated upon in a manner different from the manner provided in Clause 19 a| con templated in Clause 7. According to him arbitrator appointed under Clause 19 can not resort to jurisdiction with regard to the situation contemplated in Clause 7. Since thereby if arbitration agreement in the same parties included in the same agreement in respect of different mattes give rise to different kind of dispute between the parties it is not open to the parties to club two different kinds of dispute in one arbitration. According to him Clause 7 being an independent clause, the same has not been eclipsed by Clause 19. As such the learned Court as well as appellate Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in according to the usurping the area of dispute or difference contemplated in under Clause 7, by the Arbitrator within the scope and ambit of the dispute and difference that was referred to the arbitrator within the meaning of Clause 19. According to him with regard to the area covered Clause 7 is outside the purview of Clause 19 by virtue of arbitration clause contained in Clause 7 and the same would be binding on the parties. According to him with regard to the area covered Clause 7 is outside the purview of Clause 19 by virtue of arbitration clause contained in Clause 7 and the same would be binding on the parties. The arbitrator appointed under Clause 19 has no other option but to ac cept the decision of the arbitrator named by designation in Clause 7 is the only remedy open to the parties and the ar bitrator appointed under Clause 19cannot enter upon a reference with regard to the Clause 7 of dispute or difference con templated in Clause 7. As such the decision cannot be sustained and there fore the orders impugned are to be set aside. 13. Mr. Tarun Agarwal, learned Counsel for opposite parties on the other hand contends that Clause 7 is not the arbitration clause. According to him Clause 19 apparently includes the area contemplated in Clause 7 since it has not been restricted and has not been made subject to Clause 7 and has been made independent which include all kinds of dispute and difference as is apparent from simple reading of the said clause. He also contends that Clause 7 was a unilateral clause to be exercised by the party No. 1. If the party No. 1 does not exercise that op tion in that event there is no right vested in the opposite party No. 2 to refer the same for a decision to the person named therein. If there are two arbitration clauses in the same agreement, in that event, the one which is more comprehensive is to be relied upon and referred to while the other has to be taken note of strictly within the terms contained therein. He further con tends that there is but one agreement, which cannot be subject matter of two separate agreements. In fact if ii is one agreement then in respect of one agree ment there cannot be any question of two arbitration agreements distinguished from each other. Therefore, according to him both the Courts below were justified and there is no infirmity or absence of jurisdiction as contended by Mr. Budhwar. On these grounds he prays the application be dismissed. 14. 1 have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. Therefore, according to him both the Courts below were justified and there is no infirmity or absence of jurisdiction as contended by Mr. Budhwar. On these grounds he prays the application be dismissed. 14. 1 have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. In order to appreciate the situation it would be beneficial to quote Clauses 7 and 19 respectively as hereinafter: " (7) That for the sake of Clause No. 6 hereinabove only that part of the estate will be considered as orchard or fruit garden subject to division in the proportion already mentioned herein before, where the fruit trees have been planted at a distance of one or two yards away from each other on all four sides and the plantation thus formed a grove or orchard, or garden. If the fruit trees are planted in a few numbers here and there in any land without forming an orchard, grove or garden the same will not be taken into consideration for division and will be considered as the exclusive property belonging to party No. 1. If however there would be any difference of opinion between the parties as to whether a certain portion of the land does form an orchard, garden grove or not, party No. 1 will be entitled to invite the views and opinion or opinions of any competent Government horticultural institution or authority and its opinion or opinions will be binding on both the parties that idea is that party No. 2 should be able to claim for himself any land towards his proportionate share at the time of division unless the said party No. 2 was planted sufficient number of trees on each portion of land in as large number as possible to qualify each such portion of land as genuinely forming an orchard, fruit and garden or grove. By planting a few trees on any piece of land without making it as a genuine proper orchard garden or grove, party No. 2 cannot claim orchard and as subject to division towards his propor tionate square. Lands covered with a few fruit trees here and there but not Constantine a proper genuine or changed, grove garden will not be subject to division and will be exclusive property of the party No. 1 without any claim thereon whatsoever of party No. 2 at the time of division. Lands covered with a few fruit trees here and there but not Constantine a proper genuine or changed, grove garden will not be subject to division and will be exclusive property of the party No. 1 without any claim thereon whatsoever of party No. 2 at the time of division. (19) That any dispute or difference which may arise between the parties or their repre sentatives with regard to the construction, interpretation, meaning, effect of this deed or any part thereof or respecting the accounts, profits or losses of the business or the rights and liabilities of the parties under this deed of the separation of the business or any other matter whatsoever pertaining to the undertaking under reference shall be referred to two arbitrators, one to be nominated by each party and in case of difference of opinion between these two nominated arbitrators, by the Umpire selected by both the parties. Any decision given by the agreed arbitration or umpire will be binding on each of the two parties. " 15. A plain reading of Clause 7 shows that if, however, there would be any dif ference of opinion between the parties as to whether a certain portion of the land does form orchard, garden, grove or not, party No. 1 will be entitled to invite the views and opinions of any competent Government Horticultural Institution or Authority and its opinion or opinions will be binding on both the parties. This seems to be a clause on which emphasis was laid by Mr. Budhwar as well as by Mr. Anil Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner. A plain reading of the said clause indicate that it was only a view or opinion is to be sought and such view or opinion would be binding on the parties. Whatever might be the interpretation with regard to the view or opinion but the same having been made binding on the parties it may be contended that it was in fact an arbitration but then it was not a right given to both the parties but was confined only to party No. 1 with the entitlement to invite such view or opinion. Thus it was a right reserved to party No. 1. Thus it was a right reserved to party No. 1. In case Clause 19 was not there, in its absence, it would have been treated to be an arbitration clause relying on passage referred to by Anil Sharma: "it is commonplace that an arbitration agreement may unilaterally delimit the disputes to be arbitrated. In effect a provision that dis putes as to short delivery only shall be arbitrated means that only the buyer has a right to initiate the steps that lead to arbitration. Clauses in an arbitration agreement can be unilateral; for ex ample a time bar clause can be unilateral. On the other hand there could be a perfectly com mon place arbitration clause which came into effect only at the option of A, and then when A exercised his option the clause would be fully mutual even if in the circumstances A waited until he had a dispute he wanted arbitrated before he exercised his option. But the Union of India clause is completely unilateral even after/1 has given notice of what is to be arbitrated; at that point of time B is dragged before the ar bitral tribunal whether he likes it or not. It is irrelevant whether, either at the time of the original contract or at the moment of arbitration B does like arbitration; at the crucial moment the power to arbitrate is wholly and unilaterally in/ls hands. It is also irrelevant that thereafter A may not be able to change his mind. It is possible that the Union of India clause would enable B to make the reference when he received notice from but it is not necessary to argue the precise construction of that clause. It is enough that the clause could be easily modified so that it is exercisable only by A making an actual submission. Then, though again/1 is now committed and cannot change his mind, there never is a time when B can make a reference. Bs only mutuality in that case is the unavoidable one that if A is arbitrating against him he is ipso facto, arbitrating against/1. " 16. In the present case in fact there being only one agreement and in such agreement a specific arbitration clause has been incorporated with all its formal re quires giving right to both the parties. Bs only mutuality in that case is the unavoidable one that if A is arbitrating against him he is ipso facto, arbitrating against/1. " 16. In the present case in fact there being only one agreement and in such agreement a specific arbitration clause has been incorporated with all its formal re quires giving right to both the parties. With regard to a particular area though it is contemplated that opinion or view or may be obtained by the party No. 1 but in view of special formation of the said clause it cannot be treated to be an independent and separate arbitration clause when t here is a complete arbitration clause present which in its scope and ambit includes any dispute or difference between the parties with regard to the construction, inter pretation, meaning, effect of this deed or any part thereof or respecting the ac counts, profits or losses of the business or the rights and liabilities of the parties under this deed of the separation of the business or any other matter whatsoever pertaining to the undertaking under refer ence. Thus in its fold Clause 19 includes each and every dispute that could be con ceived in respect of the agreement. Sub sidiary agreement in Clause 7 on the face of Clause 19 cannot be expected to supersede Clause 19 or that by reason of the words used in Clause 19 in no uncertain terms and there being ambiguity, it cannot be said that there were two different arbitra tion causes in respect of one agreement. It may be a subsidiary clause but if the same is not resorted to in view of Clause 19 the same does not confer any right on the party No. 2 to fall back on the said clause when by, its own agreement had confined the right only to the party No. 1. 17. In the passage referred to by Mr. Anil Sharma, learned Counsel for the ap plicant it is observed that arbitration agreement may unilaterally delimit the disputes to be arbitrated. 17. In the passage referred to by Mr. Anil Sharma, learned Counsel for the ap plicant it is observed that arbitration agreement may unilaterally delimit the disputes to be arbitrated. But it can be perfectly arbitrated at the option of one of the parties and if such option is exercised by such party then it would be fully mutual even if in the circumstances it is not resorted to by A at all then such party shall not be allowed to change his mind when the reference is made by the other party to fall back on the unilateral agreement to be exercised by the party to whom the option was reserved. 18. In the present case diametrically opposite to the example dealt with in the said passage where the reference was sought for by the other party while the party with whom the option was available did not refer until the other party had referred to the arbitration and had sought to invoke the same. Thus in the present case party who having the right to invoke the same having not invoked it is not open to party No. 2 to fall back on the same on the basis of Clause 19 itself under which the entire matter can be thrashed up. 19. Admittedly, Clause 19 has not been circumscribed by any condition. It has not been subject to Clause 7. Clause 7 is a specific agreement between the parties confined to a particular purpose confer ring right only upon one of the parties, who again has not resorted to the same. There cannot be two agreements within one agreement in respect of the same dispute for being referred to arbitration when the subsidiary clause was not resorted to at all. Clause 19 being comprehensive and having included by specific mention with regard to everything relating to the agree ment includes the dispute contemplated within Clause 7 as well. Thus there being no material available before the arbitrator as can be available in terms of Clause 7 it cannot be said that there was any infirmity or absence of jurisdiction or resorting of the jurisdiction by the Court below in entertaining the dispute within scope and ambit of the arbitration. In case the party No. 1 invited the views in terms of Clause? In case the party No. 1 invited the views in terms of Clause? in that event it could have been binding on the parties and can form piece of evidence with regard to such question before the arbitrator. Once Clause 7 is given a go-by and Clause 19 is resorted to the entire matter is open before the arbitrator who may decide the same accordingly. 20. Thus I am unable to find any reason to agree with the contention of Mr. Budhwar ably supplemented by Mr. Anil Sharma. 21. The decision in the case of Chancier Bhan Harbhajan Lal v. The State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 1210 , deals with the matter in which there was an agree ment-that the dispute should be referred to settlement committee consisting of a Su perintending Engineer, an Officer of the Finance Depart of the Rank of at least Deputy Secretary and an Accounts Officer all to be nominated by the Government for arbitration whose decision will be final. In the said case a settlement committee was constituted. Before expiry of the time, the matter was referred and therefore the award was set aside whereupon a fresh notice was given and fresh settlement com mittee was constituted. The said clause was inserted by way of amendment was supplemental to the original agreement. The Court was concerned with regard to the authority of the settlement committee and its reference thereto. Thus the Court was concerned to decide the matter which was altogether different from those in volved in the present facts and circumstan ces of the case. There it was held that the second settlement committee was not ter minated by the action of the Government. It was by unilateral act of the Government such committee could be terminated. But this ground was not held to be available on the ground that non- termination of second committee would put the case out side the purview of Section 8 of the Ar bitration Act. The Court had negatived the said contention and held in favour of the respondents that such view cannot be taken. Thus this decision does not help us in the present case. 22. The Court had negatived the said contention and held in favour of the respondents that such view cannot be taken. Thus this decision does not help us in the present case. 22. So far as the decision of the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Central Bank of India and others, AIR 1985 Calcutta (sic), is concerned the same deak with the question where a privileged con tract for a reference to arbitration was incorporated in the policy which per mitted the bank to refer unilaterally. Inter preting the said clause as quoted in para graph 13 thereof relying on the Russel on Arbitration the Court had held that there was a valid arbitration agreement between the parties but both the parties have agreed that when future disputes will arise it is only the privileged party who will have the right to make the reference, but the privileged party can also render the ar bitration agreement infruetuous by not ex ercising its option. This option does not negative the existence of the arbitration agreement but only restricts its enforceability. If the privileged party alone can refer the dispute, it can do so only on the basis of the advance consent by the other party recorded in the agreement that the reference would be by the privileged party alone. This unilateral right to make the reference flows from the agreed term in the contract. 23. In the said case the option was exercised by the Insurance Company and not by the privileged party. Though how ever it was held that assuring the bank had not exercised the option still then the bank could make reference to the arbitrator. 24. Mr. Anil Tiwari had contended that thus Clause 7 was also a valid arbitra tion agreement which can very well be enforced separately and as such it could not have been included within the scope and ambit of reference under Clause 19. 25. In the present case the fact ap pears to be somewhat distinguishable to the extent that in this case reference was made by party No. 1 being privileged party and that such right have been agreed by the parties lo be confined by privileged enforcement restricted at the option of para No. 1 which could render the same infrue tuous by not exercising the said option. There being clear and unambiguous ar bitration agreement in Clause 19, it is not necessary to fall back on the saddle clause as to Clause 7 which was restricted lo the party No. 1 alone and that too with regard lo a particular aspect which is also covered under Clause 19 and as such Clause 7 does not carve out on exception to the area of dispute or difference as would be referred to under Clause 19. 26. It is also contended by Mr. Anil Tiwari relying on the decision in the case of V. G. George v. Indian Rare Earths Ltd. and another,171999 (2) SC629; 1999 (2) JCLR 105 (SC ). But the said decision has no manner of application in the present cir cumstances of the case. Inasmuch as the ratio decided therein was related to the overlooking of clause (c) of tender notice which was part of the agreement under which reference could not be liable for such obstruction and that in the said case certain area was not made available to appellant for mining. Thus ignorance of clause (c) was held to be bad on the basis that it was with regard to the merit of the case which did not refer to arbitration clause. 1 n the present case the question was gone into on the basis of the material available on record. Since there was no view or opinion sought for therefore there was nothing, which construed to be an ignorance of Clause 7. Clause 7 could not have been ignored if there was a view or opinion within the meaning of Clause 7 filed before the arbitration but in the ab sence of any material under Clause 7 it does not bring the present case within scope and ambit of the ratio decided in the said case. So far as other clause that was over looking was with regard to the escala tion which did not form part of the agree ment at all and as such it was held that the award with regard to the escalation was outside the scope of the agreement. Clause (c) which was ignored in the said case (V. G. George) (supra) as was quoted in para graph 14 relates to responsibility of the contractor who were made responsible for the situation therein. Clause (c) which was ignored in the said case (V. G. George) (supra) as was quoted in para graph 14 relates to responsibility of the contractor who were made responsible for the situation therein. Overlooking the said clause, the responsibility was fixed on the contractor which was negatived by the apex Court because clause (c) was over looked in fixing the responsibility. Thus the said decision on fact is distinguishable from the facts of this case. For all these I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the contention of Mr. Budhwar. The revision therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed. Revision dismissed. .