Order.- This revision petition is directed against an order of the Sessions Judge, Warangal, given on 11th September, 1965. The facts necessary to understand the argument properly are that the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner, C.C.No. 2689 of 1964, before the Additional Munsif-Magistrate, Warangal under sections 211 and 500, Indian Penal Code. After issuing summons to the accused the learned Magistrate recorded the evidence adduced by the complainant. On an appreciation of that evidence he reached the conclusion that no charge is made out under section 500, Indian Penal Code. He therefore dismissed the complaint and discharged the accused under section 253(1), Criminal Procedure Code. Dissatisfied with that order of discharge the complainant preferred a revision before the Sessions Judge under section 435, Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Sessions Judge holding that the appreciation of the prosecution evidence by the lower Court was not satisfactory and the discharge order was liable to be set aside, directed the lower Court to make further enquiry as indicated in his order. He held that selling the sugar quota for the months of February, and March at Mahbubabad was false as sugar quota for those two months was not lifted at all. In view of that finding the learned Judge observed that that charge was a mere fabrication and since the relations of the accused with the complainant were strained he found that the imputation was made and published to harm the reputation of the complainant. After holding that there appears to be a prima facie case against the accused for the offence under section 500, Indian Penal Code, the learned Judge observed: “From the above discussion, it follows that the appreciation of the prosecution evidence by the lower Court is not satisfactory and the discharge order is liable to be set aside.” It is this view that is now challenged in this revision petition by the accused. The: short question which has necessarily to be considered in this revision petition is whether the learned Sessions Judge acting in the exercise of powers vested in him under section 436, Criminal Procedure Code, can direct further enquiry after holding the accused guilty of a particular offence after disagreeing with the conclusion of the trial Court. In order to answer this question it is necessary to read section 436, Criminal Procedure Code. In order to answer this question it is necessary to read section 436, Criminal Procedure Code. That section is in the following terms: “On examining any record under section 435 or otherwise, the High Court or the Sessions Judge may direct the District Magistrate by himself or by any of the Magistrate subordinate to him to make and the District Magistrate may himself make, or direct any subordinate Magistrate to make, further inquiry into any complaint which has been dismissed under section 203 or sub-section (3) of section 204 or into the case of any person accused of an offence who has been discharged.” I am not concerned with the proviso in this case. An analytical reading of that section would reveal that the power under section 436, Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised in all the three cases of discharge mentioned in the section. While section 203 and sub-section (3) of section 204 speak of discharge prior to the issue of summons to the accused, in other words, prior to his appearance, the words “into the case of any person accused of an offence who has been discharged” refer in so far as this case is concerned to section 253. Now under section 253 two situations are visualised; one, after the entire evidence referred to in section 252 is recorded and after making such examination of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary, the Magistrate discharges the accused, and the second, where the Magistrate discharges the accused at any previous stage of the case as is visualised by sub-section (1) of that section. In so far as sections 203 and 204(3) are concerned they do not present any difficulty in understanding the meaning and the scope of the expression ‘further enquiry’. In those cases where no enquiry was made one can easily understand a Sessions Judge directing a further enquiry under section 436, Criminal Procedure Code. Likewise situations arising under section 253(2) are also easily understandable. In that case the Magistrate discharges the accused at any previous stage. In those cases also direction in regard to further enquiry can easily be understood since the accused in such cases is discharged before the entire evidence is recorded and the accused is examined. Likewise situations arising under section 253(2) are also easily understandable. In that case the Magistrate discharges the accused at any previous stage. In those cases also direction in regard to further enquiry can easily be understood since the accused in such cases is discharged before the entire evidence is recorded and the accused is examined. In a case falling squarely under section 253(1) however one has to see how far and in what cases the order of further enquiry envisaged by section 436 would be legal. There can possibly be three situations: (1) a case where the trying Magistrate has omitted to take into consideration some evidence, (2) he has taken into consideration evidence which he ought not to have taken into account and (3) he refused to record evidence which he ought to have recorded. In all these three situations further enquiry can certainly be directed without final expression of any opinion in regard to the innocence or the guilt of the accused. It is only in a case where the enquiry is complete the Magistrate takes into account all the relevant material and does not omit from his consideration any material which he ought to have considered that a question arises as to how far an order of further enquiry under section 436, Criminal Procedure Code would be valid. The only situation which can be visualised is whether the evidence has not been properly sifted. In such a case the Sessions Judge would be perfectly justified in directing further enquiry without of course holding that there is a prima facie case to frame a charge. It cannot now be in doubt or dispute that in the exercise of powers under section 436 the Sessions Judge cannot frame the charge himself nor can he direct the trying Magistrate to frame charge. He cannot also give any suggestion to the Magistrate to proceed on a particular line. He has to leave it to the discretion of the Magistrate who is required to make the enquiry. The Sessions Judge cannot fetter the judicial discretion of the Magistrate by any decision, direction or instruction. It would be wholly wrong if he directs that the Magistrate should pass such and such order. He has to leave it to the discretion of the Magistrate who is required to make the enquiry. The Sessions Judge cannot fetter the judicial discretion of the Magistrate by any decision, direction or instruction. It would be wholly wrong if he directs that the Magistrate should pass such and such order. In making an order for further enquiry, it is plainly improper for the Sessions Judge to write a judgment which is practically a mandate to the Magistrate to act in a particular manner. He cannot hold that there is a prima facie case for framing a charge and then to formally comply with section 436, Criminal Procedure Code direct a further enquiry. If he reaches the conclusion that there exists a prima facie case to frame a charge under a given provision in the Indian Penal Code, the right course for his is to make a reference to the High Court under section 438, Criminal Procedure Code. It is thus plain that all that the Sessions Judge can direct is further enquiry leaving it entirely to the enquiring Magistrate to determine whether or not the evidence justifies the accused being charged and put on his trial. It is clear from the provisions of the Code that the Magistrate has complete jurisdiction subject of course to the supervisory powers of the superior Court to take cognisance, to issue process, to hold the enquiry and to try and pass final orders in the case. It would thus be patently wrong if the order of the Sessions Judge under section 436, Criminal Procedure Code either expressly or by necessary implication gives direction to the enquiring Magistrate to frame the charge under a particular provision of the Indian Penal Code and to proceed with the further enquiry. That this position of law is correct gathers support from many decided cases. In Narayanaswamy Naidu v. Emperor1, one of the questions referred to the Fall Bench was whether it is open to a District Magistrate or Sessions Judge to set aside an order of discharge for reasons other than those which justify the High Court to interfere in revision. The question was answered by Wallis, J. in the affrmative. In Narayanaswamy Naidu v. Emperor1, one of the questions referred to the Fall Bench was whether it is open to a District Magistrate or Sessions Judge to set aside an order of discharge for reasons other than those which justify the High Court to interfere in revision. The question was answered by Wallis, J. in the affrmative. He observed: “I would therefore answer the first question which refers to this point by saying that the powers of interference of the High Court and the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate are co-extensive under section 437 and are not limited as suggested in the order of reference.” With this view Munro, J., agreed. Sankaran Nair, J., understood the main judgment not to deny their proposition that though section 437 empowers the District Magistrate or Sessions Judge to order a further enquiry, his order may be and in fact ought to be set aside by the High Court in revision if on the facts found the case is not one in which an order for enquiry is the appropriate order. It is true that in earlier part of his judgment Wallis, J., observed that there is nothing in section 437 to suggest that misappreciation of evidence in the lower Court cannot be a ground of interference, but that has to be understood in the light of the facts of that case. Their Lordships do not lay down as a broad proposition of law that if the Sessions Judge comes to a conclusion different from the enquiring Magistrate and holds prima facie that charge can be framed the Sessions Judge can direct further enquiry after giving such a finding. Any such interpretation of that view would be inconsistent with the answer given to the question referred to the Full Bench. I do not therefore understand the said Full Bench tomean that the Sessions Judge can after appreciating the evidence hold the accused guilty of a particular offence and then direct further enquiry. It would, as stated earlier, go contrary to the answer which their Lordships have given to the first question. That this is so is clear from an earlier decision with which the Full Bench agreed. It would, as stated earlier, go contrary to the answer which their Lordships have given to the first question. That this is so is clear from an earlier decision with which the Full Bench agreed. In Queen Empress v. Balasinnatambi1, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court held that if the subordinate Magistrate has not properly sifted the evidence a Sessions Judge can direct further enquiry, under section 437 (now section 436), Criminal Procedure Code. Further enquiry, it is held, does not necessarily mean additional evidence. Re-consideration of the same material can amount to further enquiry. It is however plain that although it may not be necessary that additional evidence should be forthcoming and that the same evidence can be reconsidered, it does not mean that the Sessions Judge can give a definite finding in regard to the guilt of the accused and direct further enquiry. It would be tantamount to giving instructions to the enquiring Magistrate that he should frame charge in pursuance of his finding and then make further enquiry. That is not what is contemplated by the abovesaid Full Bench decision. Nor it would be a proper order under section 436. In order to justify the order of reconsideration of the same evidence there must be some reasons for doing that and what such a reason can be is well-illustrated by the abovesaid Full Bench decision, that is to say, where the evidence has not been properly sifted then the Sessions Judge would be perfectly within bis jurisdiction to direct further enquiry in order to properly sift the evidence. But while doing so he must take precaution not to express any opinion and thus fetter the discretion of the Magistrate to form an independent opinion on re-consideration of the evidence. Govinda Menon, J., In Nanjappa v. Periakkal,2 ina similar case held: "The Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction, in setting aside an order of discharge, to direct that a charge be framed against the accused. All that the Sessions Judge has got the right to do is to direct a further enquiry so that the Court which hears the case afresh has to take evidence and come to a conclusion as to whether there is enough evidence to frame a charge or not." In reaching this conclusion he depended upon an earlier decision of his in Karuppiah Ambalam v. Andiappan Servai3. In Sidda Reddi v. Venkata Girianna4, Lakshmana Rao, J., held that it is not possible under section 436 to direct the Magistrate to frame a charge and dispose of the case. In Queen Emprees v. Munisami5, a Bench of the Madras High Court held: "A District Magistrate who refers a case to a Sub-Magistrate for further enquiry has no authority to fetter him in the exercise of his judicial discretion as to the question whether the case should or should not be committed to the Court of Sessions." The last case to which I must make a reference is Tado v. Emperor6. On an argument that the order of the Sessions Judge for further enquiry was in terms a judgment on the merits of the case which must seriously prejudice the accused before the new Magistrate, his Lordship observed: "As regards the second ground of impropriety, there is clear authority is Wahed Ali v. Emperor7 if authority is necessary for so obvious a proposition. As I have already said, the order, in terms, is practically a mandate to a subordinate Magistrate to commit the accused for trial. It makes prominent all the points against him, and makes no mention of the points in his favour, e.g., that the complainant has undoubtedly laid in saying that he was dismissed from the accused’s service for no reason whatever. In every way the better course was for the District Magistrate to have ordered the commitment of the accused, and it seems expedient that he should now be directed to make that order." That being the position of law as I understand it I have to see whether the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge is in any way contrary to this position of law. I have already extracted what the learned Sessions Judge says in his judgment. After discussing the evidence he not only holds the accused guilty of an offence under section 500, Indian Penal Code, but observes more than once that there is prima facie case under section 500, Indian Penal Code against the accused. After giving this finding the conclusion which he thinks must followis the direction in regard to the further enquiry. That obviously is not a proper order under section 436, Criminal Procedure Code and is contrary to the decisions referred to above. After giving this finding the conclusion which he thinks must followis the direction in regard to the further enquiry. That obviously is not a proper order under section 436, Criminal Procedure Code and is contrary to the decisions referred to above. If the learned Judge thinks that a sifting of evidence has not been properly made, he could have directed further enquiry, but that does not seem to be his opinion. He does not agree with the conclusion of the Court below on an appreciation of evidence and does not find fault with sifting or analysing the evidence. He does not say that some evidence was improperly considered or was left out of consideration, or further evidence has to be recorded. After holding the accused guilty under section 500, Indian Penal Code, he cannot virtually direct the Magistrate under the garb of further enquiry to frame a charge and then to try the accused. That being the essence of the order I think it is bad in law and cannot be allowed to stand. This revision petition therefore is allowed, the order of the Sessions Judge set aside and he is directed to restore the revision on his file and dispose it of in accordance with law. G.S.M. ----- Revision allowed; Matter remitted.