BHANWAR SINGH, J. This appeal arises out of a judgment and decree dated 24-7-1979, passed by the then District Judge, Kheri. By virtue of the said judgment and decree, the learned District Judge al lowed the Civil Appeal No. 32 of 1979 filed by Mahabali, the plaintiff of an original suit No. 88of 1977 filed by him for cancellation of sale-deed executed by Smt. Jagdei. 2. The brief facts giving rise to this appeal may be recapitulated as below: Mahabali, since deceased, filed original suit No. 88 of 1977 for cancella tion of the registered sale-deed dated 17-1-1977 executed by Smt. Jagdei in favour of the defendant-appellant, Madho Ram. The said sale-deed was registered on 18-1-1977 and the plaintiff also pleaded for setting aside of the said registration. A short pedigree brought for by the plaintiff would reveal that one Neelkanth had two sons, namely, Raghubir and Jagan. Jagan had a son, Mohan who died leaving behind him Sml. Jagdei as his widow (the ex ecutant of the sale-deed in question ). Raghubir had two sons, namely, Gajodhar and Mahabali (plaintiff ). After the death of her husband, Sml. Jagdei became bhumidhar of two plots and Sirdar of one plot situated in village Banstali, Pargana and District Kheri. She had inherited the entire holding from her husband. Mahabali pleaded in her plaint that Smt. Jagdei was illiterate, inexperienced and a Pardanashin lady. At the time of executing the sale-deed, she was about 80-85 years of age. It was pleaded further by the plaintiff that the defendant, Madho Ram Verma being in collusion with Sheo Nandan Prasad and Banwari put up before the Sub-Registrar another lady who represented herself as Smt. Jagdei and got the sale-deed in question executed in his favour. As a matter of fact, Smt. Jagdei expired on 6-1-1977, i. e. 10 days before the date of the alleged execution of ihe sale-deed and, as such, the sale-deed was fictitious and col lusive. Further, the sale-deed being ex ecuted without prior permission of the District Collector was illegal and without authority. As a mailer of fact, the plaintiff who was a family member of Smt. Jagdei continued to be in possession of the entire agricultural holding and on the strength of his possession, he filed the sun for cancellation of the sale-deed. 3. Madho Ram, the defendant resisted the suit and denied all the plaint allegations. As a mailer of fact, the plaintiff who was a family member of Smt. Jagdei continued to be in possession of the entire agricultural holding and on the strength of his possession, he filed the sun for cancellation of the sale-deed. 3. Madho Ram, the defendant resisted the suit and denied all the plaint allegations. According to him, Smt, Jagdei acquired the land in suit in the life-tune of her father-in-law from her own income. Being absolute owner of the entire hold ing, she was competent to transfer it to the defendant and the plaintiff Mahabali was neither the legal representative of the deceased, Jagdei nor he ever remained in possession. In fact, the plaintiff had full knowledge regarding execution of the sale-deed and it was on account of this that he did not file any objection in the muta tion proceedings. Being conscious of her legal right and knowledge, Smt. Jagdei in her life-time executed the impugned sale-deed in favour of answering defendant and delivered possession of the land to him. She had fully understood the contents of the sale-deed before she had executed it. It was denied that Smt. Jagdei was a Par-danasin lady. She was quite an experienced and shrewd woman and was able to under stand her own acts and welfare. She never lost her capacity to understand and at the time of the execution of the sale-deed, she was in her full senses. It was pleaded with vehemence that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. 4. On having perused the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the fol lowing issues: 1. Whether the sale-deed dated 17-1-1977 was obtained as alleged in para 4 of the plaint? If so, its effect? 2. Whether the sale-deed in question is liable to be set aside as mentioned in para 5 of the plain!? 3. Whether the Civil Court had no juris diction to try the suit? 4. To what relief, if any. is the plaintiff entitled? 5. Whether the plaintiff is not the legal representative of the deceased? if so. its effect? 6. Whether this Court had the jurisdiction to hear the case. 5. 3. Whether the Civil Court had no juris diction to try the suit? 4. To what relief, if any. is the plaintiff entitled? 5. Whether the plaintiff is not the legal representative of the deceased? if so. its effect? 6. Whether this Court had the jurisdiction to hear the case. 5. On having scrutinised the submis sions of the parties, the trial Court arrived at a common finding on issues 3 & 6 that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and on the basis of the said finding, the plaintiffs suit was dis missed. However, the plaintiff was recog nised to be as the legal representative of the deceased, Smt. Jagdei but no finding had been recorded on issues 1 and 2. 6. Feeling aggrieved of the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, the plaintiff, Mahabali preferred an appeal which was heard and decided by the Dis trict Judge, Kheri vide its judgment of July, 24,1979. 7. Initially, this appeal was termed to be as second appeal but later it was converted into a First Appeal from Order as it was treated to be an appeal filed under Order XLI1i, Rule 1 (4) C. P. C. . However, the original suitor, Mahabali expired on January 13, 1986 and in his place, his legal heirs, Mangu Lal arid another were substituted. 8. The crucial question to be deter mined by this Court is as to whether the suit filed by late Mahabali was cognisable by I he Civil Court or a Revenue Court. It is clear from the facts brought forth by the parties that the dispute related lo the ex ecution of a sale-deed alleged to have been executed by Smt. Jagdei in favour of the plaintiff. By virtue of the said sale-deed, Bhumidhariand Sirdari rights were trans ferred to the appellant and the real con troversy revolved around the cancellation of the sale- deed in question. Whereas the appellant-defendants contention was that the Revenue Court alone had the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the plea regarding cancellation of the sale-deed and, as such, the suit was barred by Section 331 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. the deceased- respondent/plaintiff, Mahabalis pleading in the plaint had been to the effect that the Civil Court was competent to lake cognizance of the matter and pass a declaratory decree as sought for. the deceased- respondent/plaintiff, Mahabalis pleading in the plaint had been to the effect that the Civil Court was competent to lake cognizance of the matter and pass a declaratory decree as sought for. The learned Munsif ap proved of the defence plea of the appellant and dismissed the suit with a finding that the jurisdiction lies with the Revenue Court. As has been rightly reversed, the finding of the trial Court was patently er roneous as a Revenue Court is not com petent to pass a decree declaring the sale-deed to be void. 9. It is a settled law that the jurisdic tion of a Court has to be determined on the basis of the pleadings recited in the plaint. It maybe recapitulated that the plaintiff, Mahabali pleaded in his plaint that the defendant Madho Ram Verma got the sale-deed in question prepared and ex ecuted on 17-1-1977 by putting a woman who impersonated herself to be as Jagdei. As a matter of fact, Jagdei had expired 10 days prior to the date of the execution of the sale-deed. In this way, the impugned sale-deed was termed to be as forged and fictious and it is significant to note that on the basis of the strength of the sale-deed, the defendant got his name mutated in the revenue record. On the face of these plead ings, the sale-deed won Id not be cancelled by a Revenue Court. Under Section 331 of the U. P. Zamindari and Land Reforms Act, the only instruments which arc void ab initio can be ignored while granting a relief described iii Schedule-II. It is only the Civil Court which is competent to can cel a sale-deed of the kind assailed by the deceased Mahahali and the learned Dis trict Judge has rightly held that a suit filed under Section 229-B of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act would not ensure the relief sought for by the plaintiff as the defendant would take the plea that the sale- deed had con ferred valuable rights upon him. If has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in Smt. Bixmillah v. Janeshwar Prasad, 1990 AWC Vol. 1,359 (SC) that the suit for cancellation of the void document will generally lie in Civil Court and following the said decision, this Court, in Shea Murat Singh v. Addl. District Judge IV, Ghazipur and others, 1992 A.- WC. If has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in Smt. Bixmillah v. Janeshwar Prasad, 1990 AWC Vol. 1,359 (SC) that the suit for cancellation of the void document will generally lie in Civil Court and following the said decision, this Court, in Shea Murat Singh v. Addl. District Judge IV, Ghazipur and others, 1992 A.- WC. 246, ruled that the Civil Court is competent to entertain a suit for cancellation of void sale-deed regard ing agricultural land. The citation, Ram Padarath and others v. 2nd Additional Dis trict Judge, Kanpur and others, 1988 L. C. D. 565 and relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not of any help as even in that case, it was held that the suit or action for cancellation of void document will generally lie in the Civil Court and a party cannot be deprived of his getting this relief permissible under law except where a declaration of right or status as a tenure-holder is necessarily needed in which event relief for cancellation will be surplusage and redundant. In the case in hand, no other relief except for cancella tion of sale-deed executed by Smt. Jagdei was sought for. The plaintiff had "not pleaded that he was the tenure- holder of the holding in question nor on the basis of any such plea, he claimed himself to be the rightful claimant of the agricultural land. If any such relief in addition to cancellation of the sale-deed had been prayed for by the plaintiff, the Revenue Court could have granted any such declaratory decree by ig noring the sale-deed in question but there was nothing of the sort. In view of this situa tion, it cannot be said that the plea for can cellation of the sale-deed was in surplusage and redundant and, therefore, it may be observed that the citation relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not applicable in the present case. 10. In view of all what has been dis cussed above, it may reasonably be held that this appeal fails and deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the appeal is dis missed with costs. 11. As the case is old, it is directed that the learned trial Court shall decide it within three months from the dale of receipt of a copy of this Courts judgment. Appeal dismissed. .