Order.- This is an application in revision in respect of an order passed by the Sessions Judge, Kolar. On a complaint filed by the petitioner, the Police of Dibburahally placed a charge-sheet against 10 persons including respondents 1 to 4 for the offence under sections 448 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code. Respondents 1 to 4 and 6 others were charged with trespassing into the dwelling house of the petitioner and stealing raw beans of the value of Rs. 400 and they were acquitted of all the charges, but notwithstanding that fact, the learned Magistrate directed the beans, the subject-matter of the charge, to be handed over to the complainant. On revision by respondents 1 to 4, the learned Sessions Judge directed the return of the property to them. The correctness of this order is challenged in this revision petition. Mr. P. Subbarao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, asks me to revise the order of the learned Sessions Judge mainly on the ground that the learned Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to deal with the petition, inasmuch as no appeal was pending before him. The question of jurisdiction turns on the true construction of section 520, Code of Criminal Procedure. That section provides: “Any Court of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision may direct any order under section 517, section 518 or section 519, passed by a Court subordinate thereto, to be stayed pending consideration by the former Court, and may modify, alter or annul such order and make any further orders that may be just.” Sections 517, 518 and 519 confer on the trial Court powers to make orders regarding property which is the subject-matter of the charge or otherwise before it. There are two schools of thought regarding the meaning of the provisions of section 520 in a case where no appeal is filed either against an order of conviction or an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. One view is that in such a case the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the orders of the trial Court cannot pass an order under section 520 as if an appeal had been filed merely against the order of the trial Court under section 517, and that the only proper course is for the appellate Court to refer the matter to the High Court on its revisional side. The other view is that the appellate Court can pass an order under section 520 modifying, altering or annulling the order of the trial Court under section 517, without having to deal with any appeal. Mr. Subbarao placed reliance on the decision in Sheo Dan v. Pir Dan and another1, in support of the former view. Therein it has been held as follows: “There is no ad hoc right of appeal or revision to the Sessions Judge from an order under section 517 and all that the Sessions Judge can do, is to substitute his own order for that passed by the trial Court, if the substantive case comes before him as a Court of appeal, or a Court of revision. All that he can do in the case of an order which comes to his notice otherwise is to report it to the High Court under section 438 for revision.” On the other hand Mr. K.R. Venkataramanaiah, the learned Counsel for respondents 1 to 4, cited a number of decisions in support of the latter view. There is no doubt that the preponderance of authorities is on the side of the latter view. In U Po Hla v. Ko Po2, it has been held that even in the case of an acquittal by the trial Court, the Sessions Judge, or District Magistrate, as a Court of revision, has power, under section 520 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to interfere with an order of the trial Court passed under section 517, regarding the disposal of the property. It was observed that where no appeal is filed against a conviction by First Class Magistrate, to the Sessions Court, the District Magistrate has power to interfere with an order passed under section 517 of the Code. The learned Judges were of the opinion in that case that the words “Court of revision” should not be interpreted in a very narrow sense. This decision was followed by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Walchand v. Hari Anant3, in which an earlier decision of that Court in Khema Rukhad,4In re was overruled. The learned Judges were of the opinion in that case that the words “Court of revision” should not be interpreted in a very narrow sense. This decision was followed by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Walchand v. Hari Anant3, in which an earlier decision of that Court in Khema Rukhad,4In re was overruled. In that case, Beaumont C.J. observed as follows: “I think the decision of the High Court of Rangoon is to be preferred to the decision of this Court it seems to me that what section 520 means is that any Court, which has powers of appeal, confirmation reference or revision in respect of the trial Court, that being the Court subordinate thereto referred to in the section, can make any substantive order, it thinks fit in respect of property dealt with by the trial Court under sections 517, 518 or 519. Unless section 520 is read in that way, it is difficult to see what practical effect it can have, because there can be no doubt that under section 423(1)(d)and section 439 a Court hearing an appeal or revision application would have ample power to deal withany order passed with regard to property the subject-matter of the charge, or otherwise, before it.” If I may say so, with respect, I agree with this view. If an application is made to the Sessions Court as the Court having powers of revision in respect of the trial Court in regard to orders relating to property made under sections 517, 518 or 519, then the Sessions Court itself shall have jurisdiction to deal with that matter and it need not refer the matter to the High Court. Mr. Subbarao further contended that having regard to the peculiar circumstances of the case, the learned Sessions Judge was not correct in interfering with the discretion that the trial Court had exercised in dealing with the property before him. The property in this case was the subject-matter of a charge and that was seized from respondents 1 to 4. The learned Magistrate ordered return of the property to the complainant mainly on the ground that the accused claimed the property as theirs belatedly. In normal circumstances, on acquittal or discharge, the property would be returned to the person from whom it was seized. The learned Magistrate ordered return of the property to the complainant mainly on the ground that the accused claimed the property as theirs belatedly. In normal circumstances, on acquittal or discharge, the property would be returned to the person from whom it was seized. But when there are circumstances showing that the culprit has not claimed the property as his specifically and when there are also no grounds to hold that the property could belong to him, and the question of ownership has not been gone into in the judgment and decided one way or the other and the discharge or acquittal is based upon inadequacy or doubtfulness of the proof offered, it would be unreasonable to return the stolen property to the accused person. But where the property is unidentifiable and commonly possessed by a large number of persons in the rural area and when the accused when examined under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, claims the property as his the normal rule is to return the property to the accused when he is discharged or acquitted. In the instant case, the beans recovered are unidentifiable and it is in evidence that during the period the alleged incident took place, most of the villagers were in possession of such property. In is also in evidence that the accused had spread the property seized on the roof of their house for drying. In these circumstances, the learned Magistrate was in error in exercising his discretion in favour of the complainant. In the result, therefore, I confirm the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge and dismiss this revision petition. S.V.S. ----- Petition dismissed.