Govinda Menon, J.- The petitioner is the fourth accused in C.C. No. 2 of 1964 on the file of the Special Judge, Trichur and he seeks to revise the order of the Special Judge overruling the objection that the Court cannot enquire into the offence without the requisite sanction under section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947) (shortly stated the Act). The petitioner was the Assistant Station Master of the Chalakudy Railway Station. He was charged along with some others with offences under section 120-B, Indian Penal Code, section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(d)of the Act and sections 420 and 477-A Indian Penal Code. A departmental enquiry was held and the petitioner was dismissed from service on 19th October, 1963. Charge-sheet was laid by the Delhi Special Establishment and the Learned Judge took cognizance of the offence on 30th March, 1964. No sanction was obtained as the accused had ceased to be a Government servant when the Court was called upon to take cognizance of the offence On 5th October, 1963 the petitioner filed an O.P. No. 2141 of 1963 before the High Court to quash the order of dismissal and this Court allowed the O.P. on14th July, 1964 on the ground that there was non-compliance with Rule 1713 of the Conduct and Discipline Rules for Railway servants and quashed the proceedings from the stage at which the Chief Commercial Superintendent had to enter findings relating to the charges. The matter was taken up in appeal by the Railway Administration and the order was confirmed by the Division Bench. What is contended by the petitioner is that by the judgment in the Writ Petition, his order of dismissal had been quashed, that must be considered as if it never existed and he was Government servant on the date when cognizance of the offence was taken and must be deemed to continue as a Government servant and the Court could not, have taken cognizance of the offence and proceeded with the trial of the case without the requisite sanction as contemplated under section 6 of the Act. Section 6 of the Act says: “(1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under section 161 or section 164 or section 163 of the Indian penal Code (XLV of 1860), or under sub-section (2) of section 5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction, (a) in the case of a person, who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is notremovable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government.............. (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government............... (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office. * * * * *” By virtue of this provision if at the time when a Court purports to take cognizance of offences punishable under sections 161, 164 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code or section 5(2) of the Act committed by a public servant, and that person is a public servant, cognizance cannot be taken by a Court unless a sanction by the competent authority has been previously accorded. If the accused had ceased to be a public servant at the time the Court took cognizance of the offence alleged to have been committed by him as a public servant the provisions of section 6 will not apply and the prosecution against him will not be vitiated for lack of previous sanction. This position is not disputed-Vide the decision in Venkataraman v. State1. Learned Special Prosecutor contends that the order of dismissal in this case was set aside purely because of some procedural irregularity and that the order would remain valid till it is set aside and that the order of dismissal cannot be said to be a nullity, that it is not void but is only voidable and on the date when cognizance was taken, there was a valid order of dismissal. It is agreed that it is only when an order is ab initio void and is a nullity that it could be taken as if in reality it never existed and in all other cases the order would be valid till it is set aside. It is agreed that it is only when an order is ab initio void and is a nullity that it could be taken as if in reality it never existed and in all other cases the order would be valid till it is set aside. So the question for determination is whether the order dismissing the petitioner from service in this case could be said to be void. As to when an order could be said to be void, learned Special Prosecutor referred us to the decision in Kumaran v. Kothandaraman, Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat2. In that case after considering the ruling in State v. Mohammed Nooh3, and various English decisions their Lordships stated in para. 19 of the judgment: “It is clear therefore that every defect in a proceeding does not make the order of the authority of the first instance a nullity. The defect must be concerning either want of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction or a patent violation of the principles of natural justice, such as want of notice or inquiry. It is such a defect which would render an order null and void and which would take the case out of the principle of merger. But where an order is passed after due notice of charges and after an inquiry, where the delinquent has been given an opportunity to be heard and where he files a detailed statement, even if there is some defect in the course of the proceedings, there would be no question of a nullity.” In State of U.P. v. Mohammed Nooh3, S.R. Das, C.J., delivering the majority judgment stated: “On the authorities referred to above it appears to us that there may conceivably be cases-and the instant case is in point-where the error, irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior Court or tribunal of first instance is so patent and loudly obstructive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision. If an inferior Court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior Court’s sense of fair play the superior Court may, we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the Court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior Court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons afore mentioned.” It is clear that the principle laid down in this decision is not that every irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction renders the order of an authority a nullity; In the decision quoted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in In re, Authers4, Hawkins, J., places the principle on the foundation of absence of a jurisdiction. Similarly, in Andrews v. Mitchell5, a condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction was not performed and the order was held null and void. Cooper v. Wilson6. is yet another case where it was held that if a statutory body acts without jurisdiction, its decision can properly be questioned in an action for a declaration that the decision is null and void. So also was the case in Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board,7 where the order impugned was declared null and void on the ground of want of jurisdiction. Learned Counsel for the petitioner referred us to the decision in Sahai v. Imam8. That was a case where a copyist was removed from service by the District Judge without issuing a show cause notice before making the order of discharge. There was a clear violation of the principles of natural justice, that no man shall be condemned without giving him an opportunity to be heard and the order was held to be a nullity and the writ of certiorari was issued to quash the order. There was a clear violation of the principles of natural justice, that no man shall be condemned without giving him an opportunity to be heard and the order was held to be a nullity and the writ of certiorari was issued to quash the order. Likewise in the decision in Ramachandra Vaidya v. State1, it was held that an action taken in violation of Article 311(2) would be an action taken without fulfilling the condition precedent to the taking of such action and such action is liable to be treated as void and inoperative and a nullity. Article 311(2) provides that no civil servant shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him.The absence of such a notice is violative of the article of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice. In this case (vide the decision in Rajappa Menon v. Union Government Railway Administration2) notice of the charges was given to the petitioner. There was an enquiry by the Assistant Commercial Superintendent. The petitioner was given an opportunity to be heard. He submitted his explanation. There was no violation of the principle of natural justice. Learned Judge adverted to all these circumstances and observed: “I do not think I should characterise the enquiry as denying fairness and of being violative of the principles of natural justice.” The jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority was also not questioned. The order was set aside only because of the non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 1713 of the Conduct and Discipline Rules. Therefore, the order was never treated as ab initio void or as a nullity, but was set aside only because of a procedural irregularity and the order would be valid till it was set aside. So at the time when cognizance of the offence was taken by the learned Special Judge there was a valid order of dismissal against the petitioner and he was then not a public servant and no sanction under section 6 was necessary. It is the status existing at the time when proceedings are initiated and cognizance is taken that has to be looked into and if the person prosecuted does not enjoy the particular status at that time, no sanction under section 6 of the Act would be necessary. It is the status existing at the time when proceedings are initiated and cognizance is taken that has to be looked into and if the person prosecuted does not enjoy the particular status at that time, no sanction under section 6 of the Act would be necessary. The objection raised by the petitioner is thus unsustainable. The Revision Petition is devoid of merits and it is dismissed. M.C.M. ----- Petition dismissed.