JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.—I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner, respondent No. 1 and learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No. 2. 2. By this application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the applicant/petitioner has prayed for condonation of delay in filing revision petition against the order dated December 6, 1997 passed by the learned Special Judge, Solan whereby the non-applicant/ respondent has been acquitted of the charge under Section 13(l)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 3. It was at the instance of the applicant/petitioner that the case FIR No. 2/95 dated May 26, 1995, Police Station A.C. Zone, Solan under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was registered against the respondent and after investigation the charge-sheet was submitted by the police. Thus, evidently the case was instituted by the State against the respondent and the role of the applicant/petitioner was rendered to be that of informant and as such prosecution witness in the case. It is also well-settled that a complainant at whose instance a criminal case is registered against a person, can prefer a revision petition against the acquittal of the accused in case the State does not prefer any appeal against such acquittal. Since no such appeal has been preferred by the State, therefore, the applicant/petitioner has the locus standi to prefer a revision petition and to make an application for condonation of delay which has occurred in filing the present revision petition. However, what is to be seen is whether for condonation of delay sufficient cause has been shown by the applicant/petitioner or not? 4. The case of the applicant/petitioner in explaining the delay, as made out in the application, is that he was not aware of the judgment dated December 6, 1997 regarding acquittal of the respondent by the learned Special Judge till he received summons in Civil Suit No. 17-S/l of 1998 titled D.D, Gautam v. Vimal Kishore, pending before the learned District Judge, Solan. The summons in the suit were received by him on March 1, 1999 and then he came to know from the copy of the plaint that the respondent has been acquitted by the learned Special Judge on December 6, 1997. The summons in the suit were received by him on March 1, 1999 and then he came to know from the copy of the plaint that the respondent has been acquitted by the learned Special Judge on December 6, 1997. He then made enquiries at his own level regarding filing of the appeal by the State against the judgment of acquittal and applied for certified copy of the judgment of acquittal on March 10, 1999 which was delivered to him on March 22, 1999. He applied to the District Magistrate on March 11, 1999 to grant him the certificate as to whether the State had filed any appeal against the acquittal or not. He received a communication from the Additional District Magistrate concerned which is dated April 19, 1999 that though filing of the appeal was recommended by the District Attorney (Vigilance), yet no such appeal was finally preferred by the State. It is further claimed that on coming to know of non-filing of the appeal by the State, the applicant/petitioner took immediate steps and filed the revision petition on April 26, 1999. It is, thus, claimed that the delay in filing the revision petition is neither intentional nor wilful on the part of the applicant/petitioner and that he was not to gain anything by delaying the filing of the revision petition and that the judgment sought to be impugned by the revision petition, has arisen out of a State case and the applicant remained under bona fide belief that the State would file an appeal against the impugned judgment, more particularly, when the case was of accepting illegal gratification by a public servant. 5. The respondent has contested the claim in the application on the grounds that the applicant had the complete knowledge about the order of acquittal passed by the learned Special Judge and after such order not only the applicant/petitioner but his father Mr. Ram Lai who is practising lawyer at Solan, had told the respondent that it did not matter that the respondent had been acquitted but at least they had been able to prosecute him and that the applicant was held entitled to get back a sum of Rs. 1,000/-. It is further averred that the replying respondent served the applicant with a notice demanding a sum of Rs. 1,000/-. It is further averred that the replying respondent served the applicant with a notice demanding a sum of Rs. 4,80,000/- which notice was received by the petitioner, thus, by virtue of the contents of the notice also he had been made aware of the acquittal of the respondent. It has been repeatedly emphasised that the applicant/petitioner and his father, who is an Advocate, had the knowledge of the acquittal right from the beginning and it is falsely claimed that the respondent came to know abut the acquittal order only on March 1, 1999 and that the present petition has been filed only with mala fide intention to defeat the genuine claim of the replying respondent made by him in the suit for recovery of amount of compensation on account of his malicious prosecution and that in case the delay in filing the revision petition is condoned, the respondent will have to incur huge "irreparable loss and injustice would be caused to him. 6. Since the respondent was being prosecuted by the State, therefore, in the ordinary course the applicant/petitioner, whose status in such a situation was rendered only that of a witness, cannot be expected to be present on each and every date of hearing in the case. It cannot also be presumed that he would have come to know about the acquittal order right from the beginning, therefore, the averments made in the application, duly supported by an affidavit, cannot be said to be false. What lands credibility to such version is the fact that by the acquittal judgment the learned Special Judge has directed return of trap-money of Rs. 1,000/- to the applicant/ petitioner. However, it is not disputed that this money has still not been received back by the applicant. Had he come to know about the order of acquittal, he would have come to know also about the -order regarding a sum of Rs. 1,000/- to him, therefore, he would have taken steps for taking back the sum of Rs. 1,000/- which otherwise is still lying as case property with the concerned Court. Thus, the version that he came to know about the acquittal order only on March 1, 1999 when he received summons from the Civil Court alongwith a copy of the plaint in the suit presented by the respondent claiming compensation for the alleged malicious prosecution, appears to be credible. Thus, the version that he came to know about the acquittal order only on March 1, 1999 when he received summons from the Civil Court alongwith a copy of the plaint in the suit presented by the respondent claiming compensation for the alleged malicious prosecution, appears to be credible. The fact that the father of the petitioner is a practising lawyer at Solan does not in any manner show that through him the applicant/petitioner ought to have the knowledge of the acquittal order. More so, when this is not the case that the father of the petitioner in his capacity as an Advocate was representing the complainant as a counsel in the case. 7. Could it be legitimately held as prima facie established that any notice about the alleged malicious prosecution of the respondent by the petitioner was duly received by him as claimed by the respondent, then no doubt, knowledge of the acquittal order on the part of the applicant/petitioner could be deemed as established on receipt of such notice. Though issue of such a notice to the petitioner is averred in the reply by the replying respondent yet the same has been denied by the applicant/petitioner in his rejoinder, duly supported by an affidavit. Therefore, in the absence of the copy of the notice and of the postal receipt/acknowledgement having been filed alongwith the reply by the respondent, it cannot be even prima facie assumed that such a notice might have been served on or received by the petitioner. Thus, what can be said is that the version of the petitioner that he came to know about the acquittal order on March 1, 1999 only on receipt of the summons from the Court in the Civil Suit instituted against him by the respondent, is correct. After having acquired such knowledge, he has taken appropriate steps without any further delay to file the revision petition. Thus, the delay which has been caused in filing the revision petition, though after sufficient period, has been explained by showing sufficient cause for such delay. 8. It is well-settled that the primary function of Courts is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 8. It is well-settled that the primary function of Courts is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest republicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destory the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 9. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within certain limit. Length of delay is not the deciding factor but acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. In every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show-utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show-utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. The words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. (See: N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123). 10. The view that the expression "sufficient cause" as used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party, has been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in many other cases also. It is sufficient to refer to cases Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and others, (AIR 1969 SC 575): The State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and others, (AIR 1972 SC 749) and Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Smt. Katiji and another, (1987) 2 SCC 107). 11. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent that in the present case the applicant/petitioner has been negligent, inactive and the filing of the revision petition is not bona fide but is a counter-blast to the Civil Suit instituted by the respondent against the petitioner. In view of this, the learned Counsel contends that this is not a case fit for condonation of delay and the reliance has been placed on P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another, (1997) 7 SCC 556. 12. As already stated here-in-above, the version of the applicant/ petitioner that he came to know about the acquittal order on March 1, 1999 is correct. Being an informant only, it was not his duty to remain present on each and every date of hearing in a case where the respondent was being prosecuted by the State. 12. As already stated here-in-above, the version of the applicant/ petitioner that he came to know about the acquittal order on March 1, 1999 is correct. Being an informant only, it was not his duty to remain present on each and every date of hearing in a case where the respondent was being prosecuted by the State. It can also not be expected that he must have been active enough to keep the track of the case and the proceedings/orders passed thereon from time to time. The applicant/petitioner, therefore, cannot be said to be negligent or inactive. 13. No doubt, he has moved the present application and the revision petition only on coming to know that a suit against him has been instituted by the respondent for compensation for malicious prosecution, however, the summons issued in the same suit brought it to the knowledge of the applicant/petitioner that the respondent has been acquitted in the case wherein he was the informant and, therefore, his taking steps to file the revision petition cannot be said to be counter-blast and thus a mala fide act on his part. 14. In the case P.K. Ramachandranv. State of Kerala and another (supra), the facts are quite distinguishable from the facts as involved in this case. The delay in the said case was sought to be condoned on the averments that at the relevant time the Advocate General office was held up with so many arbitration matters equally important to this case pending for consideration as per the direction of the Advocate General on September 2, 1995, and there was a delay of 565 days in filing the appeal. Evidently, the aforesaid averments did not disclose a sufficient cause for condonation of delay. 15. Thus, once the sufficient cause explaining the delay is shown and negligents inaction or want of bonafide cannot be attributed to the petitioner, irrespective of the period, the delay has to be condoned. In the case in hand, as already observed, sufficient cause for delay in filing the revision petition has been shown by the applicant/ petitioner, therefore, this application deserves to be a allowed and the delay in filing the petition is liable to be condoned. 16. As a result, this application is allowed and the delay in filing the revision petition is condoned. Revision allowed.