JUDGMENT : - R.H. Zaidi, J. Present defendant's second appeal is directed against judgment and decree passed by VI Additional District Judge, Sultanpur dated 26-3-1996 allowing Civil Appeal No. 48 of 1994, and decreeing the suit of the plaintiff/respondent, No. 452 of 1989, for mandatory in junction to deliver possession of the shop in dispute to the plaintiff/respondent within 2 months. 2. FACTS of the ease, in brief, arc that the plaintiff/respondent filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants/appellants from interfering in his possession over the shop No. 4 situated at Kurwar Road near Tehsil compound, Sultanpur, for short hereinafter referred to as "the shop in dispute", pleading that the plaintiff had a wooden Gumti at the aforesaid road and place from which he used to earn his livelihood by carrying on tailoring work. The defendant/appellant No. 1, used to charge Rs. 15. 50 per annum as Tah-Baxari through Thekedar from the plaintiff/respondent for use and occupation of the aforesaid Gumti. Nagar Palika Sultanpur resolved to remove wooden Gumtis placed by the side of the aforesaid road and to construct pucca shops to augment its income and to prevent encroachment on the road. It was also resolved that after construction of shops they shall be allotted to the Gumti-owners. A list of Gumti-owners was also prepared in which name of the plaintiff/respondent was also entered. In pursuance of the aforesaid resolution shops were constructed and were allotted to Gumti-owners who were financially well-up. Some outsiders were also inducted in the said shops; but not to the plaintiff/respondent who was a poor man. He, therefore, applied to the Administrator for allotment of a shop. The Administrator directed the Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika to allot one of the shops to the plaintiff but none was allotted. The Administrator, therefore, orally permitted the plaintiff/respondent to occupy the shop No. 4. On the basis of oral permission granted by the Administrator, the plaintiff/respondent occupied shop No. 4 and started his tailoring work in the same. It was on 22-5-1989, the plaintiff was threatened to be evicted from the shop in dispute by Nagar Palika through its Thekedar, hence the plaintiff/respondent had to approach the Court and file the suit for above mentioned relief. The plain tiff/respondent also applied for grant of ad interim injunction. It was on 22-5-1989, the plaintiff was threatened to be evicted from the shop in dispute by Nagar Palika through its Thekedar, hence the plaintiff/respondent had to approach the Court and file the suit for above mentioned relief. The plain tiff/respondent also applied for grant of ad interim injunction. The application filed by respondent was not only objected to and opposed by the defendant/appellant No. 1; but the same was rejected on ground that plaintiff had no allotment order in his possession. After dismissal of the said application, I he defendant/appellant No. 1 forcibly ejected the plaintiff/respondent from the shop in dispute after throwing out his sewing machine etc. from the said shop, and allotted the shop to defendant/appellant No. 2 and put him in possession of same. The plaintiff/respondent, therefore, applied for amendment, of the plaint which was allowed on 16-3-1972. By means of amendment the plaintiff/respondent placed sub sequent facts on the record which had happened during pendency of the suit and also added the prayer of mandatory injunction directing defendants/appellants to restore back possession of the shop in dispute to the plaintiff/respondent. 3. THE suit filed by the plain tiff/respondent was contested by the defendants/appellants by filing separate written statements. Appellant No. 1 pleaded that the application of plain tiff/respondent dated 19-8-1988 was rejected by the Administrator on 24-8-1988 on the ground that as brother of the plaintiff was allotted one shop, the shop in dispute could not be allotted to him. 4. DEFENDANT No. 2 on the other hand pleaded that plaintiff/respondent had no Gumti at the place where shop in dispute was situated. Other facts pleaded by plain tiff/respondent were admitted but it was asserted that the shop in dispute was never allotted to him. Other technical and legal pleas were also taken. It was pleaded that the shop in dispute was allotted to defendant No. 2 on 3-10-1988 on the basis of which he took possession of the said shop and was carrying on his business in the same. After amendment of the plaint additional written statements were also filed by defendants/appellants. It was also pleaded that after rejection of application for interim injunction plaintiff/respondent succeeded in obtaining ex pane in junction from appellate Court and on that basis he took possession over the shop in dispute. 5. ON the basis of the pleadings of the parties as many as 8 issues were framed. It was also pleaded that after rejection of application for interim injunction plaintiff/respondent succeeded in obtaining ex pane in junction from appellate Court and on that basis he took possession over the shop in dispute. 5. ON the basis of the pleadings of the parties as many as 8 issues were framed. After amendment application was allowed the said issues were re-framed on 19-1-1991. Parties in support of their cases, produced evidences, oral and documentary. 6. THE trial Court did not record findings on the issues framed by it separately as required under the law; but held that plain tiff/respondent was not in possession of the shop in dispute, therefore, was not entitled to any relief in the suit and dismissed the suit by its judgment and decree dated 23-7-1994. Challenging the validity of said decree the plaintiff/respondent preferred Civil Appeal No. 48 of 1994, before the Court below. The Court below formulated 4 questions for determination in the appeal. The Court below while dealing with question Nos. 1 and 2, after perusing the evidence on the record held that at the place where the shop in dispute was situated, plaintiff/respondent had a wooden Gumti and he was, therefore, en titled for allotment of shop after the same was constructed by defendant/appellant No. 1. The rejection of his application for allotment merely on the ground that one of his brothers was already allotted a shop, was unreasonable inasmuch as other shops were allotted to two brother, separately and that allotment of shops made by Nagar Palika was not fair. On Question No. 3 it was held that plaintiff/respondent was dispossessed from the shop in dispute illegally without following the procedure prescribed for under the law by the defendant appellant No. 1. After recording findings on the aforesaid questions while dealing with question No. 4 it was held by the Court below that suit was originally filed for permanent injunction; but after his ejectment from the shop in dispute the relief for recovery of possession of the shop in dispute was also added in the plaint, therefore, it was not necessary to since a notice under Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. 7. THE Court below held that the trial Court acted illegally in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff/respondent, therefore, appeal was liable to be allowed. 7. THE Court below held that the trial Court acted illegally in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff/respondent, therefore, appeal was liable to be allowed. Having recorded the said finding, appeal was allowed by the Court below by its judgment and decree dated 26-3-1996, hence the present second appeal by defendants/appellants. 8. THIS appeal was although not formally admitted but following substantial question of law was formulated by this Court on 8-5-1996: "(I) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the suit in question which was dismissed by the trial Court, was correctly decreed on appeal." After formulating the aforesaid question notices were directed to be issued to the respondents and parties were directed to maintain status quo of the disputed properly by order dated 22-7-1996. It was staled that second appeal has al ready been admitted. The record of the case was directed to be summoned. 9. SUBSTANTIAL question of law as framed by this Court referred to above was in general form and did not fulfill requirement of Section 100, CPC, and if it is permitted to be raised and pressed whole case will be re-opened, which will be contrary to the aforesaid Section. 10. LEARNED counsel for the appellant Mr. Mohd. Abid Ali, urged that in the absence of the written agreement or the order for allotment in favour of plaintiff-respondent, suit for possession of the shop in question was legally not maintainable, that oral evidence regarding allotment of the shop in favour of the plaintiff by the Administrator of Nagar Palika, Sultanpur was legally not admissible and that the Court below had no jurisdiction to reverse the findings recorded by the trial Court and to decree the suit for possession and mandatory injunction. He, however, could not formulate any question as substantial question of Law for consideration of this Court in this appeal. On the other hand learned counsel Mr. S. K. Mehrotra, appearing for the respondent supported the judgment and decree passed by the Court below and with his usual vehemence sub-milted that no substantial question of Law was involved in the appeal and the same was concluded by findings of fact which are based on the relevant evidence. I have considered the submission made by learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record. 11. PRESENT appeal has been filed under Section 100, CPC. I have considered the submission made by learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record. 11. PRESENT appeal has been filed under Section 100, CPC. A second appeal can be entertained by this Court if it involves substantial question of law only. Apex Court in Chunni Lal V. Mehta v. C. 's, and M. Co. Ltd. , AIR 1962 SC 1314 , while considering the scope of Article 133 (1) explained the meanings of "substantial question of law" as follows: "the proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law. " 12. IN another case of Arumugluim (dead) and others v. Sundarambal and another, 1994 (4) SCC 350, while considering the scope of Section 100, CPC, Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to lay down the guidelines for exercise of powers under Section 100 of CPC by the High Court, as under: "from the aforesaid judgment of the three-Judge Bench in Ramchandra Ayyar case, it is clear that this Court held that the second appellate Court cannot interfere with the judgment of the first appellate Court on the ground that the first appellate Court had not come to close grips with the reasoning of the trial Court. It is open to the first appellate Court to consider the evidence adduced by the parties and give its own reasons for accepting the evidence on one side or rejecting the evidence on the other side. It is open to the first appellate Court to consider the evidence adduced by the parties and give its own reasons for accepting the evidence on one side or rejecting the evidence on the other side. It is not permissible for the second appellate Court to interfere with such findings of the first appellate Court only on the ground that the first appellate Court had not come to grips with the ; reasoning giving by the Court. The aforesaid judgment of this Court in Ramachandra Ayyar case specifically distinguished Rtini Ileniunta Kumari Devi v. Maharaja Jagdindra Natk Roy Bahadur rendered by the Privy Council on the ground that was a case wherein the High Court was dealing with a first appeal. The observations made by the Privy Council in that context would not be applicable to cases where the second appellate Court was dealing wit h the correctness of the judgment of the first appellate Court which reversed the trial Court. " In another case of Kondiin; Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sonan Gujar and others, 1999 (3) SCC 722 , Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the guide lines for exercising powers under Sect ion 100 of the CPC by the High Court. Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to rule that the High Court must adhere to the conditions and procedure prescribed in the section and no Court had got power to enlarge conditions of appeal". The High Court must satisfy itself that a substantial question of law is involved and must then formulate the question on which the appeal would then be heard. The respondent has the right to argue that no substantial question of law is involved and that a second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds, that the Court must distinguish between a question of law and a substantial question of law. A substantial question of law must be distinguished from a substantial question of fact and that con current findings of fact, howsoever, erroneous they may be, cannot be disturbed under Section 100, CPC, unless they are against the law laid down by the Supreme Court or against mandatory provisions of law or are based on inadmissible evidence. Judging from the guidelines prescribed by the Supreme Court in the above noted decisions, present appeal is concluded by findings of fact and no substantial question of law is involved in the same. Judging from the guidelines prescribed by the Supreme Court in the above noted decisions, present appeal is concluded by findings of fact and no substantial question of law is involved in the same. The Court below, as stated above has recorded clear and categorical findings that the plaintiff-respondent had his wooden shop where the shop in dispute has been constructed by Nagar Palika. He was, thus, entitled to allotment of the said shop. Plaintiff- respondent took possession of the shop on the oral order of allotment/permission granted by the then Administrator, but was ultimately refused the allotment on a highly arbitrary ground that his brother was allotted shop else where and further that the plaintiff-respondent was evicted from the shop in dispute by force without following the procedure prescribed under the law. Said findings are findings of fact, they arc based on relevant evidence on the record and call for no interference by this Court in exercise of powers under Section 10 of the CPC. The status of the appellant in the shop in dispute was that of allottee may be on the oral order of the Administrator or of a licensee of the Nagar Palika. Her is also filed receipts of payment of rent in support of his claim. He, therefore, could not be ejected from the shop in dispute except in accordance with law. According to the findings recorded by the Court below, he was illegally thrown out from the shop in dispute and the same was allotted to appellant No. 2. 13. IN Krishna Ram Mahale v. Mrs. Shobha Venkta Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2097 , apex Court was pleased to rule as under: "it is well settled law in this country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the properly, he cannot he dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. If any authority were needed for that proposition, we could refer to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in I Mia Yasliwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh 1965 (2) SCR 203 at pp 208- 210. AIR 1968 SC 620 at pp 622-630. This Court in that judgment cited with approval the well-known passage from the leading Privy Council case of Midnapur Zamindary Co. AIR 1968 SC 620 at pp 622-630. This Court in that judgment cited with approval the well-known passage from the leading Privy Council case of Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Narexh Narain Roy, 51 Indian Appeals 293 at p 299: AIR 1924 PC 144 where it has been observed at page 208 of SCR, at page 622 of AIR that in India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession, they must obtain such possession as they arc entitled to through Court. " 14. IN the aforesaid decision, reference has also been made to the decision in Ram Raian v. State of U.P., 1977 (2) SCR 232 : AIR 1977 SC 619 , wherein it was ruled that even a true owner cannot dispossess a trespasser if the trespasser has been successful in accomplishing the pos session to the knowledge of the true owner. IN such circumstances, the law re quires that the true owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to (he remedies under the law. In the present case, as stated above, it has been held by the Court below that plaintiff-respondent took possession on the basis of oral allotment order/per mission granted by the Administrator. Therefore, defendant-appellant No. 1 had no right to dispossess him by force. In the case of Krishna Ram Mahaliy (supra) it was ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to decree for recovery of possession. The Court below, therefore, committed no mistake in allowing the appeal and decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. In the present appeal, learned counsel for the appellant wanted this Court to go through the entire evidence on the record, oral and documentary, to reverse the findings recorded by the Court below as he could not formulate a substantial question of law. In view of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court, referred to above, it is not permissible for this Court to appraise the evidence on the record and substitute its own findings for the findings recorded by the Court below. This Court, therefore, declined to accept the request made by learned counsel for t he appellant. 15. LEARNED counsel for the appellant failed to substantiate his argument that the suit for possession of the shop in dispute filed by plaintiff/respondent was legally not maintainable and that oral evidence regarding allotment of shop in favour of the plaintiff by the Administrator was legally not admissible. 15. LEARNED counsel for the appellant failed to substantiate his argument that the suit for possession of the shop in dispute filed by plaintiff/respondent was legally not maintainable and that oral evidence regarding allotment of shop in favour of the plaintiff by the Administrator was legally not admissible. He has also failed to show that the Court below had no jurisdiction to reverse the findings recorded by the trial Court and to decree the suit for pos session and mandatory injunction. It is well-settled in law that first appellate Court in exercise of power under Section 96, CPC, has got jurisdiction to appraise the evidence and to record its own findings on the question of law and fact involved in the case after upsetting the findings recorded by the trial Court in accordance with law. This Court, therefore, is unable to accept the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant. 16. THIS appeal is concluded by findings of fact, which are based on relevant evidence on the record and do not suffer from any error of law or jurisdiction. No substantial question of law is involved in the present appeal, it fails and is dismissed but without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.