JUDGMENT D. Raju, C.J.—The above writ petition has been filed seeking to set-aside the notice dated 22.9.1994 filed as Annexure-C, as void in law culminating in the proceedings filed as Annexure-K and also to set-aside the notice dated 31.12.1994 filed as Annexure-F as non-est and without jurisdiction. The relief prayed for as above, though it is generally and vaguely worded the sum and substance of the grievance of the petitioner seems to be against the two notices issued on 22.2.1994 and 31.12.1994 by the 3rd respondent-Society and the orders passed by the 2nd respondent dated 30.9.1996 in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 116/96 filed as Annexure-K. The notice dated 22.9.1994 filed as Annexure-C was issued by the counsel for the 3rd respondent-Society under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act purporting to terminate the tenancy in favour of the petitioner and calling upon him to surrender the possession on or before 1.11.1994 on threat of action under the Himachal Pradesh Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Similarly the notice dated 31.12.1994 is the one issued by the Sub-Divisional Collector exercising the powers of the Collector under the Act on being moved by the 3rd respondent-Society for eviction under the provisions of the said Act. It is seen that on such notice being issued by the Sub-Divisional Collector, the matter came to be decided after hearing the petitioner and this resulted in an order dated 3.8.1996 filed as Annexure-I whereunder in exercise of the powers under the Act, the petitioner has been directed to vacate the premises in dispute in addition to paying the compensation at the rate fixed for the unauthorised occupation. The appeal filed by the petitioner therein came to be also decided against the petitioner on 30.9.1996 and this order of the Appellate Authority has been filed as Annexure-K. From the orders of the above referred to two statutory authorities, it is found that the tenancy of the petitioner came to be terminated with effect from 1.11.1994 and when the applicability of the Act as also the proceedings instituted under the said Act for eviction of the petitioner came to be contested and strongly objected to, the authorities below have categorically held that the provisions of the H.P. Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1971 are attracted to the case on hand and that the petitioner also rendered himself liable to be evicted on account of lawful, termination of the tenancy in his favour and as a consequence .f which the petitioner became the unauthorised occupant of the premises in question. The plea strongly urged before the authorities below about the deposit of the arrears of rent to the account of the Bank which according to the petitioner has been accepted without demur has been held not to exonerate the petitioner of the liability incurred to be evicted after due and proper termination of the tenancy in his favour. Hence aggrieved by the orders of the authorities below the above writ petition came to be filed. 2. Mr. Sureshwar Thakur, learned Counsel for the petitioner strongly urged that in the light of the provisions contained under the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 and protection available to the petitioner as a tenant the order of eviction could not have been passed by the authorities exercising the powers under the Public Premises Act. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner under the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, even if the tenant has been held to be in default in payment of rent as long as he paid the same after such determination and quantification within the time stipulated by the competent authority exercising the powers under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act he is entitled to the benefit of protection of his tenancy and the harsh provisions contained in the Public Premises Act could not have been invoked to the detriment of the petitioner. In this connection, the learned Counsel for the petitioner apart from inviting our attention to the relevant provisions of the above referred two legislations also sought to place reliance upon a Division Bench Judgment of this Court reported in 1999 (1) SLC 371, The Chamba District Co-op. Marketing & Supply Fed. v. State of H.P. and others, to contend that it is only the Rent Control Act, 1987 that applies to the case on hand and, therefore, initiation of the proceedings under the Public Premises Act, 1971 as also orders passed therein are without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside. 3. Per contra, Mr. Bhupender Gupta learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the 3rd respondent-society while placing reliance upon the decision reported in (1980) 4 Supreme Court Cases 435, M/s. Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another and (1990) 4 Supreme Court Cases, Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and another v. Punjab National Bank and others, contended that being a special law applicable to the Public Premises Act as defined under the Act, the Public Premises Act of 1971 is attracted and applicable to the case on hand and has been rightly invoked and orders passed therein and no exception could be taken to the impugned orders. Argued the learned Counsel further that the decision of the Division Bench relied upon for the petitioner has no application to the case on hand and the same was rendered on the peculiar nature of issues raised therein. It was also further contended that at any rate in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court, the objections as to the applicability of the Public Premises Act, 1971 has no merit of acceptance. The learned Advocate General has also been heard and the learned Advocate General defended the orders passed by the authorities below as being in accordance with law. 4. The relevant provisions of the Act may be first noticed before adverting to the decisions relied upon and undertaking consideration of the respective submissions made by learned Counsel on either side. The Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 has been brought into force with effect from 17.11.1971. It is an Act to provide for the Control of Rents and Evictions within the limits of Urban Areas in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 has been brought into force with effect from 17.11.1971. It is an Act to provide for the Control of Rents and Evictions within the limits of Urban Areas in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The definition of building under Section 2(b) defines it to mean, any building or part of a building let-out for any purpose and the provisions contained in Section 3(1) stipulates that the State Government may direct that all or any of the provisions of the Act shall not apply to any particular building or rented land or any class of buildings or rented lands. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 provides that provisions of this Act shall not apply to any building or rented land owned by the Government. Section 14 of the Act provides that a tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. The Himachal Pradesh Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1971 has been enacted to provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupation from public premises and for certain incidental matters. The Act though received the assent of the Governor on 5.11.1971, was first published in the Gazette Extra-ordinary dated 19.11.1971 and having regard to the fact that it was ordered to come into force at once, it must be held to have come into force only from the date of first publication of the Act as noticed above. Section 2(e) defines "Public Premises/ to mean, any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requistioned by, or on behalf of, the State Government and includes any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or an behalf of, among other things with effect from 1983, by virtue of Act 4 of 1983. Any Cooperative Society registered or deemed to have been registered under the H.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1968, in view of the above, the premises in question would be a public premises within the meaning of the Act. Section 3 provides as to when, for the purposes of the Act, a person shall be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation of any public premises, by enacting in Section 3 as hereunder:— "3. Section 3 provides as to when, for the purposes of the Act, a person shall be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation of any public premises, by enacting in Section 3 as hereunder:— "3. Unauthorised occupation of public premises.—For the purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation of any public premises— (a) where he has whether before or after the commencement of this Act entered into possession thereof otherwise than under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant; or (b) where he, being an allottee, lessee or grantee, has by reason of the determination or cancellation of his allotment, lease or grant in accordance with the terms in that behalf therein contained, ceased, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, to be entitled to occupy or hold such public premises; or (c) where any person authorised to occupy any public premises has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act— (i) sub-let in contravention of the terms of allotment, lease or grant, without the permission of the State Government or of any other authority competent to permit such subletting the whole or any part of such public premises or (ii) otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms, express or implied, under which he is authorised to occupy such public premises. Explanation.—For the purposes of Clause (a) a person shall not merely by reason of the fact that he has paid any rent be deemed to have entered into possession as allottee, lessee or grantee." 5. Section 4 enjoins the issue of notice to show cause against the order of eviction and Section 5 provides for the procedure for eviction of unauthorised occupants and Section 7 provides for issuing a direction for the payment of rent/dam ages in respect of such public premises. Section 8 provides for the authorities under the Act to order eviction and Section 9 provides for appeals. 6. The decision reported in (1999) 1 Shimla Law Cases 371 (supra) on which strong reliance has been placed for the petitioner, needs proper explanation and clarification. Section 8 provides for the authorities under the Act to order eviction and Section 9 provides for appeals. 6. The decision reported in (1999) 1 Shimla Law Cases 371 (supra) on which strong reliance has been placed for the petitioner, needs proper explanation and clarification. That was a case wherein the Society concerned moved the competent authority under the Public Premises Act, 1971 for the eviction of the legal representatives of a tenant, who died, on the ground that the legal representatives of the deceased tenant are in an unauthorised occupation of the premises for the purpose of this Act. This position was contested and the original authority under the Public Premises Act held that the legal representatives of the deceased tenant are entitled to the benefits of the Rent Control Act and, therefore, the Public Premises Act will not apply to the case on hand. When the Society concerned pursued the matter on appeal, the authority was of the view that the premises belonging to a registered Co-operative Society constituted Public Premises in view of the amendment introduced in 1983, but at the same time, the contesting respondents are entitled to the benefits under Rent Control Act and inasmuch as the tenancy can be terminated only in accordance with the terms as provided in Section 3 of the Public Premises Act for initiating proceedings under the said Act. In the absence of proof of proper termination of the tenancy there is no claim of the society concerned therein. Not satisfied, the society in that case approached this Court by instituting proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the absence of proof of proper termination of the tenancy there is no claim of the society concerned therein. Not satisfied, the society in that case approached this Court by instituting proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is in this context, the Division Bench on the earlier occasion had considered the issue raised with particular reference to the fact that under the general law of property and succession the legal heirs of tenant would be as much tenants and in the absence of any provisions to the contrary in the Public Premises Act, 1971 to per se render the possession of the legal representatives of the deceased tenant as unauthorised and in the absence of any proper termination of the tenancy as such, under the provisions of the Public Premises Act, 1971 there was no scope for applying the provisions of the Public Premises Act, 1971 for evicting the legal representatives of the deceased tenant and that in such cases it is the other Act that will apply. It is in the context of appreciating arguments made by the contesting parties therein in that manner that the relative scope and applicability of the Rent Control Act and Public Premises Act came to be incidentally considered. The very controversy that was put into issue in the said case before the Division Bench was as to whether in the absence of any specific provision in the Public Premises Act, 1971 to override and destroy the common law principle and rights of legal representatives of a tenant succeeding to the interest of the original tenant under a lease, could the possession of the legal representatives be held to be unauthorised notwithstanding the specific recognition of such rights in the Rent Control Act. The observations of the Division Bench in the earlier decision in this regard would make the position clear that the points which are now raised in this case in the present form were not raised or arose for consideration in the earlier case:— "There is no controversy also that the provisions of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 apply to the area in question. If that be the position, the inevitable consequence of the prohibitory clause in Section 14 of the Act is that a tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of the Act or otherwise, whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act. Therefore, the rights of a tenant within the meaning of Rent Control Act, even if disputed by the petitioner society obviously have got to be adjudicated under the provisions of the Rent Control Act before the competent authorities constituted under the said Act and it is not given to the petitioner society to accept the authority constituted under the Public Premises Act to adjudicate issues which otherwise are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the authorities constituted under the Rent Control Act. Consequently, we see no merit in the submissions that the appellate authority exercising powers under the Public Premises Act committed any error in not deciding about the entitlement of the contesting respondents as tenants under the Rent Control Act to continue in possession, the Public Premises Act being a special enactment for a limited purpose, the authorities under which also conferred jurisdiction in respect of only adjudicating for the purpose of the Act the issues that arise for consideration under Section 3 of the said special enactment." 7. In the light of the above, the observations made about the applicability of the relative provisions of the respective enactments noticed therein has to be confined to a case where there is no termination of tenancy within the meaning of Section 3 of the Public Premises Act, 1971 and, therefore, the said Act stood excluded in the context of a particular case. In the light of the above, the reliance placed on the earlier decision of the Division Bench cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner, effectively. 8. In the light of the above, the reliance placed on the earlier decision of the Division Bench cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner, effectively. 8. Coming to the question of relative applicability of the provisions of the Public Premises Act, 1971 and H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, it has to be observed that though the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 applies to all the tenancies except in respect of any rented building of land owned by the Government and there is no specific notification exempting from the provisions of the Act, the building or land owned by the Co-operative Society as such, at the most it would lead to the position that the two enactments may under some given circumstances where there has been a proper termination of the tenancy within the meaning of Public Premises Act, 1971 as well as H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, both Acts may over-lap in their application. There is no non-obstante clause in either of the legislations, excluding the applicability of the other, though the Rent Control Act provides that no tenant can be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the Rent Control Act, 1987. But as long as the applicability of 1971 Act is not excluded, and the provisions of Section 3 of the Public Premises Act, 1971 are satisfied in a given case, in our view, the 1971 Act being a special legislation alone would apply to a given case wherever it is found applicable. The H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 applies to all tenancies in respect of all buildings irrespective of the ownership of the building to be that of an individual or the State or any specified State undertaking, whereas the provisions of Public Premises Act, 1971 apply specifically and specially only in respect of "Public Premises" as defined under the said Act. It is in this context that the two decisions of the apex Court become significant and the principles laid down therein become relevant. The decision reported in (1980) 4 Supreme Court Cases 435 (supra) considered the relative applicability of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Like-wise the decision reported in (1990) 4 Supreme Court Cases 406 (supra) considered the relative applicability of the very same provisions. The decision reported in (1980) 4 Supreme Court Cases 435 (supra) considered the relative applicability of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Like-wise the decision reported in (1990) 4 Supreme Court Cases 406 (supra) considered the relative applicability of the very same provisions. It has been held in the latter decision after elaborate consideration of the case law and earlier decisions noticed above that where two enactments of the same legislature fall under the same legislative list, the question as to which enactment will override the other in case of conflict of laws will have to be determined on the basis of principles of statutory interpretation with particular reference and having regard to the purpose policy and legislative intent of the two enactments, also. Viewed thus, in our view, having regard to the purpose, policy and legislative intent that in respect of getting the unauthorised occupant of the public premises evicted expeditiously and summarily, a special procedure is envisaged and enacted under the Public Premises Act, 1971. Therefore, it is that law, as a special law, would prevail and be applicable to a case concerned and it is only in respect of matters not covered by the said State law or that if at all if there is any vacum left in the provisions of 1971 Act in respect of any area, the question of falling back on or applying the provisions of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 will arise. In the case on hand, since the two statutory authorities have concurrently held that the petitioner committed default which operated as defeasance clause to put an end to his tenancy and that his tenancy has been lawfulfy terminated also and thereby he rendered himself to be an "unauthorised occupant" under Section 3 of the Act, 1971, there is no scope or possibility or justification to exclude the applicability of the Public Premises Act, 1971 to the case on hand at any rate. The fact that at one stage the Rent Control Court was moved is no estoppel against the statute. Therefore, it is not given to the petitioner to fall back upon and claim protection engrafted in the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 to the case on hand. 9. The fact that at one stage the Rent Control Court was moved is no estoppel against the statute. Therefore, it is not given to the petitioner to fall back upon and claim protection engrafted in the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 to the case on hand. 9. In view of the above, we see no error whatsoever in the impugned orders of the authority below, and therefore, the writ petition fails and shall stand dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.