Research › Browse › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

1999 DIGILAW 17 (MAD)

Panduranga Rao v. Osman Khan Sahib

1999-01-07

V.KANAGARAJ

body1999
Judgment 1. Theabove appeal suit is directed against the judgment and decree dated 12.2.1985 made in O.S.No.141 of 1982 by the Court of Subordinate Judge, Salem, thereby dismissing the suit, filed by the appellant herein for specific performance of the contract, without costs. 2. The facts and circumstances, as pleaded by the appellant/plaintiff in the plaint are that the suit schedule ‘A’ properties belonged to the mother of the defendants 1 to 6, viz., Majubi alias Khairoonkhathu, who died in 1977, leaving behind her the defendants 1 to 6 to succeed to her estate, since her husband had pre-deceased her; that in September, 1978, defendants 1 to 3, for themselves and authorised by defendants 4 and 5 their brothers and the 6th defendant-their sister, represented to the plaintiff to negotiate and sell the suit property and offered the same for sale to the plaintiff, further promising to evict the tenants and hand over vacant physical possession of the property at the time of executing the sale deed; that after negotiation, the price was settled at Rs.51,750 and that the defendants 1 to 3 executed an agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff on 28.9.1978, after receiving an advance amount of Rs.5,000 from out of the sale price of Rs.51,750, further agreeing to execute the sale deed by all the heirs of Majubi alias Khairoonkhathu Bi (their mother) after receiving the balance sale consideration and to evict the tenants within five months from the date of agreement; that in spite of the plaintiff being ready and willing to perform his part of contract, defendants 1 to 3 adopted declaratory tactics; that on 19.2.1979, at the representation of the defendants 1 to 3, the time for performing the contract was extended till 28.8.1979 or till they got possession of the suit property and necessary endorsement was made on the back of the agreement, but all of a sudden, the second defendant issued a notice dated 8.10.1979 to the plaintiff returning thereby the sum of Rs.5,000 received as advance by defendants 1 to 3, by crossed cheque dated 8.10.1979. 3. 3. The further pleadings of the plaintiff are that the plaintiff sent a reply notice dated 19.10.1979 to the notice issued by the second defendant on 8.10.1979, repudiating the false allegations made in the said notice and further demanding the execution of the sale deed in terms of the contract and in spite of receipt of the reply notice, the defendants failed to comply with the requirements of the same; that on the contrary, the plaintiff was give to understand that the defendants 1 to 3 and 5 and 6 sold the property in favour of the 7th defendant by executing a sale deed on 30.4.1980 for Rs.15,000; that the 7th defendant, having fully known of the earlier agreement of the appellant with defendants 1 to 3, had purchased the suit property; that the 7th defendant is not a bona fide purchaser for value of the suit property, without notice of the suit agreement, as such, he is liable to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff along with the other defendants, if necessary, and put the plaintiff in possession of the suit property. Hence, the suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale, directing the defendants to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and to put the plaintiff in possession of the suit property, after effecting division by metes and bounds; for awarding mesne profits; alternatively, for granting damages and refund of advance and for costs. 4. In the written statement filed by the second defendant and adopted by the defendants 1, 3, 5 and 6, would deny the allegations of the plaint that in September, 1978, the defendants 1 to 3, represented to the plaintiff that they were authorised by the defendants 4 and 5 their brothers and 6th defendant-their sister, to negotiate and sell the suit property; that the suit property is not capable of division to be enjoyed by the heirs of Majubi alias Khairoon Khathun Bi separately and that since the defendants 1 to 6 were scattered in different places, they leased out the property to tenants and would also deny the allegation of the plaint regarding the undertaking said to have been given by them to the appellant. They would further contend that the plaintiff wanted to purchase the suit property and accordingly, an agreement was entered into between the defendants 1 to 3 and the plaintiff and that the defendants 1 to 3 have jointly received a sum of Rs.5,000. These defendants would further deny the allegation that the defendants 1 to 3 have agreed to register the document along with other heirs of the said Majubi and would say that the defendants 4 to 6 are not the parties to the document dated 28.9.1978 and that they do not have any knowledge of the document dated 28.9.1978. It would further be denied that the defendants 1 to 3 approached the appellant on 19.2.1979 to extend the time to execute the sale deed in order to facilitate them to take possession of the suit property. They would further contend that the plaintiff could not perform his part of contract and at his request only, they have extended the time till 28.8.1979; that the time was also considered to be essence of the contract; that the agreement expired on 19.2.1979 and since the agreement become a dead record, the defendants 1 to 3 did not want to keep the advance money of Rs.5,000 with them and therefore they issued the cheque for Rs.5,000 in favour of the plaintiff on 8.10.1979 as ex gratia and they would deny the allegations of the paras Nos.11 and 12 of the plaint. The further allegations that the defendants 1 to 3. acted on behalf of the defendants 4 to 7 also that the defendants all joining hands with each other, have colluded to defraud the plaintiff etc. are denied as false and would further contend that the R.C.O.P.Nos.32 and 33 of 1978 have been filed by the second defendant in his individual capacity as the landlord against the tenants and not otherwise and therefore the same cannot be associated with the alleged agreement. Likewise, the other allegations contained in para Nos.14 and 15 of the plaint that the privity subsisted inter-parties relates to the essence of the contract, would be denied as false and would ascertain that the document given in favour of the 7th defendant is valid and binding on everyone including the plaintiff. Likewise, the other allegations contained in para Nos.14 and 15 of the plaint that the privity subsisted inter-parties relates to the essence of the contract, would be denied as false and would ascertain that the document given in favour of the 7th defendant is valid and binding on everyone including the plaintiff. The other allegations contained in para Nos.15 to 19 of the plaint are also denied, thereby denying that the plaintiff was equipped with the balance of sale consideration; that the defendants are estopped from denying the commitment and the agreement is also binding on defendants 5 and 6, that the claim of damages is also on false founds, since on terms of the agreement, it is forfeited. Moreover, the plaintiff had already received the advance amount of Rs.5,000 by way of cheque and therefore, he is not entitled to any damages or costs and would pray to dismiss the suit with costs. 5. In the written statement filed by the 7th defendant it would be contended that he purchased the suit property on 30.4.1980 for a sum of Rs.15,000 and to this execution of sale deed, even though the document had been written in the name of all the defendants 1 to 6, since at the last moment, the fourth defendant did not turn up for singing the deed or for registering the same, the other defendants i.e., defendants 1 to 3, 5 and 6 duly signed and executed the sale deed on the said date and the amount due to the fourth defendant to his share amounting to Rs.2,727 had been withheld and the same had been paid to him on 9.9.1980, when the fourth defendant, on receipt of the said amount, released his share in the whole of the suit properties in favour of this defendant, thus, this defendant became absolutely entitled to the suit property; that the actual physical possession had been effected partly on 30.4.1980, partly on 26.6.1980 and a little portion left with having been subsequently delivered on payment of an amount of Rs.1,000 to Sharja Bi, whose husband was a tenant for that portion, thus, the defendant got the title and actual physical possession of the property wholly. 6. 6. This defendant would deny the allegations of the plaint regarding collusion, but admit that a notice dated 4.2.1981 has been issued to him, which had been suitably replied by him; that only on inspection of the documents in the court, this defendant was given to understand that defendants 1 to 3 have already entered into a sale agreement with the plaintiff in respect of the suit property, but defendants 4 to 6 have not joined in the said agreement in any manner and that since the agreement with the plaintiff is specifically to the effect that in case breach is committed by defendant 1 to 3, they should pay the liquidated damages of Rs.5,000 to the plaintiff, that portion of the agreement regarding damages could only be enforced and no specific performance of the agreement to sell the property could lie. This defendant would deny knowledge of the earlier agreement in between the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 and would further allege that he is a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice of the earlier agreement in favour of the plaintiff and hence he is not bound by it. 7. This defendant would further allege that subsequent to the purchase of the suit property, he spent enormous amounts for the improvement of the same to the knowledge of the plaintiff, who is living in the same street; that since the defendants 1 to 3 had no authority to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff on behalf of the defendants 4 to 6 and when the earnest money had also been promptly returned and the cheque issued to the said effect having not been returned by the plaintiff, though it is alleged on his part that he has not encashed it, the plaintiff becomes disentitled to seek for a specific performance on an agreement, which was neither legally entered into nor in force wherein the time was also considered to be the essence of the contract and hence this defendant would ultimately pray to dismiss the suit with costs. 8. 8. Based on the above facts, figures and circumstances, as put forth by parties in their pleadings, the lower court framing 16 issues, 12 original issues and 4 additional issues would order for the trial, in which on the part of the plaintiff, he would examine himself as the sole witness on his side as P.W.1 and on the part of the defendants, the 7th defendant would examine himself as the sole witness on the defence witness as D.W.1. So far as the documentary evidence is concerned, the plaintiff had marked 14 documents on his side as Exs.A-1 to A-14 and the defendants would mark six documents on their side as Exs.B-1 to B-6. The lower court, having regard to the above evidence placed on record, would ultimately arrive at the conclusion to dismiss the suit without costs. It is only testifying the validity of the said decision and challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Court of Subordinate Judge, Salem, the plaintiff has come forward to prefer the above appeal suit on certain grounds, as offered in the memorandum of grounds of appeal, such as (1) the lower court erred in holding that respondents 1 to 3 did not represent respondents 4 to 6 (the other co-sharers) in executing the agreement of sale Ex.A-1 in favour of the appellant and consequently the same was void even as against the executants. (2) Having held that it is respondents 1 to 3 (defendants 1 to 3) who broke the contract, the lower court ought to have granted specific performance at least against defendants 1 to 3. (3) The lower court ought to have held that defendants 1 to 3, who signed Ex.A-1 had authority and power to represent defendants 4 to 6 (the other co-sharers) and that Ex.A-1 was binding on all the defendants 1 to 6. (4) The lower court erred in holding that the 7th defendant is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the agreement in favour of the plaintiff (appellant). (5) The court below has failed to draw adverse inference against the 7th defendant from the fact that while the agreement for sale in favour of the plaintiff was for Rs.51,750, the sale in favour of the 7th defendant was for Rs.15,000 only. (5) The court below has failed to draw adverse inference against the 7th defendant from the fact that while the agreement for sale in favour of the plaintiff was for Rs.51,750, the sale in favour of the 7th defendant was for Rs.15,000 only. (6) If only the 7th defendant had looked into the encumbrance certificate, he would have known about the non-handing over of Ex.A-2 partition deed and would have known about the previous agreement. (7) The lower court had also failed to note that the 7th defendant did not pay the entire consideration for the sale in his favour and that before he parted with the entire consideration, he was aware of the agreement in favour of the plaintiff. (8) The lower court erred in thinking that though there is no explanation on the part of the respondents (defendants) as to why Ex.B-2 is for Rs.15,000 only, it cannot be said that the sale is without consideration. (9) The lower court erred in thinking that the plaintiff ought to have pleaded in his plaint the evidence by which he sought to prove his case ultimately viz., that he himself had told that 7th defendant about the agreement in his favour. (10) The lower court erred in holding that Sec.12 of the Specific Relief Act barred the grant of specific relief in case, where the property is not divisible among its joint owners and that consequently the plaintiff was estopped from claiming specific relief. (11) The lower court ought to have drawn an adverse inference against the 7th defendant from his own pleading that the agreement in favour of the plaintiff was not subsisting and was also invalid. (12) The lower court failed to note that the brokers who negotiated the sale with the 7th defendant were necessary witnesses and ought to have drawn an adverse inference against the 7th defendant by their non-examination. (13) The lower court having observed in Paragraph 8 of its judgment that “as on 26.6.1980 the defendants 1 to 3 were not able to get possession from the tenants” ought to have held that the 7th defendant had knowledge of the agreement in favour of the plaintiff before the execution of sale in his favour and that in any event Ex.B-2 was hit by Sec.23 of the Contract Act. 9. 9. The 7th defendant preferred a cross-objection on grounds, such as: (1) The court below ought to have held under Issue No.2 that the suit agreement was executed only by defendants 1 to 3 and that the payment of Rs.5,000 was made also only to defendants 1 to 3. (2) Having held that the 7th defendant/cross-objector herein purchased the property in good faith for consideration and without notice of any prior sale agreement, the court below ought to have held that there is no agreement between the defendants 1 to 6 and the plaintiffs. (3) The court below ought to have held that the time was extended only as between the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 and therefore erred in giving finding on Issue No.3 in favour of the plaintiff. (4) The court below failed to see that there is no breach of agreement at all by the defendants and hence erred in finding Issue No.5 in favour of the plaintiff. (5) Having held that there is no agreement in which defendants 4 to 6 were parties, the court below ought to have held that there can be no breach of any agreement by them. (6) The court below ought to have held that the plaint did not incorporate a prayer for specific performance of any contract by defendants 1 to 3. (7) The court below ought to have held that the plaintiff had not complied with the requirements of Sec.12 of the Specific Relief Act. (8) The other reasons given by the court below for its findings on issueness 2, 3, 4, 5 and 9 and Additional Issue No.4 in its judgment dated 12.2.1985 are unsound and unsustainable in law and on facts of the case. [Paras.10 to 22 omitted - Ed.] 23. In consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and further having regard to the evidence placed on record - both oral and documentary - and the arguments advanced on either side, the following points arise for consideration: 1. Whether Ex.A-1 sale agreement entered into in between the appellant and respondents 1 to 3 is legally a valid and enforceable document. 2. Whether the 7th respondent is a bona fide purchaser of the suit property for value and without notice. 3. Whether the lower court is right in dismissing the suit for the relies sought for. 4. Whether Ex.A-1 sale agreement entered into in between the appellant and respondents 1 to 3 is legally a valid and enforceable document. 2. Whether the 7th respondent is a bona fide purchaser of the suit property for value and without notice. 3. Whether the lower court is right in dismissing the suit for the relies sought for. 4. What relief, if any, is the appellant entitled to in the above appeal. 24. Point No.1:The suit has been filed by the appellant/plaintiff for specific performance of a contract entered into by him for the purchase of the suit property, which is a residence-cum-shop structure, belonging to the defendants 1 to 6, among whom defendants 1 to 5 are the brothers and the 6th defendant is their sister, which they inherited from their mother Majubi alias Khairoonkhathu Bi after her death in the year 1977. The said agreement by the plaintiff is said to be with all the defendants 1 to 6, the defendants 1 to 3 for themselves and as authorised representatives of defendants 4 to 6 also entering into the same. The 7th defendant is none other than the subsequent purchaser of the suit property. The further case of the plaintiff is that the sale consideration was fixed at Rs.51,750, the advance amount was Rs.5,000 and it was agreed that the defendants 1 to 6 should execute the sale deed in favour of the appellant/plaintiff within five months from the date of contract and since there were tenants in occupation of the suit property, it was further agreed that the defendants, prior to the execution of the sale deed, should get the tenants evicted from out of the suit property. With these besides the other usual conditions, the agreement was reduced into writing on the date of entering into the agreement itself under Ex.A-1, dated 28.9.1978, wherein the signatories are the plaintiff, defendants 1 to 3 and one witness, viz., Varadan, s/o.Sadayan. It is again stated that since the defendants were not able to evict the tenants in spite of the plaintiff being ready and willing to execute the sale deed, within the stipulated time of five months, the defendants sought a further time of six months, as a result of which, the agreement got further extended by six months, as per the endorsement made by defendants 1 to 3 on Ex.A-1, as per Ex.A-6 endorsement dated 19.2.1979. Thus, the time for execution of the sale deed was extended to 28.8.1979. But, the case of the appellant/plaintiff is that the defendants 1 to 6, without his knowledge and behind his back had executed the sale deed, pertaining to the suit property, in favour of the 7th defendant, as per Ex.B-2, dated 30.4.1980, for a meagre sale consideration of Rs.15,000 and the plaintiff was left with no option, but to effect the publication in Ex.A-10, dated 20.6.1980, cautioning the general public against creating any encumbrances on the suit property. Hence, it is the case of the plaintiff that as per the recitals of Exs.A-1 and A-6, the defendants 1 to 6 and the 7th defendant should be directed to execute the sale deed of the suit property or such portion of it and put him in possession of the suit property or such portion, after effecting division by metes and bounds and to pay the mesne profits with costs or in the alternative granting damages refunding the advance amount. The plaintiff would examine himself as P.W.1 and would mark 14 documents as Exs.A-1 to A-14, as evidence on his part. 25. On the part of the defendants, the second defendant would file the written statement, adopted by defendants 1, 3, 5 and 6, generally rebutting the allegations of the plaint, but admitting to the extent of entering into the sale agreement under Ex.A-1 by the defendants 1 to 3 and vehemently denying that they did not at all either represent or act as the authorised representatives of the defendants 4 to 6 and even on their part, in spite of they being ready and willing to execute the sale deed within the stipulated time of five months, since the plaintiff was not ready with the balance sale consideration, to get the sale registered in his favour and at his instance only the time was extended for a further term of six months under Ex.A-6 endorsement into Ex.A-1 and that since the plaintiff did not case to get the registration, even within the extended time, the defendants, by a lawyers notice in Ex.A-7, sent a cheque for Rs.5,000 in Ex.A-8 thus returning the advance amount on humanitarian grounds, though it was not incumbent on them to return on legal grounds. Their further stand point is that only after issuing Ex.A-7 notices and cancelling the agreement entered into with the appellant by respondents 1 to 3, on account of the appellant not coming forward to perform his part of contract, in spite of they being ready, they sold the suit property in favour of the 7th defendant/7th defendant, he would file a separate of the 7th defendant, he would file a separate written statement stating that he purchased the suit property under Ex.B-2, dated 30.4.1980, for a valid consideration of Rs.15,000 and though as recited in the said document, the 4th defendant did not come forward to put his signature in Ex.B-2, thus executing the sale deed in his favour, on persuasion by the other defendants, the fourth defendant came forward to execute a release deed in his favour under Ex.B-3, dated 9.9.1980 and that the said sale was acted upon by himself getting inducted into possession of the suit property and that the purchase of the suit property by him was quite legal, in the sense that he was a bona fide purchase for value and without notice. On the part of the defendants, the second defendant alone has filed the written statement, which had been adopted by defendants 1, 3, 5 and 6. But all the defendants 1 to 6 did not participate in the trial proceedings and the 7th defendant-the subsequent purchaser, examined himself as the sole defence witness, deposing to the effect of innocent purchaser for value without notice. So far as the 4th defendant is concerned, he would neither file a written statement nor partake in the trial proceedings and he was set exparte right from the beginning of the suit proceedings. The respondents 1 to 6 also remained ex parte in the appeal. 26. Even on the part of the appellant/plaintiff, it would be seen that he alone gets into the witness box and testifies to the facts and circumstances of the case. The respondents 1 to 6 also remained ex parte in the appeal. 26. Even on the part of the appellant/plaintiff, it would be seen that he alone gets into the witness box and testifies to the facts and circumstances of the case. The plaintiff would depose that the defendants 1 to 3 offered to sell the suit property in its entirety, representing to the effect that they were not only willing to part with, but they were also authorised by defendants 4 to 6, thus acting on their behalf also, ultimately resulting in the coming into being of Ex.A-1 dated 28.9.1978, thereby the defendants agreeing to sell the suit property for a valid consideration of Rs.51,750; that to fructify the same with the execution of the sale deed, five months time has been provided; that the plaintiff was ready and willing to get the sale registered in his favour. So far as Ex.A-6 endorsement regarding extension of time is concerned, the plaintiff would say that since the defendants were not able to evict the tenants, as assured, within five months, fixed under Ex.A-1, at the initiation of the defendants only the time was extended for a further term of six months. But, on the other hand, the defendants 1 to 3 would say that only because the plaintiff was not ready with the balance consideration to get the sale registered in his favour, the time was extended at his instance and in spite of having waited for the extended time of six months also, since the plaintiff did not care to consummate Ex.A-1 agreement into the sale deed, after issuing Ex.A-7 notice dated 8.10.1979, to the plaintiff besides annexing Ex.A-8 cheque for Rs.5,000 they sold the suit property in favour of the 7th defendant under Ex.B-2 dated 30.4.1980 and there was absolutely nothing illegal nor wrong in the sale in the properties in favour of the 7th respondent herein. On the part of the 7th respondent also, it would be contended that in two days, the entire sale transaction was over and nothing was revealed on record about the previous agreement nor was it in force on the date of Ex.B-2 coming into existence and in fact he came to know about it only on perusal of the suit documents. 27. 27. It is a plaintiff has only entered into the agreement with defendant 1 to 3 and not with the other three co-owners of the suit property. Though it is alleged on the part of the plaintiff that defendants 1 to 3 represented that they were acting under the authority of the other defendants also, absolutely there is no evidence or circumstances connecting to the said allegation nor is it the case that during the long pendency of the agreement, the plaintiff took the least step to verify whether the version of the defendants 1 to 3, in so far as their representative capacity is concerned, is true or not. Till the time that he landed in the court, he did not know anything about defendants 4 to 6. Moreover, defendants 5 and 6 would ultimately deny that they gave any power or authorisation to defendants 1 to 3 and defendant No.4 did not at all come to the picture but would register a case even against the 7th defendant. But, even prior to notice being served on the 7th defendant, it seems to have been compromised, as a result of which, the 4th release deed on 9.9.1980, thus filling up the lacuna that had occurred in Ex.B-2 sale deed dated 30.4.1980. All these facts would go to show that the plaintiff had acted in an inconsistent manner in the whole of the drama without clear verification of the whole affair connected to the suit property. Though the plaintiff entering into the agreement with the defendant 1 to 3 cannot be denied, Exhibit A-1 agreement cannot be said to be a complete document acceptable, since it carries wrong details as though defendants 4 to 6 also joined hands in giving the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and such of the details having been denied as false, nothing comes forth in favour of these contentions from the plaintiff. Hence, Ex.A-1 agreement becomes unenforceable one and even as demanded on the part of the plaintiff, it cannot be partly performed regarding the agreement entered into by the defendants 1 to 3. Hence, Ex.A-1 agreement becomes unenforceable one and even as demanded on the part of the plaintiff, it cannot be partly performed regarding the agreement entered into by the defendants 1 to 3. This is because the defendants 1 to 3 are not entitled to the whole of the properties burned by Ex.A-1 nor admittedly have they got any right over 5/11 share in the property mentioned in Ex.A-1 to represent the other three defendants, who are entitled to a portion of the property mentioned in Ex.A-1. 28. It is also relevant to point out the time element whether the time was considered the essence of contract by parties to Ex.A-1 agreement. Since Ex.A-1 itself has been held an unenforceable instrument, any discussion on the time factor is undesirable. However, since being a legal question, a comment on the position of law would be valuable. It is well settled that time is not the essence of the contract, so far as the contract pertaining to the immovable properties is concerned, unless it is specifically mentioned in the contract itself that so far as the particular contract is concerned, the time is considered to be the essence of the contract and a relevant factor and the other side is put on notice to the effect that the time is the essence of the contract. Since the property being indivisible, Sec.12 of the Specific Relief Act becomes operative and ultimately Ex.A-1 document becomes a void and unenforceable instrument in law. Hence point No.1 is answered accordingly. 29. Point No.2:So far as the purchase of the suit properties by the 7th defendant is concerned, absolutely no evidence comes forth either from the oral evidence of P.W.1 or from any of the documents that the 7th defendant had any previous knowledge about Ex.A-1 agreement entered into in between the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3. Two judgments reported in Sinna Ponnu v. Singaru Odayar , (1969)2 MLJ. 358 and Veeramalai Vanniar v. Thadikara Vanniar, (1968)1 MLJ. 437 have been cited by the learned senior counsel for the appellant to stress the point that the transferee should have paid the entire amount to the transferors to claim the protection under Sec.27(b) of the Specific Relief Act. Two judgments reported in Sinna Ponnu v. Singaru Odayar , (1969)2 MLJ. 358 and Veeramalai Vanniar v. Thadikara Vanniar, (1968)1 MLJ. 437 have been cited by the learned senior counsel for the appellant to stress the point that the transferee should have paid the entire amount to the transferors to claim the protection under Sec.27(b) of the Specific Relief Act. It is a proposition that has been adduced in order to ward off the doubt that the seller having entered into an agreement in order to defeat the rightful claimed of the intended purchased, should not have created a sham and nominal document of sale deed in favour of anyone in a collusive manner. But, at the same time, in this case, it is seen that the fourth defendant in spite of having been made a party to the Ex.B-2 sale deed, did not turn up to execute the same in defence of certain terms having not been fulfilled and ultimately under Ex.B-3, dated 9.9.1980 only, he gives a release deed and hence there is no doubt need be entertain regarding the genuineness of the purchase of the suit property by the 7th defendant. 30. The next doubt that is to be cleared is whether the 7th defendant had purchased the property for values since he has purchased the suit property under Ex.B-2 for an amount of Rs.15,000 in spite of the case of the plaintiff being that he agreed to purchase the same under Ex.A-1 for a sum of Rs.51,750. The argument advanced on the part of the appellant is that since the Ex.B-2 is for a lesser value the purchase of the property by the 7th defendant is not for proper value. We cannot simply say that the price offered by the 7th defendant at Rs.15,000 is not the proper value of the property, taking the same in comparison with Ex.A-1 document, under which, the plaintiff is said to have agreed to purchase the property for Rs.51,750. In the above discussion, it has already been concluded that Ex.A-1 is an unenforceable document and hence it is not a reliable piece of evidence for any purpose, much less for fixing the value of the property. Hence, the price offered under Ex.B-2 cannot be taken as a meager and nominal price for the suit property. In the above discussion, it has already been concluded that Ex.A-1 is an unenforceable document and hence it is not a reliable piece of evidence for any purpose, much less for fixing the value of the property. Hence, the price offered under Ex.B-2 cannot be taken as a meager and nominal price for the suit property. Since no other evidence comes forth, this Court is left with no option, but to accept the value being reasonable. 31. Moreover, on the part of the 7th respondent a judgment reported in Arunachala Thevar v. Govindarajan Chettiar, (1977)2 MLJ. 431 would be cited, whereunder the four elements that are to be proved to successfullyclaim the benefit of the exception, as laid under Sec.19(b) of The Specific Relief Act are given as “(1) that the transfer is for value: (2) that the consideration has been paid; (3) that the subsequent transferee has taken the transfer in good faith; (4) that both the purchase and the payment of consideration had been made without notice of prior contract.” The 7th defendant/7th respondent becomes entitled for the benefit of Sec.19(b), since all the above four elements have been established by him. 32. Regarding the burden of proof, it has been held in Durga Prasad v. Deepchand, (1954)1 MLJ. 60: 67 L.W. 945: 1954 S.C.J. 23: 1954 S.C.R. 360: A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 75 followed in Veeramalai Vanniar v. Thadikara Venkayya Veeramalai Vanniar v. Thadikara Venkayya Veeramalai Vanniar v. Thadikara Venkayya , (1968)1 MLJ. 437 :81 L.W. 90: A.I.R. 1968 Mad. 383 that it is clear that onus is upon the subsequent purchaser to prove that he is the transferee for value, who had paid his money in good faith and without notice of the earlier contract, so as to bring himself within the exception provided under clause (b) of Sec.19. But, the degree of the onus, expected from the said subsequent purchaser has been fixed by this Court in Adinarayana v. Jagannatha, (1949)1 MLJ. 557 : 62L.W. 377: A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 762 wherein it is held that the initial burden is upon the purchaser and it may be that very little evidence on the part of the purchaser is sufficient to discharge the onus in a particular case. In another case reported in Durga Prasad v. Lilavati, A.I.R. 1972 All. 557 : 62L.W. 377: A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 762 wherein it is held that the initial burden is upon the purchaser and it may be that very little evidence on the part of the purchaser is sufficient to discharge the onus in a particular case. In another case reported in Durga Prasad v. Lilavati, A.I.R. 1972 All. 396 it is held that it is true that the initial burden is always on the vendee to show that he had no knowledge of the agreement. But, the vendee has only to discharge this burden by leading a negative evidence, which could consist of his own statement denying the allegation that he had knowledge of the same and as soon as the vendee denies knowledge of the notice, the burden shifts on the vendor to prove that the vendee had the notice of the earlier agreement. 33. From the oral evidence adduced and from the circumstances gathered, abundant evidence has been let in the part of the 7th defendant/subsequent purchaser to the effect that he had no knowledge nor notice and thus he has well discharged his burden. But, on the contrary, on the part of the earlier agreement holder/the appellant herein, no least attempt has been taken to prove that the 7th defendant had any knowledge of the earlier agreement, much less to the expectations of the legal propositions. Hence, I have no hesitations to hold that the 7th respondent is a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice. This point is answered accordingly. 34. Points 3 and 4:For the above discussions, excepting for certain reasons arrived at regarding the validity of Ex.A-1, the conclusions arrived at by the lower court in dismissing the suit without costs is a valid conclusion and the reasons assigned by the Court below being sound, reasonable and acceptable, the interference sought for into the well considered and well merited judgment of the lower court is unnecessary and uncalled for. Hence, the judgment of the lower court is hereby confirmed. 35. Hence, the judgment of the lower court is hereby confirmed. 35. A cross-objection has also been preferred by the 7th respondent/7th defendant, thereby contending that the lower court should have spelt out that the suit agreement i.e. Ex.A-1 was executed only by defendants 1 to 3 and the payment of Rs.5,000 as advance was also made only to defendants 1 to 3; that the lower court ought to have held that the time was extended only as between the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3; that it should have also held that there was no breach of agreement on the part of defendants 1 to 3; that the plaintiff has not complied with the requirements of Sec.12 of the Specific Relief Act and that the reasons given for issues 2 to 5, 9 and additional issue No.4 are also unsound and unsustained in law. Since in some form or other, the questions raised in the cross objection have been answered in the above discussion and in any event, and since the conclusions that are arrived at, as above, are only feasible, subject to the clarifications, the cross-objection filed by the 7th respondent is also dismissed, since they are of the nature that no relief could be granted specifically and the relief already granted is only a combination of certain points raised in the cross objection. 36. In result, the above appeal suit as well as the cross-objection preferred by the 7th respondent/7th defendant are hereby dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 12.2.1985 made in O.S.No.141 of 1981 by the Court of Subordinate Judge, Salem, is hereby confirmed, subject to the clarifications mentioned supra. 37. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.