JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, A.C.J. 1. In this application for habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short, the 'Constitution'). Dasarathi Panda (hereinafter referred to as 'detenu' has called in question legality of the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate, Ganjam, Chatrapur on 11.2.1999 in purported exercise of power under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (in short, the 'Act'). Pursuant to the mittimus the detenu is interned in the Circle Jail, Berhampur. Ground on which the detention has been directed as indicated in the grounds of detention was that the detenu was creating havoc in different places of Berhampur town. His antisocial activities have become a matter of concern in maintenance of public order in the said town particularly in Laxminrusingha Sahi, Jagabandhu Sahi, 1st gate, Old Berhampur etc. He made his debut in the criminal world with a murder in the year 1985. Ever since he had been involved in more than twenty cases registered at various police stations of Berhampur town. Offences for which he was prosecuted include murder, attempt to murder, rioting with deadly weapons, collection of Dada Mamuls, violent gang war, and also offences committed with arms and explosive substances. With a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, detention was felt necessary. It was noted that though he was in custody there was likelihood of his being released on bail whereafter he shall continue his criminal and anti-social activities, pre-judicial to the maintenance of public order and tranquility. 2. Detention has been primarily challenged on four grounds but he learned Counsel for detenu: Firstly, it is submitted that there is no material to show that the detenu was likely to commit any criminal activities after getting bail. The conclusions in this regard are presumptuous as there was no foundation therefor. Secondly, due and proper opportunity was not granted to the detenu to make a representation. Thirdly, the incidents described at the most are law and order situations and cannot be called to be public order situations. Lastly it is submitted that in most of the cases referred to in the order of detention the detenu has been acquitted. 3. Secondly, due and proper opportunity was not granted to the detenu to make a representation. Thirdly, the incidents described at the most are law and order situations and cannot be called to be public order situations. Lastly it is submitted that in most of the cases referred to in the order of detention the detenu has been acquitted. 3. So far as the procedure to be adopted in cases where the detenu is already in custody is concerned, the position has been highlighted by one of us (Pasayat,J.) in Sarat Kumar Mohanty seeking releases of Saras Kumar Mohanty seeking release of Kunumunia alias Sisir Mohanty Vs. State of Orissa and Others. In matters where the detention orders are passed in relation to persons who are already in jail under some other laws, the detaining authorities should apply their mind and show their awareness is this regard in the grounds of detention, the changes of release of such persons on bail and stating the necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws. Subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention, and the decision must depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order, etc. Ordinarily, it is not needed when detenu is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied on cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities and the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. (See N. Meera Rani Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Another, : Dharmendra Suganchand v. Union of India : AIR 1990 SC. The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa and Others Vs. Union of India and another. (See N. Meera Rani Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Another, : Dharmendra Suganchand v. Union of India : AIR 1990 SC. The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa and Others Vs. Union of India and another. The principles wee set out as follows: Even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed: (1) if the authority passing the order is a ware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him; (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail; and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand the order of detention and grounds of detention show awareness of custody and/or possibility of re lease on bail, and/or apprehension aspect. This is manifest from the following indications in that regard in the grounds of detention. Your criminal background and the recent events where you have openly terrorised the general public have created large scale apprehension in the minds of the common public. In the past you have been prospected several times under the ordinary law of the land. This has not deterred you from indulging in acts of terrorizing the public, collecting Dada Mamul and such other activities. Besides your criminal backgrounds, the proximate event is a cause of concern. Since 8-10-1998 when you were forwarded to the Court of S.D.J.M., Berhampur, People of the locality have breathed a sigh of relief as your name evokes panic among the general public. It is necessary to prevent you from getting released on bail an acting in a manner prejudicial to public order by a suitable order of detention. You are an extremely violent person and a desperate anti-social. You have become a certain threat to public order in the Municipal limit of Berhampur town. It is also certain that once released on bail you will become active in gang war which will lead to injuries and loss of life and property and disruption of normal rhythm of life. You are an extremely violent person and a desperate anti-social. You have become a certain threat to public order in the Municipal limit of Berhampur town. It is also certain that once released on bail you will become active in gang war which will lead to injuries and loss of life and property and disruption of normal rhythm of life. Thus in view of your anti-social and criminal activities and your habitual tendency which are proximate at the point of time, your detention is essential in order to maintain the even tempo of normal life and public order. Hence, the detention order. The records reveal that the detenu after acquittal in some cases continued his criminal activities therefore, the conclusion of the detaining authority cannot be said to be based on presumptions and without any foundation. The plea in that regard taken by the detenu-petitioner fails. 4. Second plea relates to the question whether due and proper opportunity was granted to the detenu to make a representation in view of constitutional sinews in terms of Article 22(5) of the Constitution. A constitutional protection is given to every detenu which mandates the grant of liberty to the detenu to make a representation against the detention, as imperated in Article 22(5) of the Constitution. It also imperated the authority to whom the representation is addressed to deal with the same with utmost expedition. The representation is to be considered in its right perspective keeping in view the fact that the detention of the detenu is based on subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned, and infringement of the constitutional right conferred under Article 22(5) invalidates the detention order. Personal liberty protected under Article 21 is so sacrosanct and so high in the scale of constitutional values that it is obligation of the detaining authority to show that the impugned detention meticulously accords with the procedure established by law. The stringency arid concern of the judicial vigilance that is needed was aptly described in the following words in Thomas Paeham Dales' case:1981 (6) OBD 376: Then comes the question upon the habeas corpus. The stringency arid concern of the judicial vigilance that is needed was aptly described in the following words in Thomas Paeham Dales' case:1981 (6) OBD 376: Then comes the question upon the habeas corpus. It is a general rule which has always been acted upon by the Courts of England, that if any person procures the imprisonment of another he must take care to do so by steps, all of which are entirely regular, and that if he fails to follow every step in the process with extreme regularity the Court will not allow the imprisonment to continue. Whenever there is executive invasion on personal liberty, the Court has to weigh in golden scales whether the personal liberty is to be placed at a high pedestal regardless of the social cost involved in the release of a possible renegade. Observations to similar effect were make by the Supreme Court in Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . In the aforesaid background, it has to be seen whether any opportunity was granted to the detenu in order to enable him to made a representation. 5. From the counter affidavit filed by the opposite parties, it appears that the order of detention along with the grounds with its Oriya version were offered to the detenu-petitioner in the Circle Jail, Berhampur, but the detenu refused to receive copies of the same. Since he refused to accept the copies, same was read over and explained to him by one Shri B. Panda, who was Sub-Inspector of Bsida Bazar P.S. in presence of Shri Rama Chandra Nayak, Jailor, Berhampur Circle Jail. Annexure-N2 to the counter affidavit of the Collector -cum-District Magistrate reveals this. It further appear that by order dated 19.2.1999 the appropriate Government approved the order of detention passed by the Collector-cum-District Magistrate. As per communication dated 22.2.1999 made by the Superintendent. Circle Jail, Berhampur, the detenu also refused to accept the approval order of the Government. Subsequently by communication dated 20.2.1999 the fact of detention was forwarded by the Government to the Advisory Board u/s 10 of the Act. The fact of forwarding the case of the detenu-petitioner to the Advisory Board was also communicated to the detenu by the District Magistrate as per order dated 26.2.1999, who refused to accept the said order. Case of the detenu was heard by the Advisory Board on 21.3.1999. The fact of forwarding the case of the detenu-petitioner to the Advisory Board was also communicated to the detenu by the District Magistrate as per order dated 26.2.1999, who refused to accept the said order. Case of the detenu was heard by the Advisory Board on 21.3.1999. Though the detenu was communicated to attend the Advisory Board for hearing, he refused to accept the said communication and on repeated request and persuasion, ultimately agreed to appear before the Advisory Board on 21.3.1999. It has been specifically stated in the counter affidavit that no representation was filed by the detenu-petitioner either before the State Government or the Central Government. That being the position there is no substance in the plea that the Petitioner was denied opportunity of making a representation to the Governments. 6. The third plea raised by the Petitioner is that the incidents indicated in the grounds of detention related to law and order situations and not public order situations. There is distinction between the law and order and the public order. While the expression 'law and order' is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order, 'public 'order' has a narrower ambit, and public order would be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it could raise the problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror have unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that help to distinguish it as an act affecting 'public order' from that concerning 'law and order'. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror have unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that help to distinguish it as an act affecting 'public order' from that concerning 'law and order'. The question to ask is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed? This question has to be faced in every case of its facts. Considered in the above background, there can be no manner of doubt that the incidents related to public order situations. The facts described are diabolic. 7. Lastly reference is made to the acquittal in some of the cases indicated in the grounds of detention. It is therefore pleaded that Petitioner has been falsely implicated. The requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, the formation of which is a condition precedent to passing of a detention order will get vitiated if material or vital fact which would have bearing on the issue and weighed the satisfaction of the detaining authority one way or the other and influenced his mind are either withheld suppressed by the sponsoring authority, ignored and not considered by the detaining authority before issuing the order of detention. Where at the time when the detaining authority passed the detention order the vital fact, namely, the acquittals of the detenu in some of the cases described in the grounds of detention, had not been brought to his notice and on the other hand they were withheld and the detaining authority was given to understand that the matter was pending trial, the non-placing of the material fact- namely, the acquittals of the detenu in some of the cases described in the grounds of detention had not been brought to his notice and on the other hand, they were withheld and the detaining authority was given to understand that the matter was pending trial, the non-placing of the material fact, namely, the acquittal of detenu resulting in non-application of mind of the detaining authority to the said fact vitiated the requisite subject satisfaction rendering the detention order invalid. (See Dharamdas Shamlal Agarwal Vs. Police Commissioner and Another, ). (See Dharamdas Shamlal Agarwal Vs. Police Commissioner and Another, ). However, even if a criminal prosecution fails, and an order of detention is then made, it would not invalidate the order of detention because the purpose of preventive detention being different from conviction and punishment and subjective satisfaction being necessary in the latter, the order of detention would not be bad merely because the criminal prosecution has failed. (See Shiv Ratan Makim v. Union of India; AIR 1986 BC 610, Mohd. Subrati v. State of West Bengal; AIR 1973 BC 207). The question of acquittal is not material, but what is material is the question of non-placing of material and vital fact of acquittal which if had been placed, would have influenced the minds of the detaining authority one way or the other. The question is whether the circumstances could possibly have an impact on the decision; and whether or not to make an order of detention. In the case at hand, we find that the detaining authority has referred to certain acquittals. It has been indicated that as detenu terrorised the witnesses, out of fear they did not depose. In the circumstance, the mere act that did not depose. In the circumstances, the mere fact that the detenu has been acquitted in some cases is inconsequential. It is not a case where effect of acquittal has not been noted and/or effect there of has not been considered. This plea of the detenu also fails: 8. In the background what has been highlighted above, we find no infirmity in the order of detention passed. That being the position, this application for habeas corpus deserves dismissal which we direct. No costs. C.R. Pal, J. 9. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed