Order.- Both these Revision Petitions arise out of the same proceedings taken by Meherunnisa, petitioner in the earlier petitions against her husband Mir Jamilur Rahman, petitioner in the latter petition. The husband’s Petition No. 20 of 1968 has, consequent upon certain interlocutory orders made by this Court and in existing circumstances, become Unnecessary or infructuous. It is therefore dismissed. This dismissal does not affect the consideration of the questions raised in the wife’s Petition No. 402 of 1965. The principal question raised in the wife’s petition, viz., that of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, arises in the following circumstances; She first filed an application under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the City Magistrate, Bangalore, on 14th May, 1964. It was disposed of on 19th January, 1965 by an order directing the husband to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs. 75 per month to the wife and Rs. 25 per month to the daughter by her with effect from 14th May, 1964. the date of application. No payment, however, was made by the husband in accordance with the order. Therefore the wife filed an application on 15th February, 1965 under sub-section (3) of section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for enforcement of the order by the issue of a warrant for recovery of Rs. 950 on account of maintenance due as well as costs ordered. The husband pleaded in his statement of objections that he had divorced his wife by pronouncing ‘talak’ on 23rd February, 1965. On behalf of the wife it was contended that the alleged ‘talak’ was not true and also that the Magistrate, while enforcing the order for payment of maintenance made by him, has no jurisdiction to go into the question of divorce. By his order, dated 21st December, 1965, the Magistrate held that he had the jurisdiction to go into the question of divorce and while ordering the issue of a warrant for recovery of maintenance in terms of the order upto the date of the alleged divorce together with costs as well as maintenance for the daughter till 19th August, 1965, adjourned consideration of the question of divorce to a subsequent date, viz., 5th January, 1966. In Revision Petition No. 402 of 1965, the wife questions the correctness of the Magistrate’s decision that he has jurisdiction to go into the question of divorce; and that is the only point for consideration in this Petition. The argument on behalf of the petitioner-wife on this question of law is briefly as follows: Once an order for payment of maintenance is passed under sub-section (1) of section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it should in normal circumstances be enforceable either under sub-section (3) thereof or under section 490. The only circumstances in which such an order can either be camelled or varied are those set out in sub-section (5) of section 488 or in section 489. Sub-section (5) of section 488 reads: “On proof that any wife in whose favour an order has been made under this section is living in adultery, or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or that they are living separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order.” Section 489 reads as follows: “(1) On proof of a change in the circumstance of any person receiving under section 488 a monthly allowance, or ordered under the same section to pay a monthly allowance to his wife or child, the Magistrate may make such alteration in the allowance as he thinks fit: Provided that if he increases the allowance the monthly rate of five hundred rupees in the whole be not exceeded. (2) Where it appears to the Magistrate that, in consequence of any decision of a competent civil Court, any order made under section 488 should be cancelled or varied, he shall cancel the order or, as the case may be, vary the same accordingly.” It is argued that these provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be regarded as stating exhaustively the powers or jurisdiction of a Magistrate to cancel or vary an order for payment of maintenance made under section 488. The cancellation under sub-section (2) of section 489 is obviously in consequence of an order made by a competent Civil Court. The only circumstances in which a Magistrate himself can cancel the order are, according to the argument, these set out in sub-section (5) of section 488. The cancellation under sub-section (2) of section 489 is obviously in consequence of an order made by a competent Civil Court. The only circumstances in which a Magistrate himself can cancel the order are, according to the argument, these set out in sub-section (5) of section 488. It is further pointed out that both sub-section (5) of section 488 as well as sub-section (1) of section 489 proceed on the basis that the relationship of husband and wife continues to exist between the parties. It is therefore contended that the Magistrate has no power to cancel an order except on proof of one or more of the three circumstances, mentioned in sub-section (5) of section 488 and that therefore a cancellation, on the basis that there has been a divorce subsequent to the date of the order, can be made by the Magistrate only pursuant to as order of a competent Civil Court, acting under sub-section (2) of section 489. The answer to this contention made on behalf of the husband is two-fold. It is stated, firstly, that a change in circumstances mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 489 is a comprehensive expression wide enough to include a change brought about by a divorce subsequent to the date of the order. Alternatively it is argued that the foundation for an order for payment of maintenance under sub-section (1) of section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the existence of a certain relationship either as husband and wife or as father and child, and that because the existence of such a relationship is fundamental to the situation, its continued existence is necessary even for an enforcement of the order and that therefore the moment the relationship ceases to exist, the liability to pay maintenance also must be held to cease. These arguments are sought to be met on behalf of the wife by stating thatthe expression ‘change in circumstances’ however wide, cannot be regarded as comprehending even a change in status brought about by divorce, that though the foundation for an order for payment of maintenance under sub-section (1) of section 488 is the existence of a certain relationship, once the order is passed it becomes final, that it cannot therefore be cancelled by the Magistrate except on the grounds specifically mentioned in sub-section (5) of section 488, and that to hold otherwise would be to permit a Criminal Court to exercise jurisdiction exclusively belonging to a Civil Court. I am told that there is nodirect decision of this Court bearing on this point. But the question has been considered by almost all the High Courts in India, and their opinion on the question, as I snail presently point out, appears to be almost Unanimous. I may first start with the proposition that there can be no doubt whatever that the existence of relationship as husband and wife or father and child is absolutely essential for the making of an order for payment of maintenance under sub-section (1) of section 488. There is also nothing in section 488 to show that the existence of that relationship is a matter which can be adjudicated upon only by a Civil Court before the Magistrate can make an order for payment of maintenance. The result is that it is part of the jurisdiction and the duty of the Magistrate first to decide whether the relationship exists or does not exist before making an order for payment of maintenance. There is also a direct decision of this Court on this matter reported in Venkavva v. C. Mahalingappa1, where it is pointed out that the foundation of a claim under section 488 being the continuance of the connubiality, the refusal to enquire into the question would amount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction. In that case, a plea had been raised that the marriage between the parties had been dissolved by a divorce according to the custom of the parties, and the Magistrate before whom it had been raised had held that he had no jurisdiction to go into the question and that the husband-respondent before him should first obtain a decree to that effect from a Civil Court. He had accordingly ordered payment of maintenance. On a reference by the Sessions Judge, this Court held that it was the duty of the Magistrate to have investigated the plea and that he was wrong in insisting upon the production of a decree of a Civil Court. As, however, necessary evidence had been recorded by the Magistrate, this Court on an examination of that evidence came to the conclusion that it was wholly insufficient to establish the custom pleaded and therefore confirmed the ultimate order of the Magistrate for payment of maintenance. The question therefore is whether the jurisdiction which a Magistrate undoubtedly has of deciding whether or not the relevant relationship exists before making an order for payment of maintenance is lost the moment he makes an order. Reliance has been placed onbehalf of the wife before me onthe observations in a judgment of this Court in the case in Syed Ahmad v. N.P. Taj Begum2, to the effect that the personal law of the parties makes no difference to the enforcement of the statutory law as enacted in section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the provisions of the said section should be enforced notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the personal law of the parties. But that does not mean, in my opinion, that the rules of the personal law of the parties which have a bearing on the question whether or not the relationship of husband and wife exists cannot be looked into or examined by the Magistrate before deciding whether the said relationship exists between the parties. Section 488 says that payment of maintenance should be ordered if the applicant proves that she is the wife of the respondent; that section does not say when and under what circumstances the said relationship may be said to exist. There is thus no conflict, nor even a possibility of any conflict, between section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the rules of the personal law which decide whether the said relationship exists or not between the parties before the Magistrate. There is thus no conflict, nor even a possibility of any conflict, between section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the rules of the personal law which decide whether the said relationship exists or not between the parties before the Magistrate. If, as I have stated, it is not only within the jurisdiction but even the duty of the Magistrate to first deride whether the said relationship exists, his investigation necessarily comprehends an examination of the rules of the personal law which determine the existence or otherwise of that relationship and the facts which attract the application of those rules. Another judgment of this Court reported in State of Mysore v. Sivashankar Murigeppa1, has also been cited on behalf of the wife to say that the three circumstances mentioned in sub-section (5) of section 488 which are identical with those mentioned in sub-section (4) as defences available to a claim for payment of maintenance must be held to fall within the expression ‘sufficient cause’ mentioned in sub-section (3). The decision actually was that the said three circumstances may be pleaded in answer to a claim for enforcement of an order without the necessity of the husband making a separate application for cancellation of the order. It is not stated that the Magistrate has no. jurisdiction, except under these three circumstances, to cancel an order already made by him. The case reported in Burghatia v. Ayodhya Prasad2, was of a suit filed by a husband against whom an order under section 488(1) had been made for a declaration that on account of alleged adultery on the part of his wife he was no longer liable to comply with the order. The Court upheld the contention that the suit was maintainable. Except stating that a Magistrate acting under section 488 is primarily interested in providing for a possible vagrant (that is to say against the possible vagrancy of a discarded or neglected wife) so as to stop the chances of immorality leading to crime and that he is not directly concerned with the civil rights of parties, the judgment does not deal with the question of jurisdiction which directly arises in the present case. On the other side, several cases have been cited on behalf of the husband. On the other side, several cases have been cited on behalf of the husband. Of these it is sufficient, in my opinion, to refer to two cases which contain an exhaustive discussion of the principles bearing on this question, viz., Inre Mohamed Rahimullah3, Janni Bibi v. Mohd. Abdul4. In the former case, Yahya Ali, J. of the Madras High Court, after an examination of several decisions of the High Courts, took the view that a change in circumstances referred to in section 489 may well include a change in the status brought about by divorce also and that the reduction in the amount of maintenance may well be made right down to zero, and stated further that quite apart from any interpretation of the said expression, the correct position in law is that it is essential to the continued operation as to the original making of an order of maintenance that the recepient of the allowance should be a wife at the time for which maintenance is claimed. He points out that such is the unanimous opinion of all High Courts with the exception of one dissenting opinion. He therefore held that if a plea of divorce is raised before a Magistrate when an order by him for payment of maintenance is sought to be enforced, the Magistrate must determine, on such evidence as may be placed before him, whether there is or is not a legally valid divorce. In the case decided by the Andhra High Court, Subba Rao, C.J., agreed with the principles stated in the Madras decision cited above and held that the existence and continuation of conjugal relationship is the foundation of an order directing payment of maintenance under section 488 and for enforcing it under section 490 and that therefore the Magistrate is bound to decide the question of the woman’s status as a wife, or the question of divorce, if raised, both at the time of making the order and also at the time when the wife seeks to enforce it. He further observed that there is no justification for not recognising the power as existing in the Magistrate to cancel an order for payment of maintenance in such circumstances. He further observed that there is no justification for not recognising the power as existing in the Magistrate to cancel an order for payment of maintenance in such circumstances. He also observed that a divorce is certainly a change in the circumstances because the wife loses her status as wife and such a change empowers the Magistrate to alter an order for payment of maintenance by actually cancelling it. As several decisions of the Indian High Courts dealing with the question are fully discussed in these two rulings of the Madras and Andhra High Courts, it is not necessary, for me to enter into a detailed discussion of the several decisions. Further, the principles, on which these decisions proceed, have been accepted by this Court. I have already referred to the case in Venkappa v. C. Mahalingappa1 in which it has been held that the existence of the relationship of husband and wife is the foundation for an order by the Magistrate under section 488 directing the husband to pay maintenance to his wife. There is another ruling of this Court, though not directly bearing on section 488, in Keshawwa v. Phadeppa Sangappa2, where it is pointed out that a decree obtained by a Hindu wife for payment of separate maintenance by her husband ceases to be executable or enforceable when she resumes cohabitation with her husband. The principle stated therein is that the continued existence of circumstances justifying a claim for separate maintenance by a Hindu wife must exist not only when a decree therefor is passed in her favour but also when she seeks toexecute the same. I am therefore of the opinion that although two views may be possible on the question whether the expression ‘change in the circumstances’ mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 489 may be regarded as comprehending a change in status brought about by divorce also, the existence of relationship of husband and wife is the very foundation for not only making an order under section 488(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing the husband to pay maintenance to his wife but also for the enforcement of the said order after the same has been made. Hence the Magistrate has the jurisdiction to go into and decide a plea of divorce not only for the purpose of deciding whether or not to make an order for payment of maintenance under sub-section (1) of section 488 but also for the purpose of its enforcement either under sub-section (3) of section 488 or under section 490 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Revision Petition No. 402 of 1965 therefore fails and is dismissed. S.V.S. ----- Petition dismissed.