Anantanarayana Ayyar, J.- These habeas corpus petitions have been filed by or on behalf of various persons who have been ordered to be detained by orders of the Government under rule 30(1)(b)of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. The petitioners in Crl.M.P. Nos. 203, 201, and 365 of 1965 are Advocates. W.P. No. 196 of 1965 has been filed by the wife of the petitioner in Crl.M.P. No. 203 of 1965, namely, Shri M. Srinivasa Rao. For convenience, we shall hereafter refer to the persons under Rule 30(1) of the Defence of India Rules in each case as ‘petitioner’ whether the petition has been filed by him or by some one else regarding his detention. The petitioner in Crl.M.P. No. 329 of 1965 is a sitting member of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly i.e., M.L.A. The petitioner in Crl.M.P. No. 313 of 1965 is a sitting Member of the Parliament. It is said that the petitioner in Crl.M.P. No. 330 of 1965 is an active worker of a section of the Communist Party which is referred to as Leftist and as pro-Peking in the affidavit filed on behalf of the first respondent. For convenience, we shall refer to the party as Leftist Communist party. The first respondent in each of these cases is the Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by the Chief Secretary. In each of the petitions, the first respondent represented by the learned Advocate-General, filed a counter-affidavit which was signed by Shri P.D. Lakshminarayana, Assistant Secretary to Government in the General Administration (Political) Department. In each counter-affidavit, he stated that he was acquainted with the facts of the case. In each of Crl.M.P. Nos. 328, 329, and 330 of 1965, the petitioner made an allegation that the arrest was based on mala fide grounds. But the allegation was a general one without giving any details. In the counter-affidavit, in each of these petitions, the first respondent denied mala fides and gave some broad facts on which it had acted and based the order of detention. The petitioners filed reply-affidavits (rejoinder) in which they gave details of facts to support the plea of mala fide. The first respondent filed a supplemental counter-affidavit which was signed by the Chief Secretary. The petitioners filed reply-affidavits (rejoinder) in which they gave details of facts to support the plea of mala fide. The first respondent filed a supplemental counter-affidavit which was signed by the Chief Secretary. In this affidavit, the Chief Secretary stated as follows: “I am well acquainted with the facts relating to the detention of the petitioners in W.P. No. 196 of 1965 and Crl.M.P. Nos. 179, 201, 203, 313, 328 and 329, 330, 365 of 1965 and I beg to state that all the statements made in the counter-affidavits are true and correct. The counter-affidavit of mine in Crl.M.P. No. 866 of 1965 may kindly be treated as an additional counter-affidavit in the ten earlier petitions.......” This supplemental affidavit was filed on 29th June, 1965 in the course of the arguments of the learned Advocate-General who had taken an adjournment for the purpose of filing it (supplemental affidavit). By then, the arguments of the petitioners had been closed and the arguments of the learned Advocate-General had not been closed. No objection was raised by any of the petitioners to the filing of this Supplemental affidavit. In Crl.M.P. No. 365 of 1965, the petitioner not only pleaded in his petition mala fides but also gave details. In the original counter-affidavit, the first respondent dealt with those facts. He explained that, in that affidavit, he gave as much details as it was possible to give, considering the nature of the case and the circumstances prevailing. Each of the petitioners were represented by Advocate and was also present in person. By common consent of all concerned, the petitions were heard together. Most of the arguments were common to all the petitions. They were urged mainly in W.P. No. 196 of 1965 and adopted practically in full in all the other Crl.M.Ps. We shall deal with those general arguments first and then proceed to deal with the additional arguments which are urged regarding some individual petitions. In each of these petitions, there is a Government Order signed by the Chief Secretary ordering detention which we shall refer to for convenience hereafter as ‘Detention Order’ and another Government Order which mentions the Jail in which he shall be detained, the class in which he is placed and the conditions of detention. In each of these petitions, there is a Government Order signed by the Chief Secretary ordering detention which we shall refer to for convenience hereafter as ‘Detention Order’ and another Government Order which mentions the Jail in which he shall be detained, the class in which he is placed and the conditions of detention. We shall refer to it for convenience hereafter as ‘Implementation Order.‘The Detention Order in each case is in a form which is type-written and cyclo-styled. In that form, there are blanks left for filling in Government Order No., name of the person to be detained and his father’s name. In those blanks, the relevant details have been filled in type for each petitioner. The Implementation Order is also similarly a type-written and cyclo-styled Form in which blanks are left for filling in the number of Government Order the name of the detained person with his father’s name and the name of the jail in which he is to be detained. These blanks are also filled up in type-writing. The colour of the type-writing which fills up the blanks, is different from the colour of the cyclo-styled ink i.e., one in which the form is typed. For convenience, we, extract below the Detention Order and the Implementation Order in W.P. No. 196 of 1965 which are typical of all other similar orders: "DETENTION ORDER. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, ABSTRACT Defence of India Rules, 1962-Order under Rule 30(1) of the Detention of Shri M. Srinivasa Rao S/o. Raghuvir Rao. Orders Issued. GENERAL ADMINISTRATION (SC-D) DEPARTMENT. G.O. Ms. No. 1723. Dated: 28th December, 1964. ORDER: Whereas the Government of Andhra Pradesh are satisfied with respect to the person known as Shri M. Srinivasa Rao son of Raghuvir Rao, that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India and civil defence and the efficient conduct of military operations, it is necessary to make the following order: Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (1) of rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh hereby directs that the said M. Srinivasa Rao be detained. (BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF ANDHRA PRADESH.) (Sd. K.N. Anantaraman) (Chief Secretary to Government) IMPLEMENTATION ORDER GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH ABSTRACT. (BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF ANDHRA PRADESH.) (Sd. K.N. Anantaraman) (Chief Secretary to Government) IMPLEMENTATION ORDER GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH ABSTRACT. DEFENCE OF INDIA RULES, 1962 Order under rule 30(1) of the Detention of Shri M. Srinivasa Rao S/o. Raghuvir Rao, Conditions of detention under Rule 30 (4)—Orders issued. GENERAL ADMINISTRATION (SC-D) DEPARTMENT. G.O. Ms. No. 1724. Dated: 28th December, 1964. ORDER: “The Government of Andhra Pradesh hereby order that Shri M. Srinivasa Rao S/o. Raghubir Rao, who in Government order No. 1723, General Administration (SC-D. Department dated 28th December, 1964 has been directed to be detained by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh under sub-rule (1) of rule 30 of the Defence of India rules, 1962 be detained in Central Jail, Rajahmundry under the following conditions: He shall be placed in the ‘special class’. He shall also be subject, as far as may be, to the conditions laid down in the Andhra Security prisoner’s rules, 1954, notified in G.O.Ms. No. 1537, Home (General-B) Department, dated 26-8-1954 except rules 21, 24, and 28 thereof.” (BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF ANDHRA PRADESH) (Sd. K.N. Anantaraman) Chief Secretary to Government. Crl.M.P. No. 313 of 1965 mentions that it is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. All the other petitions mention section 491, Criminal Procedure Code. In the Detention Order concerned in W.P. No. 196 of 1965 and Crl.M.P. No. 203 of 1965 viz., G.O.Ms. No. 1724 dated 28th December, 1964, reference is made to the Andhra Security Prisoner’s Rules, 1965 notified in G.O.Ms. No. 1537, Home (General-B) Department dated 16th August, 1964. This Government Order is mentioned in the Implementation Order in some other Crl.M.Ps. also. That Government Order was passed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh and was in force in Andhra area. Another Order called ‘the Hyderabad Conditions of Detention Order, 1960’ issued by the former Government of Hyderabad by Notification No. DET/PD/70/50 dated 9th October, 1950 was in force. Subsequently, Government passed G.O. Ms. No. 1190 dated 28th October, 1964 in supersession of the Hyderabad Order and G.O.Ms. No. 1537 dated 26th August, 1964, thus introducing a set of integrated rules to be in force in the whole of Andhra Pradesh State which had come into existence on 1st November, 1956. This G.O. Ms. No. 1190 of 1964 is mentioned in other petitions. No. 1190 dated 28th October, 1964 in supersession of the Hyderabad Order and G.O.Ms. No. 1537 dated 26th August, 1964, thus introducing a set of integrated rules to be in force in the whole of Andhra Pradesh State which had come into existence on 1st November, 1956. This G.O. Ms. No. 1190 of 1964 is mentioned in other petitions. An argument has been advanced in W.P. No. 196 of 1965 and Crl.M.P. No. 203 of 1965 etc., on the basis of a superseded Government Order being quoted. But, it is beyond doubt or dispute, that the clauses of G.O.Ms. No. 1537, which are mentioned in some Implementation Orders, are substantially identical with clauses 26, 29 of G.O.Ms. No. 1190 dated 28th October, 1964 in the other Implementation Orders. One important and conspicuous factor which has to be taken into account in the present case is that there is a Proclamation of Emergency by the President under Article 352 of the Constitution and there is Presidential Order dated 3rd November, 1962 under Article 359(1). In M. Akhan Singh v. State of Punjab1, two questions arose for decision namely, (1) what is the true scope and effect of the Presidential Order which has been issued under Article 359(1)? (2) Does the bar created by the Presidential Order issued under Article 359(1) operate in respect of applications made by detenues under section 491(1)(b)of the Code? Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows (at page 397): “.... (2) Does the bar created by the Presidential Order issued under Article 359(1) operate in respect of applications made by detenues under section 491(1)(b)of the Code? Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows (at page 397): “.... In other words, it is clear that the content of the detenus right to challenge the legality of his detention which was available to him under section 491(1)(b) prior to the Constitution, has been enlarged by the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens by the Constitution, and so, whenever a detenu relies upon his fundamental rights even in support of his petition made under section 491(1)(b)he is really enforcing the said rights and in that sense, the proceedings inevitably partake on the character of proceedings taken by the detenu for enforcing these rights..............The prohibition contained in the said article and the Presidential Order will apply as much to proceedings under section 491(1)(b) as to those under Article 226(1) and Article 32(1).” Their Lordships also observed as follows (at page 399): “........If in challenging the validity of his detention order, the detenu is pleading any right outside the rights specified in the order, his right to move any Court in that behalf is not suspended, because it is outside Article 359(1) and consequently outside the Presidential Order itself ....” (at page 400). “............It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the exercise of a power mala fide is wholly outside the scope of the Act conferring the power and can always be successfully challenged. It is true that a mere allegation that the detention is mala fide would not be enough; the detenu will have to prove the mala fide................................That is another kind of plea which is outside the purview of Article 359(1).” The petitioners have raised both the pleas referred to above. The main contention raised on behalf of all the petitioners is that the order of detention is not valid as it does not contain any details of acts of the nature referred to in it and as no details are furnished by the first respondent even in the counter-affidavits, it has also been urged that the failure to mention these details amounts to malice in law. Shri P.A. Choudary, learned Advocate for some of the petitioners, urges that this mala fide or malice in law is distinct from malice in fact which has got to be specifically urged with relevant details. He says that the mere failure of the Detaining Authority to furnish details of grounds on which it based its Order of detention is sufficient by itself to constitute malice in law. In the counter-affidavit by the first respondent in W.P. No. 196 of 1965, it is mentioned as follows: “The detenu has been a strong follower of the Leftist Wing of the C.P.I. He has been a member of the Communist Party from his student career. He has been taking active part in the activities of the Left Wing of the C.P.I. The Government have received ample information and the Government have reason to be believe this information to be absolutely true, that the detenu has been acting prejudicial to the Defence of India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order and the maintenance of peaceful conditions in this country. So, the Government, being satisfied on the basis of the material in their possession, that this particular detenu has to be prevented from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of the country, the maintenance of public order, etc., passed the impugned order.. ..He was an active worker taking part in the Leftist party activities of the C.P.I. which is ante-National and pro-Peking faction.......” The counter-affidavit mentions various activities of the ‘Pro-Peking factions’ and then mentions as follows: “It was reliably reported that these Leftists have been preparing for subversion and violence and have been preparing for implementing their party programme adopted at the Calcutta Congress. From all the above facts, it is clearly seen that the detenu who is an active member of the Leftist C.P.I. has acted in a m inner prejudicial to the Defence of India.......” Substantially similar statement is made in the counter-affidavit in the other petitions. Thus, the details of activities as distinct from broad description of the activities of the petitioner and the activities of the political group of which he is alleged to be an active member are not disclosed though it is asserted that such details are in the possession of Government. Thus, the details of activities as distinct from broad description of the activities of the petitioner and the activities of the political group of which he is alleged to be an active member are not disclosed though it is asserted that such details are in the possession of Government. The omission to give those details of the petitioner’s activities, according to Shri P.A. Choudary and other learned Advocates, amounts to mala fide in law. The learned Advocates rely on the following observations in the decision of the Madras High Court in M.R.S. Mani v. The District Magistrate1, at page 171: “.........The Communist Party was not declared illegal, in which case, it will be open to the Government to take action under section 17, Criminal Law Amendment Act, if the person continued thereafter to associate himself with that party. Even if a party is declared illegal, the mere association with that party would not justify the inference that the person was acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety....................We are not concerned with the objects of a particular political party, nor are we prepared to accept the argument advanced on behalf of the applicants that the proceedings under the Act are actuated by political animosity and that, therefore, they are mala fide. We are concerned only with the question whether the grounds communicated are definite and are such as would enable the applicant to present his case properly to the Provincial Government.” The learned Judges proceeded to deal with a sample of the grounds communicated toan applicant. The learned Advocate-General contends that the action against the petitioner in each case is not based merely on his being a member of the parly but is based on his activity which has come to the notice of the Government and which has been referred to generally in the Order. He contends that further specific particulars of the acts committed by the petitioner are not given in the counter-affidavit as their disclosure would be prejudicial to the interests of the State. He also contends that the State is not bound todisclose such details of facts in view of the fact that the Order has been passed under Rule 30 of the Defence India Rules when there is a state of emergency proclaimed by the President. He also contends that the State is not bound todisclose such details of facts in view of the fact that the Order has been passed under Rule 30 of the Defence India Rules when there is a state of emergency proclaimed by the President. In the counter-affidavit in W.P. No 196 of 1965, which is representative of all the counters, it is mentioned as follows: “..........After the proclamation of emergency by the President under Article 352 of the Constitution and after the President issued the order on 3rd November, 1962 under Article 359 (1) suspending the rights of the citizens to move any Court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution, no person against whom action is taken under the Defence of India Act, and the rules made thereunder can approach any Court for the redressal of the grievances arising out of action taken under the provisions of the above Act and Rules. As such, this writ petition for writ of habeas corpus and the petition under section 491(1)(b)of the Criminal Procedure Code, are misconceived and this Hon’ble Court has no jurisdiction to entertain them. The petitioner is questioning the legality of the detention order made by the Government in exercise of the power conferred on them under rule 30(1)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. Even though the petitioner has not specifically asked for the enforcement of his fundamental right under Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution in effect the relief asked in this writ petition is for the enforcement of such rights. It is exactly this that is prohibited by Article 358 and by the President’s Order under Article 359(1) of the Constitution.......” It is indisputable and undisputed that the President has made proclamation and issued order as stated above. We do not extract them in the judgment as there is no need to do so. Section 45 of the Defence of India Act runs as follows: “Section 45(1). No order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any Court.” The learned Advocate for the petitioners contend that the Detention Orders are not really passed under the Defence of India Act because they have not conformed to the requirements of that Act for example, provisions of section 44 of the Act. We shall first decide the general and fundamental question whether the detention order is bound in law to disclose the details of facts and information on the basis of which the authority passed the detention order and whether, therefore, the non-disclosure amounts to mala fides in law and vitiates the detention orders. In Rameshwar v. Dist. Magistrate2, it was observed regarding retention under section 3(1)(a)of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, which is substantially similar to rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules in material features, as follows: (at page 336). “..........It will be noticed that before an order of detention can be validly made by the detaining authorities specified by section 3(2), the authority must be satisfied that the detention of the person is necessary in order to prevent him from acting in any prejudicial manner as indicated in Clauses (i) to (iii) of section 3(1)(a)....... (at page 337): It is true that the satisfaction of the detaining authority to which section 3(1)(a)refers is his subjective satisfaction, and so is not justifiable. Therefore, it would not be open to the detenu to ask the Court to consider the question as to whether the said satisfaction of the detaining authority can be justified by the application of objective tests. It would not be open, for instance, to the detenu to contend that the grounds supplied to him do not necessarily or reasonably lead to the conclusion that if he is not detained, he would indulge in prejudicial activities. The reasonableness of the satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be questioned in a Court of law: the adequacy of the material on which the said satisfaction purports to rest also cannot be examined in a Court of law. That is the effect of the true legal position in regard to the satisfaction contemplated by section 3(1)(a).......” Therefore, the contention which has been put forward before us by Shri Raghuvir alone in Crl.M.P. No. 329 of 1965 that the first respondent must disclose the entire material on which it acted and that the Court must apply objective tests to grounds on which the detaining authority purported to act is not tenable. Shri P.A. Choudary and other Advocates (other than Shri Raghuvir) conceded that the Court cannot go into the sufficiency of the reasons and grounds on which the detaining authority acted but contended that that material had a rational connection with the provisions of the Defence of India Rules. They contend that the first respondent was bound to disclose some material, though not all the material with full details, on which it acted and felt satisfied and that failure to disclose it constituted mala fide in law. The distinction between malice in fact and malice in law is explained in Shearer v. Shields1, thus: “Between ‘malice in fact’ and ‘malice in law’ there is a broad distinction which is not peculiar to any particular system of jurisprudence. The person who inflicts an injury upon another person in contravention of the law is not allowed to say that he did so with an innocent mind. He is taken to know the law, and he must act within the law. He may, therefore, be guilty of ‘malice in law.‘although so far as the state of his mind is concerned he acted ignorantly, and in that sense innocently. ‘Malice in fact’ is quite a different thing; it means an actual malicious intention on the part of the person who has done the wrongful act.” To see whether there was any malice in law, we have to find out whether the impugned orders were passed in contravention of law. In some Crl.M.Ps. like Crl.M.P. No. 365 of 1965 malice in fact is also urged. Various grounds are urged in the petitions to show that the order had gone beyond the needs of the situation and that it was, therefore, contrary to section 44 of the Defence of India Act. We shall deal with this question in a later portion of this judgment. The learned Advocate-General had relied on a series of decisions to show that, in detention orders of the nature of those concerned in this case, the detaining authority need not disclose any reasons or give details of material basis. The law on the matter has been settled by various decisions of the highest authority. The learned Advocate-General had relied on a series of decisions to show that, in detention orders of the nature of those concerned in this case, the detaining authority need not disclose any reasons or give details of material basis. The law on the matter has been settled by various decisions of the highest authority. In Liversidge v. Anderson2, the House of Lords had to deal with a case relating to an order of detention passed under Defence (General) Regulations whose provisions were substantially similar to rule 30 with which we are now concerned except that the Regulation provided that the detaining authority should have ‘reasonable cause to believe.‘The case itself was a suit for damages by the detenu or the ground that he has been unlawfully detained and he called for particulars to be furnished by the Home Secretary as to the ground on which he (detaining authority) had reasonable cause to believe as required in the Regulation. The majority held that, where regulations were made for the safety of the Realm and administrative plenary discretion was vested in the Secretary of State, it was for him to decide whether he had reasonable grounds and that the particulars could not be ordered to be furnished. Viscount Maugham observed as follows: (at page 348): “The order on its face purports to be made under the regulation, and it states hat the Secretary of State had reasonable cause to believe the facts in question. In my opinion, the well-known presumtion omnia arte rite esse praesumuntur applies to this order, and, accordingly, assuming the order to be proved or admitted it must be taken prima facie-that is, until the contrary is proved-to have been properly made, and it must be taken that the requisite as to the belief of the Secretary of State was complied with........” Lord Macmillan, who shared the majority view, observed as follows: (at page 367): “As I have indicated, a Court of law manifestly could not pronounce upon the reasonableness of the Secretary of State’s cause of belief unless it were able to place itself in the position of the Secretary of State and were put in possession of all the knowledge, both of facts and of policy, which he had. However, the public interest must, by the nature of things, frequently preclude the Secretary of State from disclosing to a Court or to anyone else the facts and reasons which have actuated him........” In Greene v. Home Secretary,1a person who was arrested under an order passed by the Home Secretary under the Defence (General) Regulations applied for an order of his release. It was held by majority of House of Lords to the following effect: (i) in such a case an affidavit by the Home Secretary stating his belief in the reasons given for the appellant’s detention in the order was sufficient, and it was unnecessary that he should state his grounds for such belief. (ii) where the return (or the affidavit showing cause) exhibits an order of commitment regular on its face, it is a complete answer to the application, and this is so even where the matter is one within the habeas corpus Act, 1816. There was, therefore, in this case no need for an affidavit by the Home Secretary. The principle of the above decisions has been followed, approved, affirmed and applied in a number of cases in India relating to detention orders or arrests under similar provisions of law. In Re. Manubhai Bitkabhai2, a person who had been detained by an order under rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939, filed a habeas corpus application. Beaumont, C.J., observed as follows: (at page 195): “But there is also no doubt that it is not open to this Court, or any other Court, to go behind the reasons given by Government for the detention. The law on the subject has recently been discussed by the House of Lords in England in (1942) A.C. 206..........It is, however open to a person detained under that rule to challenge the bona fides of Government, and to show that Government were not really of the opinion stated in their order, but where induced by some different reason to detain the detenu. But normally the Court will require definite evidence that a charge of lack of bona fides can be preferred against Government in the matter.” In Emperor v. Vimalabai Deshpande3, their Lordships of the Privy Council (judgment delivered by Sir John Beaumont) pointed out the difference between rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939 and rule 129 and emphasized the fact that in rule 26 the Government must be satisfied not merely suspecting and there was no qualifying word such as ‘reasonably’ or ‘honestly’ attached to the word ‘satisfied’ unlike rule 129 which contained the words ‘reasonably suspects.‘They held that the decision in Liversidge v. Anderson4, would not apply to a case of detention under rule 129. They also indicated that the above decision would be applicable to a case of detention under rule 26. In Sobranal v. State of Bihar5, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court relied on the above two decisions in disposing of a habeas corpus petition by a detenu who had been detained by an order under rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, and observed as follows: (at page 238): “The inevitable consequence of the omission of such qualifying adverbs is that it is not open to the Court to require disclosure of the grounds and to determine whether the grounds were sufficient to justify the detention.” In Narayanaswamy v. Inspector of Police1, a Special Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of three Judges dealt with application under section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, on behalf of persons ostensibly detained under the provisions of Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act (I of 1947). Section 16(1) of that Act is substantially similar to section 45(1) of the Defence of India Act, 1962, in material particulars. Similarly, section 16(3) of the Madras Act I of 1947 is substantially similar to section 45(2) of the Defence of India Act, 1962. Rajamannar, C.J., held that the Court had the power only to the following extent: (at page 324): "What then is the residum of power and jurisdiction of this Court? It is the power to interfere and set at liberty a person who is being detained by an order which, though purporting to be made under section 2 of Madras Act (I of 1947) is not in fact such an order. This will be so in the following circumstances...... (a) .................................. It is the power to interfere and set at liberty a person who is being detained by an order which, though purporting to be made under section 2 of Madras Act (I of 1947) is not in fact such an order. This will be so in the following circumstances...... (a) .................................. (b) ......when the person detained in pursuance of the order is not the person intended to be detained, that is to say, when there is a mistake of identity; (this question is raised in Crl.M.P. No. 179 of 1965). (c) when there is lack of bona fides; and (d) when it is established that the essential requirement of section 2 namely, the satisfaction of the Provincial Government...............that he (detenu) is acting or about to act in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order and with a view to preventing him it is necessary to direct him to be detained or otherwise dealt with under section 2(1) of the Act., is not present.................. If these grounds do not exist, it is well established on the highest authority that this Court, ‘cannot investigate the sufficiency of the material or the reasonableness of the grounds,‘ upon which the Government or the empowered officer or authority had been satisfied. It is not competent for this Court to call upon the Government or the detaining authority to disclose the information and material on which it or he was satisfied as to the necessity for the detention of the person concerned. The satisfaction required by the section isthe satisfaction of the Government or the empowered authority and not the satisfaction of this Court. There is no question of fact which can he submitted to this Court in this matter......." This decision of a Special Bench of three Judges is binding on this Court. It isin conformity with the decisions of the Privy Council, the Supreme Court and otherCourts. In Machinder Shivaji v. The King2, their Lordships of the Federal Court observed regarding a detention under the C.P. and Berar Public Safety Act, as follows: "............In the present case, section 2(1)(a)authorised the detention of any person if the Provincial Government is ‘satisfied’ that he is acting or is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety, order or tranquillity. The language clearly shows that the responsibility for making a detention order rests on the Provincial Executive.... The language clearly shows that the responsibility for making a detention order rests on the Provincial Executive.... and it would be a serious derogation from that responsibility if the Court were to substitute its judgment for the satisfaction of the Executive Authority, and to that end undertake an investigation of the sufficiency of the material on which such satisfaction was grounded." In Amdad Hussain v. State3, it was observed in dealing with a habeas corpus petition by a person detained under rule 30(1)(b)of the Defence of India Rules as follows: (at page 76): " ...... according to the law as it exists it is the detaining authority which has to be satisfied about the need of the detention provided the grounds of detention are related to the objects mentioned in rule 30 and in case the detaining authority is satisfied about the existence of those grounds the Court cannot, in a petition for habeas corpus interfere unless it is shown that the order of the detaining authority is mala fide of which there is no proof or even allegation in the present case....." In Rameshwar v. Dist. Magistrate4, the Supreme Court also observed as follows: (at page 337): "..........though the satisfaction of the detaining authority contemplated by section 3(1) (a)is the subjective satisfaction of the said authority, cases may arise where the detenu may challenge the validity of his detention on the ground of mala fides and in support of the said plea urge that along with other facts which show mala fides the Court may also consider his grievance that the grounds served on him cannot possibly or rationally support the conclusion drawn against him by the detaining authority. It is only in this incidental manner and in support of the plea of mala fides that his question can become justiticible; otherwise the reasonableness of propriety of the said satisfaction contemplated by section 23(1)(a) cannot be questioned before the Courts." The orders concerned in these petitions have to be scrutinised in the light of these observations. It is only in this incidental manner and in support of the plea of mala fides that his question can become justiticible; otherwise the reasonableness of propriety of the said satisfaction contemplated by section 23(1)(a) cannot be questioned before the Courts." The orders concerned in these petitions have to be scrutinised in the light of these observations. Shri P.A. Choudary for the petitioners has sought to rely on the decision of the Privy Council in Eshugbayi v. Government of Nigeria1, In that case, their Lordships observed as follows (at page 252): "Their Lordships entertain no doubt that under the legislation in question, if the Home Secretary deported a British subject in the belief that he was an alien, the subject would have the right: to question the validity of any detention under such order by proceedings in habeas corpus and that it would be the duty of the Courts to investigate the issue of alien or not." This observation does not affect the various observations which we have already referred to as made by the Supreme Court and other Courts. Each and every petitioner is a citizen of India and not an alien. The ground that detenu was an alien was a disclosed ground and the plea that relevant material was secret or confidential could be pleaded by Government to meet his contention that he was not an alien which was capable of proof. We have already extracted the observation of the Supreme Court in Rameshwar v. Dist. Magistrate2, showing the extent to which the grounds given to the Detention Order can be taken into account in considering the question of mala fides. Shri Choudary also relies on the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Vimlabai Deshpande v. Emperor3, which related to a case of detention under rule 129 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939. Therein, the learned Judges observed as follows (at page 16): "In cases where the liberty of the subject is at stake, the responsibility of this Court is great, and it has a right to expect that the Crown will place all the facts before it frankly, or at any rate so much of the facts as will, without disclosing secret information, enable the Court to reach a conclusion on the issues raised....." Reliance is placed on the above observation. It clearly indicates that secret information need not be disclosed. It clearly indicates that secret information need not be disclosed. The learned Judges also observed as follows (at page 16): "....In considering the law the first thing to bear in mind is that the detentions we are considering here are under rule 129, Defence of India Rules and not under rule 26. There is a fundamental difference between the two....." This distinction has been also emphasised by the Privy Council in the observation which We have already extracted in Emperor v. Vimala Bhai Deshpande4, which is a judgment in an appeal against the decision in Vimalabai Deshpande v. Emperor3. The learned Judges of the Nagpur High Court also observed as follows (at page 18): "There must therefore have been some point in drawing a distinction between the powers conferred on the Central and Provincial Governments in rule 26 and those in Police officers under rule 129. We think that the distinction means that under rule 129 the Courts must decide the question of reasonableness and not the police; also that the burden of proof lies on the police." We find that the respondent cannot be compelled to place before this Court materials on the basis of which it (Government) felt satisfied as required under rule 30 but that, all the same, the petitioners entitled to challenge the order to the extent indicated in the various decisions referred to above. In particular it is open to them to challenge the detention orders by urging mala fides and for that purpose rely on the grounds given in the Detention Orders to the extent indicated in the passage extracted by us from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rameshwar v. District Magistrate2. It is also open to the petitioners to challenge the validity of the orders on grounds as indicated in Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab5, Especially it is open to them to challenge the detention orders on the ground that it is not an order passed under the Defence of India Act and in conformity with the requirements of that Act. It is urged before us that, in view of section 44 of the Act, the competent authority had to indicate in its order that it has considered the relevant facts and circumstances relating to a petitioner and that detention under rule 30(1)(b)was really necessary and that it was not sufficient to deal with the person under any other provisions in rule 30(1) like rule 30(1)(c), rule 30(1)(d),rule 30(1) (e) etc. Section 44 runs as follows: “Any authority or person acting in pursuance of this Act shall interfere with the ordinary avocations of life and the enjoyment of property as little as may be consonant with the purpose of ensuring the public safety and interest and the defence of India and civil defence.” Such a contention was urged before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Godavari v. State of Maharashtra1, They observed as follows (at page 1134): “.....It is true that section 44 provides that there should be as little interference with the ordinary avocations of life as possible when orders are made under the Act or the rules; but that does not mean that a detention order must show on the face of it that the State Government had considered the various clauses of rule 30(1) and had come to the conclusion that the only way in which the purposes of the Act and the rules could be carried out was by the use of clause (b) of rule 30(1). In our opinion when the order says that it is necessary to make an order of detention in order to restrain the prejudicial activities mentioned therein it means that that was the only way which the State Government thought was necessary to adopt in order to meet the situation. It will then be for the detenu to show that the order had gone beyond the needs of the situation and was therefore contrary to section 44. No such thing has been shown in the present cases and we are satisfied that the orders in question cannot be said to go beyond the needs of the situation, even assuming that section 44 is mandatory as urged on behalf of the appellants and not merely directory as urged on behalf of the State.” Their Lordships made the above observation assuming for arguments’ sake, without deciding or admitting, that section 44 was mandatory. They left open, without deciding, the question whether section 44 was mandatory or merely directory. The same question arose for decision and was decided in Thangamani v. Government of Madras2. In that case a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that the directive in section 44 was merely advisory and directory in character and not mandatory and that, therefore, an infringement of the same did not carry with it any justiciable right whatsoever. The learned Judges also observed as follows (at page 237): “The original set of rules G.S.R. 1465, dated 5th November, 1962, contained, no provision for review. But rule 30-A was added by G.S.R. 1813, dated 28th December, 1962, providing specially for review of detention orders by the authority concerned. This shows that if a person feels aggrieved that section 44 has been transgressed his remedy is only to apply to the executive for review or reconsideration of the order.” In some of the petitions, for example in Crl.M.P. No. 328 of 1965, various, grounds have been urged showing the domestic circumstances of the petitioner. In the reply affidavit in Crl.M.P. No. 328 of 1965, it is stated as follows: “In any event I humbly submit that..........the restrictions other than complete deprivation of my liberty so as to allow me to carry on ordinary avocations of my life pertinent to my profession (medical) and taste in consonance with the constitutional rights also to attend to my sick father who needs my attention as a Doctor in his old age could be sufficient in the circumstances of my case.” The question as to whether it is necessary for the competent authority to adopt the course mentioned in clause (b) of rule 30(1) or whether it was sufficient to adopt a milder course given in other clauses of rule 30(1) has to be decided by the competent authority which passed the order with reference toall available material which consisted of not only the needs, tastes and desires, of the petitioner but also his activities and tendencies which were relevant to be considered in the aspect of the authority having to satisfy itself as to what had to be done under rule 30 to prevent the person from acting in the manner mentioned in that Rule. When it is not possible under the law for this Court to compel the competent authority from disclosing the material on which it felt satisfied that an order of detention had to be passed and when the competent authority had to decide the course to be taken on the basis of such material by way of subjective satisfaction, it is not desirable for this Court to hold that all the relevant material is before it or to substitute this Court’s satisfaction or judgment for the subjective satisfaction of the competent authority. So, it is not practicable and possible for this Court to go in to and decide on the material mentioned by the petitioner in Crl.M.P. No. 328 of 1965 as to whether the course under rule 30(1)(b)was absolutely necessary in preference toother courses given in rule 30(1). The remedy adopted in any case has to suit the malady concerned. A malignant malady may call for a drastic remedy. When only the remedy is known and the malady is not fully and sufficiently known and cannot be compelled to be disclosed, it is not possible to decide whether the remedy is unduly drastic or disproportionate. Further, rule 30-A provides for review of detention order which has been passed by the Government to be reviewed by that Government at intervals of not more than six months. In such review it will be open to the Government to consider the various material under rule 30. On the materials on record, this applies to other petitions also which are under consideration by us in these proceedings. In Thangamani v. Government of Madras1, Anantanarayanan, J., observed thus (at page 234): “.......The power conferred under Article 226 as well as the jurisdiction must be construed as wide and overriding, and could not be affected, by the provision of a specific enactment seeking, in effect, to curtail the exercise of such a power. ......On the contrary, what this really implies is that, in addition to the two factors upon which the Courts could nevertheless interfere with regard to orders of detention or orders imposing restrictions upon detenus, under the Defence of India Act, namely, acts outside the statutory powers or acts lacking. bona fides, this Court would have the power of interference upon the principles of writ jurisdiction but within the limits of those principles alone. bona fides, this Court would have the power of interference upon the principles of writ jurisdiction but within the limits of those principles alone. For instance, this Court could interfere, in certiorari where the order is an error of law apparent on the face of the record; it could interfere, by the issue of an appropriate writ, where a principle of natural justice has been flagrantly violated. But the exercise of writ jurisdiction is always within the limits of proper recognition by this Court of factors relevant to powers delegated to the Executive by the Legislature..............We, would therefore, hold in conclusion, that the fact that these petitions purport to be under the Article 226 of the Constitution, does not necessarily imply that the petitioners have truly any justiciable right either to canvass the propriety of the orders of detention per se or any of the terms and restrictions imposed under the rules, or to seek the relief of relaxation of such terms or restrictions.......” As laid down by the Supreme Court in Rameshwar v. District Magistrate2, it is open to any petitioner to urge in support of his plea of mala fides, along with other facts show mala fide, that the grounds served on him cannot possibly or rationally support the conclusion drawn against him by the detaining authority. In each Detention Order, it is mentioned that the making of that order was necessary with a view to (a) preventing the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the Defence of India and Civil Defence and (b) preventing the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the efficient conduct of military operations. These are purposes which are specifically mentioned in rule 30(1). If these are looked upon as grounds, they certainly support the conclusion in the order hat detention is necessary. As already mentioned by us, apart from these broad grounds, no details are given as to the basis on which the detaining authority made the decision and passed the detention order. Shri P.A. Choudary has urged that the second purpose mentioned above has. no basis as there were no military operations at the time when the order in W.P. No. 196 of 1965 was passed on 28th December, 1964. This argument has been adopted by Advocates in other petitions also. Shri P.A. Choudary has urged that the second purpose mentioned above has. no basis as there were no military operations at the time when the order in W.P. No. 196 of 1965 was passed on 28th December, 1964. This argument has been adopted by Advocates in other petitions also. It is urged that military operations can only mean operations by the armed forces of this State against an enemy and that India was not at war on the date of the orders and is not at war at any time up to now also with any country and has no enemy and that, therefore, there is no scope for military operations. In the counter, it is stated as follows: “the plea of the petitioner that there were no military operations now being conducted or that there is no state of war between India and any other country is not correct. The entire nation is still under a slate of emergency and there is still a threat of danger from the Chinese on the Northern borders of the Indian Union. The Proclamation of Emergency made by the President of India is still in force.” The purpose of each of the orders of detention is preventive. It is not punitive. It can be precautionary. So, it was open to the competent authority to pass an order under rule 30 with a view to prevent the accused from doing something after the order was passed. Even if military operations did not actually exist and were not being conducted on the date of the Detention Order, if such operations were likely or possible and in contemplation in the near future, order of detention can be passed with a view to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to such operation. Though hostilities have not been formally declared as between India and any other country, it is a well-known fact that a National emergency arose which necessitated the fighting forces of this country to adopt a certain course of action which can properly be called military operation as distinct from peace-time parades and military exercises. India was a combatant ranged against mighty world powers formally as declared enemies in two world-wars but no substantial portion of Indian territory was invaded and occupied by an enemy country during those wars to a greater extent than has happened now. India was a combatant ranged against mighty world powers formally as declared enemies in two world-wars but no substantial portion of Indian territory was invaded and occupied by an enemy country during those wars to a greater extent than has happened now. It is of frequent occurrence that a neighbouring country which is not technically at war and which has not declared war has been persistently indulging in frequent inroads and incursions into Indian territory, conducting predatory expeditions spreading terror and panic and causing death and devastation. Vast extent on Indian territory are under continuous occupation by such country. These acts have necessitated the Government in India to take adequate steps to defend the soil and citizens of India and to engage its fighting forces in operations which are in the nature of military operations. If such country is to be called friend. India has to save herself and her citizens from her friend and to defend herself against unfriendly acts of such aggressive friend. Such situation has resulted in emergency being proclaimed and order being passed by the President. It has also resulted in the passing of the Defence of India Act, 1962. Section 2 contains definitions as follows: “2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (c) ‘enemy’ means- (i) any person or country committing external aggression against India; (ii) any person belonging to a country committing such aggression; (iii) such other country as may be declared by the Central Government to be assisting the country committing such aggression; (iv) any person belonging to such other country; (e) ‘military operations ‘means the operations of the Armed Forces of the Union; (f) ‘Occupied territory’ means any territory of India which is for the time being in the occupation of a country referred to in, sub-clause (i) or a country referred to in sub-clause (iii) of clause (c) of this section” Therefore, it is obvious that real enemy of the country as defined in section 2(c)does exist. The contention of the petitioners is not tenable. The contention of the petitioners is not tenable. ‘Civil Defence’ is also defined in section 2(a)of the Act as follows: “‘civil defence’ includes any measures not amounting to actual combat, for affording defence against any form of hostile attack by a foreign power or for depriving any form of hostile attack by a foreign power of its effect either wholly or in part whether such measures are taking before, during or after the time of the attack;” The items mentioned in each of the detention orders conforms strictly to the working of rule 30. We find that there is no defect in any of the Detention Orders, such as alleged by the petitioners, so as to vitiate the orders. It has been urged that, if one of the items mentioned in the Detention Order does not exist, then the whole detention order must fail. There is no basis of fact for this contention as we find that none of the items in the order is shown as not existing. It has been contended that the orders have been passed mechanically without the Officer who passed the order, i.e., Chief Secretary, applying his mind. For this purpose, the following features are relied on regarding each other: (1) The order is in cyclo styled form with blanks being filled up. (2) The filling up of blanks is done in type and not in manuscript. (3) As regards W.P. No. 196 of 1965, Crl.M.P.Nos. 203, 179 of 1965 etc.. in which G.O. Ms. No. 1537 is mentioned in the Implementation Order, a G.O. which had been superseded was typed in the cyclo styled form but it was not: corrected. In the counter-affidavits filed by the Assistant Secretary, it is mentioned that the order of detention was passed by the first respondent in the name of the Governor after satisfying himself (Chief Secretary) that there was rational basis for satisfaction regarding the activities of the detenu. It is also stated as follows: “The petitioner has alleged that the 1st respondent had simply signed a cyclo styled form issued against hundreds of people and that the 1st respondent has signed the aforesaid order on 28th December, 1964 and he did not choose to write the name and description of the detenu in his own hand but it was separately filled in by typewriter. It is not possible for the Chief Secretary who authenticates the order of the Government to write for himself the names of all the large number of detenus in his own hand. To expedite the same they have been typed on different typewriters with different kinds of ribbons to the dictation and under the instructions of the first respondent. It is also not correct to say that the 1st respondent had no requisite satisfaction......” The Chief Secretary himself has, in his counter-affidavit dated 28th June, 1965 in Crl.M.P. No. 866 of 1965, requested that the affidavit be treated as additional counter-affidavit in all the earlier petitions which are in this batch. We accordingly treat it. In this counter-affidavit he had stated as follows: “I am well acquainted with the facts relating to the detention of the petitioners in W.P. No. 196 of 1965......(all the petitions in this batch) and I beg to state that all the statements made in the counter-affidavits are true and correct.” In effect, the position is substantially the same as if the Chief Secretary had himself signed each of the earlier counter-affidavits. The first and second features are adequately explained by the Chief Secretary in his counter-affidavit dated 28th June, 1965. We see no reason to doubt its correctness or truth. Before typewriter and the process of cyclostyle were invented when many copies of a document were required, there was no alternative for people except writing copies in manuscript (apart from printing and using carbon paper). But, even then, the practice of a scribe’s writing down various documents and the signatory signing it was not unknown. Nor could it be asserted in every such case that the signatory had blindly signed a manuscript without knowing its contents. After typewriting was invented, typing was taken to instead of writing in manuscript by those who could afford to do it. In big offices, especially of busy officers like Chief Secretary who has got large volume of work to do of various types in various fields, typewriters are supplied in the interests of speed and efficiency so that the officer concerned who had to pass orders need not waste his time by having to write every order himself. When the cyclostyle was invented, it made it possible for a large number of copies to be prepared. When the cyclostyle was invented, it made it possible for a large number of copies to be prepared. It was naturally availed of by very busy officer like the Chief Secretary for saving the time of not only that officer but also those who would have to prepare the copies of the form in writing and typing otherwise. When the Chief Secretary had to pass a large number of Detention Orders, it was quite natural that he got a form typed and a large number of copies of that typed form prepared by cyclostyle for use. It was a proper utilisation of the facilities which were at his disposal for quick and efficient discharge of his work and economy of public funds and time. It was possible for him to use one out of those forms for an individual person after satisfying himself properly as required by the law that it was necessary to detain that person. The mere fact that he used the cyclostyled form and got the names and other details typed in the form to fill up the blanks does not, by itself, necessarily mean that he did not apply his mind to the facts of each case as required by the law or that his statement in his affidavit (read along with the statement in the affidavit originally signed by the Assistant Secretary), that he satisfied himself, is not or cannot be true. The services of typists and typewriters are utilised in other departments also to save time of officers who pass considered orders. Judgments of Courts are dictated by Judges to stenographers and typed by the latter and only signed by the Judges. Printed or typed forms are in common use in Courts by Judicial Officers for expressing what they have decided after very careful consideration of relevant material; for example, in framing charges by filling up the blanks in printed or typed forms of charge. There may be some cases where, in addition to names being filled up in form, there were other circumstances which clearly indicate that the order must have been signed as a mechanical act without applying mind to the relevant facts. Such facts existed in Keshan Gokhale v. Emperor1. There are no such circumstances or indications in the present cases. There may be some cases where, in addition to names being filled up in form, there were other circumstances which clearly indicate that the order must have been signed as a mechanical act without applying mind to the relevant facts. Such facts existed in Keshan Gokhale v. Emperor1. There are no such circumstances or indications in the present cases. We are not prepared to say that the Chief Secretary ought to have denied himself the advantages of time-saving and labour-saving devices and facilities which were available to him by way of cyclostyle and typists and should have adopted primitive and antiquated methods and undergone drudgery of writing each ofnumerous Detention Orders and Implementation Orders in his own hand and thus wasted public time with a view to give a manifest demonstration and intrinsic evidence in each order that he applied his mind to relevant matters. It was observed in Kamala Kant v. Emperor2, regarding a similar argument based on the fact that the cyclostyle documents were used for orders against a large number of persons as follows (at page 360): “That a procedure of this kind was adopted, in order, presumably to save time and labour does not, in my opinion, create any kind of presumption that the case of each person, against whom an order was made, was not separately and properly considered by the Governor.” The third feature relates to the Implementation Order and not to the Detention Order. The Implementation Orders were signed on the same day as the respective Detention Orders. Probably the cyclostyle forms used in the cases covered by the third feature were forms prepared at a time when G.O.Ms. No. 1537 was in force that is, prior to 28th October, 1964. The cyclostyle form used in the other cases which mention G.O.Ms. No. 1190, dated 28th October, 1964, were prepared at a time when that Government Order had come into force. The fact that the old G.O.Ms. No. 1537 was allowed to continue to remain in the cyclostyle form without being corrected into G.O.Ms. No. 1190 does not necessarily mean that the Chief Secretary did not or would not have satisfied himself as required by Rule 30. We accept the statement of the Chief Secretary that he applied his mind to each case and passed the concerned Detention Order and Implementation Order. The learned Advocate-General points out that Rules contained in G.O.Ms. No. 1190 does not necessarily mean that the Chief Secretary did not or would not have satisfied himself as required by Rule 30. We accept the statement of the Chief Secretary that he applied his mind to each case and passed the concerned Detention Order and Implementation Order. The learned Advocate-General points out that Rules contained in G.O.Ms. No. 1537, dated 26th August, 1954 and the Rules contained in G.O.Ms. No. 1190, dated 28th October, 1964 were framed under section 4 of the Preventive Detention Act to regulate the detention of persons detained under the Act and that they do not directly apply to persons detained under the Defence of India Act. He also contends that the Government had the discretion to pass any suitable orders for detention of detenus under the Defence of India Act and that the mention by them of the Government Order referred to above in the various Implementation Orders was only as a means of convenient reference and easy brief description and specification of the terms of detention and that, therefore, it is of very little importance or significance as to which Government Order is mentioned for indicating the terms of detention. We agree that neither of the two Government Orders was passed under the Defence of India Act or Rules and that, therefore, mention of Government Order which was not in force on the date of the Implementation Order does not vitiate the latter order. We reject the contention on behalf of the petitioners that the orders consisted of mechanically filling up the forms and that the Chief Secretary and the Government did not apply their mind to relevant facts and material. It is contended that the counter-affidavit has been filed by the Assistant Secretary and not by the Chief Secretary who passed the order and that, therefore, there is no proper affidavit. It is true that originally the Assistant Secretary filed the counter-affidavit. Even assuming for arguments’ sake, without admitting, that such affidavit signed by the Assistant Secretary is not sufficient as proving the contents therein, the Chief Secretary has asserted by a subsequent affidavit dated 28th June, 1965 the truth of the contents of the affidavits which had been filed earlier by the Assistant Secretary. Even assuming for arguments’ sake, without admitting, that such affidavit signed by the Assistant Secretary is not sufficient as proving the contents therein, the Chief Secretary has asserted by a subsequent affidavit dated 28th June, 1965 the truth of the contents of the affidavits which had been filed earlier by the Assistant Secretary. This is sufficient to place the contents of the affidavits of the Assistant Secretary on the same position as it would have been if the Chief Secretary had himself signed the counter-affidavit at the time when it was originally signed by Assistant Secretary. So, the contention is now merely a technical one, the basis of which has ceased to exist. So, this contention is not tenable. Even on merits, it is not tenable even if the affidavit of the Chief Secretary were treated as not having the effect which we have mentioned. In the reply-affidavit in Crl.M.P. No. 330 of 1965, it is stated as follows: "The Assistant Secretary is not the proper authority to exercise the powers laid under rule 30 (1)(b) of the Defence of India Rules and he has no right to file counter-affidavits. It is only the detaining authority who is entitled to contradict the allegations mentioned in my petition or affidavit. As the detention order was passed and signed by the Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh, he is the only person who can substantiate the grounds of detention . Therefore the affidavit filed by the Assistant Secretary is without jurisdiction and hence it cannot be looked into......." The detention order and the implementation order is in each case was an order of Government. It was not an order of the Chief Secretary as such. Itwas signed by the Chief Secretary as a person competent to sign in a Government’s order. In affidavit also, on behalf of the Government, he could have signed. The learned Advocate-General points out that under Rule 13 of the Business Rules, Assistant Secretary also can sign an order on behalf of the Government as he, like the Chief Secretary, is mentioned as one of the officers who can sign orders on behalf of Government. In the counter-affidavit, which is signed by the Assistant Secretary, it is mentioned in one place that Government had received ample information and Government had reason to believe. In the counter-affidavit, which is signed by the Assistant Secretary, it is mentioned in one place that Government had received ample information and Government had reason to believe. It is mentioned in another place that the order of detention was issued by the first respondent in the name of the Governor after satisfying himself that there was rational basis for satisfaction and that it is not correct to say that the first respondent issued the order without applying his mind to the facts of this case. The first respondent is the State of Andhra Pradesh, though it is represented by the Chief Secretary. So, it would be proper for the Chief Secretary to file affidavit which says that he was satisfied. But that was not the only proper course. In the present case the Assistant Secretary was competent to file affidavit on the basis that Government, which he had right to represent under the rules, was the respondent. In State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog1, it was observed as follows (at page 319);- "........it is not necessary in every case to call the Minister-in-charge. If the Secretary, or any other person, has the requisite means of knowledge and his affidavit is believed, that will be enough." In Carltona Ltd. v. Commissioner of Works2, it was observed as follows: "......In the administration of Government in this country, the functions which are given to ministers......are functions so multifarious that no minister could ever personally attend to them........The duties imposed upon ministers and the powers given to ministers are normally exercised under the authority of the ministers by responsible officials of the department. Public business could not be carried on if that were not the case.......The whole system of departmental of organisation and administration is based on the view that ministers, being responsible to parliament, will see that important duties are committed to experienced officials..... Public business could not be carried on if that were not the case.......The whole system of departmental of organisation and administration is based on the view that ministers, being responsible to parliament, will see that important duties are committed to experienced officials..... In the present case the Assistant Secretary, a high official of the Ministry, was the person entrusted with the work of looking after this particular matter and the question, therefore, is, relating those facts to the argument with which I am dealing did he direct his mind to the matters to which he was bound to direct it in order to act properly under the regulation?" We find that there is no substantial defect by way of the Assistant Secretary having filed the earliest counter-affidavit in all the present cases. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner in Crl.M.P. No. 328 of 1965 that the Implementation Order is illegal by reason of its excluding the benefit of clause 26 of G.O.Ms. No. 1190. The implementation G.O. excludes clause 29 also but that is not relied upon for the purpose of this contention. That rule relates only to visits by official visitors and non-official visitors. Clause 26 in G.O.Ms. No. 1190 runs as follows: "26. Legal advice.-(1) Detenu shall be allowed all reasonable facilities to obtain legal advice. Correspondence in regard to legal advice shall be treated as private matter. In addition to the interviews permissible under clauses 13 and 14 a detenu may, with the permission of the Government, interview his legal Adviser in connection with a pending or contemplated legal proceeding to which the detenu is or will be a party. The interview shall be with the lawyer only or with a specified member of a firm of lawyers and no other member of the firm shall be allowed to be present. Not more than one such interview shall ordinarily be allowed in connection with a contemplated legal proceeding before the proceeding is instituted. All such interviews shall take place on the premises in which the detenu is confined and shall be subject to such conditions and restrictions as the Superintendent may consider necessary to ensure security and prevent the passing of unauthorised communications unconnected with the case relating to which the interview is granted. All such interviews shall take place on the premises in which the detenu is confined and shall be subject to such conditions and restrictions as the Superintendent may consider necessary to ensure security and prevent the passing of unauthorised communications unconnected with the case relating to which the interview is granted. (2) In addition to the interviews permissible under sub-clause (1) and clauses 13 and 14, a detenu shall be allowed, with the permission of the Government an interview with a legal practitioner or any other person of his choice for the purpose of drafting his representation against his detention." It is contended that, because this facility was not afforded to the petitioner, the order is not purely preventive but is punitive. The learned Advocate-General contends that it is purely left to the discretion of the Government whether to allow the person (detenu) to have benefit of clause 26 being extended to him. We agree with this contention. In In re Manubhai Bhikabhai1, it has been observed by Beaumont, C.J. as follows (at page 195): "The learned Advocate-General tells us that it is the practice of Government in the case of persons accused of offences, to allow them proper facilities for preparing their defence, and if Government decide to proceed with the charge under the Explosive Substances Act, then they will follow that practice in this case. But, in the case of persons detained under Rule 26 , it is not, I understand, the practice of Government to allow them to see their legal advisers. In my opinion, that is a matter which is entirely within the discretion of Government and it is not open to us to make any order in the matter." In the present case, in fact we allowed; the petitioners who already had no Advocate to defend them, to arrange for their being defended by Advocates without any objection by the learned Advocate-General. In fact, every one of the petitioners in this batch of cases was defended by Advocate. So, in fact, no one has suffered any prejudice because of withdrawal of benefit of clause 25 of G.O.Ms. No. 1190 or the corresponding clause of G.O.Ms. No. 1537 of the year 1954. Still, it is urged that the Government withdrawing the benefit of that clause amounted to punitive measure and, therefore, vitiated the order. We do not agree with this contention. No. 1190 or the corresponding clause of G.O.Ms. No. 1537 of the year 1954. Still, it is urged that the Government withdrawing the benefit of that clause amounted to punitive measure and, therefore, vitiated the order. We do not agree with this contention. We agree with the learned Advocate-General that it was within the discretion of the Government whether to extend clause 26 or withdraw clause 26 in a case of detention as in the present case under the Defence of India Rules where the Government had a right to decide as to whether the detention which they wanted to impose was to go to the extent of saying that the person did not have access to lawyers also just as they did not have access to non-lawyers. Petitioners in W.P. No. 196 of 1965 and Crl.M.P. No. 365 of 1965 are practising lawyers and petitioner in Crl.M.P. No. 201 of 1965 is also a lawyer. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner in Crl.M.P. No. 365 of 1965 that he was arrested at Hyderabad by a Police Officer, that the latter did not serve the order on him at that time of arrest but gave him the detention order only at Nalgonda Police Station after taking him there and that, therefore, the detention of the petitioner is illegal. This contention, as an allegation of fact, is denied by the first respondent in the counter-affidavit. We are unable to accept this allegation of fact made by the petitioner in preference to the contention of the respondent. As the basis of contention is not proved, this question as to whether detention is illegal on the present ground does not arise. In Crl M.P. No. 179 of 1965, the petitioner is S. Rajeshwara Rao, son of Ramaiah, and a special ground has been urged as follows: “that the order in G.O.Ms. No. 1715 dated 28th December, 1964 is against Sri S. Rajeshwara Rao, S/o Papa Rao, aged 40 years, R/o Lakshmidevapeta village under P.S. Ghanpur, Mulug Taluk, Warangal District but the Police officials with mala fide intentions instead of executing the order against him, the proper person, have deliberately struck off his father’s name and have retyped my father’s name ‘Ramaiah’ and executed on me. That on the abovementioned G.O.Ms. That on the abovementioned G.O.Ms. No. 1715, dated 28th December, 1964 the address of the person to be detained is also written by the police officials themselves. They have noted as follows on the G.O.Ms.-‘Lakshmidevipet, P.S. Ghanapur, Mulug Taluka, S/o Papa Rao.‘This shows clearly that the order is intended against Sri S. Rajeshwar Rao, S/o Papa Rao and not against me.” In the counter-affidavit, it is stated as follows: “In G.O.Ms. Nos. 1715 and 1716............the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued orders for the detention of Sri S. Rajeshwar Rao, son of Ramaiah and not against Sri S. Rajeshwara Rao,. S/o Papa Rao, resident of Laxmidevipet, as stated by the petitioner. As there are two members of the leftist faction of the Communist Party of India in the Warangal district, with the same name i.e., one S. Rajeshwara Rao, S/o Ramaiah, Arepally (detenu) and the other S. Rajeswara Rao, S/o. Papa Rao, Laxmidevipet, the local police were confused and corrected the father’s name of the detenu as ‘Papa Rao’, thinking that it was the latter ‘Rajeswara Rao’ that had to be detained; but they quickly realised that it was the former that was to be detained and again corrected the father’s name as ‘Ramaiah’, as originally noted in the Government order. There was no mala fide intention in making the change in the father’s name and the correct person only was arrested..............The Government order was meant for the petitioner only and it was correctly executed on him............The Government order was not meant for S. Rajeswara Rao, S/o Papa Rao of Laxmidevipet. Therefore, the detenu was not arrested illegally.” The petition-enclosure copy of G.O.Ms. No. 1715 shows as follows. Originally ‘Ramaiah’ was typed in the blank space after the words ‘son of’. That name is struck off. In continuation, after leaving one letter space as blank, the name ‘Papa Rao’ is typed. The first name ‘Ramaiah’ and the name ‘Papa Rao’were struck-off and, after leaving one letter space as blank, another name ‘Ramaiah’ is again typed. Both sides are agreed that the name ‘Papa Rao’ originally existed and that some Police Officials scored it off and typed the name ‘Ramaiah’ which now stands. The first name ‘Ramaiah’ and the name ‘Papa Rao’were struck-off and, after leaving one letter space as blank, another name ‘Ramaiah’ is again typed. Both sides are agreed that the name ‘Papa Rao’ originally existed and that some Police Officials scored it off and typed the name ‘Ramaiah’ which now stands. According to the first respondent, the name ‘Ramaiah’ and not the name ‘Papa Rao’ was itself the name which was originally typed and stood, when the Chief Secretary signed it and issued and despatched to the Police and that the Police struck-off ‘Ramaiah’ and typed ‘Papa Rao.‘This version is supported by the order served on the petitioner and produced by him and relied on by him. The existence of the struck-off name ‘Ramaiah’ before the name ‘Papa Rao’ Strongly supports the contention of the learned Advocate-General. No explanation for this first struck-off name ‘Ramaiah’ is offered or attempted by the petitioner. The learned Advocate-General produced a document saying that it was the carbon copy of G.O.Ms. No. 1715. He says that it was a carbon copy which was typed simultaneously along with G.O.Ms. No. 1715 which was served on the petitioner. The carbon copy contains after the words ‘son of’ only one name i.e., ‘Ramaiah.‘It does not contain the words ‘Papa Rao’ or the word ‘Ramaiah’ written for the second time. The relative position of all the words and letters which are typed in the carbon copy exactly correspond to the relative positions of the corresponding and respective letters which are typed in the petition enclosed. The letter ‘R’ which occurs in the carbon copy is. identical with the letter ‘R’ which is found in similar words in the petition enclosed copy of the detention order and is different from the letter ‘R’ in the words which are in the detention order but not in the carbon copy viz., ‘Papa Rao’ which have been struck off and second name ‘Ramaiah’ which stands without being struck off. A careful comparison and scrutiny of this carbon copy with the G.O. which was served on the petitioner and which was produced by the petitioner in Court shows that the contention of the learned Advocate-General is right. What we have said above regarding the filling up of the names applies to Implementation. G.O.Ms. No. 1716 (Implementation Order) also except regarding the letter ‘R’, The letter ‘R’ in the carbon copy of G.O. Ms. What we have said above regarding the filling up of the names applies to Implementation. G.O.Ms. No. 1716 (Implementation Order) also except regarding the letter ‘R’, The letter ‘R’ in the carbon copy of G.O. Ms. No. 1716 is different from the letter ‘R’ which is found in the carbon copy of G.O.Ms. No. 1715 (Detention Order) apparently because a different typewriter had been used. We find that the contention of the learned Advocate-General is acceptable on facts as regards G.O. Ms. Nos. 1715 and 1716 and we accept it. When the detention order and the implementation order were issued by the Government and sent to the local Police for being given effect to, they contained only the name and description of the petitioner. Subsequently, the Police corrected the father’s name so as to result in the description of another man. But, they again re-corrected it so as to restore the name of the father of the petitioner. This means that the detention order and the implementation order as issued by the Government and as they stood when being served on the petitioner described him and were meant for detention of only the petitioner. Sri P.A. Choudary, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, contends that ever on these facts the detention of the petitioner was illegal because it was done on the basis of tampered documents. At the time when the petitioner was arrested, the Government had passed a valid Government Order which was in force. On the basis of that Government Order the petitioner could have been validly arrested. The petitioner could not have raised any objection to his arrest and detention if the Government Orders had been served on him in an untampered condition. Even though the Government Orders were in tampered condition when served on him, he was arrested and detained on the basis of these Government Orders. Government has passed valid orders under which he can be lawfully continued in detention. They continue to be in force unaffected by the fact that some Police officer tampered with the particular copies which were sent to him for service on petitioner for implementation. It was highly improper for the Police Officer to tamper with a Government Order issued under Defence of India Rules, rule 30(1) (b)and the Implementation Order. They continue to be in force unaffected by the fact that some Police officer tampered with the particular copies which were sent to him for service on petitioner for implementation. It was highly improper for the Police Officer to tamper with a Government Order issued under Defence of India Rules, rule 30(1) (b)and the Implementation Order. But, such tampering with particular copies does not affect the validity or value of the orders which Government passed and their executability against the correct person. The contention of Sri P.A. Choudary is not tenable. We proceed to deal with the allegations and contentions advanced regarding malice in fact. In Crl.M.P. No. 328 of 1965, it is merely alleged in the petition as follows: I am therefore entitled to be protected against capricious or malicious exercise of powers. In support of this, no facts are alleged except the prohibition in the Implementation Order that the petitioner would not be entitled to the benefit of Clause 26 of G.O. Ms. No. 1190 dated 28th October, 1964, regarding legal advice. We have already held that the denial of legal advice does not by itself vitiate the detention or implementation order, and also that each of the petitioners, in fact, had legal advice and was represented by a lawyer. In the counter-affidavit of the first respondent, various details are given about the objectives of the Leftist’s faction of the Communist party and other facts which we have already mentioned. It was also mentioned that withholding of application of Clause 26 of Government Order Ms. No. 1190 did not amount to denial of a right. The petitioner filed an elaborate reply-affidavit. In this reply-affidavit, he asserted that the Communist party was not anti-national or pro-Peking and denied his indulging in anti-national activities. He has not disclosed in the petition any grounds which go to show any mala fides in fact. It mentions certain matters of a political nature with reference to what is mentioned in the counter-affidavit. But, in these proceedings, we do not consider it necessary or proper to go into political matters. The learned Advocate-General filed on 29th June, 1965, a supplemental counter-affidavit, signed by the Chief Secretary to which we have already referred. The counter-affidavit is regarding the reply-affidavit filed by the petitioners in Crl. M.P. Nos. But, in these proceedings, we do not consider it necessary or proper to go into political matters. The learned Advocate-General filed on 29th June, 1965, a supplemental counter-affidavit, signed by the Chief Secretary to which we have already referred. The counter-affidavit is regarding the reply-affidavit filed by the petitioners in Crl. M.P. Nos. 328, 329 and 330 of 1965 and the allegations of the petitioner in his affidavit in Crl.M.P. No. 365 of 1965. In it, he asserted as follows: “The reply affidavits in Crl.M.Ps. Nos. 328 3 29, and 330 of 1965 follows a single pattern of political propaganda with which I, obviously, cannot concern myself in this supplemental affidavit. It cannot be necessary on behalf of the Government to deal with the political statements in those reply-affidavits. The administration proceeded without any political bias.” In Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab1, their Lordships observed as follows. (at page 1126): “A plea of mala fides must always be made by proper pleadings at the trial stage, so that the respondent has an opportunity to meet the said pleadings. Mr. Garg no doubt attempted to refer us to certain averments made by the appellant in his petition for special leave, but we do not think we can permit Mr. Garg to make out a case of mala fides on the averments made for the first time in the application for special leave.” In Union of India v. P.K. More2, it was observed as follows (at page 633): “It is well-known that when an improper conduct is alleged, it must be set out with all particulars In Walling ford v. Mutual Society3, Lord Selborne observed, ‘with regard to fraud, if there beany principle which is perfectly well settled, it is that general allegations, however strong may be the words in which they are stated, are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud. which any Court ought to take notice. In the absence of the particulars all that the opposite side could do would be to simply deny that there had been discrimination and this is what the appellant had done in its written statement in this case’.” We find that no mala fides in fact has been made out in Crl.M.P. No. 328 of 1965 and that the order of detention is valid. Crl.M.P. No. 329 of 1965.-In the original affidavit of the petitioner, it is alleged is follows: “The order is based on mala fide grounds.” No details are given. No facts are mentioned which can establish mala fides in fact. After the Government filed a counter-affidavit, the petitioner filed a reply affidavit mentioning the numerous details of political matters. The respondent filed a supplemental counter-affidavit to which we have already referred. In reply affidavit also, there are no facts mentioned except regarding political matters. We do not consider it necessary to go into the allegations of political matters in the reply-affidavits or the replies thereto mentioned in the supplemental counter-affidavit. We find that no fact is satisfactorily established which can prove mala fides in fact. We find that no mala fides in fact have been proved. Crl.M.P. No. 330 of 1965.-The position is substantially the same as in Crl. M.P. No. 329 of 1965. We find that no mala fides in fact have been established. Crl.M.P. No. 365 of 1965.-In the petition, the plea of mala fide is specifically made and various allegations of fact are given in support of this contention. These allegations were met in the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent. The petitioner did not file any reply affidavit. The main contention in the petitioner’s affidavit, apart from contentions which are common to all petitions and which we have dealt with are as follows as contained in paragraph 5 to the affidavit: “(a) The petitioner was defending most of the criminal cases of political origin and also had civil suits on hand against the Government. He was defending an election petition as an Advocate of a respondent against a member of the ruling party who had filed that petition. The present Chief Minister Sri K. Brahmananda Reddy and the Union Minister Sri. N. Sanjeeva Reddy, during their visit to Nalgonda in 1964, said at an ‘at home’ ‘that they feel danger because of myself as there is less likelihood of their candidate winning the Chairmanship of the Zilla Parishad.” The fact that the petitioner was appearing as an Advocate against the Government is not a ground to hold that the Government had a grouse against he petitioner. Nor is it a ground for holding that the Chief Minister had a ground for detaining the petitioner mala fide. Nor is it a ground for holding that the Chief Minister had a ground for detaining the petitioner mala fide. As an Advocate, the petitioner had a right to appear for any party and against any other party including the Government. In Kali Prasad v. Emperor4, it was observed regarding a similar contention as follows: (at page 63) “In Case No. 60 there is an affidavit that the person detained is an Advocate of this Court and he was engaged as a defence Advocate in several cases against prominent Congressmen and representatives of the Kisan Sabha and he believed that he was detained for having appeared in these cases. The Advocate-General offered to file a counter affidavit in this case, but we have found it unnecessary to call on him to file such an affidavit as the facts disclosed in this affidavit do not show that the Governor had no proper material, to satisfy him of the necessity for the order.” In this case, the first respondent has filed an affidavit in which it has denied the allegation that the detention was because of the petitioner’s appearing as an Advocate against the Government or in an election petition. The allegation in the petition regarding the alleged observation of the two Ministers is very vague, and even if the observation by the Ministers were true, it cannot be taken as meaning that they meant that the petitioner should be unlawfully put in detention. The affidavit of the petitioner also contains allegations as follows: “(b) the Government persuaded by the ruling party had interfered twice by issuing stay orders to postpone the Presidential Election of the Nalgonda Panchayat Samithi in the year 1960 as the nominee of the ruling party lost his election against me. The Government has maliciously issued a show cause notice to take action against me within a month after I was elected to the post of the President of the Panchayat Samithi, Nalgonda in the year 1962. The population figures of the Panchayat Samithi, Nalgonda were incorrectly lessened by the Government. All this was done by the Government to show what would be the fate of the people if they do not elect their nominees.............” These allegations have been denied by the first respondent. These allegations are capable of being proved by documents but there has been no attempt to prove them. All this was done by the Government to show what would be the fate of the people if they do not elect their nominees.............” These allegations have been denied by the first respondent. These allegations are capable of being proved by documents but there has been no attempt to prove them. We find that no facts are established on which we can hold that there was malice in fact on the part of the Government in issuing the Detention Order. In Sobran Lal v. State of Bihar1, a contention was raised regarding the petitioner who was detained under Rule 30(1)(b)that the detention was the result of malicious proceeding engineered by the police authorities. The learned Judges observed as follows: “..........no relation between the proceedings under section 110 of the Code (which had been started at the instance of the Police) and the proceedings under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules has been established.......” Crl.M.P. No. 313 of 1965.-The petition contains statement as follows: “The petitioner submits that the action of the respondent Government is not done in good faith and it is a clear case of mala fides.” After the respondent filed a counter-affidavit, the petitioner did not file any reply affidavit. We find that no mala fides in fact have been established in any of the petitions in these proceedings. The petitioner has asked for the relief of directing the Government to allow the petitioner to attend the Lok Sabha which was sitting when he filed the petition. In the counter-affidavit, it is stated as follows: “..........Memorandum No. 751/S.C./B/65-2, dated 17th March, 1965, the Government of Andhra Pradesh informed the petitioner that his request for permission to attend the current session of the Lok Sabha............were carefully considered and rejected..........” Obviously, the Government considered it necessary for the implementation of the order under Rule 30(1)(b)of the Defence of India Rules that the petitioner should not leave the place of detention and go to Lok Sabha. We see no ground for interfering with that order and for granting the special relief prayed for by the petitioner. In various petitions, a ground is urged that the petitioners paid certain amounts towards National Defence Fund. In the counter-affidavits in certain petitions, the payment of such amounts is admitted and in some other petitions, it is not admitted. We see no ground for interfering with that order and for granting the special relief prayed for by the petitioner. In various petitions, a ground is urged that the petitioners paid certain amounts towards National Defence Fund. In the counter-affidavits in certain petitions, the payment of such amounts is admitted and in some other petitions, it is not admitted. The fact that a person has paid contribution to the National Defence Fund cannot be taken as decisive or as showing conclusively that it is not possible to believe that the first respondent had information on the basis of which could have passed an order of detention against the petitioner concerned. We find that none of the contentions pressed on behalf of the petitioners in the various petitions is tenable. We find no reason to hold that the detention order or implementation order in any of the petitions is illegal or that the petitioners should be ordered to be released from detention. In the result, we dismiss the petitions. G.S.M. ----- Petitions dismissed.