S. N. Kapoor ( 1 ) LEARNED Counsel for the parties pray that the statements ofhusband and wife may be recorded. Let their statements be recorded. ( 2 ) HEARD the Counsel for the parties. ( 3 ) BRIEFLY stated, the material facts are as under :petitioner No. 1, Saleemuddin was married to complainant/respondent No. 2, Najma Naaz, on 23/03/1987 according to Muslim Law. Two children wereborn out of the wedlock. However, some differences and misunderstanding arosein the family. Najma Naaz, wife, lodged an FIR No. 171/91 under Sections 498-A/406, Indian Penal Code with the Police Station Chandi Mahal, Delhi. Other petitioners are brothersand sisters of petitioner No. 1, Saleemudin. There has been inter se fights among thetwo families. Recently on intervention of elderly and respectable people of the areathe families of petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 2 sat down and decided to endthe bitterness and to live in peace in future. Pettioner No. 1 and respondent No. 2accordingly agreed to live together for their own betternemnt and for the betterment of their children. The family would respect her and everybody shall makeconscious effort to live together in peace. The petitioner shall give all legitimaterights to the wife and children and respondent No. 2 on her part shall also give loveand respect to all. It is notable that respondent No. 2 is living with her husbandsaleemuddin for quite some time. She also appears to be happy. She prays that hermarriage may be saved. This Court has been assured by petitioner Saleemuddinthat he would try his level best to keep his wife happy and would not give her anyoccasion to approach either the police or the Court. He also prays that his family lifemay be saved, for he has got two growing children, namely. Master Anwar andbaby Gulnaz. Children of the parties are also present. Hence, in order to save themarried life of the couple and to avoid unnecessary bitterness and to promote theends of justice this petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. , 1973 forquashing the said FIR as well as the proceedings relating thereto. ( 4 ) IT is submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioners that reading of Section482 makes it amply clear that Section 482 is not subservient to any other provisionscontained in the Code in view of the non obstante clause in the beginning of Section482. P. C. , 1973 forquashing the said FIR as well as the proceedings relating thereto. ( 4 ) IT is submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioners that reading of Section482 makes it amply clear that Section 482 is not subservient to any other provisionscontained in the Code in view of the non obstante clause in the beginning of Section482. Consequently, provisions under Sub-section (9) of Section 320 do not curtail thepowes of the Court to quash the proceedings if the Court is otherwise satisfied thatit is necessary to do so to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuseof the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is contendedthat suppose for the sake of technicalities arising out of the Sub-section (9) of Section320, the FIR and the proceedings are not quashed, then it would amount to unsettleotherwise settling family. All over the world such settlements are encouraged andthis Court should not feel inhibited in quashing the proceedings to secure and savethe family life of the parties. That is the requirement of ends of justice. Further it wasalso decided that they have settled all the disputes relating to cruelty and "stridhan"and everything stands condoned. The petitioners have undergone trial for the lastseven years. Now, the compromise has been arrived at between the parties. Hence,prayer for quashing of the FIR under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. ( 5 ) IT is not in dispute that offence under Section 498-A is not compoundable andoffence under Section 406, Indian Penal Code could also not be compounded, for the value of theproperty exceeds Rs. 250. 00. In a recent judgment in Ram Lal and Anr. v. State of Jammuand Kashmir, 1999 (1) Supreme 216 =1 (1999) SLT 317=1 (1999) CCR 29 (SC): JT 1999 ( 1) SC 147, the Supreme Court took the view that Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of thecode of Criminal Procedure, 1973 imposes a legislative ban by stating "no offenceshall be compounded except as provided by this section" and therefore, thesupreme Court refused to accede to the request of the learned Counsel to permit theoffence under Section 326, Indian Penal Code to be compounded. in Amarnath v. State of Haryana, (1978) 1 SCR 222 , the Supreme Court observed that the power under Section 482should not be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redressalof the grievance of the aggrieved parties. Accordingly, feeling it desirable the partieswere heard at length. ( 6 ) BEFORE proceeding further, it would be desirable to refer to Section 482,cr. P. C. , which reads as under: "saving of inherent powers of High Court-482. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherentpowers of the High Court to make such orders as may. be necessary ary to giveeffect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of anycourt or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. " ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner relies upon V. C. Shukla v. State, AIR1980 SC 962 in support of his contention. In that case after considering numerousearlier judgments, the Supreme Court in para 6 of that judgment while dealing witha bar similar to bar under Section 320 (9) of the Criminal Procedure Code in Section 397 (3) of the Cr. P. C. observed about the scope of Section 482 as under: ". . . SUB-SECTION (3), however, does not limit at all the inherent power of the High Court contained in Section 482, as mentioned above. It merely curbs the revisional power given to the High Court or the Sessions Judge under Section397 (1) of the Code. " ( 8 ) IN that case Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1978) I SCR 222 was alsoconsidered wherein a observation was made that the power undersection 482should not be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redressalof the grievance of the aggrieved parties. S. Murtaza Ali, J. , who was party to Amarnath v. State of Haryana (supra), was also party to the judgment in V. C. Shukla v. State (supra) and it was observed after referring to Amar Nath s case (supra) as under: "it is no doubt true that this Court held that an order summoning an accusedwas an interlocutory order but being a matter of moment it decided theimportant aspect of the trial and was, therefore, in a sense a final order whichcould be revised by the Sessions Judge or the High Court under Section 397of the Code. The observations made by this Court, however, have to be readin the light of the peculiar facts of the said case. " ( 9 ) WHILE considering the impact of non obstante clause in Section II of thespecial Court Act, the Supreme Court observed as under: THE non obstante clause which starts with the words "notwithstandinganything in the Code excludes appeals from any interlocutory order of aspecial Court. The reason for this exclusion is not far to seek. In the first place,such an exclusion is fully consistent with the object of the Act, viz. , to securethe quickest despatch and an expeditious disposal of the case so as to cut downall delays which may be caused by providing for appeal against interlocutoryorders also. As the non obstante clause expressly excludes the provisions of thecode of Criminal Procedure, we cannot call into aid the provisions of Section397 (2) of the Code which would amount to frustrating the very object whichsection II seeks to advance. " ( 10 ). THE Supreme Court in Krishnan and Anr. v. Krishnaveni and Anr. ,jt 1997 (1)657=l (1997) CCR 146 (SC) (para 14) further observed as under: IN view of the above discussion, we hold that though the revision beforethe High Court under Sub-section (1) of Section 397 is prohibited by Subsection (3) thereof, inherent power of the High Court is still available undersection 482 of the Code and as it is paramount power of continuoussuperintendence of the High Court under Section 483, the High Court isjustified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice and insetting aside the order of the Courts below. . . . " - ( 11 ) THE applicant further contends that seeing the language of Section 482, theanxiety of the framers of the Code to prevent abuse of the process of the Court orotherwise to secure the ends of justice, the High Court can pass any ordernotwithstanding anything contained in the Cr. P. C. ( 12 ) WHAT is the meaning of the phrase "otherwise to secure ends of justice?" Nodoubt this phrase may be interpreted according to ones own perception. In AIR 1992sc 603, the Supreme Court observed that the fresh trial after 33 years of occurrencewas not justified in the interest of justice. P. C. ( 12 ) WHAT is the meaning of the phrase "otherwise to secure ends of justice?" Nodoubt this phrase may be interpreted according to ones own perception. In AIR 1992sc 603, the Supreme Court observed that the fresh trial after 33 years of occurrencewas not justified in the interest of justice. ( 13 ) THE aim and object of every law is to secure just order for the purpose ofensuring greater happiness in the society. When any unmarried girl finds a wifewho has been thrown out by her husband, she is scared, suffer from fear psychosisas to what would happen to her after her marriage. The continuation of this kind ofcases will continue to create bitterness. Seeing a mother-in-law, father-in-law,brother-in-law or sister-in-law running to the Courts to save themselves from theallegations made by the estranged wife will stir fear psychosis among the would bemothers-in-law, fathers-in-law, brothers-in-taw and sisters-in-law. Insuch circumstances, this Court is supposed to ensure larger happiness by allowing the settlements between the parties, specially where the parties have started living togetheror the divorce has taken place to enable them to settle down in life and all-out efforthas to be made by each one of us to contain this ever spreading fear psychosisleading to tension and consequential strange relations. ( 14 ) SUPPOSING for the sake of argument it is accepted that this Court feelsinhibited to exercise extraordinary powers under Section 482 to quash the proceedings, the only result would that the witnesses who ate appearing in this case wouldbe forced to tell lies before the Court, making the system a laughing stock and thenet result would be the same. There would be sheer wastage of time and energy ofthe Court. The vested interests here and there may try to exploit the situation. Would it serve the ends of justice? If not, then this Court is bound to exercise powersunder Section 482, Cr. P. C. ( 15 ) I must appreciate fairness of learned Counsel for the State who submits thatin the larger interest of the society she would not oppose exercise of the power undersection 482. ( 16 ) IN the peculiar facts and circumstances and seeing that the husband andwife are living together for the last two years and for the foregoing reasons, I feel thatit would be appropriate to quash the proceedings relating to FIR No. 171/91 undersections 498-A/406, IPC, PS Chandi Mahal, Delhi. ( 16 ) IN the peculiar facts and circumstances and seeing that the husband andwife are living together for the last two years and for the foregoing reasons, I feel thatit would be appropriate to quash the proceedings relating to FIR No. 171/91 undersections 498-A/406, IPC, PS Chandi Mahal, Delhi. The petition is disposed of accordingly.