K. Muraleedharan v. V. V. Raghavan — 1999 DIGILAW 171 (KER)

Judgment :- K.A. Mohammed Shafi, J. This Election Petition is filed by the defeated candidate from 9 -Thrissur Constituency to the House of People for which poll was conducted on 28.2.1998 and the result was declared on 3.3.1998, to declare that the election of the 1st respondent - returned candidate is void and to declare that the petitioner has been duly elected from 9 -Thrissur Constituency in the election to the House of People for which poll was held on 28.2.1998. 2. The 1st respondent, who is the contesting respondent has filed a detailed written statement controverting and denying the allegations made in the Election Petition against him. He has also filed CMP No. 4942/98 to dismiss the Election Petition at the threshold without hearing it on merits. 3. The petitioner in the Election Petition who is the 1st respondent in the CMP has filed a detailed counter affidavit in that CMP and the petitioner therein has filed a reply affidavit. 4. The petitioner in the E.P. has filed CMP No. 5092/98 under O.VI R.17 of the CPC to amend the Election Petition by inserting the word 'petitioner' at the end of the paragraph under the caption 'Reliefs Claimed' and above the verification and to subscribe the signature of the petitioner above the word 'petitioner' so inserted. The 1st respondent in the E.P. vehemently opposed the petition as unsustainable and the amendment sought for is not permissible under law. Both the above petitions are heard together and this common order is passed. 5. The learned senior counsel appearing for the election petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has signed and verified the above election petition filed under S.101(b) of the Representation of the People Act to declare the election of the 1st respondent as void and to declare that the petitioner has been duly elected. According to him, in spite of the fact that the petitioner has signed at the bottom of all pages in pages 1 to 13 of the pleadings and in page 14 wherein the reliefs are claimed and verified in page 14 as contemplated under O. VI R.15 of the CPC, the 1st respondent has raised the contention that there is no signature below the reliefs claimed in the Election Petition. In order to cure that defect the petitioner has filed C.M.P. 5092/98, though the contention raised by the 1st respondent is a highly hyper-technical contention. In order to cure that defect the petitioner has filed C.M.P. 5092/98, though the contention raised by the 1st respondent is a highly hyper-technical contention. 6. The counsel for the 1st respondent has vehemently submitted that the Election Petitions liable to be dismissed at the threshold as it is defective and unsustainable under law and the defect in the Election Petition which go to the root of the case are not curable under law. According to the 1st respondent the E.P. is not signed by the petitioner. It is not verified by him. There is conflict in verification in the E.P. as well as the affidavit filed in support of the Election Petition. There is no verification of the affidavit as prescribed under law and therefore, there is no affidavit as contemplated under the election law which should entail in dismissal of the Election Petition. There is no verification in the three Annexures to the Election Petition as prescribed under law. There is omission of the number of Annexures I to III in the verification. Paragraphs 8A, 8B and 8C in the Election Petition narrating corrupt practice against the 1st respondent are very vague which are liable to be expunged and there is no cause of action against the 1st respondent in the remaining pleadings in the E.P. Therefore, the Election Petition is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. 7. The learned senior counsel appearing for the election petitioner submitted that the petitioner has filed the Election Petition as required under law and even if it is not signed, the Election Petition cannot be discarded or rejected and that defect of not signing the pleadings being an irregularity, can be rectified by invoking the power under O. VI R. H of the CPC. 8. S.81 of the Representation of the People Act deals with presentation of election petitions, and S.83 stipulates the contents of the Election Petition and S.83(1)(b) mandates that the full particulars of corrupt practice should be set forth and the petition should be verified and signed by the election petitioner. Under S.83(1)(c) the Election Petition should be signed by the petitioner and verified in accordance with the provisions of C.P.C. S.86(5) of the Act empowers this Court to amend particulars of corrupt practice. Under S.83(1)(c) the Election Petition should be signed by the petitioner and verified in accordance with the provisions of C.P.C. S.86(5) of the Act empowers this Court to amend particulars of corrupt practice. S.87ofthe Act deals with the trial of Election Petitions and S.87(1) stipulates that the trial of the election petition should be as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Civil Procedure Code to the trial of suits subject to the provisions of the Act. Art.329(b) of the Constitution of India mandates that election can be challenged only by presenting a petition as prescribed under law. Part VI of the Representation of the People Act commencing from S.79 onwards deal with disputes regarding elections and the form and procedure for challenging the elections. 9. The counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that election can be challenged by presenting an Election Petition as provided under S.80 which is in Part VI of the Representation of the People Act and therefore, an unsigned petition is not a proper petition under S.80 of the Act. He also submitted that even if the Election Petition is presented to the court by the petitioner himself as provided under S.81 of the Act, if the petition is not in conformity with S.83(1)(c) of the Act, there is no proper petition as contemplated under S.80 of the Act. S.86(1) stipulates that a petition which does not conform to Ss.81, 82 or 117 of the Act should be dismissed. Therefore, according to him, non-compliance of the provisions of S.83 of the Act is in violation of S.81 and therefore, the Election Petition should be dismissed. Therefore, he vehemently submitted that since the election petition is not signed by the petitioner, it is invalid, the defect being patent which cannot be cured after the limitation period is over, as it will amount to acceptance of a new Election Petition after the expiry of the period of limitation. 10. O. VI, R.15 of the CPC deals with verification of pleadings and O. VI, R.16 deals with striking out of pleadings. O. VI R.15(3) stipulates that the verification should be signed by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed. 10. O. VI, R.15 of the CPC deals with verification of pleadings and O. VI, R.16 deals with striking out of pleadings. O. VI R.15(3) stipulates that the verification should be signed by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed. Under O. VI, R.16, the Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to strike out or amend any matter in any pleading which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suitor which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. O.VII R.11 of the CPC deals with rejection of plaint, and the plaint can be rejected in the following cases: (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. In this case only clauses (a) and (b) of Order VII R.11 are attracted. The purpose for the stipulation of signing and verifying the pleadings or document is to certify and to pin down the authorship of the statements made in the pleadings or the document upon the person purported to have signed as provided under S.3(56) of the General Clauses Act. 11. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no need to sign at the foot of the pleadings and in this case the petitioner has signed in pages 1 to 14 of the Election Petition at the bottom of each page as contemplated under O, VI, R.15 of CPC and the failure of the petitioner to sign in page 14 after the reliefs claimed is immaterial especially considering the fact that the Election Petition is presented in Court by the petitioner himself, in person. 12. 12. In the decision in Birbal v. Thamansingh (AIR 1955 Raj asthan 91) a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court has held that even if a document contained signature at the beginning or middle of the document it is binding as if it is signed at the foot of the instrument, when the party who signed the document admits that the document is executed by him and the mere fact that he has not affixed his signature in the other pages of the instrument is of no material consequence. 13. In the decision in Hindustan Construction Co. v. Union of India (AIR 1967 SC 526) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "S.3(56) of the General Clauses Act No. 10 of 1897, has not defined the word 'sign' but has extended its meaning with reference to a person who is unable to write his name to include 'mark' with its gramatical variations and cognate expressions. This provision indicates that signing means writing one's name on some document or paper. In Mohesh Laly, Busunt Kumaree, (1881) ILR 6 Cal 340, a question arose as to what "signature' meant in connection with S.20 of the 'Limitation Act, No. IX of 1871'. It was observed that 'where a party to a contract signs his name in any part of it in such away as to acknowledge that he is the party contracting, that is a sufficient signature'. It was further observed that the document must be signed in such a way as to make it appear that the person signing it is the author of it, and if that appears it does not matter what the form of the instrument is, or what part of it the signature occurs. (7) We accept these observations and are of the opinion that so long as there is the signature of the arbitrator or umpire on the copy of the award filed in Court and it shows that the person signing authenticated the accuracy or correctness of the copy the document would be a signed copy of the award". 14. Therefore, it is clear that the cardinal question is whether the party purported to have signed the document has accepted and admitted the authorship of the statements made in the document irrespective of the fact that in what part of the document the signature occurs. 15. 14. Therefore, it is clear that the cardinal question is whether the party purported to have signed the document has accepted and admitted the authorship of the statements made in the document irrespective of the fact that in what part of the document the signature occurs. 15. In this case the petitioner has contended that even if the contention of the 1st respondent is accepted that the election petition is not properly signed, it cannot be discarded especially when the petitioner has in person presented the petition in Court as the author of the document. He also contended that even if the plaint is not signed, it cannot be discarded or rejected and the irregularity in not properly signing the pleadings can be rectified by the court by invoking the powers under O. VI R117 of the CPC. In support of the contention of the petitioner, the learned senior counsel relied upon a large number of decisions. 16. In the decision in Subbiah Pillai v. Sahkarapandian Filial (AIR (35) 1948 Madras 369) a Division Bench of the Madras High Court has held that omission to sign a plaint filed with knowledge and consent of the plaintiff is only a curable defect under S.99 of CPC 1908 and amendment should be allowed even by appellate court. 17. In the decision in Radakrishen v. Wall Mohammed (AIR 1956 Hyderabad 133) a Division Bench of the Hyderabad High Court held as follows: "If the Court comes to the conclusion that the person signing the plaint was not authorised, it should call upon the plaintiff to cure the defect and on his failure to do so, proceed to decide the question for di with and to dismissi under O.17 R. 3 if the case falls within the said provision or to reject the plaint under O.7 R.11 or under its inherent powers. O.6 R.14 which refers to the verification of the pleadings is only a matter of procedure. An omission to sign the plaint is a mere irregularity and defect of procedure, and does not affect the jurisdiction of the court." 18. O.6 R.14 which refers to the verification of the pleadings is only a matter of procedure. An omission to sign the plaint is a mere irregularity and defect of procedure, and does not affect the jurisdiction of the court." 18. In the decision in All India Reporter Ltd. v. Ramchandra (AIR 1961 Bombay 292) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has observed as follows: "(17) It is open to the Court or to the officer of the Court authorised to receive plaints to refuse to admit a plaint if it is not properly signed or properly verified. It is also open to the Court at any subsequent stage, on its own initiative or upon objection being taken by the defendant, to require the plaintiff to sign and verify the plaint, and if the plaintiff refuses to do so, the Court can refuse to take any further steps. but that does not mean that if the court requires the plaintiff to sign the plaint subsequently, the original plaint ceases to be a plaint". 19. In the decision in S.M. Banerji v. Sri Krishna Agarwal (AIR 1960 SC 368) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "(12) At this stage we must guard against one possible misapprehension. Courts and Tribunals are constituted to do justice between the parties within the confines of statutory limitations and undue emphasis on technicalities or enlarging their scope would cramp their powers, diminish their effectiveness and defeat the very purpose for which they are constituted. We must make it clear that within the limits prescribed by the decisions of this Court the discretionary j urisdiction of the Tribunals to amend the pleading is as extensive as that of a civil Court. The same well-settled principles laid down in the matter of amendments to the pleading in a suit should also regulate the exercise of the power of amendment by a Tribunal. This aspect has not been ignored by this Court in the aforesaid decision, and the Court observed, at P. 394 (of SCR):(at P.456 of ATR): "It is no doubt true that pleadings should not be too strictly construed, and that regard should be had to the substance of the matter and not the form"' 20. This aspect has not been ignored by this Court in the aforesaid decision, and the Court observed, at P. 394 (of SCR):(at P.456 of ATR): "It is no doubt true that pleadings should not be too strictly construed, and that regard should be had to the substance of the matter and not the form"' 20. In the decision in Karam Singh v. Ram Rachhpal Singh (AIR 1977 H.P. 28) a single judge of the Himachal Pradesh High Court observed as follows: "It seems tome that the requirement in Rr.14 and 15 of 0.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure that a plaint should be signed by the party and should be verified by him are purely matters of procedure, and it is always open to such party to make good the deficiency at a later stage". 21. In the decision in Prag Oil Mills Depot v. Transport Corporation of India (AIR 1978 Orissa 167) a single judge of the Orissa High Court has observed as follows: "In this case the plaint has been signed and verified by Tarachand Agarwal who was the manager and power of attorney holder of the plaintiff at the relevant time. That being so, the non-signing of the plaint by one of the parties of the firm is not such a defect as to entail dismissal of the suit on that ground." 22. From the above rulings of the Supreme Court and various High Courts it is clear that the omission to sign the plaint by the plaintiff is only a curable defect and the Court is competent to cure the defect by permitting the plaintiff to sign the plaint at any stage by resorting to the provisions under O. VIR.17 of CPC. 23. The counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that the above decisions relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner relate to amendment of pleadings under Civil Procedure Code and not regarding amendment of pleadings in an election petition instituted and prosecuted under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act and Rules framed thereunder. He submitted that strict compliance of the provisions of the Representation of the People Act and the Rules framed thereunder is warranted while considering election petitions and the Supreme Court has stated that very strict compliance should be observed regarding signing and verification of the election petitions, annexures, etc. He submitted that strict compliance of the provisions of the Representation of the People Act and the Rules framed thereunder is warranted while considering election petitions and the Supreme Court has stated that very strict compliance should be observed regarding signing and verification of the election petitions, annexures, etc. According to him, S.86(5) of the Representation of the People Act provides the extent to which amendment of the pleadings in election petitions can be allowed. He argued that the Supreme Court has gone to the extent of dismissing election petition when the copy served on the opposite side did not contain signature of the petitioner. Therefore, according to him, the above petition filed by the petitioner which does not contain his signature is invalid, and the defect is not curable after the limitation period is over. In support of the contention that amendment of the pleadings permitting the petitioner to subscribe his signature as sought for in CMP5092/98 cannot be allowed in this case, the counsel for the 1st respondent relies upon several decisions of the apex court. 24. In the decision in Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh (AIR 1957 SC 444 =i-1957 SCR 370) the Supreme Court has held that though the Election Tribunal had the power under S.83(3) of the Representation of the People Act to allow amendment in respect of any particulars of illegal and corrupt practices, or to permit new instances to be included, provided the grounds or charges were specifically stated in the petition, its power to amend a petition under O. VI, R.17 of the Code of Civil Procedure could not be exercised so as to permit new grounds or charges to be raised or the character of the petition to be so altered as to make it in substance a new petition, when a fresh petition on those allegations would be time-barred. 25. In the decision in K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunjti Thevar (AIR 1958 SC 687) the Supreme Court has held that the defect of non joinder of necessary party to the election petition cannot be cured by amendment of the election petition since the Election Tribunal has no power to grant such an amendment be it by way of withdrawal or abandonment of a part of the claim or otherwise, once an Election Petition has been presented to the Election Commission claiming such further declaration. 26. 26. In the decision in Amin Lai v. Himna Mai (AIR 1965 SC 1243) the Supreme Court has held that an election petition which has become defective by reason of the amendment allowed by the Tribunal, should not be permitted to amend further to cure the defect caused by the amendment. 27. In the decision in Mohan Raj v. Surendra Kumar (AIR 1969 SC 677) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "No doubt the power of amendment is preserved to the Court and 0.1 R.10 enables the Court to strike out parties but the Court cannot use 0.6 R.17 or 0.1 R.10 to avoid the consequences of non-joinder for which a special provision is to be found in the Act. The Court can order an amendment and even strike out a party who is not necessary. But when the Act makes a person anecessary party and provides that the petition shall be dismissed if such a party is not joined, the power of amendment or to strike out parties cannot be used at all. The Civil Procedure Code applies to the provisions of the Representation of the People Act and Rules made thereunder (See S.87). When the Act enjoins the penalty of dismissal of the petition for non joinder of a party the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be used as curative means to save the petition." 28. In the decision-in S.N. Balakrishna v. Fernandez (AIR 1969 SC 1201) the Supreme Court has held that S.83 of the Representation of the People Act is mandatory and requires first a concise statement of material facts and then requires the fullest possible particulars. It is also held that the power of amendment is given to the Tribunal in respect of particulars but there is a prohibition against an amendment which will have the effect of introducing particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition. 29. It is also held that the power of amendment is given to the Tribunal in respect of particulars but there is a prohibition against an amendment which will have the effect of introducing particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition. 29. In the decision in D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan (AIR 1976 SC 1599 =1976 (2) SCC 455) it was held that the Court has no power to allow the amendment by permitting the election petitioner to amplify a material particulars of a corrupt practice which is not specifically pleaded in the election petition itself for that would amount to introducing a new corrupt practice after the expiry of the period of limitation - a result which was never envisaged or contemplated by the statute. 30. In the decision in Sharif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani (AIR 1980 SC 303) the Supreme Court has held that the requirement that the copy of the election petition for the respondent should be attested by the petitioner under S.89(3) of the Representation of the People Act is mandatory and non-compliance with that requirement should result in the dismissal of the petition. 31. In the decision in Rajendra Singh v. Usha Ram (AIR 1984 SC 956) the Supreme Court has held that filing of incorrect copies of the election petition and the respondents receiving those incorrect copies amounts to non-compliance of S.81(3) of the Representation of the People Act and therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed. In that decision the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "A perusal of Ss.81(3) and 86 of the Act gives the impression that they do not contemplate filing of incorrect copies at all and if an election-petitioner disregards the mandate contained in S.81(3) by filing incorrect copies, he takes the risk of the peti tion being dismissed in limine under S.86. It is no part of the duty of the respondent to wade through the entire record in order to find out which is the correct copy. If out of the copies filed, the respondent's copy is found to bean incorrect one, it amounts to non-compliance of the provisions of S.81(3) which is sufficient to entail a dismissal of the election petition at the behest." 32. In the decision in Jyothi v. Debt Ghosal (AIR 1982 SC 983) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "8. If out of the copies filed, the respondent's copy is found to bean incorrect one, it amounts to non-compliance of the provisions of S.81(3) which is sufficient to entail a dismissal of the election petition at the behest." 32. In the decision in Jyothi v. Debt Ghosal (AIR 1982 SC 983) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "8. A right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy, is, anomalously enough, neither a fundamental right nor a Common Law Right. It is pure and simple, a statutory right. So is the right to be elected. So is the right to dispute an election. Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation. An election petition is not an action at Common Law, nor in equity. It is a statutory proceeding to which neither the common law nor the principles of equity apply but only those rules which the statute makes and applies. It is a special jurisdiction, and a special jurisdiction has always to be exercised in accordance with the statute creating it. Concepts familiar to Common Law and Equity must remain strangers to Election Law unless statutorily embodied. A court has no right to resort to them on considerations of alleged policy because policy in such matters, as those, relating to the trial of election disputes, is what the statute lays down. In the trial of election disputes, Court is put in straight jacket. Thus the entire election process commencing from the issuance of the notification calling upon a constituency to elect a member or members right up to the final resolution of the dispute, if any, concerning the election is regulated by the Representation of the People Act, 1951, different stages of the process being dealt with by different provisions of the Act, There can be no election to Parliament or the State and again, no such election may be questioned except in the manner provided by the Representation of the People Act. So the Representation of the People Act has been held to be a complete and self-contained code within which must be found any right claimed in relation to an election or an election dispute." 33. In the decision in Dr. So the Representation of the People Act has been held to be a complete and self-contained code within which must be found any right claimed in relation to an election or an election dispute." 33. In the decision in Dr. Anup Singh v. Abdul Ghani (AIR 1965 SC 815) the Supreme Court has observed that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of S.81(3) of the Representation of the People Act eventhough the words 'true copy' were not written on the carbon copies above the signature of the petitioner in the carbon copies of the original accompanying the election petition. In that judgment the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "(7) an exactly similar matter came to be considered by this Court in Subba Rao v. Member, Election Tribunal, AIR 1964 SC 1027. In that case also the copies were signed by the petitioner but there was no attestation in the sense that the words 'true copy' were omitted above the signature of the petitioner. This Court held that as the signature in original was there in the copy, the presence of such original signature in the copy was sufficient to indicate that the copy was attested as a true copy, even though the words 'true copy' were not written above the signature in the copies. This Court further held that there was substantial compliance with S.81(3) of the Act and the petition could not be dismissed under S.90(3). That case applies with full force to the facts 'of the present case, and it must therefore, beheld that there was substantial compliance with S.81(3) and the petitions could not therefore, be dismissed under S.90(3)." 34. In the decision in F.A. Sapa v. Singora (AIR 1991 SC 1557) the Supreme Court has held that the High Court should be liberal in allowing amendments sought within the purview of S.86(5) of the Representation of the People Act. In that judgment the Supreme Court observed as follows: "It is thus clear from this decision which is binding on us that meredefect in the verification of the election petition is not fatal to the maintainability of the petition and the petition cannot be thrownout solely on that ground. As observed earlier since S.83 is not one of three provisions mentioned in S.86(1), ordinarily it cannot be construed as mandatory unless it is shown to be an integral part of the petition under SM." 35. As observed earlier since S.83 is not one of three provisions mentioned in S.86(1), ordinarily it cannot be construed as mandatory unless it is shown to be an integral part of the petition under SM." 35. In the decision in Gajanan Kishnaji Bapat v. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe (AIR 1995 SC 2284) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "86. S.86(5) of the Act deals with the amendment of an Election Petition. It lays down that the High Court may upon such terms as to costs or otherwise, as it deems fit, allow amendment in respect of particulars but there is a complete prohibition against any amendment being allowed which may have the effect of introducing either material facts not already pleaded or introducing particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition. The first part of S.86(5) of the Act, therefore, is an enabling provision while the second part creates a positive bar. Of course, the power of amendment given in the Code of Civil Procedure can be invoked by the High Court because S.86 of the Act itself makes the procedure applicable, as nearly as may be, to the trial of election petition, but it must not be ignored that some of the Rules framed under the Act itself over-ride certain provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and thus, the general power of amendment drawn from the Code of Civil Procedure must be construed in the light of the provisions of the election law and applied with such restraints as are inherent in an election petition." 36. A careful consideration of all the above decisions of the Supreme Court establishes that the power of this Court to grant amendment of the pleadings provided under the Civil Procedure Code is available in a proceeding under the Representation of the People Act subject to the constraints provided under S.86(5) of the Representation of the People Act. It is clear that S.86(5) of the Act cannot be read in isolation of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code with regard to the amendment of pleadings. It is clear that S.86(5) of the Act cannot be read in isolation of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code with regard to the amendment of pleadings. It only lays down the constraints placed on the Court in granting amendment of pleadings and permits to amplify the particulars of corrupt practice already alleged in the petition and prohibits amendment of pleadings to introduce any particulars of corrupt practice which is not, in fact, alleged in the plaint, but that provision does not place any fetter on the powers of the High Court under O.VI R.17 of the CPC to amend the pleadings at any stage of proceeding for the purpose of determining the real controversy between the parties, though it prohibits amendment of the pleadings intended to introduce new cause of action or which goes to the root of the case. Therefore, It is clear that in this case since the petitioner has subscribed his signature at the bottom of all the pages in pages 1 to 13 of the pleadings and in page 14 wherein the reliefs are claimed and verified and has admitted the authorship of the allegations made in the election petition by presenting the same in person before the Court. The omission to subscribe the signature below the reliefs claimed in the petition is only a curable defect which is permitted under O.VI R.17 of the CPC within the limitations introduced by S.86(5) of the Representation of the People Act. Therefore, the contention of the 1st respondent mat the amendment sought for by the petitioner goes to the root of the case which is not permissible under law, is not sustainable. Hence the petitioner is entitled to amend the election petition as sought for CMP No. 5092/98. 37. The counsel for the 1st respondent contended that since there is no proper pleading as contemplated under S.81(3) of the Representation of the People Act, the election petition is liable to be dismissed. As already noted S.8 7 of the Representation of the People Act provides for trial of the election petition in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code subject to the limitations imposed under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act and the Rules framed thereunder. As already noted S.8 7 of the Representation of the People Act provides for trial of the election petition in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code subject to the limitations imposed under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act and the Rules framed thereunder. O.VI R.17 forms part of the Civil Procedure Code and there is no provision in the Representation of the People Act totally prohibiting the amendment of the election petition. S.86(1) of the Representation of the People Act provides for dismissal of the election petition, if it does not comply with the provisions of Ss.81,82.or 117 of the Act. If the non-compliance of the defect is curable under O. VI R.17 of the CPC subject to S.86(5) of the Representation of the People Act the election petition cannot be dismissed under S.86(1) of the Act as contended by the 1st respondent, O. VI R.16 of the CPC empowers this Court to order the strike out or to amend any matter in any pleading at any stage and O. VII R.11 of the CPC deals with rejection of plaint, which does not provide for rejection of the pleading if the pleading is defective. If the defect is not cured, the Court is competent to dismiss the plaint or petition. Therefore, in this case, if the defect in the pleadings found to be curable defect, the election petition cannot be dismissed due to that defect without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to cure the defect. Therefore, this contention of the 1st respondent is also not sustainable. 38. The 1st respondent has contended that there is no proper verification of the pleadings as laid down under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act and the Rules framed thereunder and therefore, the election petition is liable to be dismissed. 39. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the defect in the verification is not at all fatal and it can be cured on an appropriate motion by the parties or by the direction of the Court. According to him, there is no law warranting dismissal or rejection of the election petition due to the defect in verification of the pleadings. 40. According to him, there is no law warranting dismissal or rejection of the election petition due to the defect in verification of the pleadings. 40. It is contended by the 1st respondent that there is defect in verification of the election petition in para 11 of the petition since the source of information is not mentioned in that paragraph. 41. The election petitioner has contended that the source of information need not be mentioned in the election petition and there is no law compelling the election petitioner to give the source of information in the verification in the election petition. He also contended that mere defect in verification is not fatal to the maintainability of the election petition and therefore, the contention of the 1st respondent that the election petition has to be dismissed for want of proper verification due to the omission to give the source of information in the verification, is not sustainable. 42. It is well settled that defect in verification of the election petition is not fatal to the maintainability of the petition. In the decision in F.A. Sapa v. Singora(AIR 1991 SC 1557) already referred to in this order, the Supreme Court has held that the mere effect in the verification of the election petition is not fatal to the maintainability of the petition and the petition cannot be thrown out solely on that ground. Therefore, this contention of the 1st respondent to the effect that as there is defect in the verification in the election petition it should be dismissed at the threshold, is not sustainable. 43. The next contention raised by the 1st respondent is that there is conflict in verification in the election petition and in the affidavit filed in support of the election petition. According to him, there is inconsistency regarding the verification of para 8 of the election petition in the petition as well as in the affidavit filed in support of the election petition. In the election petition it is verified by the petitioner that the facts stated in paragraphs 1 to 7 in the petition are true to the knowledge of the petitioner and the facts stated in paragraphs 8 to 11 are based upon information received by him and believed to be true. In the election petition it is verified by the petitioner that the facts stated in paragraphs 1 to 7 in the petition are true to the knowledge of the petitioner and the facts stated in paragraphs 8 to 11 are based upon information received by him and believed to be true. In the affidavit filed along with the election petition in paragraphs 1 to 3 it is stated that the particulars corrupt practice mentioned in paragraphs 7,8A, SB and 8C of the election petition are true to the knowledge of the election petitioner. 44. The counsel for the 1st respondent vehemently submitted that the affidavit filed along with the election petition is intended to fortify what is pleaded in the election petition. But in this case, the affidavit filed by the election petitioner along with the petitioner does not support the election petition. Therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed. He also contended that in this case the petitioner has contended the defect and offered to cure the defect. But according to him, the amendment will defeat the very legislative intent to pin down to the averments made in the election petition. 45. R.94A of the Conduct of Election Rules stipulates that the affidavit referred to in the proviso to sub-s.(1) of S.83 shall be sworn before a Magistrate of the First Class or a Notary or a Commissioner of Oaths and shall be in Form 25. Para (a) of Form 25 prescribed under R.94A of the Conduct of Election Rules provides that the particulars of such corrupt practice mentioned in paragraphs ... of the election petition and in paragraphs.... of the schedule annexed thereto are true to the knowledge of the petitioner. Para (b) stipulates that the particulars of such corrupt practice given in paragraphs... of the petition and in paragraphs of the Schedule annexed thereto are true to the information of the petitioner. 46. R.82 of the Kerala High Court Rules lays down that every affidavit shall clearly express how much is the statement of the deponent's knowledge and how much is the statement of his belief, as in Form No. 7 and the grounds of belief must be stated with sufficient particularity to enable the Court to judge whether it would be safe to act on the deponent's belief. In Form No. 7 prescribed as per R.82, the concluding portion of the affidavit should be as follows.' What is stated above in paragraphs .... is true to the knowledge of the deponent and what is stated in paragraphs ... are stated on information and belief derived from records or obtained from such source and the deponent believes the same to be true. 47. In the decision in V.K. Saklecha v. Jagjvwan (AIR 1974 SC 1957) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "Section 83 of the Act. requires an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of allegations of corrupt practice. R.94A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 requires an affidavitto be in Form No. 25. Form No. 25 requires the deponent to state which statements are true to knowledge and which statements are trueto information xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 11 the source of information is required to be given under the provisions in accordance with R.7 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules. In so far as Form No. 25 of the Conduct of Election Rules requires the deponent to state which statements are true to knowledge there is no specific mention of the sources of information in the form. The form of the affidavits and the High Court Rules are not inconsistent. The High Court give effect to provisions of 0.19 of the Code of Civil Procedure." The Supreme Court also stressed the importance of setting out the source of information in the affidavits and observed as follows: "again. in A.K. Nambiar v. Union of India, (1970) 3 SCR 121 = (AIR 1970 SC 652) this Court said that the importance of verification is to test the genuineness and authenticity of allegations-and also to make the deponent responsible for allegations." 48. In the decision in Balan v. Manoharan Master (1988(1) KLT 717) this Court has held as follows: "Importance of verification has been considered in AIR 1970 SC 652 also and it was laid down that verification is required to enable the court to find out whether it will be safe to act on such affidavit evidence. In the absence of proper verification affidavits cannot be admitted in evidence" 49. In the decision in K.C. Madhava Kurup v. K. Muraleedharan (AIR 1991 Kerala 20) this Court has held that the failure to produce a proper affidavit also is violation of the provisions of the Act. 50. In the absence of proper verification affidavits cannot be admitted in evidence" 49. In the decision in K.C. Madhava Kurup v. K. Muraleedharan (AIR 1991 Kerala 20) this Court has held that the failure to produce a proper affidavit also is violation of the provisions of the Act. 50. In the decision in Abraham Kuriakose v, P.T. Thomas (AIR 1992 Keral.a 19) this Court has observed as follows: "11 The facts mentioned therein also should have been covered by the affidavit, the correctness of those facts are not affirmed in the affidavit. Therefore, the Court is not to consider the averments made by the petitioner in paragraphs 1 to 8 of the petition because those averments even though relate to corrupt practice are not supported by an affidavit. This defect in the affidavit, which was to accompany the petition is fatal and cannot be cured." 51. In the decision in Gajaiian Kishnaji Bapat v. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe (1995) 5 SCC 347) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "18. A petition levelling a charge of corrupt practice is required, be law, to be supported by an affidavit and the election petitioner is also obliged to disclose his source of information in respect of the commission of the corrupt practice. This becomes necessary to bind the election petitioner to the charge levelled by him and to prevent any fishing or roving enquiry and to prevent the returned candidate from being taken by surprise. 52. In the decision in Krishan Chancier v. Ram Lai (AIR 1973 SC 2513) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "6. at the out set it may be stated that the provision for setting out the source of information where the allegations have been verified as having been made on information and knowledge of the petitioner is not a requisite prescribed under R.94- A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, which are applicable to the filing of the election petition But when there are specific Rules made under the Act which govern the election petitions, no other Rules are applicable. Nor is the disclosure of the source of information a requisite under O. VI, R, 15(2), C.P.C. 9 In our view, there is no detect in the election petition. Nor is the disclosure of the source of information a requisite under O. VI, R, 15(2), C.P.C. 9 In our view, there is no detect in the election petition. There is no force in the submission that because the source of information had not been disclosed the allegations of corrupt practices made in the petition have to be ignored. It may also be pointed out that the logical result of the contention urged by the appellant that the affidavit is defective, if accepted, would make the election petition itself not maintainable for having filed a defective affidavit. On this ground itself the petition could be rejected, but such is not the position in law and in our view the election petition does not suffer from any defect on this score". 53. In the decision in Prabhu Narayan v. A.K. Srivastava (AIR 1975 SC 968) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "4 It is obvious that when S.123(4) speaks of publication it means distribution. Mere printing of the pamphlets would not fall under S.123(4). Therefore, the failure to give particulars of the printing cannot lead to the dismissal of the petition. Nor could evidence regarding it be shut out. The proviso to S.83(1) lays down that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. It does not say that the allegation of corrupt practice and particulars thereof should be given in the affidavit. The election petition contains the allegation of corrupt practices and particulars thereof. That this is the intention of the Legislature is also clear from a perusal of Form 25, which is the one prescribed under R.94 A of the Conduct of Election Rules. The affidavit filed in support of the election petition is in accordance with that form." 54. In the decision in K.M. Mani v. P.J. Antony (AIR 1979 SC 234) the Supreme Court has observed as follows:' "11 we find that the only objection which was taken in the written statement (paragraph 11) was that the "affidavit filed along with the petition (was) not in conformity with the requirements of law'. The law in that respect is contained in the proviso to S.83(1) which requires that the affidavit shall be in the "prescribed form'. The law in that respect is contained in the proviso to S.83(1) which requires that the affidavit shall be in the "prescribed form'. A cross reference to R.94A and Form 25 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 show that it was enough for the election petitioner to say that the statements made in the relevant paragraphs (3 to 6) were true to his "information" and that is what he has done. The decision in Saklecha turned on the Rules of the High Court, but no breach of any rule of the Kerala High Court has been brought to our notice." 55. In the decision in F.A. Sapa v. Singora (AIR 1991 SC 1557) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "27. From the text of the relevant provisions of the R.P. Act, R.94A and Form 25 as well as O.6, R.15 and O. 19, R.3 of the Code and the resume of the case law discussed above it clearly emerges (i) a defect in the verification, if any, can be cured, (ii) it is not essential that the verification clause at the foot of the petition or the affidavit accompanying the same should disclose the grounds or source of information in regard to the averments or allegations which are based on information believed to be true, (iii) if the respondent desires better particulars in regard to such avermen is or allegations, he may call for the same in which case the petitioner may be required to supply the same, and (iv) the defect in the affidavit in the prescribed Form 25 can be cured unless the affidavit forms an integral part of the petition, in which case the defect concerning material facts will have to be dealt with, subject to limitation, under S.81(3) as indicated earlier. Similarly the Court would have to decide in each individual case whether the schedule or annexure referred to in S.83(2) constitutes an integral part of the election petition or not; different considerations will follow in the case of the former as compared to those in the case of the latter. 28 Allegation of corrupt practice being quasicriminal in nature, the failure to supply full particulars at the earliest point of time and to disclose the source of information promptly may have an adverse bearing on the probative value to be attached to the evidence tendered in proof thereof at the trial. 28 Allegation of corrupt practice being quasicriminal in nature, the failure to supply full particulars at the earliest point of time and to disclose the source of information promptly may have an adverse bearing on the probative value to be attached to the evidence tendered in proof thereof at the trial. Therefore, even though ordinarily a defective verification can be cured and the failure to disclose the grounds or sources of information may not be fatal, failure to place them on record with promtitude may lead the court in a given case to doubt the veracity of the evidence ultimately tendered. If, however, the affidavit or the schedule or annexure form an integral part of the election petition itself, strict compliance would be insisted upon". 56. It is clear from the above decisions of the Supreme Court that the defective verification of the affidavit is only a curable defect. The only requirement is that the affidavit should be verified as provided in R.94A of the Conduct of Election Rules and prescribed under Form 25. No rule is framed regarding the manner of verification of affidavits to be accompanied the election petition under S.83(1) of the Representation of the People Act. In this case it is clear that the affidavit filed is in consonance with R.94A and Form 25 prescribed under the Conduct of Election Rules. The mistake in 'the affidavit with reference to the paragraphs in the election petition is only a curable defect which the learned senior counsel submitted that the petitioner is prepared to cure if directed by this Court. Therefore, the contention of the 1st respondent that as there is conflict in verification in the election petition and the affidavit filed in support thereof and there is no verification of the affidavit as prescribed under law and as such mere is no affidavit prescribed under the election law, the election petition should be dismissed, is not sustainable. 57. The 1st respondent has contended that there is no verification in the three annexures to the election petition. The three annexures to the election petition are given at pages 16,19, 20, 26 and 27. In the verification of the three annexures it is omitted to state the number of Annexure. In Annexures I and III, though in Annexure II in the verification it is stated that the document is marked as annexure- II to the election petition. The three annexures to the election petition are given at pages 16,19, 20, 26 and 27. In the verification of the three annexures it is omitted to state the number of Annexure. In Annexures I and III, though in Annexure II in the verification it is stated that the document is marked as annexure- II to the election petition. Therefore, according to the respondent the verification in Annexures I and III is not as prescribed in O. VI R.15(2) of CPC. 58. S.83(2) of the Representation of the People Act stipulates that any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition. Even though formerly the particulars regarding corrupt practice should have been given in the schedules, now the particulars regarding the corrupt practice should be given in the petition itself. The counsel for the election petitioner submitted that though three annexures are produced in this case in support of the allegation of corrupt practice alleged in this case, the petitioner cannot vouch the truth of those documents annexed apart from stating that those documents evidence the allegation of corrupt practice made by the petitioner. Therefore, according to him though the schedules are loosely called as annexures, the petitioner cannot be called upon to verify those schedules as the verification of the petition. According to him, if verification in the schedules is also needed it can be done but not as in the case of pleadings. 59. In the decision in S.N. Balakrishna v. Fernandez (AIR 1969 SC 1201) the Supreme Court observed as follows: "Formerly the petition used to be in two parts. The material facts had to be included in the petition and the particulars in a schedule. It is inconceivable thatapetition could be filed without the material facts and the schedule by merely citing the corrupt practice from the statute. Indeed the penalty of dismissal summarily was enjoined for petitions which did not comply with the requirement. Today the particulars need not be separately included in a schedule but the distinction remains. The entire and complete cause of action must be in the petition in the shape of material facts, the particulars being the further information to complete the picture." 60. Today the particulars need not be separately included in a schedule but the distinction remains. The entire and complete cause of action must be in the petition in the shape of material facts, the particulars being the further information to complete the picture." 60. The only contention raised by the 1st respondent with regard to the three annexures to the above election petition is that they are not properly verified and the number of annexure is not mentioned in the annexures in the verification. Therefore, in view of the fact that the annexures are not material facts, they need not be verified as in the case of election petition and the general mode of verification of the annexures is sufficient. The only defect in the verification in the annexures in this case viz. failure or omission to state the number of the annexure in the verification of Annexures I and III is only a curable defect and the counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner is prepared to cure the defect. Hence the contention of the 1st respondent that since there is defect in the verification of the annexures it materially affects the election petition and therefore, the election petition should be dismissed, cannot be accepted. 61. The 1 st respondent has contended that certain pleadings in this case are liable to be struck off being vague and imperfect and after striking off those portions of the pleadings the remaining part of the pleadings will not constitute a cause of action against the respondent and therefore, the election petition itself is liable to be dismissed. 62. The correct practice alleged by the petitioner in this case is only within the ambit of S.123(4) of the Representation of the People Act. Four ingredients are necessary to constitute corrupt practice under S.123(4) of the Representation of the People Act viz, (1) Publication of a statement, (2) The statement should be false or the publisher either believes to be false or does not believe to be true, (3) The statement should be in relation to the personal character or conduct of any candidate and (4) The statement being reasonably calculated or intended to prejudice the prospects of that candidate's election. 63. 63. According to the petitioner, all these ingredients are spelt out in paragraphs 6 to 8, 8A to 8C and 11 of the election petition and those allegations satisfy the requirements of Ss.83(1)(b) and 83(2) of the Representation of the People Act. According to him, the full particulars of corrupt practice to bring out a cause of action and the necessary material particulars are also set forth in those paragraphs and the annexure- i to III to the election petition. 64. The counsel for the respondent submitted that in para 8 A of the election petition the allegation is that annexure- i is distributed to the voters of several assembly constituencies at various places and no details regarding the time, date or the person who distributed is mentioned in that paragraph. He also submitted that even though it is alleged that annexure- i was affixed in the market, bus station etc., the time, place, date and the person who affixed annexure- i are not mentioned in para 8. Therefore, according to him, the allegation with regard to annexure- i is vague and is liable to be struck off. He also submitted that in para 8B allegations are made regarding distribution of annexure- II. But apart from stating that they were distributed in Thrissur, no details reading the localities in Thrissur where they were distributed are given. Therefore, according to him, the allegation being very vague and highly prejudicial to the 1st respondent regarding annexure- II is also liable to be struck off. He further submitted that in para 8C of the election petition it is alleged that annexure- III notice was distributed at Manaloor and Alagappanagar at the same time viz. by 5 p.m. on 27.2.1998. He argued that absolutely no details regarding the distribution of annexure- III is given in para 8C. He further argued that the campaign for election should end with 5 p.m. on 26.2.1998 and therefore, the allegation of distribution of annexure- III pamphlet on 27.2.1998 is inherently improbable. He also argued that if in fact such distribution of pamphlets is made the day previous to the election there should have been very serious repercussions and counter action and many things would have happened and pleaded in the election petition also. He also argued that if in fact such distribution of pamphlets is made the day previous to the election there should have been very serious repercussions and counter action and many things would have happened and pleaded in the election petition also. Therefore, he submitted that in the absence of any contemporaneous report or material with regard to this allegation produced in the electionpetition, para 8C also should be struckoff as vague. In support of the contention that the petitioner has only made very vague, imperfect and arm chair allegations which should be struck off and the election petition should be dismissed, the counsel for the respondent relied upon several decisions. 65. In the decision in Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi (AIR 1986 SC 1253) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "Under the circumstances, there is greater reason why in a democratic set-up, in regard to a matter pertaining loan elected representative of the people which is likely to inhibit him in the discharge of his duties towards the Nation, the controversy is set at rest at the earliest if the facts of the case and the law so warrant. Since the Court has the power to act at the hold the power must be exercised at the threshold itself in case the court is satisfied that it is a fit case for the exercise of such power and that exercise of such power is warranted under the relevant provisions of law." 66. In the decision in Bhagwati Prasad v. Rajeev Gandhi (AIR 1986 SC 1534) the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "4, It is now well settled that in election petitions pleadings have to be precise, specific and unabmiguous and if the election petition does not disclose a cause of action it is liable to be rejected in limine." 67. In the decision in Lalit Kishore Chaturvedi v. Jagdish Prasad Thada (AIR 1990 SC 1731) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "Mere averment that appellant exercised undue influence in absence of precise facts, namely, the nature of such influence, the persons on whom it was exercised and time and place of it the pleading in paragraphs (i) and 0) fell short of the requirement in law. Allegations fishing and roving, as were pleaded in this case could not be said to be sufficient compliance of S.83(1)(b)." 68. Allegations fishing and roving, as were pleaded in this case could not be said to be sufficient compliance of S.83(1)(b)." 68. In the decision in Subhash Desai v. Sharad J. Rao (1994 Supp (2) SCC 446) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "10 In view of the repeated pronouncements of this Court, that the charge of corrupt practice is quasi -criminal in nature, the person challenging an election on the ground of corrupt practice, cannot take liberty of making any vague or reckless allegation, without taking the responsibility about the correctness thereof. Before the Court proceeds to investigate such allegations, the court must be satisfied, that the material facts have been stated along with the full particulars of the corrupt practice alleged by the petitioner, which have been duly supported by an affidavit. In cases where the court finds that neither material facts have been stated, nor full particulars of the corrupt practice, as required by S . 83, have been furnished in the election petition, the election petition can be dismissed, not under S . 86 but under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which are applicable, read with S . 83(1) of the Act, saying that it does not disclose a cause of action." 69. The senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that sufficient and necessary particulars regarding the corrupt practice alleged against the 1st respondent are set forth in the election petition and the affidavit in support of the same and the contention of the respondent that the allegations are vague is absolutely untenable. According to him, the details with regard to the distribution of the pamphlets annexures- I to III are matters of evidence and for that purpose witnesses are cited in the petition to prove the distribution, affixture etc. of the various annexures at various places as alleged in the petition. The senior counsel for the petitioner also submitted that even if the particulars of corrupt practice set forth in a petition are insufficient the petition cannot be dismissed in limine and in such cases the petitioner should be given an opportunity to amend the petition amplifying the material particulars with regard to the corrupt practice alleged. 70. The senior counsel for the petitioner also submitted that even if the particulars of corrupt practice set forth in a petition are insufficient the petition cannot be dismissed in limine and in such cases the petitioner should be given an opportunity to amend the petition amplifying the material particulars with regard to the corrupt practice alleged. 70. In the decision in Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain (AIR 1960 SC 770) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "(8) the practice to be followed in cases where insufficient particulars of a corrupt practice are set forth in an election petition is this. An election petition is not liable to be dismissed in limine merely because full particulars of a corrupt practice alleged in the petition, are not set out. Where an objection is raised by the respondent that a petition is defective because full particulars of an alleged corrupt practice are not set out, the Tribunal is bound to decide whether the objection is well-founded. If the tribunal upholds the objection, it should give an opportunity to the petitioner to apply for leave to amend or amplify the particulars of the corrupt practice alleged; and in the event of non-compliance with that order the Tribunal may strike out the charges which remain vague." 71. In the decision in S.N. Balakrishna v. Fernandez (AIR 1969 SC 1201) already referred to above, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "37. From our examination of all the cases that were cited before us we are satisfied that an election petition must set out a ground or charge. In other words, the kind of corrupt practice which was perpetrated together with material facts on which a charge can be made out must be stated. It is obvious that merely repeating the words of the statute does not amount to proper statement of facts and the section requires that material facts of corrupt practices must be stated. If the material facts of the corrupt practice are stated more or better particulars of the charge may be given later, but where the material facts themselves are missing it is impossible to think that the charge has been made or can be later amplified. This is tantamount to the making of a fresh petition." 72. In the decision in M. Karunanidhi v. H.V. Honda (AIR 1983 SC 558) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "42. This is tantamount to the making of a fresh petition." 72. In the decision in M. Karunanidhi v. H.V. Honda (AIR 1983 SC 558) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "42. The conclusion is irresistible that the words 'copies thereof in sub-s.(3) of S.81 read in the context of sub-s.(2) of S.83 must necessarily refer not only to the election petition proper but also to schedules or annexures thereto containing particulars of any corrupt practice alleged therein. That being so, we are constrained to reverse live judgment of the High Court in so far as it holds that the photograph of the fancy banner adverted to in paragraph 18(b) could not be treated to be integral part of the election petition but was merely a piece of evidence as to the nature and type of fancy banner erected by the appellant and therefore, failure to supply a copy of the photograph to the appellant did not amount to a violation of the provisions of sub-s.(3) of S.81 of the Act". 73. In the decision in F.A. Sapa v. Singora (AIR 199 SC 1557) already referred to above, it has been observed as follows: "32 If a document does not form an integral part of the election petition but is merely referred to in the petition or filed in the proceedings as evidence of any fact, failure to supply a copy thereof will not prove fatal. Therefore, the maintainability of an election peti tion, in Hie context of the point on hand will depend on whether the schedule or annexure to the petition constitutes an integral part of the election petition or not. If it is constitutes an integral part it must satisfy the requirements of S.81(3) and failure in that behalf would be fatal. But if it does not constitute an integral part of the election petition, a copy thereof need not be served along with the petition to the opposite parly." 74. In the decision in Manohar Joshi v. N.B. Patil (AIR 1996 SC 796) the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "23. But if it does not constitute an integral part of the election petition, a copy thereof need not be served along with the petition to the opposite parly." 74. In the decision in Manohar Joshi v. N.B. Patil (AIR 1996 SC 796) the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "23. The distinction brought out in the above decisions is, that in a case where the document is incorporated by reference in the election petition without reproducing its contents in the body of the election petition, it forms an integral part of the petition and if a copy of that document is not furnished to the respondent with a copy of the election petition, the defect is fatal attracting dismissal of the election petition under S.86(1) of the R.P. Act. On the other hand, when the contents of the document are fully incorporated in the body of the election petition and the document also is filed with the election petition, not furnishing a copy of the document with a copy of the election petition in which the contents of the document are already incorporated, does not amount to non-compliance of S.81(3) to attracts. 86(1) of the R.P. Act In other words, in the former case the document filed with the election petition is an integral part of the election petition being incorporated by reference in the election petition and without a copy of the document, the copy is an incomplete copy of the election petition, and, therefore, there is non-compliance of S.81(3). In the other situation, the document annexed to the petition is mere evidence of the averment in the election petition which incorporate fully the contents of the document in the body of the election petition and, therefore, non-supply of a copy of the document is mere non-supply of a document which is evidence of the averments in the election petition and, therefore, there is no non-compliance of S.81 (3)." 75. In the decision in Ashwani Kumar Sharma v. Yaduvansh Singh (AIR 1998 SC 337) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "7 The election petition, however, is required to contain a concise statement of material facts, this being equivalent to a cause of action. The entire evidence in support of such material facts is not required to be set out. In the decision in Ashwani Kumar Sharma v. Yaduvansh Singh (AIR 1998 SC 337) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "7 The election petition, however, is required to contain a concise statement of material facts, this being equivalent to a cause of action. The entire evidence in support of such material facts is not required to be set out. From the contents of the election petition, it is not possible to hold that a concise statement of material facts is not to be found in the petition". 76. It is clear from the averments made in the petition that Annexures I to III produced by the election petitioner in this case are only evidence materials in support of the material fact of allegation of corrupt practice attracting the provisions of S.123(4) of the Representation of the People Act. The further particulars with regard to the publication of those pamphlets as to the time, place, etc. are all matters of evidence which need not be mentioned in the election petition under S.81(3) of the Representation of the People Act, they being matters of evidence. Therefore the contention of the 1st respondent that the allegations made by the petitioner with regard to the publication of annexures- I to III in paragraphs 8 A to C of the election petition are vague and therefore, those portions of pleadings should be struck off, is not sustainable. . 77. The counsel for the 1 st respondent submitted that if portions of the pleadings with regard to the publication of annexures- I to III are struck off, the remaining portion of the pleadings will, not constitute a cause of action against the respondent and therefore, the election petition itself is liable to be dismissed. The counsel also submitted that if no cause of action is made out in the election petition, it can be dismissed at the threshold or rejected under O. VI R.11 of the CPC. 78. The counsel also submitted that if no cause of action is made out in the election petition, it can be dismissed at the threshold or rejected under O. VI R.11 of the CPC. 78. In the decision in Dhartipakar v. Rajeev Gandhi (AIR 1987 SC 1577) the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "8 S.87 deals with the procedure to be followed in the trial of the election petition and it lays down that subject to the provisions of the Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the High Court as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable to the trial of suits under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Since provisions of Civil Procedure Code apply to the trial of an election petition, O. VI, R.16 and O. VI R.17 are applicable to the proceedings relating to the trial of an election petition subject to the provisions of the Act. On a combined reading of Ss.81, 83, 86 and 87 of the Act, it is apparent that those paras of a petition which do not disclose any cause of action, are liable to be struck off under O. VI, R.16, as the court is empowered at any stage of the proceedings to strike outer delete pleading which is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the petition or suit. It is the duty of the TOurttoexaininetheplaintanditneednotwaittilltliedefendanttiles written statement and points out the defects. If the court on examination of the plaint or the election petition finds that it does not disclose any cause of action it would be justified in striking out the pleadings. O. VI, R.16 itself empowers the Court to strike out pleadings at any stage of the proceedings which may even be before the filing of the written statement by the respondent or commencement of the trial If the Court is satisfied that the election petition does not make out any cause of action and that the trial would prejudice, embarass and delay the proceedings, the court need not wait for the filing of the written statement instead it can proceed to hear the preliminary objections and strikeout the pleadings. If after striking out the pleadings the court finds that no triable issues remain to be considered, it has power to reject the election petition under O. VI R.11." 79. The above claim is reiterated in various decisions of the Supreme Court as well as this Court. But in this case those principles have absolutely no application since have already found that the portions of the pleadings sought to be struck off by the respondent as frivolous, vexatious, ambiguous, imperfect etc., are not liable to be struck off. Therefore, the question whether the remaining portion of the pleadings after striking out those portions will make out a cause of action in this case, does not arise. Hence the contention of the 1 st respondent that the entire pleadings should be struck off as it does not disclose a cause of action in this case, is also not sustainable. 80. From my foregoing discussions it is clear that CMP 5092/98 filed by the petitioner in the election petition to amend the election petition has to be allowed and CMP 4942/98 filed by the 1 st respondent in the election petition to dismiss the election petition on various grounds alleged in the affidavit filed in support of the petition has to be dismissed. Accordingly CMP 5092/98 is allowed and CMP 4942/98 is dismissed. The election petitioner is directed to take steps to cure the defects in the affidavit filed in support of the election petition and the number of annexures in the verification of the annexures as pointed out in the affidavit filed in support of CMP 4942/98 by the 1st respondent. Post the election petition to carry out the amendment as prayed for in CMP 5092/ ..98 and to take steps to amend the affidavit and annexures filed along with the election petition.