Judgment A. RAMAMURTHI, J. 1. The unsuccessful plaintiffs are the appellants. The 1st appellant died and appellants 6 to 15 were brought on record as legal representatives. The 3rd appellant also died and appellants 16 to 23 were brought on record as legal representatives. Thereafter, appellant No. 9 also died and appellants 24 to 27 were brought on record as legal representatives. 2. The case in brief is as follows: The plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration that the suit properties absolutely belonged to them and also for permanent injunction. The family of plaintiffs owned large extent of properties including the schedule properties. They are mostly shop buildings built in Gramanatham, "No 291/1 in Kallakurichi. Under a partition deed dated 14.9.41 between Sheik Ahamed and his minor sons in one hand and others, there was division of properties between the family of two cousins, viz., Masthan Sheriff and Sheik Ahamed. The suit properties were set out in C schedule in the partition. They are the absolute properties of those persons. These properties should be enjoyed by the parties and the income divided between the two branches. The branch of Sheik Ahamed and the branch of the first plaintiff should take the income from these buildings in equal moieties. The parties should perform certain charities. Subject to their spending for the charities and also for repairing the buildings, the entire income has to be taken in moieties without any further liability. The parties have been enjoying these properties as their absolute properties and after partition, they were enjoyed by the sharers of two branches. The name of these parties alone are shown in Kallakurichi Panchayat records. There was another partition in 1950 amongst the plaintiffs 2 to 5. Even after this partition, the parties have been in exclusive possession of these properties as absolute owners. They have been paying the tax payable for the Panchayat and renting out the properties to various tenants and realising the income. 3. The Muthavalliship of Jumma Masjid at Kallakurichi has always been in the family of the plaintiffs. Sheik Ahmed, father of plaintiffs 2 to 5, was the Muthavalli till his death and thereafter, the plaintiffs have been the Muthavallis. 3. The Muthavalliship of Jumma Masjid at Kallakurichi has always been in the family of the plaintiffs. Sheik Ahmed, father of plaintiffs 2 to 5, was the Muthavalli till his death and thereafter, the plaintiffs have been the Muthavallis. There was a litigation between the first plaintiff on the one hand and plaintiffs 2 to 5 on the other with regard to the Muthavalliship and has been finally decided in A.S.Nos.254 of 1973 and 276 of 1973 on the file of Sub Court, Cuddalore that the plaintiffs alone are jointly entitled to Muthavalliship. The defendant also was a party to these proceedings. Subsequently, the defendant Board framed a scheme under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Wakf Act of 1951 on 9.5.1964. Mismanagement was also alleged and there was some kind of enquiry. While recognising the first plaintiffs Muthuavalliship, they appointed Khadar Sheriff Sahib and Mohamed Ummar to be in joint possession along with the first plaintiff. These properties were mistakenly treated as properties belonging to Jumma Masjid. It will not take away the valuable absolute right of the plaintiffs in the suit properties. Jumma Masjid owns separate properties. The mosque has absolutely nothing to do with these properties. The suit properties have not been dedicated for any pious, religious or charitable purpose. The liability to perform the charity is not fastened on the suit properties or on the beneficial income. It will not be a wakf within the meaning of the Wakf Act. It appears that a notification was issued by the defendant under Sec.5(2). The plaintiffs have not been given any notice of the said notification. No enquiry was done and none of the mandatory provisions had been followed. The principles of natural justice have also not been adhered to plaintiffs 2 to 5 filed suit O.S.No.74 of 1964 on the file of District Court, Cuddalore and later transferred to Sub Court, Cuddalore and numbered as O.S.No.10 of 1965 claiming the relief of declaration and for permanent injunction. the suit was coming up for trial and evidence also was taken and only at the stage of arguments, it was found out the notice under Sec.56 of Wakf Act is a pre-requisite for filing the suit and, as such, the suit filed by them was withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. the suit was coming up for trial and evidence also was taken and only at the stage of arguments, it was found out the notice under Sec.56 of Wakf Act is a pre-requisite for filing the suit and, as such, the suit filed by them was withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The plaintiffs are in uninterrupted possession of the properties and there was no interference by the defendant at any point of time. The defendant issued a notice on 12.11.1979, calling upon the tenants to pay the rent to the Wakf Board. The plaintiffs also filed W.P.No.4500 of 1979 and thereafter, the plaintiffs gave the suit notice as contemplated under Sec.56 of the said Act and the suit was filed. 4. The defendant resisted the suit, stating that the suit is barred under Sec.6(1) of the Wakf Act. The allegation that the suit properties are private and absolute properties and they were included in the partition of the years 1941 and 1950 are not correct. After dispute arose and taking advantage of the fact that the 1st Plaintiff happened to be the member of the Panchayat Board, Kallakurichi, the names must have been changed in the records. The suit properties are comprised in an area of 100 yards east-west and 100 yards north-south and they are public wakf properties. They are in R.S.No.291/1 Government Poramboke. The Jumma Masjid is in existence for more than 300 years and within the precincts there was also a Kabarasthan. The schedule properties form part of Jumma Masjid Wakf. They had been held and enjoyed and managed as public wakf by successive Muthavallis. The first plaintiff as well as others have been successively the Muthavallis and looking after the properties only in such capacity. In fact, Sheik Ahamed, father of the 1st plaintiff, has filed a suit in O.S.No.776 of 1923 on the file of District Munsifs Court, Kallakurichi, against one Khader Sheriff Sahib. The pleadings and the judgment in O.S.No.776 of 1923 and in appeal A.S.No.41 of 1926 will show that the property was found to be part of the Jumma Majid Wakf and Sherif Ahamed obtained recovery of possession only as Muthavalli. The pleadings and the judgment in O.S.No.776 of 1923 and in appeal A.S.No.41 of 1926 will show that the property was found to be part of the Jumma Majid Wakf and Sherif Ahamed obtained recovery of possession only as Muthavalli. In the face of such immemorial user and admissions by the plaintiffs and the predecessors-in-title about the public wakf character, the present claim of private ownerships is a false and fraudulent one made with a view to wrongfully appropriate to their own use, the huge income realised by way of rent from several tenants of the shops. 5. The heading for ‘C’ schedule in the partition deed itself read that they are inam properties.” The recitals further disclosed that the surplus income from the properties after performing the religious charities for the mosque and repair was to be taken by the parties thereto in turns, are self serving and fraudulent. Even by virtue of the terms in the partition deed, the suit properties are wakf properties. The plaintiffs are well aware of the survey done by the Assistant Commissioner, The 1st plaintiff himself had given the statement on 28.7.1955 as Muthavalli admitting that he is in possession and enjoyment of the inam land and also the suit properties as Muthavalli and they will produce the account later on. On the basis of the report only, the Board duly published the notification under Sec.5 of the Wakf Act. They have to institute a suit within one year if really they are aggrieved by the notification. There were several acts of misfeasance and malfeasance by the plaintiffs and wilful evasion to submit accounts. The Board has framed the scheme by constitution of a committee of three members for a term of three years, associating the 1st plaintiff also a member along with two other persons. The plaintiffs filed a suit in O.S.No.74 of 1965 without notice to the statutory Board. They are not entitled to any relief. The plaintiffs have not valued the suit property for purpose of court fees. The defendant has nominated about 12 members to form an Advisory Committee along with an Executive Officer to look after the management and they are also necessary parties and the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties also. 6. They are not entitled to any relief. The plaintiffs have not valued the suit property for purpose of court fees. The defendant has nominated about 12 members to form an Advisory Committee along with an Executive Officer to look after the management and they are also necessary parties and the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties also. 6. The trial court framed seven issues and on behalf of the plaintiffs, Exs.A-1 to A-45 were marked and P.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and on the side of the defendant, Exs.B-1 to B-24 were marked and D.Ws.1 to 3 were examined. The trial court decreed the suit was aggrieved against this, the defendant preferred A.S.No.248 of 1984 on the file of District Court, Cuddalore and the appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree of the trial court were set aside and the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved against this, the plaintiffs have come forward with the present second appeal. 7. At the time of admission of the second appeal, the following substantial questions of law were framed: (1) Whether the prior proceedings in O.S.No.776 of 1923 and A.S.No.41 of 1926 would preclude the appellants from claiming title to the suit properties. (2) Whether the judgment of the lower appellate court is not vitiated owing to its failure to frame a point and consider the question relating to prescriptive right. 8. The points that arise for consideration are: (1) whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of declaration and permanent injunction. (2) Whether the suit properties are the private properties of the plaintiffs or wakf properties as contended by the defendant. (3) Whether the suit is also barred by limitation. (4) Whether the plaintiffs have prescribed the title to the properties by adverse possession. (5) To what relief. 9. Points; The plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration that the suit properties are the private absolute properties and they continued to be in uninterrupted possession of the properties for more than the statutory period and in any event, they have also prescribed the right. They further claimed the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant, Wakf Board from taking any action in respect of these properties. The defendant mainly resisted the suit, stating that the suit properties are wakf properties and the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest were only functioning as Muthuvallis and they cannot claim any prescribed title to the properties. They further claimed the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant, Wakf Board from taking any action in respect of these properties. The defendant mainly resisted the suit, stating that the suit properties are wakf properties and the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest were only functioning as Muthuvallis and they cannot claim any prescribed title to the properties. The authorities have made proper enquiry and notification was also done as contemplated under the Wakf Act. Moreover, already there was a suit which reference to one shop concerned in the present subject matter in O.S.No.776 of 1923 and in which, the first plaintiff as well as the defendant were also parties. There is a clear finding that the properties belonged to Jumma Masjid and they are the joint Muthavallis of the properties. 10. It is admitted that item 1 of the properties consist of 14 shops and item 2 of the properties covers about 21 shops. These properties are in Gramanatham Survey No.291/1. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest were alone in management of the properties for a very long time and they have dealt with these properties in the earlier partition deeds of the year 1941 as well as 1950 as their absolute properties. It has come out in evidence that Sherif Ahamed, father of plaintiffs 2 to 5 was the Muthavalli since 1923 for Jumma Masjid. Sheik Ahmed himself was examined as P.W.1 in the earlier suit, apart from seven other witnesses. Ex.B-17 is the copy of the judgment in O.S.No.776 of 1923 and Ex.B-18 is the copy of the judgment in A.S.No.14 of 1926. There is a finding as seen from Ex.B-17 that the subject matter of the shop belonged to Pallivasal and Sheik Ahamed along was entitled to manage the same as Muthavalli and he was also entitled to recovery of possession of the said Shop. The lower appellate court also confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court and Sheik Ahamed took possession of the properties in his capacity as Muthavalli. 11. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the lower appellate court erred in holding that the decision referred in O.S.No.776 of 1923 will operate as res judicata. The prior proceedings was only with reference to one shop and admittedly, the plaintiffs father had not filed the suit in his individual capacity, but only as a Muthavalli. 11. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the lower appellate court erred in holding that the decision referred in O.S.No.776 of 1923 will operate as res judicata. The prior proceedings was only with reference to one shop and admittedly, the plaintiffs father had not filed the suit in his individual capacity, but only as a Muthavalli. The suit properties are classified in the settlement register as natham and the mosque cannot put forward title. They have also filed Exs.A-1 and A-2, the partition deeds entered into by them in 1941 and 1950 respectively, to claim that these properties were also dealt with as their absolute properties. ‘C’ schedule property under Ex.A-1 relates to the property in question. There is a clear reference that Sheik Ahamed himself can continue as Muthavalli and carry on the work. It is further stated that income realised by way of rent from ‘C’ schedule property can be collected by Sheik Ahamed for one month and by the first plaintiff in turns. They should spend money for Muharam as well as repair work in Pallivasal. There is also a specific reference in ‘C’ schedule as Inam properties. There is no reasonable explanation on the part of the plaintiffs relating to such a description in this document. However, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that the properties have not been dedicated for any pious, religious or charitable purpose, but only some expenses have to be met in equal share and this will not lead to the conclusion that the properties are wakf properties. They should explain as why these properties alone have to be shown in a separate schedule in partition deed and the intention can be gathered from the recitals in these documents. But the other properties have not be in described as inam properties. This specific reference in respect of ‘C’ schedule property would only falsify the case of the plaintiffs. 12. It is necessary to look into the provision of Wakf Act, 1954 (Act 29 of 1954), to consider the rival contentions of the parties. But the other properties have not be in described as inam properties. This specific reference in respect of ‘C’ schedule property would only falsify the case of the plaintiffs. 12. It is necessary to look into the provision of Wakf Act, 1954 (Act 29 of 1954), to consider the rival contentions of the parties. Sec.3(1) of the Wakf Act defines “wakf” means the permanent dedication by a person professing Islam (of any other person) of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognized by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and includes (i) a wakf by user but such wakf shall not cease to be a wakf reason only of the user having ceased irrespective of the period of such cessor; (ii) grants for any purpose recognized by the Muslim Law as pious, religious or charitable; and (iii) a wakf-alalaulad.” 13. Sec.3(f) defines Mutawalli. “Mutawalli” means any person appointed either verbally or under any deed or instrument by which a wakf has been created or by a competent authority to be the mutawalli of a wakf and includes any person who is mutawalli of a wakf by virtue of any custom or who is Naib-mutawalli, Khadim, Mujawar, Sajjadanashin, Amin or other person appointed by a mutawalli to perform the duties of a mutawalli and, save as otherwise provided in this Act, any person, Committee or Corporation for the time being managing or administering any wakf or wakf property. 14. It is clear from the documents filed on the side of the plaintiffs themselves that the plaintiffs are acting as Muthavalli for these properties. Previously, the father of plaintiffs 2 to 5 was acting as Muthavalli. The very fact that persons have been described as Muthavalli even in the documents filed by the plaintiffs themselves, would only lead to the conclusion that a wakf has been created and only for the purpose of management, Muthavalli has been nominated. If really the intention of the parties was only to spend a portion of the amount recovered from the rent, then there was no necessity to appoint any muthavalli. This is one circumstance to show that the intention of the parties is manifestly clear that the properties were dedicated for the purpose mentioned under this Act and the appointment of Muthavalli only fortified this contention. 15. This is one circumstance to show that the intention of the parties is manifestly clear that the properties were dedicated for the purpose mentioned under this Act and the appointment of Muthavalli only fortified this contention. 15. The definition for ‘wakf’ given under the Act includes not only wakf by user but also grant and a wakf-in-aulad. The recitals in the document established that his property has been separately described under ‘C’ schedule and, therefore, it will come under the head ‘grant’ for any purpose recognised by the Muslim Law as pious, religious or charitable. This is another circumstance to show that the property is a wakf property. 16. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the wakf Inspector had already conducted survey as provided under Sec.4 of the Wakf Act and publications was also made under Sec.5 of the Act, pointing out that it is a wakf property. No doubt, the Inspector had made a survey and notification was also issued, but the learned counsel for the appellants contended that an opportunity was not given to the plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest and, moreover, the various columns provided under Sec.4(3) of the Act have not been duly filed up. A perusal of the document viz., Ex.A-3 indicate only as Jumma Masjid and apart from that, the other columns provided under Sec.4(3) have not been filed up. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that it is a proper publication made in accordance with law and, as such, parties may not be in a position to find out whether these properties were also duly notified. No doubt, Sec.6 of the Act provides that immediately within a period of one year, it can be questioned in a civil court of competent jurisdiction. But, in the present case, the available materials indicated that necessary and proper particulars have not been provided in the notification issued by the Board and, as such, it is not possible for the parties to find out which are the properties covered under the notification and, hence, one could not expect in filing of a suit within the period allowed under Sec.6 of the said Act. Under the circumstance only, the lower appellate court also came to conclusion that it cannot be said that the present case is barred by time in view of Sec.6 of the said Act. 17. Under the circumstance only, the lower appellate court also came to conclusion that it cannot be said that the present case is barred by time in view of Sec.6 of the said Act. 17. The next contention put forward by the learned counsel for the respondent is that already the father of plaintiffs 2 to 5 instituted a suit with reference to one item of property in O.S.No.776 of 1923 before a competent court of law and the suit was also filed in his capacity as Muthavalli for recovery of the said property. There is a clear admission in the plaint itself that the property is a wakf property and he was the Muthavalli, managing the same. On the basis of the admission, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the admission is binding on the plaintiffs also. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on D.S.Mohite v. S.I.Mohite D.S.Mohite v. S.I.Mohite D.S.Mohite v. S.I.Mohite , A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 153 wherein it is observed that admission on question of fact and admission can be considered in subsequent proceedings regarding the same subject matter. There is no dispute about this proposition. 18. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on Dasarathi Chamar v. Balmukunda , A.I.R. 1959 Ori. 38 wherein it is stated that an admission can be used as against the party making it only when the admission is taken as a whole. Hence, mere recital in the judgment that the tenant admitted surrender cannot be admissible as an admission to be used against him unless the entire deposition is placed on record. Similar view has also been reiterated in Dundabahadur Singh v. Durga Prasad Singh Dundabahadur Singh v. Durga Prasad Singh Dundabahadur Singh v. Durga Prasad Singh, A.I.R. 1953 Pat. 346. 19. Reliance was also placed upon another decision in Ambika Prasad v. Ram Ekbal Rai Ambika Prasad v. Ram Ekbal Rai Ambika Prasad v. Ram Ekbal Rai , A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 605 wherein it is observed that admission made by witness in other litigation is admissible against him alone and not against other defendants. There is no dispute about this proposition, but the applicability of the same depends upon the fact and circumstances in each case. 20. The learned counsel for the appellants strenuously contended that even assuming that there was a decree in O.S.No.776 of 1923, it will not operate as res judicata. There is no dispute about this proposition, but the applicability of the same depends upon the fact and circumstances in each case. 20. The learned counsel for the appellants strenuously contended that even assuming that there was a decree in O.S.No.776 of 1923, it will not operate as res judicata. The father of plaintiffs 2 to 5 filed the suit and Exs.B-17 and B-18 are the copies of the judgment in the trial court as well as in the appellate court. The appellants contended that the earlier dispute was only with reference to management of the properties and not with reference to the nature of the properties. Further more, apart from the copies of the judgments, the pleading in the case were not filed and the statement made in the judgments alone cannot be made use of to apply Sec.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A perusal of Exs.B-17 and B-18 indicated that there is a finding to the effect that the properties covered in the case as well as other shops concerned belonged to Pallivasal as inam properties. The filing of the earlier suit as well as the finding are not disputed by the appellants. In the light of the finding, the burden of proof would be more heavy on the appellants to establish that they are the private absolute properties. No doubt, the appellant have filed number of documents to show that they have paid kist to the Panchayat Board and even the assessment stood in their names. It is necessary to state that the plaintiffs and their predecessors were members of the Panchayat and as they were holding the posts, they were able to get the assessment in their names and payment of the tax would not clothe them with absolute right in the properties, more so, when admittedly they are Muthavallis for these properties. 21. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on Mohd. S.Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa Mohd. S.Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa Mohd. S.Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa , A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1569 wherein it is observed that the best method to decide the question of res judicata is first to determined the case of the parties as put forward in their respective pleadings of their previous suits, and then to find out as to what had been decided by the judgments which operate as res judicata. Hanifa , A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1569 wherein it is observed that the best method to decide the question of res judicata is first to determined the case of the parties as put forward in their respective pleadings of their previous suits, and then to find out as to what had been decided by the judgments which operate as res judicata. It is well settled that pleadings cannot be proved merely by recitals of the allegations mentioned in the judgment. There is no dispute about this proposition. Reliance was also placed upon another decision of this Court in Ramalinga Bajanai Madam, etc. v. Gerart Papammal and others Ramalinga Bajanai Madam, etc. v. Gerart Papammal and others Ramalinga Bajanai Madam, etc. v. Gerart Papammal and others , (1998)1 MLJ. 468 : (1998)2 L.W. 371 wherein it is observed that, “where the causes of action are different, even a dismissed of the first suit by the court after contest on the merits is no bar to the maintainability of a second suit, even though the defences may be the same in the two suits.” The facts in the case referred to above clearly indicate that it cannot be made applicable to the case on hand. There is already a finding in the case referred to about that the defendants have no right over the suit property by virtue of the sale deed and a finding was given relating to title in favour of the plaintiff and only under such circumstances, it was held that the plaintiff in that suit is entitled to the reliefs as prayed for. In view of the documents filed on the side of the defendant and also in the capacity of the Muthavalli only, the plaintiffs and their predecessors dealt with the properties, there is no difficulty in come to the conclusion that the earlier decision will operate as res judicata and it is no longer open to the plaintiffs to contend that they are separate properties. It has also come out in evidence that at the time of preliminary survey, the statement from one of the plaintiffs was also recorded and thereafter only, a scheme was also framed relating to the properties in question. 22. Ex.B-23 dated 9.5.1964 is an order passed by the State Wakf Board. It has also come out in evidence that at the time of preliminary survey, the statement from one of the plaintiffs was also recorded and thereafter only, a scheme was also framed relating to the properties in question. 22. Ex.B-23 dated 9.5.1964 is an order passed by the State Wakf Board. There is a finding that of prior administration of the Jumma Masjid Wakf and to ensure that the income from other properties was properly utilised, committees were also appointed. Ex.B-24 is the suit register extract relating to the suit O.S.No.776 of 1923. Column 5 under Ex.B-24 indicated that the suit was filed for establishing plaintiffs right to the plaint mentioned properties and for recovery of the same through court. As adverted to, Sheik Ahamed, the father of plaintiffs 2 to 5 alone filed the said suit in his capacity as Muthavalli. There is nothing in this document to show that the properties were ever claimed as private properties and this being so, naturally plaintiffs 2 to 5 are also bound by the result of the case. 23. The learned counsel for the appellants also relied upon a decision in Karnataka Wakf Board v. State of Karnataka , A.I.R. 1996 Kar. 55 relating to the notification issued under Sec.5 of the Act, It is stated as follows: “When the plaintiff has taken a contention that there is no enquiry held as required under Sec.4(3) of the Act and consequently the list published under Sec.5 of the Act is not legal and is not binding on the plaintiff, it was for the defendants to have proved by adducing satisfactory evidence that a valid enquiry has been held and the plaintiff had notice prior to such enquiry. …In the absence of such evidence, it has to be held that there is no enquiry at all under Sec.4(3) of the Act in the eye of law and consequently the list published without such enquiry is illegal.” Even in the present case, there is no satisfactory evidence on the side of the defendant to show that the enquiry was conducted in accordance with Sec.4(3) of the Act and, as such, by virtue of the publication under Sec.5, it cannot be made use of by the defendant. 24. 24. The learned counsel for the appellants relied upon another decision of this Court in C.Balasundaram v. C.Abdulla Badsha C.Balasundaram v. C.Abdulla Badsha C.Balasundaram v. C.Abdulla Badsha , 84 L.W. 252. wherein it is stated that it is well settled that if once the courts come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit properties, the declaration prayed for and the injunction prayed for must automatically follows. The applicability of the decision depends upon the facts and circumstances in each case. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that admittedly possession of the properties continued only with the plaintiffs and their predecessors from 1923 onwards. They have also partitioned the properties as early as 1941 and subsequently in 1950 also. They have gone to the extent of even stating that they have also prescribed the title to the properties by adverse possession. But the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants cannot be accepted. It is admitted that the plaintiffs are acting as Muthavallis in respect of these properties and prior to that their father was acting as Muthavalli for these properties. The records filed in the case also indicated that the earlier suit in O.S.No.776 of 1923 was also filed in the capacity as Muthavalli. So long as they were acting as Mutavallis, the possession of the properties cannot be said adverse to the interest of the defendant Board. The decision referred to above also indicated that the courts below have concurrently found that the defendant in that suit have neither title nor possession of the property and only under such circumstance, the finding was given to that effect. In the present case, there is abundant material to come to the conclusion that the properties are wakf properties and there is nothing to show that they are the private properties. When the defendant had established the title to the properties, I am of the view of that the plaintiffs are not entitled to get the relief of declaration and injunction. 25. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on Surendrakrishna Roy v. Shree Shree Ishwar Bhubaneswari Thakurani , A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 295 wherein it is observed that the possession of two joint shebaits does not become adverse to the idol, even when they openly claim to divide the property between them. 25. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on Surendrakrishna Roy v. Shree Shree Ishwar Bhubaneswari Thakurani , A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 295 wherein it is observed that the possession of two joint shebaits does not become adverse to the idol, even when they openly claim to divide the property between them. The fact of their possession is in accordance with the idols title, and the change made by them in the intention with which they hold, evidenced by an application of the rents and profits to their own purpose and other acts does not extinguish the idols right, because such a change of intention can only be brought home to the idol by means of the shebaits knowledge and the idol can only re-act to it by the shebaits. The principle enunciated in the decision can be made applicable to the facts of the case also and there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that any length of possession of the properties by the plaintiffs in their capacity as Muthavallis would not enable them to claim any title by adverse possession and, as such, this claim was also rightly rejected by the lower appellate court. 26. It is admitted that the Board framed a scheme under Ex.B-23 dated 9.5.1964. Plaintiffs 1 to 4 were also parties to this proceedings. Aggrieved by this, they filed a suit in O.S.No.74 of 1964 before the District Court, Cuddalore and later, it was transferred to Sub Court, Cuddalore and re-numbered as O.S.No.10 of 1965. Admittedly, the suit was taken up for trial and parties have also let in evidence. When the suit was nearing completion only, the plaintiff withdrew the suit since statutory notice as contemplated under Sec.56 of the Act was not given and they were also given liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. This order was passed on 31.12.1970 as seen from Ex.A-7. However, it is necessary to state that the plaintiffs have not chosen to file any suit till 1982. If really the plaintiffs thought that the properties are their private properties and having obtained liberty to file a fresh suit on the file a suit for a period of nearly twelve years. Only when the Wakf Board issued notice, calling upon the tenants to pay the rent, the plaintiffs were driven to the necessity of filing, a suit in 1982. Only when the Wakf Board issued notice, calling upon the tenants to pay the rent, the plaintiffs were driven to the necessity of filing, a suit in 1982. This is one more circumstance to indicate that since the possession of the properties continued with the plaintiffs and they were collecting the rent, they want to squat on the properties by adopting all dilatory tactics and as the plaintiffs lack in bona fide they are not entitled to claim any relief in the suit. 27. The respondents have positively established that the suit properties belonged to Jumma Masjid Pallivasal at Kallakurichi, by positive evidence. The appellants already filed W.P.No.4500 of 1979 as seen from Ex.B-22 and obtained an interim order. Thereafter only, the statutory notice under Sec.56 of the Act was issued by them and the suit was filed. The Wakf Board has issued notice and thereupon only the appellants filed the writ petition before this Court. Already the Wakf Board has appointed 12 persons in the Committee to run the administration. In all fairness, the plaintiffs/appellants ought to have impleaded them as parties in this proceedings. They have deliberately impleaded only the Wakf Board, ignoring the Committees already appointed by them. The learned counsel for the appellants further stated that if necessary, the matter can also be remitted back to the trial court in order to enable both parties to let in further evidence and to establish their case. I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. Both parties have filed the documents in their custody and they have also let in available evidence. It is not the case of the appellants that they are in possession of some other documents and they could not file the same and, as such, they enquire one more opportunity to establish their case. The case can be remanded only if felt necessary in the interests of justice. Now, the case has bene filed as early as 1982 by the plaintiffs and more than 17 years have already passed. There is absolutely no valid reason or justifiable cause for remanding the matter and the remand at best, would enable the plaintiffs to squat on the properties and collect the rent and spend for their personal expenses rather than fulfilling the desire of the persons, who have dedicated the properties for pious, religious or charitable purpose. There is absolutely no valid reason or justifiable cause for remanding the matter and the remand at best, would enable the plaintiffs to squat on the properties and collect the rent and spend for their personal expenses rather than fulfilling the desire of the persons, who have dedicated the properties for pious, religious or charitable purpose. The lower appellate court has considered all the contention raised by the appellants and it is a well considered judgment. It cannot be said that there is erroneous application of law or non-consideration of material evidence adduced by the parties. The documents filed by the parties clearly establish that the suit properties are wakf properties and the plaintiffs were only Muthavallis, managing the properties and they are not the private properties. There cannot be any prescription do title to the properties by adverse possession since they are only functioning as Muthavallis. Since it is a second appeal and as the finding is not perverse and all the points had been reasonably considered by the lower appellate court, no interference is called for. 28. For the reasons stated above, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.