Order: This is a petition under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, filed by the Public Prosecutor for quashing the order of committal in P.R.C. No. 3 of 1964. on the file of the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Tirupati and to direct him to proceed with the enquiry after examining the approver. The short facts relevant for the disposal of this petition may be stated thus: A-1 to A-3, A-6 and A-7 are residents of Kolar District in Mysore State. A-4, A-5, and A-8 are residents of Chittoor District. A-8 was a peon in the Andhra Bank at Tirupati. Between 5th March, 1960 and 31st August, 1960, at Kolar and Tirupati, the said accused along with the approver, one T.R. Sampangi Ram Gupta of Sugutur, Mysore State, entered into a criminal conspiracy on different dates to cheat the Agent, Andhra Bank Limited, Tirupati, and the Secretary, Tirupati Town Co-operative Bank, Limited, by pledging spurious gold jewels representing them to be real gold, as security and obtaining loans on the strength of that security. Pursuant to that conspiracy, they obtained loans. It is not necessary to state all the details regarding the modus operandi or the actual amounts in respect of which the Banks were cheated. The learned Magistrate, perused the records under section 173(4), Criminal Procedure Code, and was of the opinion that A-1 to A-8 conspired for the purpose of cheating the two banks as alleged by the prosecution. He also found that A-2 and A-3 forged the loan applications and promissory notes, which are valuable securities, in the names of fictitious persons for the purpose of cheating, that none of the accused repaid the loans taken by them, and that the accused had, thus conspired and cheated the said banks. Having regard to the documents filed, and the other circumstances appearing in the case, the Magistrate felt that there was sufficient ground for committing the accused to take their trial in the Court of Sessions. Accordingly, a charge was framed against A-1 to A-8 under section 420 read with section 120-B, Indian Penal Code, under section 420, Indian Penal Code, against A-1 to A-6 under section 420 read with section 109, Indian Penal Code, against A-7 and A-8 and under sections 467 and 468, Indian Penal Code against A-2 and A-3. The charges were read over, and copies of the same were furnished to the accused. The charges were read over, and copies of the same were furnished to the accused. They were committed to take their trial before the Court of Sessions, Chittoor, under section 207-A(10), Criminal Procedure Code, for the offences as stated above. During the trial before the Additional Sessions Judge, Chittoor, the prosecution realised that it committed a mistake in not examining the approver in the committal Court and prayed for two months’ time for having the committal order quashed. Time having been granted by the Sessions Judge, this petition was filed in this Court. The learned Public Prosecutor contends that in the instant case one of the accused was granted pardon, and he had to be examined as an approver under section 337(2), Criminal Procedure Code every person accepting a tender under section 337(1) shall be examined as a witness in the Court of the Magistrate and also in the subsequent trial and it is after such examination, if the Magistrate is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is guilty of an offence commit him for trial to the Court of Sessions. It is also contended that in cases where there was an approver, the committal is under section 337(2-A), Criminal Procedure Code, but not under Chapter XVIII of the Code. The order of committal passed by the Magistrate is, therefore, manifestly illegal and should be quashed. In support of his contention the learned Public Prosecutor placed reliance on a decision of a Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Kalu Khoda and others v. The State1. Inthat case, two contentions were raised, (1) that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to tender pardon and (2) that even assuming he had jurisdiction, the failure to examine the approver in the committal Court had rendered the committal order passed by him illegal and liable to be quashed. It may be noted that the applications in that case for quashing were also filed by the State. The learned Judges held that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had no power to tender pardon under section 337(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It may be noted that the applications in that case for quashing were also filed by the State. The learned Judges held that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had no power to tender pardon under section 337(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Having answered that question they considered whether the committal proceedings and the order would be illegal, if in breach of section 337(2), Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate committed the accused to the Court of Sessions without the prosecution examining the person who has been tendered pardon and who has accepted the same. That question was answered in the affirmative. The observations of Shelat, J. (as he then was) may usefully be extracted: “There is no doubt that whereas section 207-A is a general provision laying down procedure for all-committal proceedings, section 337(2-A) is a special provision touching cases where a person concerned in an offence is made an approver. Though section 207-A was enacted later than section 337 (2-A) the former cannot be said to have been superimposed on the latter. The committal order passed in a case where a person is made an approver is not one made under Chapter XVIII, but is one made under section 337(2-A), and therefore, the procedure laid down for committal proceedings in section 207-A must be read subject to the express provision of sub-section (2-A) of section 337. * * * * * * * The discretion left to the prosecution to adduce such evidence as it think fit before the committing Court under section 207-A(4) does not apply to a case under section 337(2-A) in view of the imperative language used in sub-section (2) of section 337, and the stage provided for in sub-section (2-A) thereof, when a committal order can be passed, viz., after the acceptance of tender of pardon and the examination of the person accepting such tender. Besides, under sub-section (2-A) of section 337 a Magistrate comes to the conclusion that there is a prima facie case against an accused person, not only from the police papers as in the case falling under section 207-A, but from he materials before him including the examination of the person who has been tendered pardon. That appears to be clear from the fact that sub-section (2) expressly requires such a person to be examined. That appears to be clear from the fact that sub-section (2) expressly requires such a person to be examined. * * * * * * * The tender of pardon is made onthe footing that an approver shall make a full and frank disclosure at all stages of the case. That being so, the failure to examine him before the committing Magistrate would not only be in breach of the express provisions of sub-section (2) of section 337 but would also be inconsistent with and in violation of the duty to make a full disclosure at all stages. The breach of sub-section (2) of section 337, therefore, is of a mandatory rather than a mere directory provisions and such a breach would tender the proceedings and the order illegal. The intended benefit for an accused for which sub-section (2) of section 337 appears to have been enacted would seem to consist in (1) that the approver would have to disclose his evidence at the preliminary stage before the committal order is pissed and (2) that an accused thus not only knows that the evidence is against him but gets an opportunity to rely uponthe deposition of an approver before the committing Court for the propose of proving the approver’s evidence at the trial untrustworthy, if there are contradictions or improvements. There can be thus no question that if the approver is not examined at both the stages as required by sub-section (2) the accused in the trial would lose this benefit and it cannot be gainsaid that he would be prejudiced if he were to lose the opportunity of showing the approver’s evidence unreliable. It would be deprivation of an important and in some cases a vital right which would cause him prejudice resulting in failure of justice. Even if, therefore, the breach of sub-section (2) is not to be regarded as illegal section 537 of the Code would not cure such an irregularityand that section cannot be invoked to cure any such irregularity.” The learned Judges, therefore, held that a non-compliance with the procedure indicated in section 337(2) not only renders the committal illegal but results in serious prejudice to the accused, and on both the grounds it should be set aside. I follow this decision with respect. I follow this decision with respect. In the instant case, Sri Chenakesava Reddy on behalf of the accused, contends that it is not the accused that is complaining of the illegal committal, but the prosecution and that when the prosecution sought to examine the approver in the Sessions Court, they objected to it on the ground that he was not examined in the committal Court. In other words, he contends that his clients are entitled to take advantage of the serious mistake committed by the prosecution. I am afraid that is not the correct way of looking at the matter. Neither the prosecution nor 1 he accused can afford to obtain victory by a trick. The Criminal Procedure Code is intended in the best interests of the accused as well as prosecution, and lays down wholesome procedure. In following the same, it may sometimes happen as in the instant case that the accused may be put to a little inconvenience and hardship. But on that ground a wholesome rule introduced in the interests of the accused in the shape of section 337(2) and (2-A), Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be permitted to be violated and a committal made in violation of that rule be upheld. There c an be no doubt that the committal order in the instant case is vitiated and must be quashed. I, therefore, make the rule absolute, set aside the order of committal passed by the Judicial Second-Class Magistrate, Tirupati, committing the accused to the Court of Sessions, and direct him to hold a fresh enquiry in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. G.S.M. ----- Order of committal quashed; fresh enquiry ordered.