JUDGMENT M. R. Verma, J.:- These two Revisions are directed against the judgment dated August 1,1998 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla, therefore, having arisen out of the same judgment of the learned Sessions Judge and the same questions of facts and law being involved therein these are disposed of by a single judgment. 2. Brief facts leading to the presentation of these Revision Petitions are that on 13.7.1991 at about 10 PM PW-6 Ravinder Kumar, Station House Officer, Theog accompanied by a few other police officials went to Fagu where he got the secret information that truck No. HPS-3268 lodged with illicit timber was to leave Theog to Shimla that night without any valid papers for transportation thereof. On receipt of this information a nakka was laid at Fagu. AT about 2 AM the truck appeared from Theog side. PW-6 Ravinder Kumar signalled the driver by lighting a torch to stop but the driver instead of stopping the truck accelerated its speed. The police party chased the truck in a Jeep. When the truck reached near Galu the driver further accellerated its speed whereupon PW-6 Ravinder Kumar fired a shot from his service revolver puncturing one of the rear tyre of the truck which led the truck to stop. The truck was found leaded with 71 scants of Deodar and 10 scants of kail. The driver of the truck was accused Kishori Lal. Accused Prem Singh and its Conductor. Kehar Singh, Sadh Ram and Gian Singh were the other occupants of the truck. On demand by the police the driver and other occupants of the truck could not produce any document regarding transportation of the timber. Even otherwise the timber could not be transported during night time even on a valid permit. In view of the provisions of HP. Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 1978. The timber and truck therefore, seized, accused were arrested and a case under Section 379 of the I.P.C. and Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act and Section 179 of the Motor Vehciles Act was registered against the accused persons. The value of the Deodar!- scants was assessed at Rs.88,208.52 and that of the kail scants at Rs.14,21111. The timber and truck therefore, seized, accused were arrested and a case under Section 379 of the I.P.C. and Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act and Section 179 of the Motor Vehciles Act was registered against the accused persons. The value of the Deodar!- scants was assessed at Rs.88,208.52 and that of the kail scants at Rs.14,21111. On submission of the charge-sheet by the police the accused-petitioners feame to be tried by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Theog who vide his judgment dated 29.10.1996 convicted them under Section 3791.P.C., Section 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act and Section 179 of the Motor Vehicle Act and sentenced them under Section 379 I.P.C. to rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay fine of Rs.2,000/- each and in default of payment el fine to undergo further imprisonment for two months. They were further sentenced to imprisonment for six months and to pay fine of Rs.500/- each under Section 41 of the Indian Forest Act in default of payment of fine to undergo further imprisonment for 15 days each. A fine of Rs.100/- each was imposed on the accused under Section 179 of the Motor Vehicles Act and in default of payment of fine they were to undergo imprisonment of five days each. The sentence of imprisonment on all counts was made to run concurrently. 3. Feeling aggrieved accused Kehar Singh, Kishori Lal, Prem Singh and Gian Singh preferred criminal appeal No. 10-S/10 of 1996 and accused Sadh Ram preferred Criminal appeal No. 18-S/l 0 of 97/96 before the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla who by the impugned judgment partly accepted the appeals to the extent that conviction and sentence imposed on the accused under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 42 of the Indian Forest Act and Section 179 of the Motor Vehicles Act were affirmed and the appeals to this extent were dismissed. Hence the present Revision petitions. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the accused and the learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent and have gone through the records. 5. Hence the present Revision petitions. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the accused and the learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent and have gone through the records. 5. The impungned conviction and sentence have been assailed by the learned Counsel for the accused on the following grounds: (a) Non-joining of independent witnesses despite prior information of alleged illicit transporation of timber; (b) Carrying on investigation by the police officer who is the complainant in the case; (c) The case having been falsely made as a measure of retaliation on | refusal of the accused to provide the truck in question to the police for patrol duty; (d) The timber having been measured not on the spot but at the police station; (e) None production of the labourers who unloaded the truck; and (0 Not taking any assistance from Police Post Fagu which is close to the place of seizure of the truck. 6. It may be pointed out at the very outset that the revisional power of the High Court though very wide is purely discretionary to be exercised fairly according to the exigencies of each case. It is well settled that such power is normally to be exercised only in axceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently there had been a flagrant mis-carriage of justice. It is to be exercised only for correcting injustice and not mere illegality. Revisional Court thus is not expected to act as a Court of appeal and the jurisdiction is not to be ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court(s) have taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record. The Revisional Court would not interfere with the order of the lower Court unless it is shown to be perverse or without evidence or not tenable in law or simply because other view is possible (see Narain Tiwari v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954SC 126,Amar Chand Agrawalla v. Shanti Bose, AIR 1973 SC 199,Akalu Ahir v. Ram Deo Ram, AIR 1973 SC 2145, Duli Chand v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1975 SC 1960, SPS Jayam and Co. v. Neharu Sadan & Anr., AIR 1977 S.C. 1621, Thakur Das (Dead) by LRs. v. Neharu Sadan & Anr., AIR 1977 S.C. 1621, Thakur Das (Dead) by LRs. v. State of M.P. & Anr., AIR 1978 S.C. 1, State of Orissa v. Nokula Sahu & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 663, Pathumma & Anr, v. Muhammad, AIR 1986 SC 1436 and State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 1126. 7. It is in view of the above settled position in law that I proceed to »;\amine the matter in hand. Ground-(a): 8. It was contended for the accused that the information about the alleged illicit transporation of the timber had been received by the police at about 10.30 P.M. Before proceeding to do the Nakabandi no independent witness was associat4d in the raiding party and no independent witness was joined as a member of the police party from Fagu or Galu, therefore, the provisions of Section 100(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been violated and the illegality committed is fatal to the case of the prosecution. To support his contention the learned Counsel Was relied on State of H.P. v. Retu Raj, 1992(1) SLC351 and Kingett Edward Christophu v. State of H.P. 1996(2) SU H93, 9. There is no independent witness m this case and the prosecution has relied on the statements of officials witnesses, some of whom are police officials and other are Forest officials. The version of such officials about the involvement of the accused in the commission of offences punishable under Section 42 of the Indian Forest Act and 179 of the Motor Vehicles Act has been believed by both the courts below. The appellate Court has vide its judgment repelled the contention that no independent witness from the locals!); had been associated and this constitute gross violation of law and entitled the accused to acquittal. In view of the settled proposition of law and the facts and circumstances of the case the learned Sessions Judge is right in doing so. 10. The object of the provisions of Section 100(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to ensure an honest and genuine search and to prevent trickery by planting the incriminating article(s) to be found on search. Non-compliance of these provisions may weaker the evidence about the search and recovery but it does not in itself affect the validity of the treat or conviction. Non-compliance of these provisions may weaker the evidence about the search and recovery but it does not in itself affect the validity of the treat or conviction. Thus it is only a rule of caution which is embodied in Section 100(4) Cr. P.C. providing for associating independent witnesses in conducting a search to further land assurance to the testimony of the official witnesses but the mere fact that no independent witness has been associated in the search is no ground by itself to disbelieve the official witnesses or to record acquittal of the accused irrespective of the reliability of the statements of the official witnesses. 11. In this case as per the contents of the Ruqua Ex.PW-6/A and the statement of PW-6 Ravinder Kumar the information available with the police was that timber was illegally transported towards Shimla in truck HPS 3268 and that the said information was believable. Thus the purpose behind Nakabandi appears to be more of apprehension of the offending truck then search thereof. The said information was received by the police at about 10.30 P.M. It can be inferred from the material on the record that even the police was not sure about the time of arrival of the truck at the place of Nakabandi which according to the witnesses arrived there at about 2 AM in the night. It is the case of the prosecution that Nakabandi was done at a place where there is no habitation. This version finds support even from a suggestion put by the defence to Investigating Officer (PW-6) that there is no house where the Nakabandi was done and the suggestion has been admitted by the Investigating Officer. Against the aforesaid background particularly the fact that truck reached at the place of Nakabandi in the dead of nights, the learned Sessions Judge is right in observing that no witness could be available at the dead of the night. 12. The facts of the cases State of H.P. v. Retu Raj and Kingett Edward Christophu v. State of H.P. supra relied by the learned Counsel for the accused are distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. 12. The facts of the cases State of H.P. v. Retu Raj and Kingett Edward Christophu v. State of H.P. supra relied by the learned Counsel for the accused are distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. In both the said cases this Court was dealing with searches under the Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances Act which provides for compliance of a few other requirements for search made under the said Act and some of such requirements are mandatory and non-compliance thereof renders the search therein illegal. While referring to the provisions of Section 100(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in both the aforesaid cases the court observed that non-compliance/want of a strict compliance of the provisions of Section 100(4) will be an irregularity and not illegality, therefore, will not vitiate the proceedings or the trial illegal. But each case, in this respect, will have to be judged on its own merits. 13. In view of the legal position regarding effect of the non-compliance of the provisions of Section 100(4) of the Cr. P.C, facts and circumstances of the case in hand, as already stated here-in-above, and the concurrent findings of the facts recorded by the courts below, which are not perverse or based on no evidence but supportable on the basis of the material on record, it cannot be held that the conviction and sentence imposed on the accused are not sustainable. Ground-(b): 14. it was contended for the accused that FIR in this case was registered on the basis of Ruka Ex.PW-6/A drawn up by PW-6 Ravinder Kumar S.H.O. and the investigation in the case was also held by him. Thus, the F.I.R. having been recorded at the instance of PW-6, he was a complainant in the case and since he acted as investigator also, therefore, investigation cannot be said fair and for this reason lone the impunged conviction and sentence are liable to be set aside. To substantiate his submission the learned Counsel has placed reliance on Megha Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1995 SC 2339 and Gyan Chand v. The State of Rajasthan, 1993 Cri. L.J. 3716. 15. In case Megha Singh v. State of Haryana supra the Honble Supreme Court has held as under: "4........ We have also noted another disturbing feature in this case. L.J. 3716. 15. In case Megha Singh v. State of Haryana supra the Honble Supreme Court has held as under: "4........ We have also noted another disturbing feature in this case. PW-3 Siri Chand, head Constable arrested the accused and on search being conducted by him a pistol and the cartridges were recovered from the accused. It was on his complaint a formal first information report was lodged and the case was initiated. He being complainant should not have proceeded with the investigation of the case. But it appears to us that he was not only the complainant in the case but he carried on with the investigation and examined witnesses under Section 161, Cr. P.C. Such practice, to say the least, should not be resorted to so that there may not be any occasion to suspect fair and impartial investigation." 16. A bare reading of the above make it clear that the observations herein-above sounds a note of caution that such a situation may give occasion to suspect the fairness and impartiality of the investigation. However in my humble view it may have to be examined in view of the facts and surrounding circumstances of each case where suspecion so raised, in the facts and circumstances of such case is such that it will render the investigation retirely illegal as a result whereof the accused therein may have to be acquitted. 17. In case Gyan Chand v. The State of Rajasthan supra it has been held as under: "11.......In the facts of the case, I find that the status of Investigating Officer, Pratap Singh could not be place on any pedestal higher than of a complainant and the complainant himself cannot be the sole agency of investigation. In my humble opinion the prosecution in this case suffers from the basic infirmity as aforesaid and it is a question which goes to the very root of the matter and in the facts of the case it must be held to be sufficient to vitiate the whole investigation. In my humble opinion the prosecution in this case suffers from the basic infirmity as aforesaid and it is a question which goes to the very root of the matter and in the facts of the case it must be held to be sufficient to vitiate the whole investigation. Once I find that the whole bedrock of the investigation on the basis of which the appellant has been prosecuted is found to be unfair and against the basic tenets of criminal jurisprudence, the conviction and sentence based on such a highly infirm investigation as aforesaid cannot be sustained in the eye of law and accordingly the whole proceedings based on such investigation as aforesaid deserved to be quashed and set aside, which I hereby do." 18. In the aforesaid case the accused was charged for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Physhot-ropic Substances Act. The Investigating Officer therein on receipt of source information recorded the same and proceeded to make search and recovered the opium from the house of the accused. The search was conducted by the Investigating Officer in the presence of Kheta Ram and Palekar. It also appears that the searched house was in possession of the accused, his family members and a few tenants. At the trial the only independent search witness Khetaram was produced who denied the factum of search and recovery and the other independent search witness was not examined. Thus, in view of the fact that this was a case under the N.D.P.S. Act which provides for authorisation of officers of different departments including police department to conduct the search and seizure and separately provides for authorisation of Officers or a class of Officers of different departments except the police department to carry out investigation has provided an improved and slightly different procedure for search, seizure and thus for investigation of the cases there under, the only independent witness examined for the prosecution having denied the search and seizure and there being other occupants in the house wherein the opium was recovered, the fact that the Officer who lodged the F.I.R. and investigated the case could easily lead to the conclusion that the investigation therein was not fair. However, in this case no circumstance has been shown even to be probable which my raise suspicion about the fairness of investigation. However, in this case no circumstance has been shown even to be probable which my raise suspicion about the fairness of investigation. No doubt the defence has tried to show that it is a case of retaliation as the accused refused to give the truck to the police for patrol purposes but there is no merit and substance in this allegation with which I shall deal hereafter. Ground-(c): 19. It was contended for the accused that PW-6 SHO Ravinder Kumar had demanded the truck in question for patrolling but the driver accused Kishori Lal refused to oblige, therefore, the said SH.O. Fabricated this case against them. This defence has been taken by the accused persons in their statements under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The accused however has not led any evidence to prove this plea of defence. So much so that it has not been suggested to PW-6 Ravinder Kumar in his cross-examination that he demanded the truck for patrol duty and on refusal of the accused this case has been fabricated by I him as a measure of retaliation nor this suggestion has been put to any other material prosecution witnesses. The defence thus taken is, therefore, simply an afterthought. Ground-(d) and (e): 20. Since both these grounds can be conveniently dealt with together, therefore, are taken up together for consideration and determination. 21. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the accused that the timber in question was not measured on the spot but was measured at the police station raising doubt about the genuineness of the recovery and that none of the labourers who unloaded the truck at the police station has been produced which multiplies the suspicion about the genuiness of the recovery of the timber from the possession of the accused. 22. As already seen above the truck in question was apprehended in the dead of light, that is, at about 2 A.M. In such a situation the measurement of the timber on the spot at the time of seizure of the truck evidently was not possible. Therefore, as per the version of the prosecution the truck was brought to Theog and thereafter the measurement of the seized timber was got done from the Forest Officials. 23. Therefore, as per the version of the prosecution the truck was brought to Theog and thereafter the measurement of the seized timber was got done from the Forest Officials. 23. PW-1 kanshi Ranrthe then B.O. Theog and PW-3 the then Forest Guard Shall beat have measured the timber at Theog and hammer marked it add they have supported this version. The list of the seized timber, that is, Deodar scants is Ex.PW-1/B whereby the total value of the seized timber has been worked out in the sum of Rs.88,208.52 and that of the Kail scants has been worked out in the sum of Rs14, 211.11. There is no suggestion that this value has been incorrectly shown. Thus, the total timber seized was worth more than rupees one lakh and keeping in view the value of the seized timber it is not probable that police might have managed to plant the timber of such huge value to implicate the accused whereas even the timber of much lesser value could be planted to implicate the accused for the same offence and with the same consequences. The contention, therefore, does not hold good that not measuring the timber on the spot or non-examination of the labourers who un-loaded the truck is fatal to the case. Ground-(f): 24. It was further urged by the learned Counsel for the accused that police post Fagu was near the place of Nakabandi by the police but no assistance from that police post has been taken nor anyone from such post has been joined in the police party and/or in the Naka. It is not disputed for the prosecution that the Naka was laid near Police Post Fagu. However, a Naka party which was constituted at Police Station Theog was not required to take an police officials from police post Fagu as a member of such party. Therefore, it does not in any manner affect the merits of the case that no official from Fagu police post was joint in the police party constituted for the Nakabandi at Theog. 25. It may however be pointed out here that the trial Court has sentenced all the accused persons under Section 179 of the Motor Vehicles Act to pay fine of Rs100/- each and such conviction and sentence has been maintained by the appellate court. 25. It may however be pointed out here that the trial Court has sentenced all the accused persons under Section 179 of the Motor Vehicles Act to pay fine of Rs100/- each and such conviction and sentence has been maintained by the appellate court. It is the case of the prosecution which is proved on record that it was accused Kishori Lal who was driving the truck at the time when the police signaled to stop it but it was not stopped but was drive away at a higher speed. The dis- obedience of the police signal, therefore, is attributable only to accused Kishori Lal who was driving the truck and not to other accused person. Therefore, it is only accused Kishori Lal who could have been lawfully convicted and sentenced under Section 179 of the Motor Vehciles Act and the conviction and sentence imposed on other accused, therefore, is illegal and not sustainable and is, therefore, liable to be set-aside. 26. As a result these Revision Petitions are partly allowed to the extent that conviction of and sentence awarded to accused Kehar Singh, Prem Singh, Gian Chand and Sadh Ram under Section 179 of the Motor Vehicles Act is set aside. The conviction of and sentence imposed on accused Kishori Lal under Section 42 of the Indian Forest Act and Section 179 of the Motor Vehicles Act and conviction and sentence imposed on other accused under Section 42 of the Indian Forest Act are maintained. Fine of Rs.100/- each imposed on accused Kehar Singh, Prem Singh, Gian Chand and Sadh Ram under Section 179 of the Motor Vehicles Act if recovered by refunded to them. The Revision Petitions are accordingly disposed of. The accused are directed to surrender to their bail bonds before the trial Court within one month of the passing of this judgment failing which the trial Court will issue warrants for their arrest and commie them to jail to serve out the sentence imposed upon them.