Judgment :- T. Meenakumari, J. 1. The writ petition is for the issue of writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records from the file of the first respondent vide proceedings in reference No. Nil, dated 19.3.1990 confirming the order of the second respondent vide proceedings in reference No. Nil, dated 22.2.1989 and quash the same and consequently direct the respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service, with back wages and continuity of service. 2. It has been argued on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner has joined as clerk in the first respondent bank on 15.2.1962. He was promoted as a Headclerk in the year 1971 and subsequently in the year 1972 he was promoted as Officer Grade-II. In the year 1976 he was promoted as Officer Grade I and subsequently he has been promoted in the Middle Management Grade II in the year 1984. Till February, 1985 he was posted as a Branch Manager in the Thanichayam Branch (Madurai District). While he was working as the Branch Manager of the said Branch an allegation was made against him stating that he was favouring certain persons in the matter of grant of loan. During February, 1985 he was transferred from Thanichayam Branch to the Regional Office at Madurai. Then again he was transferred to Kumbakonam Branch and reverted as ordinary officer. The Regional Manager, Madurai issued a memo dated 2.8.1996 calling for his explanation on the said allegation. The memo was based on the alleged complaint received from the members of the public during September and October, 1984. In the memo it has been stated that an investigation was made on the said complaint and after a detailed enquiry the allegations against the petitioner came to be proved. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 30.9.1986. On 13.7.1987 the second respondent issued charge sheet and asked for the explanation before the initiation of the disciplinary action. On 2.11.1987 the enquiry officer was appointed. The enquiry officer submitted his report on 15.12.1988. On the basis of the said report, the disciplinary authority - the General Manager (Operation) came to the conclusion of removal of the petitioner from service and recommended the same to the second respondent by his order dated 21.2.1989. By order dated 22.2.1989, the second respondent agreeing with the order of the disciplinary authority, imposed punishment on the petitioner for removal from service. By order dated 22.2.1989, the second respondent agreeing with the order of the disciplinary authority, imposed punishment on the petitioner for removal from service. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the first respondent on 4.4.1989. The first respondent rejected the appeal by his proceedings dated 19.3.1990. The said order of rejection is impugned in this writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that the charge sheet was framed on an allegation which has no basis. He has also argued that the enquiry itself is vitiated as the authorities have violated the principles of natural justice and no reasonable opportunity was afforded to the petitioner in the course of enquiry. It has also been argued that during the course of domestic enquiry, statement of witnesses were not produced. Learned counsel has also argued that the appellate authority has not properly considered the appeal while confirming the punishment of removal. He has further argued that as the appellate authority has failed to consider the appeal in proper perspective, the order of the appellate authority dated 19.3.1990 confirming the order of the second respondent dated 22.9.1989 is vitiated. Learned counsel has relied upon the following decision to substantiate his contention that there was no proper consideration of the appeal by the appellate authority. 1. Ram Chandar v. Union of India and Ors. 1986 II CLR 10 S.C. 2. Arokiadoss v. The Deputy Commissioner of Police, 1989 Writ L.R. 274. 3. P. Rajasekaran v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 1990 Writ L.R. 113. 4. M. N. Prasad v. Board of Directors, Rayalseema Grameena Bank, 1994 (7) SLR 174. 5. Executive Committee, State Bank of Hyderabad v. D. Dhaneswara Rao, 1996 (4) SLR 138. 6. M. A. Kalam v. The Registrar (Management), High Court, A.P., Hyderabad, 1996 (4) SLR 476. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as per Sub-rule (2) to Sec. 51 of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules where an appeal has been preferred, the appellate authority shall consider whether the findings are justified and/or whether the penalty is excessive or inadequate and pass appropriate orders. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as per Sub-rule (2) to Sec. 51 of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules where an appeal has been preferred, the appellate authority shall consider whether the findings are justified and/or whether the penalty is excessive or inadequate and pass appropriate orders. The appellate authority may pass an order confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it deems fit in the circumstances of the case. Learned counsel has submitted that there was total non-application of mind by the appellate authority as no reasons were assigned in the order especially on the question of punishment. He has also argued that this Court cannot exercise the appellate jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, while reviewing the order made by the disciplinary authority and it can interfere only when the disciplinary authority has committed manifest errors of law on the finding recorded by it is without any basis but cannot interfere in the assessment of evidence. He has further argued that when the order passed by the appellate authority is based not in conformity with the provisions to the Regulations, that order is subject to judicial review, under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. The point to be met in this writ petition is whether the appellate authority has considered the appeal as laid down under the provisions of Rule 51(2) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules. Rule 51(2) reads as follows : "An appeal shall be preferred within 45 days from the date of receipt of the order appealed against. The appeal shall be addressed to the appellate authority and submitted to the authority whose order is appealed against. The employee may, if he so desires, submit an advance copy to the appellate authority. The authority whose order is appealed against shall forward the appeal together with its comments and records of the case to the appellate authority. The appellate authority shall consider whether the findings are justified and/or whether the penalty is excessive or inadequate and pass appropriate orders. The authority whose order is appealed against shall forward the appeal together with its comments and records of the case to the appellate authority. The appellate authority shall consider whether the findings are justified and/or whether the penalty is excessive or inadequate and pass appropriate orders. The appellate authority may pass an order confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it deems fit in the circumstances of the case." Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that there was no proper consideration of the appeal as laid down by the Supreme Court in Ram Chandar v. Union of India and Ors. 1986 II CLR 10 S.C. The Apex Court in the above judgment has laid down the law that the word 'consider' has different shades of meaning and must in Rule 22(2) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 in the context in which it appears, mean an objective consideration by the Railway Board after due application of mind which implies the giving of reasons for its decision. 5. In this case, the appellate authority, in its order has observed as follows : "The appellant also has averred that there was lack of application of mind on the part of the Disciplinary Authority and Appointing Authority who imposed on him the penalty of removal from service. On going through the records, I observe that there were enough evidence indicating the fact that the disciplinary authority duly analysed the findings of the Inquiry Officer before making his recommendations to the appointing authority. In fact a copy of the recommendations of the disciplinary authority was supplied to the appellant. The appointing authority also after due application of mind agreed with the findings of the disciplinary authority, inquiry officer and imposed the penalty conformable with the service rules. The appellant, therefore, cannot allege that there is lack of application of mind on the part of the concerned authorities and as such this contention is not acceptable to me. The appellant has maintained throughout that there was no proper evidence/witnesses to prove the charges. After a thorough examination of the records and also in view of what is stated by me above, I do not accept this contention. The appellant has maintained throughout that there was no proper evidence/witnesses to prove the charges. After a thorough examination of the records and also in view of what is stated by me above, I do not accept this contention. The appellant has not brought out any new facts/evidences in support of the plea that charges were not proved. The inquiry officer has given sufficient reasons for his finding that the charges were proved. I do not, therefore, see any reason to interfere with the order made by the appointing authority imposing on the appellant the penalty of 'removal from service'. I, therefore, do hereby reject the appeal of Shri C. V. Raman." From the above, it could be culled out that the appellate authority has come to the conclusion that the petitioner herein has not brought out any new facts. The appellate authority has not given any other finding so as to come to the conclusion that there was proper consideration of the appeal. In R. P. Bhatt v. Union of India, the Supreme Court has observed as follows which can be usefully referred to with advantage : "The word 'consider' in Rule 27(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965, implies 'due application of mind'. It is clear upon the terms of Rule 27(2), that the appellate authority is required to consider, (1) whether the procedure laid down in the rules has been complied with; and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice; (2) Whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record; and (3) Whether the penalty imposed is adequate; and thereafter pass orders confirming, enhancing etc. the penalty, or may remit back the case to the authority which imposed the same. Rule 27(2) casts a duty on the appellate authority to consider the relevant factors set forth in clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. There is no indication in the impugned order that the Director General was satisfied as to whether the procedure laid down in the Rules had been complied with and if not, whether such non-compliance had resulted in violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice. There is no indication in the impugned order that the Director General was satisfied as to whether the procedure laid down in the Rules had been complied with and if not, whether such non-compliance had resulted in violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice. We regret to find that the Director General has also not given any finding on the crucial question as to whether the finding of the disciplinary authority were unwarranted by the evidence on record. It seems that he only applied his mind to the requirement of clause (2) of Rule 27(2) viz., whether the penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There being non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 27(2) of the Rules, the impugned order passed by the Director General is liable to be set aside." 6. Learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the enquiry held was proper and the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that a major penalty of dismissal should be imposed in view of the gravity of the charges. Taking into consideration of the evidence on record the authorities have imposed the major penalty of dismissal. He has further argued that the appellate authority concurred with the reasons of the disciplinary authority and there is no necessity for giving separate reasons. He has also argued that the impugned order is not vitiated on account of lack of reasons. 7. I am of the view that the appellate authority should conform to the Regulations. The word "to consider" has been interpreted by the Apex Court in the above cited judgment to mean an objective consideration after due application of mind. The appellate authority did not consider the gravity of the punishment with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case. The appellate authority has failed in its duty in considering whether the punishment of removal is proper under the particular circumstances of the case. The disciplinary authority has passed an order basing on the evidence but the appellate authority did not consider the material on record in the light of Regulation 51(2). The appellate authority should have considered whether the evidence recorded was sufficient for imposing the penalty. In my view, the appellate authority did not consider the matter as laid down under Regulation 51(2). The appellate authority should have considered whether the evidence recorded was sufficient for imposing the penalty. In my view, the appellate authority did not consider the matter as laid down under Regulation 51(2). In the circumstances, it has to be held that there was no proper application of mind by the appellate authority while considering the appeal preferred by the petitioner herein and the impugned order is vitiated on the above ground. In view of the above, I reject the contentions made by the learned counsel for the respondents. The writ petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P. No. 19069 of 1996 is closed.