Judgment.- The Health Inspector of the Badagara Municipality has filed this appeal against the judgment of the District Magistrate, Kozhikode acquitting the respondent (accused) who had been convicted by the Sub-Magistrate of Badagara for an offence under section 355(1)(c)read with section 250 of the Kerala Municipalities Act (XIV of 1961), (hereinafter referred to as the Act). On 21st May, 1962 the Municipal Commissioner served the accused with a notice requiring him within 7 days of the receipt of notice to demolish his building bearing Municipal door No. 6/210 as it was in a dilapidated and ruinous condition. Again on 22nd June, 1962 a second notice was served giving seven days’ time to execute the work. Service of notice is admitted by the accused, but he pleaded that he could not comply with the notice as the tenants were in actual occupation of the building. The accused having failed to comply with the notice the complaint; was filed on 30th January, 1963. Section 355(1)(c)penalises the failure to comply with the direction given to a person or any requisition lawfully made upon a person under or in pursuance of the provisions of any of the sections or Rules under the Act. On the evidence the learned Magistrate found the accused guilty and convicted him and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs.50 in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. On appeal the District Magistrate acquitted the accused on the ground that the order and direction were not lawful; and secondly that even if it were lawful the accused could not have complied with it as tenants were in occupation. Regarding the second point if the occupier or tenant of a building had prevented the owner from complying with the notice issued by the municipality there is provision under section 375 of the Act for the owner to report the fact to the Commissioner and the Commissioner can give an order requiring the said occupier to permit the owner within 8 days from the date of service to execute all such work as may be necessary and for the period during which he is prevented as aforesaid, be exempt from any fine or penalty to which he might otherwise have become liable by reason of default in executing such works. The accused has no case that he had actually attempted to comply with the notice and the occupiers prevented him and that he had sent intimation of this fact to the Municipality as required under the provisions of section 375. So this plea is of no avail. Coming to the question whether the notice issued was lawful where the executive authority of a Municipality issues an order under the provisions of the Act it is not open to the criminal Court to acquit the accused on the ground that the order is not proper and is not lawful and what the Court has only to see is whether the provisions of law have been complied with and the question whether the discretion has been reasonably and properly exercised cannot be the subject of scrutiny by the criminal Court. It will be open to the Court to find out whether the order of the statutory body was made without jurisdiction. But where the order is in the legitimate exercise of jurisdiction vested in the statutory body and passed bona fide after considering the materials before it, even if the order is wrong on the merits, the Court cannot hold it to be wrong. It is not the function of the criminal Court tosubstantiate its judgment as an appellate authority. It is for the Commissioner with the help of his engineering staff, if any, to satisfy himself whether any particular building is in a ruinous condition necessitating an order under section 250 of the Act to be issued. It is his subjective satisfaction that is important. If aggrieved there is provision made under section 364 of the Act to appeal to the Council, and even the Government has revisional powers. It is not open to the Court to sit in judgment over the Commissioner’s finding and hold that the notice issued by the Municipality is not correct. So both the grounds relied upon bythe learned District Magistrate to reverse the conviction cannot stand. However, the order of acquittal has to be confirmed on the ground that the prosecution is barred under section 389 of the Act. So both the grounds relied upon bythe learned District Magistrate to reverse the conviction cannot stand. However, the order of acquittal has to be confirmed on the ground that the prosecution is barred under section 389 of the Act. Section 389 reads as follows: “No person shall be tried for any offence against the provisions of this Act, or of any rule, or bye-law made under it, unless complaint is made by the Police or the Commissioner or by a person expressly authorised in this behalf by the Council or the Commissioner within three months of the commission of the offence ..........” The offence is deemed to have been committed when the notice served upon the accused is disobeyed and limitation begins to run from such date. The date of commission of the offence is next day after the expiry of the time granted to the accused by any notice from the Municipality. Here in this case no ice was served on 26th June, 1962 and a week’s time was granted. Prosecution in this case was started only on 30th January, 1963, which is more than three months as provided under section 389 of the Act, and the prosecution is thus clearly barred by limitation. Any explanation given by the accused or any extension by the Municipality, both being after the date of the offence are ineffectual in extending the period of limitation (vide the decision in Kumud Kumari Deasi v. Corporation of Calcutta1). In the result the order of acquittal is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed. M.C.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.