Order: The prosecution evidence establishes beyond doubt that the accused was in possession of a gunny bag containing two hot water bags which contained arrack. This was what was discovered when he was sitting in a bus. So he was prosecuted for an offence punishable under section 59(b)of the Mysore Prohibition Act, and the charge against him was that he was in possession of an intoxicant. The argument advanced by Mr. Ramachandra Rao was that it was not proved that the accused was in possession of any intoxicant since the gunny bag which contained the hot water bags was only behind the back of the petitioner in the bus and that it was just possible that some other passenger might have introduced it after or before the petitioner sat in the bus. This argument, to my mind, is entirely unacceptable. The gunny bag was found right behind the back of the accused and between him and the rear portion of the seat. It was not necessary for the prosecution to produce any further evidence in proof of his being in possession of the arrack. The next argument advanced was that arrack of which the accused was in possession was not an intoxicant and that possession by the accused of arrack was not an offence punishable under section 59 (b)of the Mysore Prohibition Act. The relevant part of that section reads: "59. Penality for illegal cultivation and collection of hemp and other matters- Whoever, in contravention of the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or order made, or of any licence, permit, pass or authorisation issued thereunder- ***** (b) consumes, uses, possesses or transports any intoxicant or hemp; ***** shall, on conviction be punished- * * * * *" So what is punishable under this part of the section in a case of this description is possession of an intoxicant. But the argument advanced by Mr. Ramachandra Rao is that arrack is not an intoxicant as defined by the Act. But the argument advanced by Mr. Ramachandra Rao is that arrack is not an intoxicant as defined by the Act. Now the word "Intoxicant" is defined by section 2 (17) of the Act which reads: "‘Intoxicant’ means any liquor or any intoxicating drug or any other substance which the State Government may, by notification, declare to be an intoxicant"; Since according to this definition, intoxicant means any liquor in addition to other substances, it would be necessary to look into the definition of liquor contained in section 2 (19) of the Act which reads: "‘Liquor’ includes spirits of wine, denatured spirits, wine, beer, toddy and all liquids consisting of or containing alcohol, and any other intoxicating substance, which the State Government may, by notification, declare to be liquor for the purpose of this Act; The clear meaning of these two definitions in so far as they are relevant for the purpose of this case is this: Every liquor is an intoxicant according to section 2 (17). So, if arrack is liquor, it is an intoxicant. Whether arrack is liquor or not, is again to be decided on the basis of the definition contained in section 2 (19). The argument maintained by Mr. Ramachandra Rao was that since arrack is not an intoxicant within the meaning of section 59 (b), unless it is liquor falling within the definition contained in section 2 (19) of the Act, and since arrack does not fall within that definition, it is not liquor. It is the correctness of this submission which required investigation. The reason why according to Mr. Ramachandra Rao arrack does not fall within the definition contained in section 2 (19) of the Act is that arrack was not declared by the State Government by notification to be liquor for the purpose of the Act. The stress of the argument was that no substance is liquor within the meaning of section 2 (19) unless it is a spirit of wine or denatured spirit or wine, beer or toddy or unless it is a liquid consisting of or containing alcohol or is some other intoxicating substance and the State Government declares that liquid or substance by notification to be liquor for the purpose of this Act. Mr. Mr. Ramachandra Rao does not dispute that if a substance is a spirit of wine, denatured spirit wine, beer or toddy it falls within the first part of the definition in section 2 (19) of the Act and would therefore be clearly liquor. Since arrack is not to be found in this opening part of the definition, Mr. Ramachandra Rao urged that it cannot be considered as liquor for the purpose of the Act unless it falls within the other part of the Act which reads: " and all liquids consisting of or containing alcohol, and any other intoxicating substance, which the State Government may, by notification, declare to be liquor for the purpose of this Act." It is not disputed before me by Mr. Ramachandra Rao that arrack consists of or contains alcohol, nor does he controvert that arrack is an intoxicating substance. But what he urges is that although a liquid may consist of or contain alcohol and although a substance may be an intoxicating substance, neither that liquid nor that substance would be liquor for the purpose of the Act falling within the definition unless there is a declaration by the State Government by notification that it is liquor for the purpose of the Act. The question posed is not without difficulty. Mr. Murlidhar Rao, the learned Government Pleader, advanced the argument that the words "which the State Government may, by notification, declare to be liquor for the purpose of this Act" contained in section 2 (19) do not govern the words “and all liquids consisting of or containing alcohol” but only the expression “and any other intoxicating substance.” In other words, his argument was that if a liquid consisted of or contained alcohol, it is clearly liquor for the purpose of the Act, even though there is no declaration by the State Government that it is so. It was urged that a declaration by the State Government was necessary only if it is intended that an intoxicating substance should be considered to be liquor for the purpose of the Act. So put, the provisions of section 2 (19) of the Act may present some difficulty. It was urged that a declaration by the State Government was necessary only if it is intended that an intoxicating substance should be considered to be liquor for the purpose of the Act. So put, the provisions of section 2 (19) of the Act may present some difficulty. What follows if Murlidhar Rao is right is that every liquid consisting of or containing alcohol would be liquor for the purpose of the Act even without a declaration by the State Government to that effect, while an intoxicating substance however intoxicating it may be will not be liquor for the purpose of the Act unless there is a declaration. The strange consequence which may ensue by the acceptance of the argument would be that an intoxicating substance containing a large percentage of alcohol or other intoxicating drug would not be liquor unless there is notification, while a liquid consisting of or containing a very small percentage of alcohol would nevertheless be liquor for the purpose of the Act even without such declaration. It is, however, not necessary in this case to pursue this discussion or to express any opinion on the validity of the two competing interpretations placed before me of section 2(19) of the Act since this case can be disposed of on other and shorter ground. Now section 2 (19) is an inclusive definition. What it does is to state that liquor includes those substances which are referred to in that definition. What the definition first does is to say that it includes all spirits of wine, denatured spirits, wine, beer and toddy. These substances are clearly liquor falling within the definition for the purpose of the Act, there being no necessity or need for any declaration by the State Government that they are liquor for the purpose of the Act. That is what clearly follows from the phraseology and the language of section 2 (19). Then what that clause of the section does is to say that certain other substances are also liquor for the purpose of the Act and those substances are divided into two categories. One category consists of liquids consisting of or containing alcohol and the other consisting of intoxicating substances. It is this part of the definition that has presented a controversy whether a declaration is necessary in respect of both categories or whether it is necessary only in the case of the latter. One category consists of liquids consisting of or containing alcohol and the other consisting of intoxicating substances. It is this part of the definition that has presented a controversy whether a declaration is necessary in respect of both categories or whether it is necessary only in the case of the latter. I have already observed that I desist from expressing any opinion on that debatable question. But what is of importance is that section 2(19) incorporates an inclusive definition. It is a firmly established rule that if a definition is an inclusive definition, what is included in the definition may have been included not merely because what is so included would not be within the definition unless it is so included, or such inclusion may be due to the fact that although what is so included is clearly what is defined according to the natural import of the word which is defined it is included by way of super abundant caution. That is what was explained by this Court in Krishnamurthy v. State of Mysore1, as to how an inclusive definition has to be understood. Now what section 2(19) does is to define liquor, and what that definition does is to give an inclusive definition. It opens with the words “liquor includes” and not with the words “liquor means”. So it is obvious that every substance which is liquor according to the natural import or meaning of the word “liquor” is undoubtedly liquor. Spirits of wine, denatured spirits, wine, beer and toddy are also included in the definition and becomes liquor for the purpose of the Act not because if there had been no inclusion of those substances in the definition that they would not have been liquor but obviously by way of super-abundant caution. Liquor, according to the natural import of that word, according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary means “liquid” (usually fermented or distilled) for drinking (maltale, beer, porter, etc.). The question is whether arrack is one such liquid, and I have no doubt in my mind it is. In 2 Encyclopaedica Britannia page 471, arrack is described in the following way: “Arrack, Rack, or Rak is a name given to many strong dry spirits, distilled all over the East for local consumption. The question is whether arrack is one such liquid, and I have no doubt in my mind it is. In 2 Encyclopaedica Britannia page 471, arrack is described in the following way: “Arrack, Rack, or Rak is a name given to many strong dry spirits, distilled all over the East for local consumption. It is well known in Indonesia, China, India, Ceylon, as well as in Egypt, Turkey and Greece; one variety from the East Indies, of a pale yellow colour, is exported, According to some authorities, the name is derived from the Arabic word arak (sweat), i.e., the”sweat“or sap of a certain tree. It is more likely that it is derived from the arecanut, from which a common variety of arrack was long made in India. Different ingredients are used according to local custom. In Ceylon, arrack is distilled from palm toddy, made from either the palmyra palm (Borassusfla belliformis) or the cocoa palm (Cocos nucifera). In India, the flowers of the nowrah or mahua tree (Bussia latifolia) and fermented rice or millet are generally used as well; sometimes poppy leaves and hemp are also added. The usual fermenting agent is molasses. Some arrack, especially that made in primitive conditions, has a high content of methyl alcohol and a large proportion of by-products, such as fuel oils, which make the spirit both fiery and potentially poisonous. In each case the character of the spirit will depend upon the ingredients used and the method of distillation; local arrack may be injurious, but it may be clean if scientifically distilled. The manufacture of arrack is diminishing, owing to the wider distribution of more commercial spirits, such as vodka and brandy. Much of the arrack that is manufactured in used (e.g., in India) for industrial purposes.” What is clear from the elucidation contained in this book is that arrack is one variety of a strong distilled spirit, whatever may be the substance which is used for distillation. That being so, arrack is clearly liquor according to the ordinary meaning of the word liquor contained in the dictionary. So whether the definition contained in section 2(19) included arrack within the definition as it included spirits of wine and other substances or not, if arrack is liquor as ordinarily understood, such non-inclusion would not denude it of its character as liquor if really, it is. So whether the definition contained in section 2(19) included arrack within the definition as it included spirits of wine and other substances or not, if arrack is liquor as ordinarily understood, such non-inclusion would not denude it of its character as liquor if really, it is. Since it is clear that it is liquor as already explained, it was not necessary for the State Government, even if Mr. Ramachandra Rao’s interpretation of the words contained in section 2 (19) is acceptable, to make any notification declaring arrack to be liquor for the purpose of the Act notwithstanding arrack being clearly liquor even otherwise. I therefore dismiss the argument advanced by Mr. Ramachandra Rao that arrack is not liquor for the purpose of the Act and that the petitioner who was proved to have been in possession of arrack did not commit any offence punishable under section 59(b) of the Mysore Prohibition Act. In my opinion, the petitioner’s conviction cannot be disturbed. Mr. Ramachandra Rao, however, urges that the sentence imposed upon the accused is excessive. The sentence imposed upon him is a sentence of fine amounting to Rs. 600 and Mr. Murlidhar Rao, the learned Government Pleader, urges that clause (i) of section 59 of the Act did not make it possible for the Magistrate to impose a fine less than five hundred rupees. So, he contends that it is not possible for me to alter the sentence to a sentence other than a sentence of fine amounting to Rs. 500. But this submission made by Mr. Murlidhar Rao does not receive support from clause (i) of section 59 which reads: “59. Penalty for illegal cultivation and collection of hemp and other matters — Whoever, in contravention of the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or order made, or of any licence, permit, pass or authorisation issued thereunder- ***** shall, on conviction, be punished- (i) for a first offence with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees: Provided that in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be mentioned in the judgment of the Court, such imprisonment shall not be less than three months and fine shall not be less than five hundred rupees.” It is undisputed that in this case the petitioner is a first offender. That being so, although the maximum sentence of fine which may be imposed as provided by clause (i) is a fine extending to Rs. 1,000 if the proviso says that this fine shall not be less than Rs. 500 when there are no special and adequate reasons to the contrary the fine imposed need not extend to Rs. 500 in the circumstances of the case justified the imposition of asmaller sentence. There are, in my opinion, reasons why the heavy sentence of fine imposed by the Magistrate was really unjustified. The quantity of arrack in the possession of the Petitioner was a small quantity which two small hot water bags could hold. Although clause (b) of section 59 punishes not only possession but also consumption, use and transportation of an intoxicant or hemp, the punishment to be imposed when a person consumes or uses an intoxicant or hemp may vary in conceivable cases from the punishment which should be imposed when a person possesses that substance or when he transports it. It is not necessary for me to say in which events the sentence should be severer although it is clear that the punishment need not or cannot be of a uniform character in respect of every variety of offence of which the clause speaks. So, the punishment to be imposed in each case depends upon its own circumstances, and taking the circumstances of this case into consideration it seems to me that the interests of justice would be met by the imposition of a smaller sentence of fine than that imposed by the Magistrate. In substitution of the sentence imposed by the Magistrate, I sentence the accused to pay a fine of Rs. 250 and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for three months. This is the only modification which I make in the judgment of the Magistrate, and this Revision Petition is otherwise dismissed. S.V.S. ----- Sentence modified.