Order: The petitioner is G. Srinivasulu, Inspector, H. R. & C. E., Gooty Division, Trustee, Religious Endowment Mudda Inam attached to Grama Devata temple, Pedda Kowkuntla, Rayadrug Taluk, Anantapur district. He filed an application Crl. M.P. No. 40 of 1961 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Rayadrug, under section 87 of the H. R. & C.E. Act, praying for possession of certain properties. Along with his application, he also produced a certificate duly issued in his favour by the Deputy Commissioner. There were nine respondents in that case. Two of them, namely, respondents 7 and 8, did not contest the petition and remained ex parte. The others contested the petition. The learned Judicial First Glass Magistrate dismissed that petition after considering the voluminous documentary evidence placed before him. Thereupon, the petitioner filed this petition praying to set aside the order of the learned Magistrate. It is mentioned in the lower Court’s order as follows: "Exhibit B-2 is the Inam ‘B’ register together with genealogies of Reddy and Karnam families. It shows that the original grant was made in favour of Thimmanna the great great grandfather of one Ayyappa Reddy and Chikkappa the great great grandfather of first respondent that Lakshmireddy and Karnam Govindappa were in joint enjoyment of the said Mudda Inam lands.......... These documents are relied on to show that the respondents have been enjoying the properties as their own sometimes mortgaging them and sometimes alienating them as absolute owners It is conceded by the Advocate for the petitioner that these lands under consideration have been (in the) enjoyment of the respondents, their vendors or their ancestors for more than a century........ From a consideration of the Inam Fair Register, the Inam B Statement and the genealogical tables marked as Exhibits A-9, A-10, A-5, A-4 and B-2, B-9, to B-11 which are the ancient documents, it will be seen that the lands were granted in the name of individuals, namely, the V.M. and the K.M. styling the inams as Mudda Inams." The District Collector, Bellary, passed an order Exhibit A-8 dated 14th February, 1942 after due enquiry, changing the entry in the Registers regarding the inam from personal inam to religious inam. It is beyond doubt or dispute that the mam are enfranchised inams. It is beyond doubt or dispute that the mam are enfranchised inams. In the petition the contesting respondents raised various contentions including the following: "....The petition schedule properties are hereditary personal inams granted to the two families of Reddy and Karnam. These respondents and their predecessors have been in uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the said lands for over 100 years in their own right, and they have been enjoying the lands as their own executing gift deeds, mortgage, etc. These respondents are neither trustees nor office holders nor servants of any religious institution and they are not even claiming any title from any such office holders. Therefore this Court has no jurisdiction to direct delivery of possession as the respondents are claiming in good faith to be in possession........ The learned Magistrate framed two points for decision: "1. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to enquire into the claim of the respondents in view of the certificate issued by the Deputy Commissioner? 2. Whether the respondents are claiming in good faith to be in possession of their own account as urged before the Court? After considering the evidence, the learned Magistrate held as follows;-"It may be stated that innumerable complicated questions such as (a) Whether the original grant was in favour of the V.M. and the K.M. for a particular service namely, to decide the boundary dispute, (b) What is the meaning of the Mudda Inam, (c) Is it a grant for any religious purpose, (d) What is the effect of the change in the nature of the grant from the personal to religious as ordered by the District Collector in the year 1942. (e) To what extent Exhibit A-7 statement goes to derogation of the rights of:he deponents, (f) What is the remedy open to petitioner in view of the decision of the Inam Tahsildar under section 3 and subsequently granting of patta under section 7 of Act XXXVII of 1956 in favour of the respondent, and several other important and complicated questions arise for consideration. These points can be decided only in a regular suit. ................But in these summary proceedings, such complicated questions should not and could not be decided.................................. I find that the resistance by the respondents is not without any bona fides. These points can be decided only in a regular suit. ................But in these summary proceedings, such complicated questions should not and could not be decided.................................. I find that the resistance by the respondents is not without any bona fides. As has already been stated what is required to be done in the summary proceedings is only to see whether the respondents have no shadow of claim which could be regarded as bona fide......The respondents have succeeded in showing not only a shadow of claim, but something more than that, substance itself............ I find that the respondents’ claim to be in possession of the petition schedule lands is bona fide. Sri Narasaraju, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, contends that the order of the lower Court is based on the fact that Inam Tahsildar made a decision in favour of some respondents and granted patta and that that basis has ceased to exist in favour of the respondents and that, on the other hand, a strong basis has come to exist in favour of the petitioner by way of the order of the Inam Deputy Tahsildar being reversed by the Revenue Divisional Officer on appeal. In support of this contention, C.M.P. No. 968 of 1963 was filed for allowing as additional evidence, the decision of the Revenue Divisional Officer dated 1st October, 1962, in C.A. No. 45 of 1962, which was filed against the order of the Inams Deputy Tahsildar. In that decision, the learned Revenue Divisional Officer directed as follows: "The Tahsildar, Rayadurg, will issue revised pattas in the name of the deity in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-section 4 of section 7 of the Andhra Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956." Sri Kondayya, the learned Advocate for the contesting respondents, objected to the admission of this document onthe ground that it came into existence after the decision of the learned Magistrate and also even after the Criminal Revision Case was filed. This objection is untenable. Though that order was passed on 1st October, 1962, it directly set aside the order of the Inam Deputy Tahsildar granting patta to some of the respondents on which the learned Magistrate had relied. So I allow the C.M.P. and mark this document as Exhibit A-17 as additional evidence. This objection is untenable. Though that order was passed on 1st October, 1962, it directly set aside the order of the Inam Deputy Tahsildar granting patta to some of the respondents on which the learned Magistrate had relied. So I allow the C.M.P. and mark this document as Exhibit A-17 as additional evidence. In that order, the learned Revenue Divisional Officer has stated as follows: "In view of the order of the Collector, Bellary, treating the inam lands as religious and as the Inam Fair Register of 1862 speaks to the fact that, the respondents may enjoy the inam so long as they render services for which they are intended, I consider that the respondents may enjoy the inam so long as they render services for which they are intended. I consider that the respondents have no absolute right in the lands and that their interests in the lands are limited. In cases where inams are intended for rendering services to the institution or communal purposes, the ryotwari pattas in such cases should be issued in the name of the deity or institution as the case may be..............." It is true that in view of the appellate order of the learned Revenue Divisional Officer, the pattadar for the lands is the temple and not any other respondents. Though the learned Magistrate relied to a great extent on the order of the Inam Deputy Tahsildar, that was not the only basis on which he (Magistrate) based his order as seen from the portions which I have extracted from his order. Therefore, this revision case cannot be allowed and the lower Court’s order cannot be set aside merely onthe basis of the order of the learned Revenue Divisional Officer (Exhibit A 17). The main question is whether the respondents, who are in possession of the lands, are liable to eviction under section 87 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. Therefore, this revision case cannot be allowed and the lower Court’s order cannot be set aside merely onthe basis of the order of the learned Revenue Divisional Officer (Exhibit A 17). The main question is whether the respondents, who are in possession of the lands, are liable to eviction under section 87 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. That section runs as follows: "Where a person has been appointed- a) as trustee or executive officer of a religious institution..................and such person is resisted in, or prevented from, obtaining possession of the religious institution or of the records, accounts and properties thereof, (i) by a trustee, office-holder or servant of the religious institution who has been dismissed or suspended from his office or is otherwise not entitled to be in possession, or (ii) by any person claiming or deriving title, from such trustee, office-holder or servant (iii) not being a person claiming in good faith to be in possession on his own account or on account of some person not being such trustee, office-holder or servant, any Magistrate of the first class................shall, on application by the person so appointed, and on the production of the order of appointment.......................... of a certificate by the Commissioner in the prescribed form..............direct delivery to the person appointed as aforesaid of the possession.......................................... Provided further that nothing contained in this section shall bar the institution of a suit by any person aggrieved by an order under this section for establishing his title to the said property. For purposes of convenient discussion, I have marked certain portions in the above section as (i), (ii) and (iii). I shall also refer in this judgment to those portions as ‘clauses’ and to person in portion (i) as ‘temple officer.‘ The respondents assert that they do not come under clause (i) or clause (ii). They say that they are persons claiming in good faith to be in possession on their own account. Sri Kondaiah, the learned Counsel for the respondents, contends that the persons do not come under clause (i) or clause (ii) and are strangers to the’ alleged religious institution and that, therefore, no order under section 87 of the Act can be passed against them. It is not shown that the respondents come under clause (i) or clause (ii). I find that the respondents do not come under clause (i) or (ii). It is not shown that the respondents come under clause (i) or clause (ii). I find that the respondents do not come under clause (i) or (ii). The question is whether an order can be passed against a person who does not fall under clause (i) or clause (ii) but all the same falls under clause (iii). Clause (i) and (ii) obviously cover two separate categories of persons. Clause (ii) consists of persons claiming or deriving title from persons coming in clause (i). If clause (iii) does not enumerate a separate category as distinct from those in clauses (i) and (ii), then no order can be passed against the respondents, as they do not come under clause (i) or (ii). There are several reasons to show that clause (iii) does not enumerate a third category of persons distinct from categories described clauses (i) and (ii), but only qualifies each of the clauses (i) and (ii). In the first place, if the Legislature had wanted to cover by clause (iii), a third category of people distinct from clauses (i) and (ii), it would have adopted on the following lines “or by any person not claiming in good faith”. Such wording has not been adopted. Clause (iii), as it stands, does not describe a person as each of clauses (i) and (ii) describes. On the other hand, it is in the form of a clause qualifying some other noun. The grammatical construction of the sentence shows that this clause (iii) qualifies or governs the words “trustee, office-holder or servant......” in clause (i) and the words “any person claiming” in clause (ii). If it is read in such a manner according to the obvious grammatical construction and if an order is to be passed against a person, he must come under clauses (i) and (iii) or he must come under clauses (ii) and (iii). On the other hand, if clause (iii) were to cover a third category distinct from clause (i) and (ii), then an order is liable to be passed against a person, if the case comes under any of the three clauses (i), (ii) or (iii). Section 87 of the Act corresponds substantially to section 78 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act though it is not exactly identical with it. Section 87 of the Act corresponds substantially to section 78 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act though it is not exactly identical with it. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons for section 78, it is mentioned as follows (as extracted in Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act by Sri P. Ramanatha Iyer and Sri P.R. Narayana Iyer, Fourth Edition, 1953 at page 279): “It is notorious that trustees dismissed by committees under Act XX of 1863 have in several instances refused to hand over possession to the person newly appointed and have defined the committees by remaining in possession pending the end of protected litigation started by them. This clause is intended to end the scandal. Under it, trustees who have been removed or dismissed or have become disqualified to hold office may be dispossessed by summary process of Court.” If clause (iii) qualifies each of clauses (i) and (ii), a temple officer or a person claiming or deriving title from temple officer would be protected from an order under section 87 of the Act being passed against him, if he made a claim in good faith to be in possession on his own account or on account of some person who is not a temple officer. Supposing a person, who was not a temple officer, had a substantial and tenable ground of claim in good faith to possess property adverse to the temple and against whom the temple could not get an order under section 87 of the Act. Supposing that person died and his rights in the property passed by inheritance to a person who happens to be a ‘temple officer’. Then his claim to the property would be based on his own personal right and not by virtue of his; being a temple officer. Because of clause (iii) that person though he was a temple officer, could put forward a claim "as being a person claiming in good faith to be in possession (of the property) on his own account" and resist an order under section 87 of the Act. Otherwise, if clause (iii) did not exist, the result would be that what right he had by being the relative of the deceased person (and not by being a trustee etc.) he would be losing completely and become liable to an order under section 87 of the Act, simply because he was a ‘temple officer’. Otherwise, if clause (iii) did not exist, the result would be that what right he had by being the relative of the deceased person (and not by being a trustee etc.) he would be losing completely and become liable to an order under section 87 of the Act, simply because he was a ‘temple officer’. Thus, he would lose his valuable rights due to his having been a trustee, office-holder or servant of the religious institution at sometime in the past and had been dismissed or due to being a temple officer who, as such, is suspended or otherwise not entitled to possession. The position would be similar if the rights of the deceased person in the property passed by inheritance or succession to some person who was not a ‘temple officer’ and if the ‘ temple officer ‘ claimed in good faith to be in possession on account of such person. Thus a person who fell under clause (i) but did not fall under clause (iii) would not be liable to an order under section 87 of the Act. Similarly, a person who came under clause (ii) but did not fall under clause (iii) would not be liable to an order under section 87 of the Act. If clause (iii) is interpreted as qualifying clause (ii) above and not as qualifying clause (1), the result would be that temple officers, who get rights independent of their being temple officers, would be made liable to an order under section 87 though they have a claim to hold in good faith as mentioned in clause (iii). The reasonable construction seems to be that this clause (iii) does not cover a category of persons distinct from clauses (i) and (ii), but that it only qualifies persons coming under each of clauses (i) and (ii). In Bathula Krishna Brahman v. Daram Chenchi Reddy1, a Bench of this Court observed as follows: "It is clear from section 87 of the Act..............that the Magistrate is required to direct delivery of the property from a dismissed or suspended, trustee or office-holder or servant........This involves a decision on the issue whether the persons who offer resistence to the trustee appointed by the Commissioner taking delivery of the property have title of their own to continue in possession or whether the claim in that behalf is in good faith. The intendment of this section obviously is to save people who have not put forward derivative titles from the dismissed trustees or employees of the institution or who claim them in good faith, from the operation of the section............" In that case, the question which we are now concerned in this case, did not arise. In that case, the matter was referred to a Division Bench by Basi Reddy, J., on the question of a preliminary objection which had been taken as to the maintainability of a Criminal Revision Petition against the order of a Magistrate to be passed under section 87 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. The learned Judges held that the preliminary objection was not teanable and overruled that objection. In Sri Rameswaraswamy Varu v. Satyanarayana2, Jaganmohan Reddy, J., observed as follows: "(1) that the person in possession of the property of the religious institution or of the records, accounts and properties thereof, is a trustee, office-holder or servant of the religious institution who has been dismissed or suspended from the office; (2) even where such persons are not dismissed from office, they are otherwise not entitled to be in possession; or (3) that the persons in possession are claiming or deriving title from such trustee, office-holder or servant............and that such person is not a person claiming in good faith to be in possession on his own account or on account of some other person not being such trustee, office holder or servant. The parenthetic clause in the section excludes third parties and also a person setting up a bona fide claim in his own right. Of course, it is contended that this bona fide right may be set up even by a person deriving title from a dismissed trustee or office-holder or servant. It is, however, unnecessary for us to determine this question, because in the present case the archakas are still rendering services to the deity. In what circumstances, if any, can a person deriving title from any of the persons enumerated in the section can set up claim in his own right in good faith is a matter which must be left to some other occasion, when the facts and circumstances justify such consideration............" The facts of that particular case are stated as follows: “The petitioner is a trustee of Sri Ramawaraswamy Varu Alias Ramalingaswaraswamy Varu temple, situate at Kuchipudi. Respondents 1 and 2 are the archakas and respondents 3and 4 are tenants from the said archakas. The tenants claimed occupancy rights under the Andhra Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956..................and tenancy rights under the Andhra Tenancy Act.......................................................... The question that we have to consider in this case are whether the archakas, respondents 1 and 2, are persons entitled to be in possession of the properties and whether having regard to the scope of section 87 of the Endowments Act it can be said that respondents 3 and 4 are persons claiming or deriving title from a trustee, office-holder or servant of the religious institution and claiming in good with to be in possession on their own account, or on account of some person not being a trustee, office-holder or servant of the regligious institution who has been dismissed or suspended from his office. The learned Judges held as follows: "In this view, since we have already held that the archakas have no right to lease, the tenants, respondents 3 and 4, can claim no rights of possession even under this Act, and as such they cannot be said to be persons claiming in good faith to be in possession on their own account or on account of some person, being such trustee, office-holder or servant within the meaning of section 87 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act." The question concerned in this case was not raised in the present form or decided in the above case. I End as follows: If an order is to be passed against a person under section 87 of the Act, he must come under clause (i) or clause (ii) and must, in addition, come under clause (iii). In the present case, the respondents do not come under clause (i) or under clause (ii) and therefore, no order is liable to be passed against them under section 87 of the Act. It is true that the petitioner had an order in his favour by the Revenue Divisional Officer granting the patta to the petitioner. But that is not a sufficient ground for passing an order in his favour under section 87 of the Act, whatever its use and effect may be in any other proceedings. In the result, the revision case is dismissed. G.S.M. ----- Revision dismissed.