JUDGMENT D. Raju, C.J.—-The above second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff in C.S. No. 319/88 on the file of the learned Sub-Judge 1st Class Nurpur, District Kangra who lost before the courts below against the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamsala dated 27.4.1993 in civil appeal No. 4 of 1992 whereunder the learned first appellate Judge has confirmed the judgment and decree of the learned trial Judge in so far as it relates to the merits of the claim but gave relief in favour of the plaintiff-appellant only to the extent of special costs passed against him in the sum of Rs. 1,000/-. 2. The suit came to be filed by the appellant for a declaration to the effect that he is owner in possession of abadi plots after settlement comprised in Khasra Nos. 1646, 1647, 1648, 1649 and 1645 etc. and for consequential injunction. The case of the plaintiff is that the property has been under a gift deed dated 13.10.1916 by one Smt. Sewati in favour of the plaintiffs father, that from the date of the gift and during the life time of the father of the plaintiff as well as the plaintiff they have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the property in question as owners in occupation and that it is during the settlement operations the defendant has managed to get his name entered in the revenue record as owner in occupation and the same is bad in law. The defendant opposed the claim of the plaintiff by contending that the grantor Smt. Sewati was not the owner in possession of the plots in question, that even during the settlement operations in the year 1947 the defendant who had been in possession asserted his right and his name was entered duly in the revenue record by attesting mutation in his favour and that the same has been properly and validly upheld by the Divisional Commissioner and the Settlement Officer after hearing the parties thereto and, therefore, there is no merit whatsoever in the claim now projected in the suit. 3. 3. After conclusion of the trial, the learned Sub-Judge 1st Class, Nurpur by his judgment and decree dated 18.9.1991 dismissed the suit holding that the property in dispute has not been shown to be the one which passed under or which was the subject matter of the gift deed dated 13.10.1916 and that the plaintiff having moved the revenue authorities, suffered an order against him and having failed to challenge these orders in the manner known to law, could not successfully project the claim in the present proceeding by way of a civil suit. 4. Aggrieved, the plaintiff pursued the matter on appeal and, as noticed earlier, the learned District Judge while confirming the judgment and decree of the learned trial Judge on merits of the claim held that Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872 cannot come to the rescue of the appellant in this case and that the presumption engrafted therein cannot be extended to proof relating to the due execution and genuineness of the document and not with reference to the contents of the document or correctness of the transaction dealt with therein. On this ground alone, the learned first appellate Judge while rejecting the claim made invoking the benefit of Section 90, came to the conclusion on merit that the plaintiff has not proved by proper evidence that Smt. Sewati was even the owner of the property in question or that the property which is said to be the subject matter of the gift deed Ex. P-2 is the same as the one which is in dispute in this case. Accordingly, the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal. Hence the above second appeal. 5. Mr. Bhupinder Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, while elaborating the substantial questions of law formulated for consideration in the appeal, contended that when the document is more than 30 years of age it should be presumed to be correct in view of Section 90 of the Evidence Act, in all respects, and the presumption in Section 90 of the Evidence Act cannot be confined or limited to a particular aspect of the document. In substance, the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant was that the presumption should be absolutely in respect of the document as well as the legality and correctness of the transaction covered by the document. In substance, the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant was that the presumption should be absolutely in respect of the document as well as the legality and correctness of the transaction covered by the document. It was also contended for the appellant by the learned Counsel that so far as the question of title in respect of immovable property is concerned, it is the civil court which is the ultimate authority to effectively and finally adjudicate and the jurisdiction of the civil court is not either be denied or could be taken away on account of any adjudication or orders passed by the revenue authorities, in a case of the nature under consideration. Reliance has also been placed on Section 46 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1953 in this connection. 6. Per contra, Mr. Sanjiv Kuthiala learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, while adopting the reasoning of the courts below, contended that de hors the question of presumption contained in Section 90, the courts below having found specifically that the property in question is not the very same one which has been the subject matter of the gift deed in question, the said finding cannot be challenged in this appeal and, at any rate, the conclusion arrived at by the learned first appellate Judge on the question of law and the factual finding recorded concurrently by both the courts-below does not call for any interference in this second appeal. 7. Mr. Bhupinder Gupta, learned Counsel for the appellant, placed reliance on the decisions reported in Chintamanibhatka Venkata Reddi Pantulu and another v. Rani Saheba of Wadhwan, (AIR 1920 P.C. 64); Probhat Chandra v.Rani Bala (AIR 1989 Cal. 202); Parkash Chand v. Hans Raj (AIR 1994 H.P. 144) and Haradhan Mahatha v. Dakhu Mahatha (AIR 1993 Pat. 129) in support of his case. 202); Parkash Chand v. Hans Raj (AIR 1994 H.P. 144) and Haradhan Mahatha v. Dakhu Mahatha (AIR 1993 Pat. 129) in support of his case. So far as the jurisdiction of the civil court to go into the question of title in a suit for declaration of title and consequential relief thereto, is concerned there can be no serious controversy that unless any immunity is given to a particular order, passed by any executive authority as such or exercising the powers of a tribunal under any special provision of the Act ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court specifically, the civil courts competency, power and authority to go into the question of title relating to immovable property cannot be said to have been lost. Section 46 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1953 also recognises this position. Liberty is given thereunder by stipulating that if any person considers himself aggrieved as to any right of which he is in possession by an entry in a record of rights or in a periodical record, he may institute a suit for a declaration of his right under Chapter ^1 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and therefore, there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the learned trial Judge committed any error in deciding this issue holding that the civil court had jurisdiction. Apparently, on this account only, the learned first appellate Judge has not gone into to this aspect of the matter and felt content to decide the appeal and the claim of the parties, on other issues. 8. So far as the scope and applicability of Section 90 of the Evidence Act is concerned and the purport and extent of the presumption engrafted therein is concerned, in my view, the learned first appellate Judge could not be said to have committed any error in proceeding on the assumption that the said presumption cannot be extended as to the correctness of the contents of the document. The decisions reported in AIR 1920 P.C. 64; AIR 1989 Cal. 202; AIR 1993 Pat. The decisions reported in AIR 1920 P.C. 64; AIR 1989 Cal. 202; AIR 1993 Pat. 129 and AIR 1994 H.P. 144, in my view, did not directly dealt with the particular aspect of the issue, in the manner in which it has been posed in this case and those decisions proceeded on the question as to whether the presumption is to be applied in a given case mandatorily or that the courts concerned have discretion in applying them or not, or as to whether such presumption enures in respect of a copy of the document also or only to the original and whether the circumstances under which a document to which the presumption applied came to be executed or the object of the execution of a document need be also proved. That, as indicated earlier, is not the issue in this case. The issue arising for consideration in this case is as to whether the presumption as contended for the appellant is absolute in its terms extending over and encompassing the document and the transaction covered by it, in all respects, dispensing with the obligation of a person asserting a claim thereunder, to prove the legality and propriety of the transaction or even the legal competency of the executant to execute such a document. 9. Section 90, is so far as is relevant for our purpose, reads as follows: "Where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that persons handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the person by whom it purports to be executed and attested." (Explanation and Illustrations omitted). 10. 10. The presumption in respect of a document purporting or proved to be of thirty years old relate, on the face of the provision, to the genuineness of the document and that it relates to only and dispenses with the proof of the signatures, due execution or attestation of a document and it does not, and in my view cannot also, involve or carry with it further presumption that its contents are true or that it has been acted upon or that the person who executed the same had the right, competency or legal authority to execute such a document. May be, depending upon the nature of the document concerned or the contents thereof such as, if it be the copy of any register or of any admission it purports to prove and record, in such cases it can in addition be also to some extent presumed of the correctness of the entry or the fact that it was an admission. That by itself will not, in my view, accord any sanctity in law to the transaction itself to make it so binding even to relieve the claimant under such document, the obligation to substantiate the legal right which flow from the said document. In this case the document is said to be a gift deed and the same by merely being admitted in evidence cannot be held to be sufficient to prove the competency of the grantor or as to the title which the grantor has or the right of the grantor to execute such a document has also been sufficiently stood proved. Consequently, I see no merit in the claim on behalf of the appellant based on the extent of presumption and the extended manner in which the presumption is sought to be availed of based on Section 90 of the Evidence Act. It is also well settled that a presumption enacted for a purpose cannot be stretched or extended beyond its legitimate purpose and if it is so done it would not only have counter productive results but defeat the very object of the Section. Section 90, in my view, specifically mention also the extent of the presumption as also the purpose for which it has been engrafted. Viewed thus, the challenge to the judgment of the learned first appellate Judge, in this regard has no merit. 11. Section 90, in my view, specifically mention also the extent of the presumption as also the purpose for which it has been engrafted. Viewed thus, the challenge to the judgment of the learned first appellate Judge, in this regard has no merit. 11. De hors even the question of the validity or otherwise of the document, the appellant has to face yet another, what in my view, may be said to be, an unsurmountable impediment, in this case, in the shape of his omission and lapse to properly identify the property which is the subject matter of the suit and which has been the very same one which had been the subject matter of the so called gift under which the plaintiffs father was said to have derived title to the property. Both the courts below have elaborately considered this issue and oral evidence on record has been found to be not only slender but not sufficient to substantiate the claim of the plaintiff projected in the suit. The revenue authorities have also gone into this aspect of the matter with the assistance of the settlement record, the question relating to the identity of the property and those materials are also adverted to and the courts below have come to the conclusion that nothing concrete has been placed on record to disbelieve the correlation effected on the identity of the property as fixed by the settlement authorities and to nullify those findings. On this ground also the appellant has miserably failed to prove his claim for the property. 12. For all the reasons stated above, the appeal fails and shall stand dismissed. Appeal dismissed.