Raman Nayar, J.- The question we are called upon to answer, and the bare facts necessary for the purpose, appear from the order of reference made by the Division Bench: “The appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 173 of 1964 have been convicted of the offence of robbery of a bus KLK 2036 after it had been attached and was in the custody of the Amin, P.W.1, under an attachment warrant issued by the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Kottayam. The main question for decision in this case would be whether non-compliance of the provisions in Order 38, rule 5 has the effect of making the order ultra vires and void and the consequent attachment a nullity and whether in passing such an order there is total lack of jurisdiction. As the decisions are not uniform and as the question involved is of considerable importance, we refer the abovesaid question for decision to a Full Bench.” Presumably the Division Bench is of the view that, if the order of attachment was void, there could be no actual possession, whether lawful or unlawful, with the Amin, or no dishonest intention on the part of the accused, so that the alleged removal of the bus would not amount to theft. In a suit for money (O.S. No. 107 of 1963 of the Sub-Court, Kottayam), which he had brought against the 2nd accused in this case, the plaintiff applied under Order 38, rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code for the attachment before judgment of a bus belonging to the 2nd accused. Attachment was ordered, but neither the application made for the purpose nor the order thereon is in evidence although one should have thought that those would be among the first things the prosecution would prove. However, the actual order or warrant of attachment signed by the Judge himself has been duly proved and that has been marked as Exhibit P-1 (b). A warrant of attachment under Order 38, rule 5 should be in Form No. 5 of Appendix F of the Code. But the form actually used for Exhibit P-1 (b) was the Malayalam form prescribed under the old Travancore Civil Procedure Code corresponding to Form No. 8 of Appendix E of the Code which is the form for a warrant under Order 21, rule 30 for the attachment of movable property in execution of a decree for money. But the form actually used for Exhibit P-1 (b) was the Malayalam form prescribed under the old Travancore Civil Procedure Code corresponding to Form No. 8 of Appendix E of the Code which is the form for a warrant under Order 21, rule 30 for the attachment of movable property in execution of a decree for money. This form has been most clumsily adapted for the purposes of Order 38, rule 5. It is headed, “udanjapthi utharavu” (in Malayalam) which literally means, “Order of immediate attachment,” but is the expression in use for a conditional attachment - usually referred to as an interim attachment - under Order 38, rule 5 (3). The number and other particulars of the suit in which the warrant is issued are furnished. But the provision of law given in the printed form, namely, Order 21, rule 26 of the Travancore Civil Procedure Code (Order 21, rule 30 of the Civil Procedure Code) has not been scored off. Then the warrant goes on to authorise the Amin to attach the property specified in the accompanying schedule - Exhibit P-2 (a) is the schedule — namely, the bus belonging to the defendant, for the decree that may be passed in the suit in the plaintiff’s favour, and, unless the amount claimed in the suit and the costs (both of which are specified) are paid to him, to hold the property until further orders from the Court. There is evidence to prove that there was a suit for money (O.S. No. 107 of 1963 of the Sub-Court, Kottayam) against the 2nd accused, that the plaintiff therein applied for the attachment before judgment of the 2nd accused’s bus and that it was on that application that the order, Exhibit P-1 (b), was made. As we have seen Exhibit P-1 (b) is headed “Order of conditional attachment” and it says that the attachment is in respect of the decree that may. be passed in favour of the plaintiff. It is therefore clear that the order is an order of conditional attachment under Order 38, rule 5 (3) of the Code. It is equally clear that it was made in utter disregard of the law. It does not say that the Court is satisfied hat the grounds necessary for making an order under Order 38, rule 5 exist. It is therefore clear that the order is an order of conditional attachment under Order 38, rule 5 (3) of the Code. It is equally clear that it was made in utter disregard of the law. It does not say that the Court is satisfied hat the grounds necessary for making an order under Order 38, rule 5 exist. But that, perhaps, is not an essential requirement since the rule does not say that the satisfaction should be recorded in writing. There is, however, the obligatory requirement of sub-rule (1) of the rule that the Court should make an order directing the defendant either to furnish security or to appear and show cause why he should not furnish security — the “may” of the sub-rule only means that it is within the discretion of the Court to take action under the rule or not to take action; but, if it decides to take action, then it must make the direction contemplated — there is no discretion in that matter. It does not appear that any such direction was issued, and, in any case, the direction for conditional attachment under sub-rule (3) was not made, as that sub-rule requires it should be made, in an order under sub-rule (1) directing the defendant to furnish security or appear and show cause against furnishing security. And the condition that the property should be held under attachment until further orders from the Court unless the suit claim is paid is altogether unauthorised. There can be no doubt that Exhibit P-1 (b) was an utterly wrong order, an erroneous or illegal order in the sense that it was not in accordance with law. But that would not suffice to make it a void order, in the strict sense of that word, if the Court had inherent jurisdiction, in other words, if it had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject-matter: “When the record itself discloses the fact that the Court had no jurisdiction of the controversy, or that jurisdiction of the person of the defendant did not attach in the particular case, the judgment is a mere nullity and may be collaterally impeached, by any person interested, whenever and wherever it is brought in question. * * * It is also to be remarked that there is a clear distinction between those facts which involve the jurisdiction of the Court over the parties and the subject-matter and those quasi-jurisdictional facts, without allegation of which the Court cannot be set in motion, and without proof of which a decree should not be pronounced. In the absence of the former, the judgment of the Court is void and may be attacked in collateral proceedings, while, in respect to the latter, it is conclusive, and cannot be questioned except on a direct proceeding.” (Black on Judgments, Second Edition, Vol. 1, Paragraph 278.) . As noticed by Black himself in Paragraph 170 and by de Smith (at page 100 of his book on Judicial Review of Administrative Action) not a little obscurity has resulted from the circumstance that terms such as “void”, “voidable”, “invalid” and “illegal” are often used inter-changeably, and the further circumstance that, even in juristic writing, expressions such as “void”, “without jurisdiction” and “ultra vires” are used in different senses. A thing that is void in the strict sense of the word is a mere nullity and may be ignored even in collateral proceedings is if it never were. (“Void ab initio” is the expression Courts often use to make it clear that they mean “void” in this strict sense of the word.) And yet Courts do often use the word, and even expressions such as “null and void” and “nullity”, as an emphatic way of saying that an order is so clearly illegal that it is to be readily set aside. Therefore, in cases where an order is directly attacked, the use of such expressions even by the highest Tribunals is no certain indication of the real nature of the order-it might mean no more than that the order is voidable, or liable to be upset. In its true sense, the word, “jurisdiction” means inherent jurisdiction and yet it is often used, as in section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, in a special sense as meaning what we might call competency, or, in the language of Black, as connoting “those quasi-jurisdictional facts without allegation of which the Court cannot be set in motion, and without proof of which a decree should not be pronounced”. The expression, “ultra vires”, likewise, which strictly speaking implies an absence of jurisdiction, is often used to imply an absence of competency. Hence the use of expressions such as “void”, “nullity”, “null and void”, “without jurisdiction”, and “ultra vires” in cases where the impugned order is under direct attack as in appeal or revision provides no safe guide for holding that the order is void in the strict sense of the word so that it is for all practical purposes non est and may be ignored in collateral proceedings. The question really is not so much whether, as some decisions put it, the provisions of Order 38, rule 5 (1) are mandatory or merely directory — even the breach of a mandatory provision does not necessarily make an order or judgment void though it would make it illegal — see Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey1, where the breach was of the mandatory provisions of section 3 of the Limitation Act — but whether compliance with those provisions is a condition precedent for the assumption of jurisdiction or whether, on the other hand, the provisions merely lay down the manner in which the jurisdiction is to be exercised. If it is the former, non-compliance would make the order void; but, if the latter, non-compliance would only make the order voidable. The order would be liable to be set aside, but, until that is done, it would be operative and cannot be ignored or collaterally attacked. On this question we do not think that we can do better than repeat what was said in Dihian Singh v. Secretary of State2: “Rule 5 of Order 38, Civil Procedure Code is intended for the protection of the person whose property is sought to be attached before judgment. If he did not receive notice required by law and was consequently denied the privilege of staving off the attachment by the offer of security 1 he injury would no doubt accrue to him but the law gives him a remedy by way of appeal under Order 43, rule 1 (q) from such an irregular order to get it set aside * * * In Jang Bahadur v. Bank of Upper India, Ltd.,3, their Lordships pointed out the difference between a matter of procedure and one of jurisdiction in these words: ‘This is a matter of procedure and not of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction over the subject-matter continues as before, but a certain procedure is prescribed for the exercise of such jurisdiction. If there is non-compliance with such procedure the defect might be waived, and the party who has acquiesced in the Court exercising it in a wrong way cannot afterwards turn round and challenge the legality of the proceedings.‘ This is what was pointed out in Devidas v. Nilkanthrao4, following the various decisions of the Privy Council. It was clearly shown there that jurisdiction is entirely independent of the manner of its exercise. The distinction between the two is that error of judgment is reversible by the appellate Court within a certain fixed time and is therefore voidable, whereas the usurpation of power is a mere nullity. The jurisdiction of the Court to attach property before judgment is indicated by the words ‘if so prescribed’, in section 94, and that condition is satisfied when rules are made to order attachment of any property of the defendant. The meaning of the expression ‘if so prescribed’ would be clear when they are compared with the words ‘subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed’ occurring in section 107, Civil Procedure Code. ‘Prescribed’ means prescribed by rules (See section 2 (16), Civil Procedure Code). In the latter case if the rules prescribe any conditions or limitations as affecting the jurisdiction of the Court, the jurisdiction cannot arise unless the conditions or limitations are satisfied. Section 94 merely says ‘so prescribed’ and does not like section 107 say subject to conditions and limitations as may be prescribed’. Rules.5 and 6 of Order 38 bring into effect the jurisdiction that is conferred by section 94 in so far as they make it clear that the Court has power to order attachment before judgment. In the absence of words such as those used in section 107 (1), Civil Procedure Code, the other provisions made in rules 5 and 6 of Order 38 must be interpreted as laying down the manner in which the Court’s jurisdiction is to he exercised, and accordingly, regarded as dealing with matters of procedure regulating the mode of exercise of a jurisdiction that exists. On this view any error in the manner of the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by section 94 would not affect the validity of the Court’s act if the Court’s jurisdiction is derived from a source independent of the provisions which merely prescribe the manner of its exercise.” other decisions taking the same view are N. Prag Nath v. Mt. Indra Devi1, Dwarka Das Badri Das v. Siri Ram2, Ayyappan Pillai v. Govinda Kurup3, Badri Prasad v. Babulal4, and Gaya Thakur v. Bhagwat Prasad5. With the contrary view taken or indicated in Abdul Karim v. Nur Mohammed6, Dular Singh v. Ram Chander7 and Rameshwardayal v. Bheemsen8, we are, with great respect, unable to agree. The remaining cases dealing with an attachment under the provisions of Order 38 cited on behalf of the accused only lay down, what cannot be doubted, that an order of attachment without compliance with the provisions of rule 5 is illegal, not that it is void. The case considered in Dhian Singh v. Secretary of State9, was of an absolute attachment under rule 6 of Order 38 without any attempt at compliance with the provisions of rule 5. Under the scheme of Order 38 it is only after a direction has been issued under sub-rule (1) of rule 5, and the defendant has been given an opportunity to show cause, that an absolute attachment can be made. But the conditional attachment under sub-rule (3) of rule 5 is to be ordered ex parte, before the direction under sub-rule (1) is communicated to the defendant, and before he has had an opportunity of showing cause. A conditional attachment ordered under sub-rule (3) of rule 5 without complying with the provisions of that rule therefore stands on a stronger footing than an absolute attachment ordered under rule 6 without such compliance. We think a distinction must be drawn between a judgment or order of a Court of law and an act such as an attachment, or a sale, or a search, or the recording of a confession under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, performed by a Court or other authority in exercise of a statutory power. We think a distinction must be drawn between a judgment or order of a Court of law and an act such as an attachment, or a sale, or a search, or the recording of a confession under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, performed by a Court or other authority in exercise of a statutory power. In the latter case, where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way that might carry the implication that thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. Or it might be that a particular step prescribed by a statute is an essential ingredient of the act itself. In either case, the act done without compliance with the statutory requirement would be legally ineffective and may therefore be properly described as void, and, among other results, would be the result that resistance to such an act, involving unlawful invasion of private rights, would be no offence. But in the former case, when the judgment or order is within the jurisdiction of the Court, it is effective until it is set aside, however irregular or erroneous it might be, and it cannot be impugned in collateral proceedings. If this distinction is borne in mind cases such as Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor10 State of Uttar Prasad v. Singhara Singh11, Muthiah Chetti v. Palaniappa Chetti12, Manoharlal Banerjee v. Bengal Immunity Co.13, Ettu Naicker v. Ayyammal14, Eravi Pillai v. Maluk Mohammad15, Srikakula Chinna v. Pannapati Elais16, and State of Rajasthan v. Rehaman17, on which such strong reliance is placed on behalf of the accused will be found to have no real bearing on the question we are considering. Our attention has been drawn to the observation in paragraph 13 of the report in Chandra Deo v. Prakash Chandra18, to the effect that failure to record reasons as enjoined by section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code before dismissing a complaint under the provisions of that section is an error going to the root of the matter and that it is possible to say that the absence of reasons would make the order a nullity. Their Lordships did not actually pronounce the order a nullity. What they did was to set it aside. Their Lordships did not actually pronounce the order a nullity. What they did was to set it aside. What they said was that it was possible to say so and we venture to think that the word, “nullity” was used to indicate not that the order of dismissal was void stricto sensu and therefore non est, but that there was an illegality going to the root of the matter, not a mere error, omission or irregularity which could be cured under section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Our answer to the question is that the order of attachment in this case, though erroneous and liable to be set aside in appropriate proceedings, is an order made with jurisdiction and is not a nullity. It cannot be ignored or subjected to attack in collateral proceedings. M.C.M. ------ Reference answered.