JUDGMENT D. Raju, C.J.—The above appeal has been filed by the defendant in Civil Suit No. 102 of 1992 under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 against the judgment dated 10.4.1996 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court whereunder the learned Single Judge after recording a finding that an illegality apparent on the face of the record within the meaning of Section 16(l)(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 vitiates the award, as a consequence thereof remitted the matter to the Arbitrators under Section 16(l)(c) of the Act for re-consideration and for giving reasons for the conclusions arrived at by them after affording an opportunity to the parties of being heard with a further stipulation as to the time limit within which such decision has to be rendered. 2. When the matter was taken up for hearing, the learned Counsel for the respondent Mr. J.S. Bhogal, Advocate, raised by way of preliminary objection a point as to the maintainability of the appeal under Section 39 of the Act by placing reliance upon the decision reported in Iftikhar Ahmed and others v. Syed Meharban Ali and others, AIR 1974 S.C. 749. Heard Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. J.S. Bhogal, learned Counsel for the respondent in this regard. 3. Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 provides that an appeal shall lie from the various orders illustrated therein to the Court authorised by law to hear the appeals from the original decrees of the Court passing the order and makes it negatively and emphatically clear by using the words "and from no others" meaning thereby that against no order other than the category or class of orders illustrated in sub-section (1) of Section 39, an appeal shall or will lie. Their Lordships of the apex Court have observed in the decision reported in AIR 1974 S.C. 749 (supra) that an order remitting the matter to the Arbitrators would not fall under the category of appealable orders within the meaning of and illustrated in Section 39(1) of the Act. Their Lordships of the apex Court have observed in the decision reported in AIR 1974 S.C. 749 (supra) that an order remitting the matter to the Arbitrators would not fall under the category of appealable orders within the meaning of and illustrated in Section 39(1) of the Act. We have also gone through the provision and find that the judgment of the learned Single Judge could not be said to answer the description of an order either modifying or correcting an award or setting aside or refusing to set aside the award, in view of the fact that the Court has not finally decided the merits of the claim, which is the subject matter of the award but on the other hand while pointing out the infirmity with which the award suffered and setting aside the same, thought fit to remit the award for consideration of the Arbitrators afresh and rendering an award in accordance with law. 4. Consequently, we are of the view that the objection taken as to the maintainability of the appeal is well merited and deserves to be sustained. The appeal, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed on this only ground. We refrain from making any observation on the other points raised in the appeal. The time stipulated by the learned Single Judge to pass the award by the Arbitrators will commence from today, instead of on the date of commencement fixed by the learned Single Judge. CMP No. 100/99: 5. Infructuous in view of the disposal of the appeal. 6. The interim order dated 30.5.1996 stands vacated. 7. Dasti copy on usual terms. Appeal dismissed.