Order: In C.C. No. 7 of 1964 on the file of the Munsif-Magistrate, Medak charges have been framed against the petitioner under section 409, Indian Penal Code, and this petition is filed before this Court to quash those charges The petitioner, Narasimha Reddy, was functioning as a Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat at Wadiyaram village from November, 1956 to January, 1960, and again from February, 1960 onwards. It is alleged that in his capacity as a Sarpanch he used to transact business relating to the Gram Panchayat. The petitioner himself was maintaining the accounts and other records apart from the dealings in money transactions in the office. The petitioner is said to have misappropriated a total amount of Rs.916-20 nP. from the funds of the Panchayat over which he had control. He is alleged to have debited various sums of money in the cash book evidencing that the amounts have been expended without proper vouchers as detailed in the charge-sheet. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised four points before me, namely (1) that at the most if the accounts have not been properly kept and there is some missing of funds that will give rise only to a civil liability under section 127 of the Gram Panchayats Act, 1956; (2) that the Sarpanch comes within the definition of a "public servant" and, therefore, sanction is necessary to prosecute him; (3) that the responsibility of the Sarpanch is a composite liability as he represents the other members of the Panchayat as well; and (4) that the petitioner cannot be made to suffer double jeopardy. With regard to the first point urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner section 127 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Gram Panchayats Act (XVII of 1956) has to be considered, and it runs as follows: "127. With regard to the first point urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner section 127 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Gram Panchayats Act (XVII of 1956) has to be considered, and it runs as follows: "127. (1) If, after giving the Sarpanch, Upa-Sarpanch or the Karbhart sufficient opportunity for showing cause to the contrary the Collector is satisfied that the loss, waste or misapplication of any money or other property owned by or vested in the Gram Panchayat is a direct consequence of misconduct or gross neglect on the part of such Sarpanch, Upa-Sarpanch on Karbhari the Collector may, by order in writing, direct the Sarpanch, Upa-Sarpanch or Karbhari to pay to the Gram Panchayat, before a date fixed, the amount required to reimburse, if for such loss, waste or misapplication, unless the Sarpanch, Upa-Sarpanch or Karbhari proves that he had acted in good faith. (2) If the amount is not so paid, the Collector shall cause it to be recovered as arrears of land revenue and credited to the Gram Panchayat fund. (3) An appeal shall lie within 30 days from any decision of the Collector under this section to the Government whose decision shall be final. " It is contended that in view of what has been laid down in sub-section (1) of section 127, if the Collector is satisfied that the loss, waste or misapplication of any money or other property owned by or vested in the Gram Panchayat is in direct consequence of misconduct or gross neglect on the part of a Sarpanch, the Collector by an order can direct the Sarpanch to pay to the Gram Panchayat the amount required to reimburse unless the Sarpanch proves that he had acted in good faith. Sub-section (2) of section 127 says that in case of non-payment, the Collector has power to recover the amount as land revenue arrears and credit it to the Gram Panchayat Fund. Under sub-section (3) an appeal also is provided to the Government against an order of the Collector. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that even if some loss to the Panchayat is discovered, it will not give rise to an offence under the Indian Penal Code. The words used in the section are ‘loss,‘ ‘waste’ or ‘misapplication of any money.‘ All these words indicate neglect, inefficiency or slack supervision and it excludes the element of dishonesty. The words used in the section are ‘loss,‘ ‘waste’ or ‘misapplication of any money.‘ All these words indicate neglect, inefficiency or slack supervision and it excludes the element of dishonesty. "The petitioner has been charged with criminal breach of trust for which the necessary ingredient is dishonest intention and the dominion over the properly which must be held in trust. If there is any loss, wastage or misapplication of any funds without the necessary dishonest intention, perhaps it would give rise to a civil liability for which the Collector has been made responsible to recover. However, if the funds of the Panchayat are misappropriated giving rise to a breach of trust,:hen criminal proceedings would be a proper remedy. Thus the argument of the learned Counsel in this respect has no force. The second point raised is that, a Sarpanch is a public servant within the meaning of section 145 of the said Act and, therefore, without the sanction of the proper authority, the Court cannot take cognizance of the offence and if it proceeds with the case, the proceedings will be without any jurisdiction. Without entering in to any discussion on this question, it will have to be considered in the first place as to whether a sanction at all is necessary for the Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code against a public servant. In this connection a number of rulings have been cited by the learned Counsel namely, In re. The Chairman of the Municipal Council, Ellore1, In re, Biswanath Das2 Chellaperumal Padayachi v. Velayudha Padayachi3 Rajagopala Aiyar v Palaniswamy Goundan4 and Subbiah v. Ramacharlu5 but I do not think it is necessary for me to discuss these decisions as the law laid down therein is no longer good law The test laid down by the Privy Council in H.H.B. Gill v. The King6 with regard to judging whether an act of a public servant can come within the discharge of his official duty has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in a number of cases, its latest decision in this respect being that of State of Maharashtra v. Jagatsingh7. It was urged on behalf of the appellant therein that all members, officers and servants of a Corporation would be free to take bribes and would never be liable to be prosecuted under section 161 and that this could not have been the intention behind section 43 of the Transport Act. Their Lordships were pleased to observe: “It is certainly unfortunate that such a result should follow from the words used in section 43. But the words are dear and it seems that members, officers and servants to the corporation were intended by the Legislature to be public servants only when they were acting or purporting to act in pursuance of the provisions of the Transport Act or of any other law and not otherwise”. It clearly indicates that the person alleged to have committed the offence in his capacity as a public servant must at that time be acting in that capacity The connection between the act and the official capacity should be so intimate that it could not be separated. It is only in such a case that a public servant could be permitted to take advantage of section 197, Criminal Procedure Code. As early as 1939 the Federal Court has held in Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown,8 that sanction was required for prosecution of a public servant for an office under section 477-A as his official capacity is involved in the very act complained of as amounting to a crime; but that no sanction was required for a charge under section 409 because the official capacity is material only in connection with the entrustment and does not necessarily enter into the later act of misappropriation or conversion which is the act complained of. This view of the Federal Court has been consistently approved by the Privy Council. In the light of the foregoing discussion, I think that even though the petitioner may be a public servant, no sanction is required for his prosecution. Thus this argument of the learned Counsel also fails. The next point raised by the learned Counsel is that, the responsibility of the petitioner is a composite liability as he represents the other members of the Panchayat also and the responsibility being equally shared by every member, the Sarpanch alone cannot be made to suffer for the acts of all. In my opinion this argument also is not sound. The next point raised by the learned Counsel is that, the responsibility of the petitioner is a composite liability as he represents the other members of the Panchayat also and the responsibility being equally shared by every member, the Sarpanch alone cannot be made to suffer for the acts of all. In my opinion this argument also is not sound. Section 39 of the said Act defines the duties and responsibilities of the Sarpanch. A perusal of this section would reveal that the Sarpanch is responsible for keeping the records and registers of the Gram Panchayat in his custody and exercising supervision and control over the acts done and action taken by all officers and servants of the Panchayat. Further he has to incur contingent expenditure and operate on the Panchayat fund including authorisation or payment, issue of cheques and refunds. He has also to issue receipts under his signature for the amounts received on behalf of the Gram Panchayat and he is the custodian of the funds of the Gram Panchayat. It follows, therefore, that if there is any misappropriation of the funds, it is the Sarpanch who wolud be responsible or answerable for it. The test point raised is that the petitioner should not be made to suffer double jeopardy. But this argument is so hollow that it does not deserve to be considered or answered. In view of the foregoing discussion, this petition fails and is, therefore, dismissed. The Magistrate will take steps to expedite the heating of the case and dispose it of in accordance with Jaw. K.N.R. ----- Petition dismissed.