JUDGMENT : P.K. Tripathy, J. - This Criminal Revision is directed against the order dated 16.9.1995 in Criminal Revision No. 41 of 1995 of the Court of Sessions Judge, Sambalpur. 2. Petitioner is the second party and the opposite party (substituted by L.R. during pendency of this Revision) is the first party in Criminal Misc. Case No. 4H of 1994 u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure of the Court of Executive Magistrate, Sambalpur. The proceeding filed by the opposite party wherein an order of attachment was passed u/s 146 (1), Code of Criminal Procedure After his appearance, Petitioner filed a petition to lift the attachment order, inter alia, on the ground of pendency of civil dispute between the parties. On 19.4.1995 without hearing opposite party, learned Executive Magistrate vacated the order of attachment passed u/s 146(1), Code of Criminal Procedure Opposite party challenged that order in the above noted Criminal Revision No. 41 of 1995. Learned Sessions Judge, at the stage of admission, heard and disposed of the revision by setting aside the order of the Magistrate on the ground that learned Executive Magistrate should not have passed that order without hearing both the parties. He directed the Executive Magistrate to hear the parties and to dispose of the matter relating to lifting of the order of attachment in accordance with law. Petitioner challenges that order in this Revision. 3. Mr. A.K. Bose, learned Counsel for the Petitioner argued that order dated 19.4.1995 of the Executive Magistrate being an interlocutory order, learned Sessions Judge should not have invoked the revisional jurisdiction in view of the provisions u/s 397(2), Code of Criminal Procedure In support of that contention, he has relied upon the case of Indrapuri Primary Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. and Another Vs. Sri. Bhabani Gogoi. His second contention is that when a civil dispute is pending between the parties and learned Magistrate proceeded in the direction to avoid a parallel proceeding and passed order in vacating the attachment order u/s 146 (1), Code of Criminal Procedure, learned Sessions Judge should not have interfered with that order. Mr. D. Rajan, learned Counsel appearing for the opp. party, on the other hand, argued that when by the impugned order rights of the opposite party had been affected with respect to the subject matter of dispute, the ban u/s 397 (2), Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable. Mr. D. Rajan, learned Counsel appearing for the opp. party, on the other hand, argued that when by the impugned order rights of the opposite party had been affected with respect to the subject matter of dispute, the ban u/s 397 (2), Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable. He further argued that point of jurisdiction and maintainability having not been raised in the Court of Sessions Judge, that cannot be raised for the first time in this forum. In defending the impugned order of learned Sessions Judge, he argued that learned Executive Magistrate acted illegally in not hearing and disposing of the objection filed by the Petitioner and passing order for vacating the attachment behind the back of the Petitioner, and therefore, learned Sessions Judge was wholly justified in asking the Magistrate to consider the show-cause after affording opportunity of hearing to both the parties. 4. So far as the contention of Mr. Rajan that point of jurisdiction cannot be raised for the first time in this forum when it was not agitated in the Court of Session is concerned, that point has No. merit, inasmuch as, if the order of the Magistrate shall be regarded as an interlocutory order coming within the ambit of the prohibition prescribed u/s 397(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, then learned Sessions Judge, at the stage of admission should have taken up that point for himself, even if not raised from the side of the opposite party. Therefore, Petitioner is eligible to raise that point. 5. The next point which falls for consideration is whether the order dated 19.4.1995 of the Executive Magistrate is an interlocutory order in terms of Section 397(2), Code of Criminal Procedure so as to make it not revisable. In that context, as noted above, Petitioner has relied upon the case of Indrapuri Primary Cooperative Housing Society Limited (supra) where Hon'ble Single Judge of Gauhati High Court has held that an order u/s 146(1), Code of Criminal Procedure being interlocutory order, No. revision lies. A little reference to the background facts of that case is necessary to appreciate the principle of law enunciated in that case. According to the facts available from the reported decision, Executive Magistrate passed order of attachment u/s 146(1), Code of Criminal Procedure The second party challenged the same before the Sessions Judge in a Criminal Revision wherein on 23.10.1989 a stay order was passed. According to the facts available from the reported decision, Executive Magistrate passed order of attachment u/s 146(1), Code of Criminal Procedure The second party challenged the same before the Sessions Judge in a Criminal Revision wherein on 23.10.1989 a stay order was passed. That order dated 23.10.1989 was challenged in the Gauhati High Court by filing a Revision application. In that context, it was held by learned Single Judge that order u/s 146(1), Code of Criminal Procedure being an interlocutory order, a revision against that order is not maintainable in view of the provisions of law u/s 397(2), Code of Criminal Procedure was not applied to the revision application against the order dated 23.10.1989. Be that as it may, for the reasons to follow, this Court is not inclined to accept the above proposition of law by Gauhati High Court. 6. In the context of Section 397(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, the matter had come up before Hon'ble Apex Court time and again to interpret the term 'interlocutory order' and to state what type of orders are not revisable in view of the provisions u/s 397 (2), Code of Criminal Procedure In the case of Amar Nath and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another Hon'ble Apex Court pleased to propound as follows: The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term" interlocutory order" as appearing in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New Word Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us 'that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense, and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. It seems to us 'that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense, and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties, cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may No. doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which No. revision would lie u/s 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. 7. In the case of Madhu Limaye Vs. The State of Maharashtra accused's petition challenging maintainability of the complaint petition was rejected by the Sessions Judge, who framed charge. The Bombay High Court refused to entertain the revision on the ground of ban u/s 397(2) of the Code. In that context the Apex Court referring to various authoritative cited before their Lordships held that: In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression" interlocutory order" as invariably being converse of the words "final order". There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may riot be final in the sense noticed in AIR 1949 1 (Federal Court), but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order?pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purpose of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of Section 397(2). It is neither advisable, nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are well known and can be culled out from many decided cases. We may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of Sub-section (2) of Section 397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course. 8. The order impugned in the Criminal Revision before the Sessions Judge, was challenged on the ground of violation of principle of natural justice, inasmuch as, the order lifting the attachment was passed behind the back of the opposite party. Therefore, it was not simplicitor, an order of attachment which was subjected of that revision. Illegality if any, in a proceeding which goes to the root of the jurisdiction is certainly revisable by the Sessions Judge in exercise of revisional power. Apart from that, as has been held by the Apex Court in the above cited decisions, the order which was impugned before learned Sessions Judge was, though nota final order, but it was an order affecting the rights of the opposite party, and therefore, when such an order was passed behind the back of the first party, learned Sessions Judge was correct in assuming the revisional power and setting right the impugned order before him. In view of that, the argument of the Petitioner that revision was not maintainable, is not sustainable. 9. In view of that, the argument of the Petitioner that revision was not maintainable, is not sustainable. 9. Coming to the other point argued, as this Court finds, learned Sessions Judge adopted the correct approach in directing the Executy Magistrate to hear both the parties and dispose of the show be filed and the motion brought by the Petitioner with a prayer to vacate the order of attachment u/s 146(1), Code of Criminal Procedure It is the settled-position of law that mere pendency of a civil or revenue dispute having the jurisdiction to decide the question of title and possession is not sufficient to take away the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Sections 145 and 146, Code of Criminal Procedure However, if the Civil or Revenue Court (if competent to adjudicate the rights of the parties in the given circumstances) is in seisin of the matter and has passed some orders granting interim protection relating to the subject matter of dispute, then the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to protect the person in possession with a view to prevent the apprehension of breach of peace and to maintain the public tranquillity does not arise. But No. such prohibition will be applicable if No. order has been passed by such Court for interim protection of the subject-matter of dispute i.e. the disputed property. Under such circumstances while deciding the matter in accordance with the direction of the learned Sessions Judge, learned Executive Magistrate shall take note of this position of law to consider and dispose of the application whether to continue or vacate the order of attachment u/s 146( 1), Code of Criminal Procedure and also whether to continue or to drop the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure as well. 10. In view of the foregoing discussion and the findings, there is nothing to interfere with the impugned order. Accordingly, the.Criminal Revision is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed