JUDGMENT Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J.—The above writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order dated 20.3.1997 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil), Tehsil and District, Una in Election Petition whereunder the petitioners election petition was dismissed and consequential order of the Deputy Commissioner, Una dated 29.12.1997 passed in the appeal confirming the order of the Sub-Division Officer (Civil). 2. Petitioner Rajinder Sharma is an elector in Electoral Roll of Gram Panchayat, Kaloh, Tehsil and District Una. The election of the Pradhan of the said Panchayat was held on 20.12.1995 in which Sh. Harpal Singh, respondent No. 4 and Sh. Manohar Lai, respondent No. 5 contested the election for the post of the Pradhan. Sh. Harpal Singh respondent was declared elected as Pradhan. The petitioner challenged the election of respondent No. 4 by way of election petition filed under Section 163 of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 before the authorised officer, inter alia, alleging that the respondent No. 4, the elected Pradhan had been convicted by the Sessions Judge for an offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for four years vide judgment and order dated 20.11.1973. Against his conviction and sentence respondent No. 4 filed an appeal before the High Court which was also dismissed on 9.6.1975 and thereafter the conviction and sentence of the 4th respondent was confirmed by the apex Court, which was reported in AIR 1981 Supreme Court 561. Respondent No. 4 at the time of the conviction was serving as a Clerk in the Kangara Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and on account of his conviction and sentence, he was dismissed by the Appointing Authority of the Bank on 17.10.1975. The petitioner had challenged the election of the respondent No. 4 on the ground that on the date of his election, respondent No. 4 was disqualified being chosen to the office of Pradhan on the ground that he had been disqualified for the appointment in public service which has been specified as one of the disqualifications in Section 122(l)(f) of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act (for short the Panchayati Raj Act). The S.D.O. (C), exercising the powers of authorised officer dismissed the election petition holding that since the respondent No. 4 contested the election of the Pradhan after the expiry, of six years of his conviction and sentence, therefore, the provisions of Section 122(l)(b) of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act would not attract the disqualification clause and the respondent No. 4 was found to be qualified for being chosen as Pradhan at the time of filing of nomination papers. Against the rejection of the election petition, the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 181 of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act before the Deputy Commissioner, Una, who concurred with the order of the authorised officer holding the respondent No. 4 qualified to be elected as Pradhan of the Panchayat and consequently, the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed. The petitioner feeling aggrieved against the orders of the authorities below has filed the present writ petition challenging both the orders mainly on one ground that the authorities below have failed to consider the effect of the provisions of Section 122(l)(f) of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act whereunder, it is provided that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen an office bearer of a Panchayat if such person has been disqualified for appointment in public service, except on medical grounds and that the authorities below has not considered the provisions of clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 122, therefore, the orders impugned in this writ petition are per se illegal and deserve to be set aside. 3. Counter on behalf of respondents No. 1 to 3 was filed on the affidavit of Sh. Dev Raj Sharma, Deputy Commissioner, Una in which it has been admitted that the petitioner was a voter in Ward No. 4 of Gram Panchayat/Sabha. 3. Counter on behalf of respondents No. 1 to 3 was filed on the affidavit of Sh. Dev Raj Sharma, Deputy Commissioner, Una in which it has been admitted that the petitioner was a voter in Ward No. 4 of Gram Panchayat/Sabha. It is also admitted that respondent No. 4 was working as Supervisor in Kangra Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Dharamsala and he was dismissed from service on 17.10.1975 by the concerned authority but he was duly qualified on the date on which the nomination papers were filed and accepted in December 1995 by the Assistant Returning Officer and the dismissal of the respondent No. 4 from service of he Bank shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment under the Government but not under any other organisation and further that respondent No. 4 was duly elected as Pradhan to represent the local body and he was not appointed as such. These respondents have stated that the provisions of Section 122(l)(f) of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act will not be applicable in the present case and the disqualification of the petitioner was only covered under clause (b) of the Section whereunder a convicted person involving moral turpitude is disqualified for being chosen an office bearer of a Panchayat unless a period of six years has elapsed since his conviction and in the present case, the stipulated period had already expired before the respondent No. 4 contested the election of the Pradhan of the Panchayat concerned. These respondents have sought to support the impugned orders passed by the authorities concerned. 4. In rejoinder to the counter of respondents 1 to 3, the petitioner has stated that both the authorities below have mis-read and misinterpreted the provisions of Section 122 (l)(b) and clause (f) of the Panchayati Raj Act and these authorities have taken both these clauses collectively for declaring the elected person under the disqualification clauses whereas in law both the clauses are different and the person can be disqualified from contesting the election of the office bearer of a Panchayat on any one of the grounds mentioned in Section 122(1) of the Panchayati Raj Act. Respondent No. 4 had suffered four years imprisonment for an offence punishable under Section 376, IPC involving moral turpitude and, therefore, he was disqualified for appointment in public service as contemplated under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 122 of the Panchayati Raj Act. Respondent No. 4 had suffered four years imprisonment for an offence punishable under Section 376, IPC involving moral turpitude and, therefore, he was disqualified for appointment in public service as contemplated under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 122 of the Panchayati Raj Act. The petitioner also stated that both the authorities below have only considered the ground of disqualification of respondent under clause (b) of the Panchayati Raj Act and not under clause (f) thereof and, therefore, respondent No. 4 has been disqualified for appointment in public service in any Government or Semi-Government job. The petitioner has reiterated his averments made in this writ petition. 5. We have heard Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sanjay Karol, learned Advocate General for respondents 1 to 3 and Mr. K.S. Dadhwal, learned counsel for respondent No. 4, who was elected as Pradhan of the Panchayat. Mr. Ajay Sharma learned counsel has made his submissions only on one ground that respondent No. 4 was disqualified to contest the election of Pradhan under clause (f), sub-section (1) of Section 122 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act. The Respondent No. 4 has not filed any counter to the writ petition and his learned counsel Mr. K.S. Dadhwal made his submissions seeking to support the reasonings rendered by the authorities below while rejecting the election petition of the petitioner. 6. The controversy involved in this writ petition is very narrow and can be considered in the light of the provisions of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act. It is not in dispute that any elector of a Panchayat can present a election petition to the authorised officer under Section 163(1) of the Panchayati Raj Act on the ground set out in Section 175. One of the grounds for setting aside the election of the elected person enumerated in Section 175(l)(a) is that on the date of his election the elected person was not qualified, or was disqualified to be elected under the Act. Section 122 of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act deals with the disqualification of a person for being chosen an office bearer of a Panchayat. Section 122 of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act deals with the disqualification of a person for being chosen an office bearer of a Panchayat. The relevant provisions of Section 122 read as under:— "122.(1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, an office bearer, of a Panchayat— (a) if he is so disqualified b}f or under any law for the time being in force for the purposes of the election to the State Legislature: Provided that no person shall be disqualified on the ground that he is less than 25 years, if he has attained the age of 21 years; (b) if he has been convicted of any offence involving -moral turpitude, unless a period of six years has elapsed since his conviction; or (c) .........................................or (d) .........................................or (e) .........................................or (f) if he has been disqualified for appointment in public service except on medical grounds; or (g) ........................................... Explanation.—For the purpose of this clause the expression "service" or "employment" shall include persons appointed, engaged or employed on whole time, part time, casual, daily or contract basis." In the teeth of the relevant provisions of clause (f), sub-section (1) of Section 122 of the Panchayati Raj Act extracted hereinabove, we propose to deal with the submissions of Mr. K.S. Dadhwal learned counsel for respondent No. 4. Mr. Dadhwal contended that respondent No. 4 before his conviction was serving as Clerk/Supervisor in the Kangra Central Co-operative Bank and after he was convicted and sentenced, he was dismissed from the service by the Bank concerned. At the time of filing the nomination papers, no objection was raised by the petitioner or any other person before the Returning Officer challenging the disqualification, if any, of respondent No. 4 and once respondent No. 4 was elected as Pradhan, his election cannot be set aside on any ground. He also contended that respondent No. 4 was firstly elected as Punch in the year 1986 and thereafter in the year 1992 he was elected as Up-pradhan of the same Panchayat and at that time too nobody objected to his election and, therefore, disqualification contained under clause (f), sub-section (1) of Section 122 of the Panchayati Raj Act will not apply in the present case as the intention of the rule is clear that the respondent No. 4 was not debarred from contesting the election of Pradhan and holding the said office. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel relied upon JT 1992 (Suppl) SC 759, J. Chandrasekhara Rao v. V. Jagapathi Rao and nine others and AIR 1988 SC 637, Shiv Charan Singh v. Chandra Bhan Singh and others. 7. We have gone through the judgments of their Lordships of the apex Court which deal with Sections 100(l)(c) and 100(l)(d)(iv) of the Representation of People Act, 1951. In that case, their Lordships were obliged to consider the question of improper acceptance of nomination while interpreting the expression "the result of election has been materially affected". In that case it was also held that burden of proof was upon the election petitioner to show affirmatively that the result of the election has been materially affected - and Courts cannot set aside the election of the returned candidate on surmises and conjectures unless established by positive evidence that the election of the returned candidate has been materially affected. We are afraid that the ratio of the said judgment has no application in the facts of the present case. Section 175(1) of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act prescribes that if the authorised officer is of the opinion that any nomination has been improperly rejected, or that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns the elected person, has been materially affected - (i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination, or (ii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void, or (iii) by any non-compliance with the provisions of this Act or any rule made under this Act, the authorised officer shall set aside the election of the elected person. These are some of the grounds in addition to the other grounds mentioned for setting aside the election. The case of respondent No. 4 is not covered under any of these grounds as it was not the case of the petitioner before the authorities below that the result of the election of respondent No. 4 has been materially affected on any of the grounds covered by clause (d), sub-section (i) of Section (1) of Section 175 of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act. The case of the petitioner is covered by Section 122 of the Panchayati Raj Act which deals with disqualification of a person being chosen as, and for being, an officer bearer, of a Panchayat and the grounds of disqualification of such person have been prescribed under this section. 8. The next contention of the learned counsel for respondent No. 4 was that in the election petition the petitioner has not taken the ground which has been convassed by him in this writ petition and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court. We are not inclined to accept this contention of the learned counsel for the reason that the petitioner has specifically stated in his election petition that respondent No. 4 was convicted by the Court and sentenced to imprisonment of four years under Section 376, IPC and his conviction was maintaine-" by the Supreme Court and in the face of the provisions of Section 122(l)(f) of the Panchayati Raj Act, respondent No. 4 was disqualified to contest the election of Pradhan and, therefore, after elected as such, he could not hold the office of Pradhan. The petitioner has taken this ground in this writ petition too and respondent No. 4 has chosen not to file any counter to the writ petition to controvert the averments made in the writ petition. It does not lie in the mouth of respondent No. 4 that the petitioner had not taken such ground in the election petition challenging his election to the office of Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat. 9. The learned counsel for respondent No. 4 has also contended that respondent No. 4 being a Pradhan of the Panchayat cannot be designated as public servant under Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, the disqualification under clause (f), subsection (1) of Section 122 of the Panchayati Raj Act will not apply in the present case. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in 1998 (4) Recent Criminal Reports, Suraj Mal v. State of Haryana. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in 1998 (4) Recent Criminal Reports, Suraj Mal v. State of Haryana. In that judgment, the learned Single Judge while dealing with a case of an accused who was working as Manager of Primary Co-operative Agricultural Development Bank Ltd. and for the purpose of charging the said officer under Sections 13 and 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, held that an employee of a Corporation would be covered within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code but an employee of a body corporate like co-operative society will not fall within the definition of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. Here we are not dealing with an employee of the Co-operative Bank to find out whether such employee is a public servant or not as defined under Section 21, IPC. As noticed above, the respondent No. 4 was dismissed by the Kangra Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. from service after he was convicted and sentenced by the Court and presently he is holding the office as Pradhan of a Panchayat. We are dealing with the interpretation of clause (f), sub-section (1) of Section 122 of the H.P. Panchayati Raj Act, to find out whether respondent No. 4 had incurred disqualification for appointment in public service except on medical grounds, if he had been convicted of any offence involving moral turpitude. Under Rule 19 of the CCS. CCA. Rules, a Government Servant after conviction can be dealt with by the Competent Authority in a Disciplinary Proceedings and he can be put under suspension. 10. The learned Advocate General has brought to our notice certain instructions made applicable to all candidates for appointment to civil services and posts under the Government of India, which are codified in the book known as "Brochure on Verification of Character and Antecedents" (Third Edition), issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, 1992. The learned Advocate General represented at the Bar that the instructions contained in the Brochure have been adopted by the State of H.P. Under Chapter-II, under the Heading of Guiding Principles, it is incombent upon the appointing authority to satisfy itself about the identity and suitability of the candidate before making the appointment by verifying his character and antecendents. The learned Advocate General represented at the Bar that the instructions contained in the Brochure have been adopted by the State of H.P. Under Chapter-II, under the Heading of Guiding Principles, it is incombent upon the appointing authority to satisfy itself about the identity and suitability of the candidate before making the appointment by verifying his character and antecendents. Further, it has also been mentioned that while normally a person convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude should be regarded as ineligible for Government service, however, in cases where the appointing authority feels that there are redeeming features and reasons to believe that such a person has cured himself of the weakness, specific approval of the Government may be obtained to his employment. Under the subject of verification of character and antecedents of Government servants before their first appointment, it has also been stated that persons convicted of offences involving moral turpitude or persons who have been dismissed from service by Central or Provincial Government should be deemed ineligible for appointment under the Central Government under the clause dealing with determination of suitability of a person for appointment to Government service. 11. It is not in dispute that respondent No. 4 was not convicted of an offence of moral turpitude. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court! in (1996) 4 Supreme Court Cases 17, Pawan Kumar v. State of Hdryana and another, held as under:— "Moral turpitude" is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity. The Government of Haryana while considering the question of rehabilitation of ex-convicts took a policy decision on 2.2.1973 that ex-convicts who were convicted for offences involving moral turpitude should not however be taken in Government service. Significantly Section 294, IPC is not found enlisted in the list of offences constituting moral turpitude." In another judgment of the apex Court in Allahabad Bank and another v. Deepak Kumar Bhola, (1997) 4 SCC 1, their Lordships while dealing with the case of a bank employee under Sections 120-B, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, I.P.C. and Sections 5(l)(d) & (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, held that what is an offence involving "moral turpitude" must depend upon the facts of each case. However, one of the most serious offences involving "moral turpitude" would be where a person employed in a banking company dealing with money of the general public, commits forgery and wrongfully withdraws money which he is not entitled to withdraw. 12. The respondent No. 4 had been convicted and sentenced under Section -376, IPC which would amount to involving him under the expression of "mortal turpitude". After giving harmonious construction and interpretation to clause (f), sub-section (1) of Section 122 of the Panchayati Raj Act, the respondent No. 4 who was convicted and sentenced would entail disqualification for appointment in public service except on medical grounds and, therefore, he was disqualified for being chosen to the office of Pradhan of a Panchayat. Both the authorities below have failed to deal with the election petition of the petitioner under clause (f), sub-section (1) of Section 122 of the Panchayati Raj Act which was also a ground taken by him in his election petition and findings have been recorded by the authorities below only after considering the disqualification of respondent No. 4 covered by clause (b) under which respondent No. 4 was not disqualified to the extent that he was elected as Pradhan of the Panchayat after the expiry of six years since his conviction. In the light of the above stated facts and circumstances and the provisions of law, we are satisfied that respondent No. 4 had entailed disqualification before he was elected as Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat under Section 122(l)(f) of the Panchayati Raj Act and the orders of the authorities below are unjustified, illegal and unsustainable rejecting the election petition of the petitioner. 13. No other point has been urged by the learned counsel on either side. 14. For the above-said reasons and discussions, the writ petition is allowed and the orders dated 20.3.1997 of the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil), Tehsil and District Una marked Annexure P-l and dated 29.12.1997 of the Deputy Commissioner, Una passed in the election appeal marked Annexure P-2, are hereby quashed and set-aside. Consequently, the election of the respondent No. 4 to the office of Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat Kaloh, Tehsil and District Una, shall stand set-aside. However, parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition allowed. -